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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the role of warfare and the United States of America (US) in 
contemporary times.  Prior to this, however, pre-modern warfare is examined to 
illustrate its dynamics prior to the emergence of the nation-state.  The Sixty Years 
War and the militias that fought it are used as an historical reference to combine the 
scholarship of military history and the sociology of warfare. These two themes 
underpin analysis throughout the thesis and establish a multidimensional framework 
of war as being dependent on many factors and variables.  From the establishment of 
the nation-state in Western European two key components of warfare are considered: 
technology and organization.  Technology is represented by the cannon and 
organization by the way in which militias began to be more strictly controlled. The 
greater bureaucratic organization of militias is addressed to the point of them forming 
standing armies, and this component is theorised up to the Napoleonic wars.  A 
considerable chronological leap to World War II (WWII) then takes place to further 
examine technology and organization—which had developed into modernity—
commensurate with the strategies of total war.  After WWII the geo-strategic 
influences of the US, as a superpower, are addressed and airpower is singled out as 
the new technology of advantage.  The Vietnam War is then investigated to observe 
how the US approached limited war and along with this, the growth of asymmetrical 
warfare. The US decisively winning the 1991 Persian Gulf War is placed in 
perspective, as are the problems of Gulf War II.  This thesis is original because it 
steps beyond the boundaries of what war research has focussed on, which directly 
postulates victory or defeat in war is what provides unambiguous power-stakes.  The 
thesis addresses why it is no longer necessary to win a war in order for power to be 
unambiguous and I contend, not needing to win a war, in the traditional sense of the 
term is the new objective of the US military, and the way in which this is 
accomplished is examined in detail. 
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Introduction 
 
Warfare is a highly-charged and highly-visible part of the twenty-first century.  This 
thesis will show that there is a new dynamic present in warfare, and the corresponding 
power that it brings.  Warfare will be viewed through the prism of the US and its 
involvement in the Middle East in the present day, however before this is able to be 
realized, an historical premise will be set up to reveal the most rudimentary elements 
that contribute to war and warfare.  The premise in this thesis, will comprise an 
historical understanding be established about how military force was actually formed, 
and the direction it has taken for modern nation-states, in particular, the US.   
 
Whilst, the study of warfare definitively involves anything from analysing the 
topography of battlefields through to examining tactical manoeuvrings on a given 
battlefield it crucially, also demands analysis beyond the highly-charged and highly-
visible components of battle incorporating the less-visible and less-tangible elements 
of warfare because they also influence and indicate specific outcomes.  These aspects 
take on a particular importance when dealing with massed groups of forces intent on 
hostile action, and although the force-on-force collisions that have taken place 
throughout the ages have often produced fields of slaughter, there are also critical 
factors that have enabled one side to excel over the other.  Hence, warfare demands 
much more than the gathering of troops and although this aspect is often the most 
overt component to a war there are many issues which underpin and contribute to 
outcomes.  This thesis will examine war and warfare from several perspectives though 
they will be interweaved with a focus on militia forces in the pre- nation-state and 
then standing armies—or a more defined military force—in the times of the nation-
state.  The adjuncts that will accompany the examination of warfare, in the build up to 
and the final emergence of the nation-state, will be organization and technology, and 
within this spectrum the way in which both Feudal Europe and Modern Europe 
influenced war will be used as the bedrock of the early part of this thesis.   
 
Whether the collisions have been made up of militia and/or mercenary forces as was  
the case in the pre- nation-state times, or whether the garnering of troops has been at 
the behest of the nation-state, the end result of massive hostile collision is often 
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disastrous for the loser and painstakingly costly for the winner.  Inevitably, warfare 
comprises much more than a single battlefield event and moreover, a war can 
continue for years.  What is of interest here is the sheer enormity of what the nation-
state is able to produce, in terms of its ability to go to war—especially in modern 
times—which can and does involve issues such as the shifting of massive quantities of 
personnel and equipment sometimes over vast distances to a prearranged locale, 
through to having numerous fluctuations in cultural and political machinations in the 
desire to gain or defend territory or ideologies.  This being the case, all have come to 
form and are signs of the immense organization and inter-connectedness within the 
Western European nation-state, with regard to war.  Whilst it remains an immensely 
difficult process to define what ‘modern war’ encompasses, for the purpose of this 
study it is suffice to rely on Montgomery’s description of war 
 
[B]ecoming highly complicated and professional.  By the nineteenth century 
signs pointed to an intensification of warfare with an increased impact on 
society…The ideas of imperialism and nationalism were hardening; 
revolutionary changes in armies and equipment were born with the growth of 
populations and new industrial techniques; new methods of communication 
increased the pace of life in general; and military theorists and politicians 
arose who rationalized and exploited these factors.1
 
 
Montgomery’s statement reflects both the way in which warfare began to influence 
Western European and is therefore, able to be firmly placed in the context of what 
modern war would comprise; and became the ‘existing knowledge’ of how war would 
be approached for many decades after 
 
Notwithstanding the historical changes associated with state formation, warfare has 
always demanded levels of organization.  Chapter one deals with the actualities of 
how this came about in the lead up to the Western European nation-state.  The times 
of the pre- nation-state, before the advent of strictly demarcated borders and 
sovereignty over territory are particularly important.  Examination of this early 
                                                 
1 Montgomery of Alamein.  A History of Warfare.  London: William Collins & Sons & Company, 1968, 
411. 
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modern phase allows for an understanding of what actually took place in the processes 
of ‘making’ a nation-state and of critical importance, how a European ‘way’ of war—
and of being ‘modern—was established in this process.  What is teased out in the 
chapter is how rulers in the pre- nation-state realms of Western Europe and 
Scandinavia established organization of militia forces in their quest to define their 
power base.  Whether this comprised land-based forces of men willing to ‘put their 
swords at the disposal of the highest bidder,’2 during the Middle Ages (1066-1485)3, 
or consisted of a continual maritime presence, which according to McNeill in circa-
1500, saw European ships probing into Asian sea-lanes ‘seizing whatever 
opportunities for trade and plunder [that] came their way.’4
                                                 
2 Michael Howard.  War in European History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, 17. 
  These two examples 
comprise organization and deliberateness of intent and furthermore, are sign of levels 
of organization which would grow and become more apparent as war and warfare 
developed.  What is more, the processes and strategies of these actions caused a never 
ending strife amongst European rulers and thus, demanded greater levels of 
organization and strategic planning.  Chapter one therefore addresses how 
organization was needed in order to gain advantage over neighbours, how strife 
needed to be confronted by force and in particular, the way in which this impacted on, 
contributed to and produced what is now termed a ‘modern’ military.  The chapter 
deals with land-based forces as the main theme and centres on how Europe formed 
organized militias and the trajectory that was set in place by the continual need for 
them to remain organized, in the first instance, well-disciplined in the second instance, 
in order for their ruler to prosper.  These aspects carry within them the obvious 
conditions that if a ruler prospered so too would the militia.  To be specific, the 
chapter discusses how the organization alluded to eventually developed into a 
‘European way of war’ and this is traced by interweaving organization and militias 
into the fabric of  what it is to be ‘modern,’ without expressly including the 
‘modernity’ that would emanate from the ongoing organization and subsequent 
3 Whether the timeline 1066-1485 comprises the Middle Ages or the later Middle Ages—as there is 
some debate within the academic community about the timeline’s accuracy—only needs 
acknowledging here, as I have settled on the title of ‘Middle Ages’ beginning with the Normans 
conquering England at the Battle of Hastings in 1066 through to the Battle of Bosworth in 1485 and 
Henry Tudor being crowned King Henry VII.  See: ‘Timeline-Middle Ages 500AD to 1500 AD.’  
eHistory Archive. Ohio State University 
<http://ehistory.osu.edu/world/TimeLineDisplay.cfm?Era_id=5>  Accessed 7 June 2010. 
4 William McNeill.  The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, 104. 
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development of the nation-state’s standing armies.  In keeping with the notion that 
organization and militia strength are not the only influences that encourage a desire to 
go to war a sociological analysis of the different dimensions of European societies is 
introduced.  Where relevant, how societies and militias interacted with each other due 
to the way war developed and further, includes the science and technology 
components that impacted on the face of war and warfare.  The main thrust of this 
chapter is to compress the systemic components of organization into a chronological 
framework and establish the various linkages of how militias were incrementally 
developed into standing armies; and how institutions that arose from this state-of-
affairs formed and informed societies with regard to these forces.  The way in which 
this is explored is through the prism of warfare and how it impacted on numerous 
aspects of societies in the pre- nation-state era and how in the development war 
encouraged; and then forced transformations.      
 
Chapter two begins with the premise that the nation-state is firmly positioned in the 
mindset of rulers and societies at the point in time of 1648, and further acknowledges 
the ongoing mechanisms of change that were developed during pre- nation-state times.  
The nascent nation-state however, is not free of problems because of agreements 
among the ruling elites of Modern Europe, nor have rulers lost their desire for 
expansion and the most powerful nation-states still remain diligent in their quest for 
‘empire.’5
                                                 
5 The aim of this thesis is to establish how warfare played a part in expansion as opposed to entering 
into debates associated with what actually constitutes an empire.  Empire needs only a simple yet 
accurate explanation which does not require further elaboration throughout the thesis.  Howe avers an 
‘empire is a large composite, multi-ethnic or multinational political unit, usually created by conquest, 
and divided between a dominant centre and subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries.’ Moreover, 
and in keeping with this tenet, the term has a telling message for contemporary times as ‘empire,’ 
‘comes form the Latin imperium: for which the closest modern English equivalent would perhaps be 
‘sovereignty’, or simply ‘rule’. For the Romans it denoted a dual capacity: to wage war, and to make 
and execute laws.’  See: Stephen Howe. Empire. A Very Short Introduction.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, 13-30. Emphasis added. I also shall not enter into debates about a potential new 
‘American Empire,’ as suggested by Hardt and Negri in ‘Empire.’   Hardt and Negri’s thesis reflects on 
US hegemony at the time of Gulf War II but not at the forms of warfare I am examining here.  For a 
critique, see Ellen Mieksons Wood Empire of Capital, London: Verso Books, 2003. 
  Organization and technology and its advantages are also foremost in the 
mindset of rulers during the times of the nascent nation-state and are shown as 
continuums in the strategy of powerful Western European nation-states exercising 
power over regions.  After establishing the organization and technology aspects a 
considerable chronological leap is made in this chapter in order to establish how 
pervasive the European way of war had managed to develop.  This is done in the first 
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instance through a brief explanation of the technology of artillery and the organization 
of the standing army in World War One (WWI) and in the second, the expanded 
operations on the part of the Allies in World War Two (WWII).  The section on 
WWII expands on the problematics of the huge force-on-force collisions of massive 
standing armies to include the technology that progressively and incrementally came 
to the fore in this total war, airpower being the principle form of warfare and how it 
developed both technologically, and as a mindset.  Moreover, the new challenges that 
the nation-state will face in the aftermath of the total war of WWII are dealt with in 
order to show how the European way of war remained deeply embedded in the 
mindset of governments due to its astounding success in this war.  The chronological 
leap that takes place is appropriate because it highlights how the stringent 
implementation of rationale, science, technology, and strict organization of the 
military through the horrors of a full-blown total war generated a continued faith in 
standing forces and its accompanying technological prowess.  After dealing with 
WWII, the further challenges the nation-state encountered with regard to war are 
viewed through the prism of the Cold War, which includes numerous references to 
technology; and its role in the pathway of power-stakes after WWII.  There is a 
purposeful emphasis on the technologies available to the most powerful nations-states 
that arose out of WWII and moreover, how they would utilize and express their 
expansive capabilities to a maximum potential, although curiously they would fall 
short of all out war.  The two that are dealt with in this process are the US and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as it is these two superpowers reflect the 
mechanisms of modernity and technology to its maximum.  The chapter will further 
show how science and technology remained at the forefront of superpower prestige.  
In particular the new technology that would assist the superpowers most in their 
expansive tendencies—and the build up of the military with due emphasis on 
airpower—is concentrated on to exhibit how powerful these two nation-states in 
general had become.  The use of airpower as the major force and the use of artillery as 
secondary force exhibits how overwhelming firepower indicates, albeit in a more 
sophisticated way, that the European way of war is being fully utilized to augment 
efforts made in grand operations.  Dealing with WWII in such an interlinked way as 
this chapter does, reflects the solidity of the standing military force as an entrenched 
part of the political landscape and draws in further conceptual underpinnings of the 
way in which war had developed; and what it could offer to powerful nation-states.   
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Chapter three moves into more contemporary times and the leap that is made is not as 
vast as in chapter two brings the argument forward decades rather than centuries.  The 
decades after WWII is what is of interest here and the way in which expansion is 
utilized and this is done through the prism of pax-Americana.   The argument that is 
made up front in this chapter is the nation-state and the standing army (and standing 
military forces in general), are intermeshed to the extent that governments 
comprehensively and absolutely rule over standing forces in all modern states and 
within industrialized nations, armed forces are an accepted part of the societal and 
political landscapes.  What it also acknowledges is that the European way of war has 
remained firmly entrenched in the psyche of both the superpowers as it has with many 
powerful and many less-powerful nation-states and regionally powerful nation-states.  
The uses of airpower in conjunction with land- and sea-borne forces are definitively 
utilized in order to impose geo-strategic will of the powerful nation-states.  The focus 
on the US is to emphasize that it had not only built up a massive and formidable 
military but that it had also embraced the ‘guarantees’ that the European way of war 
had managed to build on over time.  This is shown to be true in the immediate 
aftermath of WWII as the full use of this way of war had been revisited in the Korean 
War with the amazing successes of airpower and artillery as well as sea-borne 
airpower via a fleet air arm and decisive air supported maritime intervention. This 
chapter however does not only focus on the European way of war and the successes it 
brings to the US.  It also generates an understanding that regardless of the guarantees 
of fighting a particular way in war supposedly brings, there are also inherent and ever-
present risks in going to war.  A broad-spectrum view of security dilemmas and geo-
strategic overstretch are placed into perspective to illustrate that the most powerful of 
adversaries are still vulnerable in the pursuit of power. Warfare is a dynamic, which is 
dependent on many variables which has, in the past, caught rulers by surprise and this 
flux within the state-of-affairs does not necessarily change for the most powerful of 
adversaries.  In keeping with the notion that war is a dynamic, current insights into 
war for instance deal with protracted interventions and how costly this type of 
engagement can become in the political arena, winning ‘hearts and minds,’ in the 
political arena, projecting power, terrorism, revolutionaries, and asymmetrical 
conflict.6
                                                 
6 Winning hearts and minds or counterinsurgency warfare has ‘become central to the missions of 
  All of these components will be dealt with in context and within the thesis. 
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The changing ‘face’ of war is expressed through the Vietnam War and this is 
presented in chapter three. The Vietnam War is used to highlight the way in which 
warfare had incrementally changed since WWII and the Korean War and moreover, 
how the world’s leading liberal-democracy and superpower was, ultimately, unable to 
meet the challenge of a drastic change in guerrilla warfare that it was able to throw up; 
and was therefore, unable to release itself from the grip and successes the European 
way of war brings.  This chapter introduces the mechanisms of asymmetrical warfare 
(and its utilities) that a less-powerful of the protagonists was able to bring to limited 
war.  The impact on the US as a superpower is traced with a composite of relevant 
military tactics, strategies and strategic indicators.  Factors which denote the way in 
which a superpower approached security via the geo-strategic underpinnings of 
powerful nation-state expansion are dealt with, and crucially, how the technologies of 
airpower, artillery and battlefield tactics borne of the European way of war—and 
developed into the ‘American way of war’—were subjugated and rendered ineffective 
in a battle zone that refused to respond to ‘European’ symmetrical tactics and 
strategies.  In short, this chapter shows how the tactics and strategies of the European 
way of war, including the use of technologies, were deconstructed and rendered 
ineffective when faced with a persistent and focussed asymmetrical challenge.   
 
After the Vietnam War the US realized that the European way of war was no longer 
the way to fight wars and hence, the way in which to win wars had changed 
drastically.  Chapter four focuses on with how the US as a powerful nation-state came 
to terms with the loss and how the underlying parameters of war influenced this 
outcome; and crucially, how future engagements would need to be managed.  All of 
these are examined under the umbrella of an horrendous loss of this magnitude should 
never occur again.  The US, after losing the war placed significant emphasis on not 
being drawn into an asymmetrical war again and their strategists studied and put into 
place new tactics associated with their military and incorporated ‘new’ strategies and 
tactics into the culture of their military forces.  The effort the US placed in 
establishing more sophisticated politico-military underpinnings associated with 
                                                                                                                                            
uniformed military forces worldwide…Aircraft carriers are used for power projection in distant regions, 
such as the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns…A revolution in military affairs is driving changes in U.S. 
military strategy, as exemplified by the use of special forces with local armies…Terrorist attacks often 
reflect the weakness of the perpetrators  and their lack of access to other means of leverage.’  See: 
Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse.  International Relations.  2008-2009 Update. New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2009, 192-200. 
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warfare is also teased out, including how it sought to re-engage elements of the loss in 
order to learn from mistakes.  This also includes how it could extricate itself from any 
damaging military and politico-military components of the war as a powerful nation-
state if a conflict began to stray from its military expectations.  Expansionism, the 
evidence will suggest in this chapter still remained high on the agenda for American 
administrations even with the loss of the limited war of Vietnam.  How this was to be 
confronted after encountering the deaths of tens of thousands of US military personnel 
is also dealt with, in order to observe new mechanisms and parameters the ‘American 
way of war’ would evolve into.  The ultimate acknowledgement in the chapter 
remains that the US could longer rely on the ‘guarantees’ that the European way of 
warfare had previously brought with it and therefore, different approaches to geo-
strategic expansion were sorely needed.    
 
A decade and a half after the perils of Vietnam the US gains an opportunity to invade 
another country—albeit with the approval of the United Nations (UN)—and in doing 
so engages all of the lessons learned from the loss of Vietnam.  The US takes an 
entirely different path than that of Vietnam (and other minor conflicts) that had come 
to the fore in the lead up to the forced removal of Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait.  
The US shows its full potential as a powerful nation-state with well-disciplined, non-
conscripted, and tactically competent land forces supported by a massive deployment 
of the technology of extreme advantage: airpower.  The lessons that had been learned 
were substantial and are reflected from a tactical perspective by the introduction of 
Warden’s Five Strategic Rings which are definitively used to highlight the most astute 
lesson that was learned: massive casualties can be prevented by the decisive use of 
airpower rather that its random use in Vietnam.   Furthermore, the US deploys a vast 
amount of material and personnel to accomplish the task-at-hand and employs new 
tactics in order to win the war, whilst staying true to specific components of the 
European way of war, and in the process circumvents any chance of the war mirroring 
the ‘quagmire’ of Vietnam.  Chapter five follows the trajectory of this brief and 
intense war and in doing so acknowledges that the definitive lessons for the US that 
were thrown up by the Vietnam War had been well-learned.  Elements that had 
proved so disastrous in that war were discarded and those which still worked or had 
potential were retained.  The lessons of Vietnam, this chapter will attest, had 
unequivocally been absorbed and expanded upon.  New strategies were in place on 
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the military front and in the domestic and international arenas and they would work in 
unison and have the desired outcome for the world’s most powerful nation-state—at 
this time.  Thus, the military are dealt with to firmly establish that the US had 
expelled the tactics of Vietnam and had paradoxically, pushed symmetrical and 
traditional warfare to the fore once again  in order to deliver grand results.  The upshot 
of this was the US could now pursue in many ways a renewed neo-colonialism7
 
 (as 
opposed to formal colonialism) through its capabilities for war, the tactics of its 
military forces in warfare and more importantly, it could do this on the back of 
controlling the trajectory of war through airpower and by invigorating a more 
traditional legedermain. 
Throughout history and in a myriad of ways powerful nation-states go through 
troughs and peaks that are associated with power.  This was to be the case with the US 
after the 1991 Persian Gulf War (PGW) which, as has been stipulated, was a high 
point for its renewed impetus of input, control and decisive use of war as a 
mechanism of regional control and/or influence.  Chapter six therefore deals more 
with the political aspects associated with the inability and reasons that the US was 
unable to maintain and fulfil the momentum which this new ‘type’ of victory on the 
battlefield presented; and how the notions of what victory constitutes had changed 
from that set out in chapter one.  This chapter is a modern day representation of a 
powerful nation-state being subject to societal movements which checked its geo-
strategic expansion and in many ways reflects the mood of more contemporary times.  
The chapter alludes to, governments/leaders progressively needing to take into 
account the way in which their society views issues, in order to maintain a position.  
Whilst this chapter does not pretend to present US presidents in the light of 
experiencing the same problems as rulers in pre-nation-state and nascent nation-state 
times it is, a relevant and meaningful part of the way in which governments pursue 
                                                 
7 Definitions differ throughout history of what colonialism constitutes and this applies to neo-
colonialism as well as there is no single or uniform outcome to either.  Colonization according to 
Osterhammel is for instance a ‘phenomenon of colossal vagueness.’  See: Jurgen Osterhammel.  
Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview.   New Jersey: Marcus Weiner Publishers, 1997, 4.  As it is the 
United Stats of America that is at the centre of this thesis and its movement into Vietnam and Iraq, to 
what extent these are versions of colonialism or neo-colonialism are moot points.  I do argue however, 
that the expansionism rides on the back of what Nikovich refers to as, ‘a surge of colonialism that 
washed over the world in the late nineteenth century, a wave of territorial expansion that differed 
quantitatively and qualitatively from countless earlier instances of empire building.’  Frank Ninkovich.  
The United States and Imperialism. Massachusetts:  Blackwell Publishing, 2001, 8.   
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policy.  The societal and political intrusions of the time into the military by the 
Clinton administration are used in this chapter to emphasise that regardless how 
powerful a military is it remains, in a liberal-democracy, constrained by a 
government’s abilities or inabilities.  This chapter deals with the perceptions of the 
military during the mid-1990s and centres on the global dealings of the Clinton 
administration which it will be shown often called for a decisive military solution to 
issues-at-hand and the failures therein.  Whilst the chapter centres on these issues it 
also examines that even though US influence was ‘dormant’ according to Clinton’s 
critics, planning for US involvement in terms of military input did not falter; and 
strategies associated with regional input throughout the world remained vibrant.  
Expansionism was still in the minds-eye of political heavyweights in Congress is 
discussed and in particular, the dealings that were afoot to express America’s military 
might once the Clinton era had ‘run its course.’  Notwithstanding, that the Clinton era 
from a military perspective failed to utilize the full strength of its military in 
comparison to other eras and in doing so, alienated a large component of Congress.  
This in turn, initiated a call for America to regain its power and geo-strategic 
influence on the back of resolute military intervention.  The malaise of the Clinton 
administration is dealt with in chapter six to highlight how it galvanised political 
enemies and produced a renewed emphasis on military power being the most astute 
and convincing way in which to deal with belligerent non-democratic nation-states, or 
what had become known of as ‘rogue states.’  This chapter whilst not dealing with a 
specific war shows the mechanisms of intervention that remained present in the 
Clinton administration and how a more decisive intervention strategy would manifest 
itself throughout.  It also illustrates how military strategy was continually assessed 
and reassessed throughout in order for the US to wage a (forecast) war of the future.  
Regardless of the perceived inabilities of the Clinton administration the persistent 
theme that remains within the body of the chapter is how rapid force boots-on-the-
ground deployment and the support of airpower in both strike and support roles, 
would remain at the very core of the administration’s geo-strategic intent. 
 
The actions that were expressed by Clinton’s political enemies can be put into 
perspective after the combined occurrences of the election of George W. Bush and the 
World Trade Center disaster.  Chapter seven examines warfare in the light of how the 
success of the PGW demanded the same legerdemains be practiced in a war that 
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would set out to establish American military might in the Middle East region.  This 
would be set about and accomplished under the auspices of a renewed focus on ‘hard 
power’ which is ‘the ability to coerce, [which] grows out of a country’s military and 
economic might.’8
 
   The track to war is traced in this chapter, along with the European 
and American cultures of war which have been addressed in previous chapters and 
where relevant are compared with the PGW and Vietnam War.  There is a crucial 
component to this chapter however, which centres on the dynamic and devastating 
beginning of the Gulf War II (GWII), which is then compared to the asymmetrical and 
decentralised components of the war that arose out of the main thrust of a US 
presence.  Where relevant instances are linked to political motivations as has been the 
case in other chapters, it is the continued resistance that these forces maintain in the 
wake of the symmetrical phase of kinetic operations by the US that is examined in 
greater detail.  The chapter also assesses the nature of how the European way of war, 
albeit with some variations, has been implemented and sustained by US forces in 
order to prolong the elements of military control up to and including the decisive use 
of airpower; and the deployment of large-scale and if possible, wide-front 
confrontations with airpower support.  Previous wars such as the PGW and the 
Vietnam War are drawn into the milieu of GWII and this is done in order to establish 
that war is a dynamic, each war is different and offers no certainties regardless of past 
successes, and that asymmetrical warfare remains strong amongst the least powerful 
of adversaries.   
Chapter eight sums up the success the US has established in its geo-strategic 
expansion, and the historical pathway that was utilized in the process is succinctly 
explained.  This includes the cross-referencing of and referring back to the traditional 
mindsets that had been produced over centuries as well as how they had been 
reinforced by winning WWII and the Korean War.  Included in this assessment, is the 
way in which it has been able to exploit technology and modernity, whilst remaining 
resolute in its intent and forthright in its actions, with regard to geo-strategic 
expansion.  It also encompasses elements of the resource base the US is able to call 
                                                 
8 ‘Hard power’ as has been stipulated in the main text centres on military and economic power, whereas 
‘soft power’ according to Nye, ‘arises from the attractiveness of a country’s values, political ideals, and 
policies.  See:  Joseph Nye. ‘Soft Power and European-American Economic Affairs.’  Hard Power, 
Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations.  Edited by Thomas Ilgen.  Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2006, 26. 
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upon in its efforts to assert hegemony and the military tactics it employs to arrest any 
deterioration when confronted with asymmetrical resistance.  This chapter firmly 
establishes the lessons of Vietnam and the PGW were at this point well-learned, as 
were the methods of contact the US would encounter with the people of Iraq up to and 
including resistance to their presence.  Crucially, the way in which the occupation is 
encountered and then monitored—in particular with the omnipresence and tactical 
advantage of airpower—and the rapid deployment of ground forces in order spearhead 
and back up operations is taken into account.  Each aspect is however dealt with under 
the auspices of the lessons of Vietnam and what occurred thereafter, due to the 
Vietnam War providing the impetus for change if future geo-strategic expansion was 
to be successful.  
 
Significance of the study 
 
The study of war and warfare over the centuries has been vast and largely centred on 
winning and losing battles and what victory and defeat constitute within the broader 
context of wars.  This study integrates the existing approaches to warfare and 
examines war within the contexts of technology and organization reigning supreme 
for powerful Western nation-states.  The US is used as a pivot point and the ultimate 
representation of these elements in the study of war and of what victory comprised in 
the application of them in WWII and furthermore, what using them allowed the US to 
achieve from a geo-strategic perspective after this war.  Significantly, the study casts 
new light on what winning a war constitutes in the twenty-first century and in order to 
achieve this draws on historical premises set up in the decades (and centuries) before 
this time.  The premises to which I allude are expressed by Tilly as armed forces, 
‘sprang from the effort [by a ruling power] to reduce rivals inside and outside the 
[claimed] territory,’9 and this is elaborated upon and given a stronger standpoint by 
Holsti who observes the ‘search for statehood has commanded the international 
agenda since the late eighteenth century, and in two of the periods (1815-1914 and 
since 1945) it has been more often associated with war and armed intervention than 
any other issue.’10
                                                 
9 Charles Tilly.  ‘Reflections on the History of European State-making.’  The Formation of Nation 
States in Western Europe. Edited by Charles Tilly. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975, 71. 
  Acknowledging and using these two arguments as a solid premise 
10 Kalevi Holsti.  Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, 311. 
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this study will go further—by using the evolution of US military force—and offer 
new evidence of the power stakes that are able to be gained by not necessarily 
winning a war, and demonstrate how this facet expands other military and geo-
strategic power interactions. In simpler terms this thesis will show that a powerful 
Western nation-state—this thesis will use the US as the prime example—is in the 
latter twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, able to exert the same control over 
another nation-state which would have once only been attainable by winning a war.  
 
Research questions 
 
This study aims to investigate the following research questions of 
 
• the rise of the modern military and how it has retained its status in Western 
nation-states;  
• the ongoing development of the modern military via the US ‘model’; 
• limited war and the changes it has undergone; 
• the new geo-strategic powers limited war extends; 
• how advances in airpower and technology influenced and continue to 
influence the way in which limited war as a geo-strategy, is pursued by the US;  
• the impact the limited war the Vietnam War had on powerful Western nation-
states; 
•  the re-invigoration of US geo-strategic policy and the impact of winning the 
PGW had on the way warfare would be managed in the future; 
• geo-strategic power through the prism of US airpower;  
• the way in which the notion of ‘winning’ a war has changed; and 
• the unambiguous power and control not winning a war in the traditional sense 
of the term provides for the US in the twenty-first century. 
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The Rise of the Modern Military  
 
Preamble  
 
Attempting to define the military, in the context of contemporary times, exposes the 
need to delineate how the military actually came to exist; and how militias evolved 
into a ‘modern military.’  The ‘need’ to which I refer, requires a contextualization of 
militias, as a persuasive force and how they came to be more and more effectively 
utilized by rulers in the pre- nation-state era.  These concepts will be brought to 
fruition by examining militias before the sovereign nation-state came into existence, 
and through the prism of the Sixty Years War.  The following paragraphs will trace 
this war in more detail due to the considerable changes that it placed on militias, their 
rulers and societies in general.  Although the rise of what is defined as the ‘modern 
military’ happened over a much greater period of time focussing on a sixty year 
timeframe through the prism of militias, war and warfare offers an opportunity to 
draw out relevant pivotal aspects of what militias underwent on the pathway of 
becoming ‘modern.’  Identifying how militias, mercenaries and other exogenous 
forces acted with regard to their rulers and by a natural extension their societies, 
enables light to be shed not only on how modern day military forces came into being 
but also, how warfare as a method of persuasion changed and developed over this 
time.  The time frame I refer to is also defined by the label ‘pre- nation-state,’ as it is 
commonly accepted that the sovereign nation-state emerged out of the ashes of these 
sixty years and from this a ‘modern’ military developed.   
 
Notwithstanding, what it is to be ‘modern,’ is a subjective term and this concept, as 
well as modernity, will be built upon in this chapter within a framework: the role 
militias played in the pre- nation-state.  Within the contextualization the way in which 
militias were utilized by rulers, how this was advanced upon and culminated in the 
‘making’ of the sovereign nation-state, will also be expanded upon.  Hence, the 
platform of what it is to be ‘modern’ will be discussed only in conjunction with 
militias and any relevant and/or related societal issues that rulers utilized in the 
process.  These analyses will therefore, be streamlined and not get bogged down in 
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nuanced definitions and variations of what constitutes being ‘modern’ beyond this 
realm.  Numerous aspects throughout this chapter will be drawn together to highlight 
militia involvement and/or interactivity on the pathway to being modern (and 
modernity) whilst examining points of connectivity and/or collision between rulers 
and their societies, especially with regard to warfare.  With this in mind, it is pertinent 
to state that many societies throughout history have deemed themselves to be 
‘progressive’ or to be ‘modern’ in one way or another and from this the underpinning 
that best serves this conceptual understanding and one which will be used throughout 
this chapter is a ‘Europe proper’11
 
 model of progression.  The organization and 
development ascribed to by Pearson serves the purpose best because it provides a 
platform from which the necessary formulations emphasize the role of warfare and the 
modern military.   
There is also a need at this early stage to establish a broad-scale notional and 
contextual understanding of what incorporates being ‘modern’ and how the Europe 
proper model contributes and pulls together the varied elements that contribute to the 
standpoint.  This is necessary because it will dominate throughout this chapter; and 
the thesis in general.  An excellent thread of understanding and one that serves this 
purpose best is Pearson’s identification of the Western European ‘perspective’ of 
being ‘modern’ is premised largely on ‘organization.’  Knowing this allows for an 
understanding of how militias began developing into what came to be recognized as a 
‘standing army’ and what rulers encountered during this development.  A short 
succinct explanation of the role of organized militias is to declare them in their true 
light: they were the needed and forceful ‘muscle’ of a ruler.  Within this framework 
there was a confrontation for rulers and that is there became an increasing need to 
recruit, train, pay and supply these enlarged standing armies and they (incrementally)  
                                                 
11 The model that I use to emphasize the point of being ‘modern’ whilst being general and having solid 
underpinnings associated with Christianity, does reinforce the concept of organization and of using 
organized force with a focus.  Pearson states, ‘The spread of Christianity in the far reaches of the 
[Roman] empire set the stage for the distinctive development of a European identity…In the centuries 
after the fall of Rome, the core of Europe resisted invasions from Arabia, North Africa, Scandinavia, 
and Asia, all the while enduring internal division and chaos…As the hierarchy around the papacy in 
Rome increased in scope and scale, as distinct Latin Christian/Roman Catholic culture began to emerge 
in Europe…By the end of the eleventh century, Western Europe began to assert itself on a larger 
scale—by going on a Crusade to the Holy Land to reclaim Jerusalem.’  See: Patricia Pearson.  ‘The 
World of the Atlantic before the “Atlantic World”: Africa, Europe and the Americas before 1450.’  The 
Atlantic World 1450-2000.  Edited by Toyin Falola and Kevin Roberts.  Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008, 16.   
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demanded over time an effective military-style organization.12
 
    
The organization of standing forces and the multifaceted offshoots became the very 
nucleus through which what it was to be ‘modern’ was measured.  Broad-scale 
notions of being ‘modern,’ in pre- sovereign nation-state times comprised 
organizational nucleuses that fell under the command of rulers such as kings, queens, 
lords and bishoprics.  These elites controlled—or attempted to exercise control—over 
their populations and paradoxically, over their own mercenary forces and through this, 
it is safe to argue, militia forces became a considerable part of societies ‘political 
landscapes’ so to speak.  Hence, a standing army-of-sorts, and its accompanying 
organization also became a part of the political landscape and thus, by definition, 
warfare became an ingrained part of society’s makeup and practice—if only due to the 
wretched and bloody nature of offense and defence.  What this perspective offers is 
that the peoples of Europe became increasingly familiar with militias, war and the 
conjoining of conquest to the ‘progression’ of their society.  The associated ‘progress’ 
acknowledged, it is not enough to rest on the single issue of ‘organization’ to define 
the processes involved in gaining a disciplined, functional and focussed militia, 
especially in the pre- nation-state.  In order to make sense of the dynamics that were 
part of the unstoppable rise of militias and their becoming sovereign military forces, 
relevant transformational components will be drawn out of the process and in turn, 
they will show the trajectory of forces. 
 
Organization, with the codicil of warfare, are those of most interest here as war by its 
very nature continually placed high levels of demands on rulers throughout history.  
Whether the organization was for straightforward garnering of troops intent on hostile 
action, or for more grandiose displays of strength, in order to influence regional blocs 
or alliances the fact remains that organization developed with the needs of the time.  
All of these activities began to acquire and demand the fundamentals of hierarchical, 
logistical, fiscal and physical requirements and all comprised increasingly complex 
planning and implementation, or what Tilly calls ‘attendant infrastructure.’13
                                                 
12 Christopher Storrs and H. M. Scott.  ‘The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c. 1600-
1800.’  War in History. London: Sage Publications, 1996, 3, 1. 
  In order 
for these processes to be understood conceptual as well as tangible components will 
13 European Revolutions, 1492-1992, 33. 
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be deliberately conjoined to gain a deeper understanding of organization.  The way in 
which this will be accomplished is to tie them to a single historical pivot point and the 
marker I will use to signal that organization was in place and underwent a significant 
change—an historical rupture if you will is the date of sixteen forty-eight (1648).  The 
transformation to which I allude for this thesis will rest on 1648 as the Treaty of 
Westphalia—which will be elaborated on later in this chapter—offers an 
identification ‘point’ of how it totally changed militias, and their interactions with the 
state and society in general. The numerous reasons for settling on this will be made 
clearer in the following paragraphs.  
 
By using a stark chronological separation point of 1648 it further announces the 
changes the sovereign nation-state demanded of its forces, and whilst in some 
instances it will be directly compared to what had gone before, it will also show the 
steadfast requirements the sovereign nation-state began to demand.  What the change 
comprised will be referred to in this chapter as a ‘militia-to-military’ transition.  
Giving the process a title allows for a clearer definition and perspective of what 
actually took place to be drawn into a nucleus, which in turn, offers an identifiable 
‘thread’ throughout the chapter.  Militia forces, it will be established came under more 
rigorous control and scrutiny of their sovereign rulers at the time of 1648.  Moreover, 
what had underpinned militias, how they were utilized and their interconnections to 
rulers and societies will also be analysed.  This will enable the organizational and 
conceptual perspectives that were already in place prior to the year 1648 to be teased 
out further.  Furthermore, an acknowledgment of these factors extends an up front 
realization that organization was already in place in varying degrees by rulers in 
keeping their militias under control whilst also signalling that stricter, more direct 
control mechanisms, would be administered.  
 
There is however, a further consideration that needs to take place and it is premised 
on the reality that there are inherent tensions created in placing warfare, militias and 
their influence on society via war, in such a limited and restrictive timeframe.  These 
tensions are unequivocally, and openly, admitted.  By implication there is an 
immediate and systemic change that took place with regard to warfare and the control 
of militias at this time.  This was not the case.  Positing this change in a given year 
merely allows for the constituent ‘parts’ of militias to be presented in a more clear-cut 
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way, and show what they were (at least in theory), supposed to take on a new 
‘features’ as part of their newfound role.  Without doubt, some militias at this time 
would have remained recalcitrant and belligerent to any new form of restrictions that 
would have been placed on them however, this does not detract from the fact that 
militias and warfare are more readily able to be given a greater perspective by using 
1648 as the crossover point.   
 
This chapter therefore is, in the main, about militias and their evolvement as a force 
through warfare and hence, a broad-scale understanding of warfare and it is timely 
and useful to put a broad-scale understanding of war in place.  Moreover, it is 
pertinent to conjoin here and express that it was the job of militias to go to war and 
exercise force on behalf of their ruler and what this actually constituted will be 
addressed.  What occurred whether in the pre- or post- nation-state realms is that 
militia’s actions were employed for gain and what this comprised is succinctly stated 
by Vasquez as involving  
 
[C]ontention over something and that while war differs from other 
contentions in that it employs a special means, namely force, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that war is a form of 
contention…From this perspective, war may be considered a violent 
way of getting objects of value.’14
 
    
The perspective offered by Vasquez, whilst it grounds warfare and militias as being 
conjoined, the central tenet of using 1648 as a pivot is that it will be offered up in 
tandem with pending or actual warfare.  Subsequently, this will lead to how the use of 
militias and war were drawn upon by rulers and then governments in achieving their 
aims.  
 
Finally, there are obvious limitations this chapter will encounter when dealing with 
the elite and their militias and a central component in addressing this factor resides in 
understanding who the ruler were and why they were so interested in greater control.  
Strengthening new controls over militias and society in the agreement of 1648 was 
                                                 
14 John Vasquez.  The War Puzzle.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 30.  Emphasis in 
original. 
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generated by the ‘powerful elites’15 of Feudal Europe—and not the general 
population—who, in the straightforward sense of the term, instigated what would 
become a nascent ‘Western civilization.’16
 
  Along with this came new forms of 
government and governance.  The newfound recognitions although dictated by the 
elite, meant new codes of conduct were introduced forthwith and with this came 
numerous forms of legitimization.  These new codes of conduct comprised some 
components that were genuinely new, and others that had been centuries in the 
making.  Acknowledging the impacts of 1648 per se will not need to be evaluated 
beyond the military or relevant politico-military realms, as all that is required here is 
to put into a perspective the relevant militia-to-military transitions; and to show in the 
process what changed standing forces in order for them to function more effectively 
as cohesive units on behalf of a sovereign.  Within the transition therefore, the role of 
militias in European society will be condensed into how forcefully they underpinned a 
ruler’s power in the first instance; what generated the cohesion necessary; how they 
were able to be utilized as an overwhelming force or threat-of-force; and in the second 
instance what were the conditions that allowed them to develop and remain a strong 
part of the nascent sovereign nation-state.   
Warfare prior to sixteen forty-eight 
 
Warfare and power stakes prior to 1648 went hand-in-hand and a germane 
observation of this situation is that it had existed for a long time and had been reverted 
to by rulers under the guise of ‘persuasion.’ Based on this, it can be argued rulers 
were attuned to the need for organization, or at least an organization-of-sorts, in order 
                                                 
15 At this time in history public opinion or the ‘political-nation’ comprised only the social and political 
elite.  See: Ronald Asch.  The Thirty Years War.  The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648.  
Houndsmills: MacMillan Press, 1997, 82. 
16 Western civilisation and what it represents is a vast and complex subject and fraught with 
interpretation.  A succinct reference to this is only needed here in order to instil an understanding of 
how it became so expansive in its mechanisms that allowed this to prosper.  Western civilisation has as 
one of its major tenets industrialization and science as part of its formulaic, and this in and of itself 
required organization and the forming of standing forces.   Although Stearns uses the Industrial 
Revolution to make a point about the West it can be applied to when the Treaty of Westphalia and the 
sovereign state came into being.  Stearns avers industrialization ‘extended a Western commitment to 
using technology as a measure of social progress.  The impulse to deplore other societies as backward 
because they lagged behind Western industrialization represented a further step is [sic] what was 
already a well-established impulse…[and moreover being Western] now depended on claiming 
unchallenged world supremacy…’  See: Peter Stearns.  Western Civilization in World History.  New 
York: Routledge, 2003, 105-108.    
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to efficiently and effectively operate their militias in their territory or territories, and 
societies.  Organization, to be precise, is required to get the most out of war.  Warfare, 
by its very nature and for it to be engaged effectively and successfully, demands high 
levels of organization in the areas of finance, logistics, tactics and overall strategies, 
to name only a few.  The effective functioning of these elements require other 
structural mechanisms be in place and the pre- nation-state was no different in its need 
to implement these mechanisms, in order for militias to operate both, as an arm of 
feudal authority; and as a panoplied force.  Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue 
that the organization alluded to had developed into a continuum, that these 
mechanisms were evolving, and moreover that rulers also understood this process.  To 
balance this out and to emphasize organization is not a homogenous and generic 
occurrence and one that applies equally to all, only requires a brief analysis of a 
proactive and organized ruler: King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden (1594-1632).  
King Adolphus was particularly effective at implementing organizational skills and 
hierarchical practices into the militias which operated under his control and up until 
his death at the Battle of Lützen, his input is widely attributed to Sweden being an 
adept, major and successful actor in the latter part of the Sixty Years War.17   This 
example illustrates organization as part of the political landscape of some, and shows 
it was embraced by rulers in varying degrees decades before the creation of the 
nation-state.  King Adolphus and his successes represent a particularly good example 
of a quasi-bureaucracy and its positive offshoots in the phases of war.  What it also 
signals is that comprehensive organization offered a greater chance of ‘victory’18
 
 in 
the strictest sense of the term, and this I argue would have been well understood by 
rulers.  Mechanisms of organization when put into action in efficacious ways, offered 
comprehensive strategic advantages and it is upon this mantle that the interminable 
demands of warfare during pre- nation-state times is able to be analysed.  
A critical component to mention at this point is that, as respective rulers’ in the pre-  
                                                 
17 Encyclopædia Britannica   <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/352219/Battle-of-Lutzen> 
Accessed 14 November, 2009. 
18 Victory, and what is a ‘true victory,’ is much debated in the scholarly, strategic, and tactical 
community.  This thesis will not dissect the plethora of information regarding what victory actually 
consists ‘of,’ and in stating this, will use the definition given by Hart as it will ground the argument of 
this thesis regarding technology and organization generating quick results.  Hart states, ‘Victory in the 
true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people being better after the war than before. 
Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick result can be gained…’ See: Basil Lidell-Hart. Strategy. 
New York: Penguin Books, 1974, 324. 
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nation-state gained notional understandings of clearly defined and demarcated 
(geographic) bordered regions were developing, is to understand they already had 
militia and/or quasi-military forces in place within their regions.  Whilst these forces 
contributed to and helped define a region from a security perspective, they also acted 
as a warning to others.  As regions and/or fiefdoms always needed protection from 
intrusion it remains clear even at this time in history that all warfare stems from, and 
is underpinned by, the straightforward twin-pillars of offense and defence.  To wit, 
militia forces pre-1648 had long been an accepted (and often detested) part of the 
political landscape and from this regardless of what the elite put in place the militia at 
some point in strategic manoeuvrings would have to be dealt with as part of the 
power-stakes. Acknowledging this the step that is now able to be taken is to draw out 
the dilemmas associated with what warfare extracted from rulers in the management 
of their militias, what warfare consisted ‘of’ at this time; and how gaining 
organizational skills eventually became linked to the European ‘model’ that had 
developed.  To extend these precepts further the overarching question that requires 
discussion is, what did rulers confront with regard to warfare and strife in the pre- 
nation-state that warranted the urgent and ongoing development of their militia 
forces?  
 
To give a clear perspective of the fractious state-of-affairs rulers had to contend with 
prior to 1648—in what would become modern day Western Europe—was in part, due 
to the ill-defined nature of geographic boundaries and exacerbating this was the 
perpetual migration of forces across extant tangible and/or perceived borders.  
Whether the migration was deliberate or accidental, it inevitably, needed to be 
repulsed by a show of force or by a collision of forces, and this state-of-affairs 
amounted to a direct and omnipresent pressure.  The end result of this situation for all 
rulers was recurrent antagonism, suspicion of neighbours and the interminable and 
onerous requirement of being on a near-constant war-footing at some level.  War 
therefore, had manifested into a form of persuasion which delivered results in one 
form or another.  The outcomes of war however, did not always deliver the clear-cut 
resolutions that were intended—a concept that will be dealt with later—and moreover, 
it always had an element of risk.  This concept needs addressing because it highlights 
that although war was omnipresent it could at times be circumvented by negotiation 
and dialogue between rulers and monarchs which further attributes that some level of 
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communication did exist.  To some extent the historical premise that governed this 
was that the elite were always indulging in cross-regional negotiations whether it be 
for power, survival, or alliances in one form or another, nevertheless war was always 
at the forefront of power.  From this the problem for rulers was power always 
comprised a continuous pressure, of needing able-bodied militias in order to repel or 
attack others in the relevant power-stakes.   
 
The line that can be drawn here, is prior to the formation of the ‘state’19 hostilities 
were engaged in by ‘muscle-powered feudal arrays’20 (read: mercenaries) on behalf of 
a ruler, rather than the more defined ‘military style’ groupings, that came to be 
associated with the nation-state.  An obvious component here is that force comprised 
rulers extending their power and influence over a given territory, and it is within this 
context that the reasons for rulers needing militias are able to be succinctly addressed.  
The muscle-power that did exist was utilized and exercised by rulers for many 
purposes such as the extraction of taxes, enforcement of decrees, subjugation of 
threats and the more general marshalling of economic advantage.  To be precise, the 
regions outside the control of a ruler were generally foreboding and there always 
existed the threat of invasion by a group or groups, extramural to a ruler’s region.  
The courses of action with regard to invasion, are able to be posited in a general, yet 
accurate summation of them being borne on the back of strategic attempts by rulers to 
‘modernize their land and enable it to survive in a hostile political environment.’21
                                                 
19 What constitutes a ‘state’ has been debated since its inception and relevant components and frictions 
related to this will be addressed later in this chapter.  From a chronological perspective however, 
historians’ generally agree it is posited within the formation of Modern Europe—sovereignty and 
demarcated borders—at its core is the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).  The Treaty will be dealt with in 
the main text later in the chapter, however the ‘state’ does comprise elements which are able to be seen 
of as being consistent over time; and would directly lead to what defined the state.  Elias avers that the 
state developed over time and with regard to Europe, in this case and using France circa-1115 
comprised ‘in each territory one family succeeds, by accumulating land, in attaining a kind of 
hegemony…The mechanism leading to hegemony is always the same—through the accumulation of 
property…’ The state-of-affairs that would develop from this, as the state came to fruition, ‘is 
characterized, above all in the West, by a certain level of monopolization.  Free use of military 
weapons is denied the individual and reserved to the central authority of whatever kind, and likewise 
the taxation of the property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social 
authority.  The financial means thus flowing into this authority maintain its monopoly of military force, 
while this in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation.’  See: Norbert Elias.  Power & Civility.  The 
Civilizing Process. Translated by Edmund Jephcott.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1982, 91-104. 
   
An offshoot of this was as greater economic and power mandates were gained, a 
20 William Guthrie.  The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of 
Westphalia.  Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003, ix. 
21 Peter Wilson. ‘New Perspectives On The Thirty Years War.’  German History. 23, 25, 2005. 
<http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=17020004>  Accessed 3 Feb 2006. 
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ruler’s security could be increased.  The activity of land acquirement by force had its 
dangers, however there was always a paradox, and it was the danger may be worth the 
risk.  If land was gained this added to influence, and hence survival, and it also 
multiplied the number of people from which processes of ‘extraction’22
 
 could be 
applied.  Rulers knew expanding territory and indulging in warfare needed funding 
and beginning a war and sustaining it would prove to be a costly business, yet it 
promoted a self-perpetuating cycle: the more territory and subjects gained the more 
taxes could be extracted, which in turn fuelled ever-greater expansion.  It is within 
this cycle and parameters that militia forces fitted into a ruler’s arsenal of gain. 
There is need to place warfare with all of its funding, taxation and costs problematics 
into a perspective to exhibit how massive the ‘processes’ of war (or wars) could 
become; and what was needed to sustain it.  What is able to be focussed on in 
addressing this is the organization that was needed to enable reliable militia forces to 
be engaged; and then maintained as a standing force.  For instance, as forces gained in 
strength and became larger there was a need to develop a ‘quasi-bureaucracy’23 which 
consisted of a hierarchy and/or hierarchical structures, being put into place.  The 
simple mention of this process however, is not enough to explain the problem at hand.  
The state-of-affairs that best describes the enormity of the task is best able to be 
shown by crossing the ‘before and after’ nation-state divide of 1648 with a single 
example.  England provides a succinct model of the onerous task to which I allude 
and Glete avers from the twelfth to the nineteenth century England’s rulers dedicated 
‘between 70 and 90 percent of their financial resources to the acquisition and use of 
the instruments of military force.’24
                                                 
22 The process of extraction associated with war is succinctly stated by Tilly as, ‘costly and requires a 
systemic and continuous process of extraction of resources.’  See: Christopher Pierson.  The Modern 
State. London: Routledge, 1996, 31.  The collecting of taxes from the populace was in place prior to the 
state being formulated and although it was somewhat ad-hoc than when the more centralised state 
existed, it was a relatively well-formed part of the political landscape. 
   Whilst this gives credence to my argument that 
the dynasties of Europe were well-entrenched in the mechanisms of gaining 
23 To be ‘quasi-bureaucratic’ is to acknowledge that processes of bureaucracy and power-elites were 
developing chains-of-command and mutual understanding, and though they lacked sophistication theyS 
were in motion.  This can be observed by levels of autonomy and the authority of ‘land owner’s, cities, 
local militias, even various parts of the Church,’ in the forming of cohesive political force which would 
develop into an ‘established’ bureaucracy.  See: Jan Glete.  War and the State in Early Modern Europe.  
Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1660.  London: Routledge, 2002, 
7. 
24 David Held.  Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance.  Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, 53. 
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territory—as was England—and offers up ample evidence of the arduousness of 
warfare, it further shows how it remained an omnipresent and onerous part of the life 
of governing elites.   
  
Further developing the thread of organization requires the Crusades (of Christendom) 
to be introduced because they offer an early example of how entrenched organization 
had become—long before the nation-state—and that long-term and adept organization 
was inextricably interlinked with many other components and demands.  A brief 
insight into the times of a single Christian world builds on both the logistics and 
morality components which dictated a just war should take place and that militias 
needed to be formed.  In this case it would be to do by God’s bidding.  The Crusades 
serve to put forward a succinct understanding of the logistics and costs of warfare, as 
well as the military and societal elements that interweave and go on to influence 
outcomes.  The idea of a single Christian world and/or empire was revived for 
numerous political and religious reasons after 900BCE and it is with this in mind that 
the momentum for the Crusades, or ‘killing God’s enemies,’25 began to gain 
momentum amongst the powerful elites of Europe; and was spurred on by the papacy.  
The pretext upon which this was built, was ‘renevatio impereii Romanorum’…the 
‘renewal of the Roman Empire’ and [the] relationship between pope [Pope John XII] 
and emperor [King Otto I] was to be one of mutual dependency.’26  The union of 
papacy and royalty heralded any diversion from what the papacy dubbed acceptable 
teachings to be heresy, and ‘heretics were those who embraced any teachings 
explicitly or implicitly condemned by the papacy…through whom the Devil worked 
to undermine the [Christian] faith.’27
 
  Numerous rulers were obliged to administer a 
call-to-arms in the belief of a need to go to war for a cause and in order achieve 
righteous goals, was trumpeted.  All required and were dependent on organization and 
logistics and were intermeshed with discipline and loyalty, and what is of interest here 
as it serves as a symbol of what the rise of a modern military would comprise.   
The Crusades called upon a disciplined force, to assail the lands to the east of Western  
                                                 
25 Steven Runciman.  A History of the Crusades.  The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades. 
Volume III.  London: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 7.  
26 Rosemary Morris.  ‘Northern Europe Invades the Mediterranean., 900-1200.’  The Oxford Illustrated 
History of Medieval Europe.  Edited by George Holmes.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 187. 
27 The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe, 199.  Emphasis in original. 
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Europe.  Expeditions would cover vast distances and of vital importance in obtaining 
their goals was coordination: the need for a fighting force to move en masse and 
arrive at a particular destination ready to fight.  The problem for the elite became how 
to get this to happen.  To emphasize the momentum of ruler and militia interactions it 
is fair to argue, that an esprit de corps had been building progressively which had 
been encouraged by rulers in Western Europe and this is also evident in the eleventh 
century as knights had genuinely formed an attachment to Christendom.  Militia 
forces at this time also had begun to fight for more than fiscal reward, as other 
motivations and notions of what constituted recompense began to creep into their 
awareness.  Bonding, although it was forming and developing, militia combatants 
remained in the realm of, as Cowdrey succinctly states ‘predatory toughs,’28
 
 which in 
simpler terms, implies they were mercenaries.  Although this may have been the case, 
due to the explicit changes that were taking place had developed deeper notions of 
loyalty to a cause, and from this a more ‘honour-driven’ mentality had begun to 
emerge.  What this highlights is that fundamental changes in societies were 
happening, and in this instance, it came to be associated with a profession: 
knighthood.  Loyalty and dedication to a profession had built up over time and for all 
of its trepidations, it would become cornerstones of military service in and to, the 
nation-state; as well as serve pre- nation-state rulers well.  The place these notions 
occupied at the time of the Crusades is put into perspective as 
The rise in the knights’ standing followed changes in military 
technique—the development of castles, for instance, and the growth of 
fighting on horseback—which enhanced the standing and prestige of 
those who fought…In the eleventh century, we also saw the blessing 
[by the clergy] of swords and weapons. There emerged a religious 
ceremony of knightly investiture…As kings were crowned so knights 
were invested.  Knighthood now was, or could be, a vocation.  The 
Church was in touch with the profession of arms, without the king as 
an intermediary.  The warfare of knights was securing a new sanction 
and prestige.  It was becoming holy war.29
 
   
As the idea of a singular Christian empire gained momentum the state-of-affairs the 
papacy demanded in many ways forced kingdoms in Western Europe to develop more 
                                                 
28 H.E. J. Cowdrey.  ‘The Genesis of the Crusades: The Springs of Western Ideas of Holy War.’  The 
Holy War.  Edited by Patrick Murphy.  Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1976, 14. 
29 The Holy War, 16-17. 
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and more sophisticated methods of ‘tax levying and the collection of taxes.’30  In 
general, taxation produced a greater understanding in the elite of the logistics and 
organization that needed to be enforced, if only to go to war on heresy and protect the 
ongoing moral-authority of the Papacy.  Warfare at the time of the Crusades was 
needed to enforce God’s will and its adjunct, adroit military strength was directly 
needed to enable God’s will to be carried out as heresy flourished where ‘political 
authority was weak.’31  A crusade to the east was needed to occupy land and do God’s 
bidding and the First Crusade began in Clermont, as decreed by Pope Urban II began 
in 1097.  In 1099 the first crusaders scaled the walls of Jerusalem and from this point 
on until the time of the Fourth Crusade in 1264, Latin Christians progressively 
dominated the political and demographic landscape of Europe/Europa—or 
‘Christianitas,’ as it was known until the twelfth century.32
 
  The relevance of the 
Crusades is that even though they comprised a substantial amount of religious fervour, 
it was that from the military standpoint they were able to be executed that matters 
most.  They covered vast distances which required coordination and mechanisms of 
logistics, transport and the loyalty and dedication of the participants, and moreover, 
they signalled to rulers what disciplined militias were able to accomplish.   
The absolute success of the Crusades remains highly contested and will not be entered 
into here, as the matter at hand is they were enabled by a forthright and determined 
                                                 
30 Taxation and the levying of taxes is an immense and complex issue, and far beyond the realms of this 
thesis.  It is suffice to state that the level of taxes had to be concomitant to the length of a war and there 
are many variations of the theme.   An excellent example of a broad brush approach to this subject is 
able to be seen in the concept of ‘Contributions.’  Tax as defined by the Oxford Dictionary  is a 
‘compulsory contribution to the support of government, levied on persons, property, income, 
commodities, transactions etc., now at fixed rates, mostly proportional to the amount on which the 
contribution is levied’  See: The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed.  Vol. XVII.  Prepared by J. A. 
Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 677.  The crucial consideration here are 
the terms ‘now at fixed rates’ and ‘proportional’ as this has not always been the case.  Taxes and 
contributions were levied and altered according to the needs of rulers and in some cases their 
commanders, especially in times of war.  Taxes were levied often under threat-of-force and neutral 
parties were also often obliged to pay.   An overarching understanding of tax can be gleaned in 
Redlich’s assessment of a contribution being ‘a regular war tax, raised by, or by consent of, the estates 
in the realm concerned. This lawful tax, collected by orderly procedure, all but disappeared in the 
Thirty Years’ War and was replaced by an impost, levied under the threat of force.’  See: F. Redlich.  
‘Contributions in the Thirty years’ War.’  The Economic History Review.  Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1959, 12, 2, 247-254.  <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2599239>  Accessed 10 January, 2010.  
The simple yet illustrative point is that over the centuries taxation underwent numerous changes at the 
behest of a ruling force, and they ranged from fair and reasonable contributions to forms of extortion.  
All were dependent on the ruler of the time.  
31 The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe, 203. 
32 William Jordan. ‘ “Europe” in the Middle Ages.’  The Idea of Europe.  From Antiquity to the 
European Union.  Edited by Anthony Pagden.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 75. 
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papacy, which had gained the following of the elites and as stipulated, showed a 
mercenary army, albeit driven by strong fundamental loyalties could operate as a 
cohesive force.  Further components which identify the organizational ambits and the 
moral imperatives are able to be observed in the sheer number of participants, and the 
number of endeavours that were engaged to conquer the lands to the east.33  As can be 
seen by the Crusades as well as the fiscal and organizational requirements for the 
elites, there were other concomitant moral and/or quasi-moral requirements that 
needed to be taken into account.  These centred on the notion of a ‘just’34 component 
to warfare and this too was a concept that had been pondered on by scholars such as 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, as early as the thirteenth century.  The notion of a ‘just war’ 
or jus ad bellum,35 —a concept that will be dealt with later in this chapter—as it had 
become known, is premised on the understanding that a sovereign could only indulge 
in a ‘permissable [sic] recourse to war…To this doctrine was added another branch to 
regulating the conduct of war, the jus in bello.’36
                                                 
33 There is a vast amount that has been written on the Crusades although what is of most importance 
here is to establish the organization and other core issues that in a sense were created by them due to 
the sheer length of the endeavours.  There are the issues associated with the control of them by the 
papacy and the funding of them that the papacy insisted on as part of the ‘will’ of God and the support 
this generated.  Some appreciation of the level of involvement is observed in circa-1147 against the 
pagans of Northern Europe saw St Bernard of Clairvaux  with God’s help shall convert the pagan or 
they would be wiped out.  Furthermore, Pope Eugenius III in this era allocated the use of force because 
there was no alternative means to either converting or crushing them.  The Crusades would continue 
and in 1209 Pope Innocent III encouraged the King of Denmark to ‘take the cross’ and ‘extirpate the 
error of paganism and spread the frontiers of Christian faith.’  The pope’s Urban II, Gregory X and 
Innocent XI would continue the Crusades in varying degrees and with various levels of obsession 
though all would be formed under the pretext and understanding that they were ‘merely recovering 
territory that rightfully belonged to Christians.’  See: Johnathan Riley-Smith.  What Were the Crusades? 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 9-26.   
  The inclusion of these precepts 
generates an understanding that rulers were beholden to many facets in their holding 
on to power and the extension of it.  Within this however, and as part of interminable 
34 The original alluding to a ‘just’ component of war, though it is much less elaborated upon than St. 
Thomas Aquinas’, is that of St Augustine of Hippo (354-430).  This is succinctly stated, ‘St Augustine 
was a 4th century Christian who lived in Algeria and Italy.  He believed the only just reason to go to 
war was the desire for peace. ‘We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war so that we 
may have peace.”’ See:  ‘History of War Ethics.’ BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] Team. 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/just/history>  Accessed 27 July 2007.  This is further 
addressed and shows the subjectiveness of his assessment by the 1054 Council of Narbonne which 
according to Cowdrey gave impetus to the First Crusade. A just war was essentially any war unless it 
was against fellow Christians, as it was asserted by Canon Mansi that, “no Christian should kill another 
Christian , for whoever kills another Christian undoubtedly sheds the blood of Christ.”  See: The Holy 
War.  14. 
35 Jus ad bellum is also referred to as ius ad bellum, jus ad bello.  The difference is in spelling only and 
for ease of understanding jus ad bellum will be used throughout this thesis. 
36 Jus in bello simply means the ‘proper’ conduct which should happen during the actual fighting, and 
throughout the duration of a war.  See: William O’Brien.  The Conduct of Just and Limited War. New 
York: Praeger, 1981, 13. 
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requirements alluded to, there were also other dilemmas and mentioning them will 
serve to highlight at an early stage, that war has many midwives.   
 
Thus, within the mechanisms of regional occupation ruler’s expansionist tendencies 
have always existed and due to this what role did warfare continue to contribute to 
this state-of-affairs?  How did warfare become such an acceptable part of the political 
landscape and be utilized as a means to an end for rulers?  Answering these questions 
now requires extending the exploration process to how the notional understanding of 
the nation-state came into being, and why this happened during a specific timeframe: 
the Sixty Years War (1588-1648).  By examining this war issues such as geographic 
boundaries, autonomy, the growth of identity and other factors that encouraged 
warfare to grow and evolve will be expanded upon.  Having briefly addressed militias 
as part of the political landscape has shown some of the ways in which rulers 
approached warfare however, there are pertinent sociological addendums that need to 
be teased out in order to fully understand what other issues impacted on rulers and 
impelled a more sophisticated agenda.  With the knowledge of what the Crusades 
entailed has shown how militias operated, in the time immediately before the nation-
state and by now showing how militia’s operated after this time will directly address 
how the rise of the modern military began to take place.  
 
The ‘making’ of the nation-state: militia forces and influences 
 
Armed forces operate loyally and efficiently in varying degrees depending upon the 
influences they are subject to; and the power of their controlling authority.  As the 
notion of statehood, or at least a more centralised body of government, began to be 
built upon a more defined functioning of armed forces entered the political 
mainstream of Western Europe.  What became crucial and helped contribute to this 
situation were the elite of Europe having to respond to almost constant strife, which in 
turn, compelled them to ‘transform ineffectual levies and unruly bands of mercenaries 
into regularized bodies of professional troops.’37
                                                 
37 John Mears. ‘The Thirty Years' War, the "General Crisis," and the Origins of a Standing Professional 
Army in the Habsburg Monarchy.’  Central European History.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988, 21, 2, 122.  < http://www.jstor.org/pss/4546115> 
  Whilst militias played a pivotal part 
influencing the direction and power-stakes of rulers, there were other societal factors 
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in constant flux which also helped shape outcomes.  These factors as well as 
contributing to the nascent ideas of statehood which will be addressed in turn, the 
need to control militias was always paramount.  An exploration of these factors will 
assemble a more robust and articulate understanding of militia’s, how they were 
influenced, and how as a unit they would go on to influence regions and rulers.   
 
As the contributing factors cannot be condensed into only that of controlling ‘unruly 
bands’ as defined by Mears, I will emphasize other facets which held sway in both 
warfare and its associated arenas.  With this at the forefront and due to the 
organizational aspects of armed forces being a crowded field of debate, I will only 
highlight theorists and relevant sociological parameters that are able to be applied to 
militias and/or warfare.  Restricting the debate in this way will set up a perspicacious 
framework linking the interconnection of warfare to the build up of ‘statehood’ and 
show how it depended on deeper issues and sub-currents that ran through societies.  
Honing the debate in this way admits that the build up alluded to—the making of a 
‘state’—whilst an intricate business, is massive and fraught with historic 
interpretation in the social sciences, and amongst historians generally.  As this is the 
case, making sense of how the state was ‘made’ beyond the realm of warfare, whilst it 
remains important, is another field of debate and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Notwithstanding, the unique contribution of militias, their organization and warfare in 
the pre- nation-state realm is able to be addressed to a greater degree from this point 
onwards.  
 
Underpinning this argument is prior to the legal formation of the nation-state rulers 
naturally sought to establish ‘normative behavioural’38
                                                 
38 Hurrell states, ‘normative behaviour’ in its simplest terms involve the dyad of ‘actual patterns of 
behaviour and give rise to expectations as to what will in fact be done in a particular situation…[which 
give further rise to] prescribed patterns of behaviour which ought to be done.’  See:  Andrew Hurrell.  
‘Norms and Ethics in International Relations.’  Handbook of International Relations.  Edited by Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons.  London: Sage Publications, 2002, 143.  
 frameworks within their 
interregional and domestic bases, if only for the advantage of shoring up political 
power.  Incorporated into their actions/behaviours were those issues of maintaining 
power over their domestic and regional areas which involved concerns such as 
absolute authority, royal court permission, direct control over populations, land 
acquisition and if need be, direct intervention.  As a result war developed into an 
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effective contrivance of persuasion, which could be executed and contribute to both 
domestic stability and/or extramural expansion.  Within this ambit, and in no 
uncertain terms, warfare had developed into a normal part of the ruling elite’s lives.39
 
  
This can be observed in Black’s assessment of 
Military success was crucial to the reputation of monarchs…[and 
they] were often eager for war, for a variety of reasons that 
included personal profit and prestige, a hope for advancement, and 
a sense that conflict was their proper role in a society in which 
derogation of rank for participating in a economic activities 
epitomized aristocratic notions of behaviour.40
 
  
The omnipresence of warfare in the life of monarchies introduced the notion that   
militia forces could become a more disciplined part of society—and be developed into 
a ‘standing army’41
                                                 
39 No greater example of this is needed than King Richard II Plantagenet who was known as the ‘boy 
King of England’ as upon his coronation in 1377, he was 10 years old.  The situation he was to be 
confronted with was centuries old and his situation, due to his age, was no different than what had gone 
before  Indeed, ‘Powerful kings were supposed to be good soldiers, and from the outset [of his 
anointment] Richard was under pressure from his uncles to reopen hostilities with France at the head of 
an English army just as his forbears had done to maintain national prestige.’  See: Trevor Royle.  
Lancaster Against York.  The Wars of the Roses and the Foundation of Modern Britain.  Houndsmills: 
PalgraveMacmillan, 2008, 17.   
—or at  the very least, could be far more organized than the ad-hoc 
cum mercenary forces that held sway.  The formation of a reliable and disciplined 
standing army would not only increase the power of a ruler, but also with attendant 
mechanisms in place (such as regular pay), would assist in deterring militia forces 
from straying or retaliating against their ruler.  What can be safely acknowledged here 
is that although regulatory procedures were in place and were progressively becoming 
more accepted by militias, rulers needed to implement ever-greater organization if 
only because they were desperate for their forces to remain loyal and solidified their 
power base.   The broad-scale workings of society that encouraged the development 
of greater levels of loyalty can now be discussed.  
40 Jeremy Black.  Why Wars Happen.  New York: New York University Press, 1998, 101. 
41 The ‘standing army’ is an army that exists and is supported by the state in times of war and more 
crucially, in times of peace—and this will be addressed later in the thesis.  It can be contextualised by 
tracing the development of the way in which the state incrementally and then completely, supported the 
notion and then practice of the standing army over time.  Bearing in mind the period from 1500 to 1800 
was one of almost continuous warfare, is to observe by circumstance the need to maintain and develop 
a cohesive military force.  With regard to the issue of statemaking, full-time professional standing 
armies forced the state to, ‘develop institutional and fiscal infrastructure to support armed forces.  
Those structures sustained judicial, regulatory and police agencies as well.’  As such, the standing army 
became an agency of the governing body and progressively developed to becoming a cornerstone of 
statemaking.  See: Julius Ruff.  Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, 4 -52. 
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Based upon the understanding that militia forces steadily became a greater part of 
societies, the relevant sociological adjuncts that helped create this level of loyalty and 
functionality are able to be contextualized with relative certainty.  The sociological 
addendums that are of interest here and rulers who were most able to utilize their 
advantages and strengths—via the understanding that standing forces could be 
impacted upon in positive ways—I argue imparted to their militias what Rydgren 
terms ‘intersubjectivity.’42
 
  When exercising and interlinking these ‘social mediators’ 
ascribed by Rydgren, it stands to reason astute rulers would be able to access their 
strengths more efficiently, which in turn would enable their militias to act more 
expeditiously.  This successful interlinking would further allow ruler’s to exercise 
power, whilst simultaneously strengthening their power base, and enable militias to 
act as an arm of authority. This reflects that warfare played a crucial part in the 
(notional) building of the nation-state and reinforces it being able to ride on the back 
of what was already in place.   
Expanding upon this precept, the simplest expression of control a ruler could use was  
violence as it would gain instantaneous unambiguous results.  Keeping the standing 
army issue in context however, there were other persistent aspects of society that 
rulers needed to take into account, if a positive exploitation of their populations were 
to occur.  A militia force, and later a standing army, does not result from 
happenstance and astute rulers needed to embrace and/or encourage behavioural 
norms on the part of their militias and their societies, if only to improve their chances 
of (successfully) getting what they wanted from them.  As a result there are societal 
factors that enhance and develop the functional components of society, and it does not 
create further problems by addressing these and making astute interpretations of them.  
For instance, Gellner articulates and reinforces the point of intersubjectivity as posed 
                                                 
42  Although Rydgren’s ‘mapping of intersubjectivity’ is centred on culture it aligns well within the 
desired paradigm of exploration here.  Intersubjectivity consists of finding meaning, knowledge and 
information by gaining a sense of oneself in both the shared (socially mediated) experience of meaning 
as a society and as an individual by encompassing culture, structural equivalence, social category 
belonging and network belonging.  See: Jens Rydgren. ‘Shared beliefs about the past: A cognitive 
sociology of intersubjective memory.’  Frontiers of Sociology.  Edited by Peter Hedström and Bjorn 
Wittröck.  Leiden: Brill, 2009, 313-314.  The claim I am making here is a more successful utilization of 
force would be able to be brought about and extended more efficiently by rulers who were able to 
understand and/or incorporate the combination of these subjectivities, when ruling their society.  
Having ‘advantages’ of contemporary Western European statehood per se were not in place at the time, 
hence, any institutionalisation direction and/or guidance that might be able to be called upon would 
also have been in its nascent stages.  Therefore, it would be up to a ruler to generate societal harmony. 
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by Rydgren, by observing societal adjuncts of organization allow it to be ‘steered’ by 
the use of ‘cultural historical and other inheritances’43 that over time, become 
imbedded within a populace. Although the inheritances may be arbitrary by nature, 
they are nevertheless, able to be ‘managed and reproduced’44 by the elite within 
society; and this has a bonding component for the society in general.  Effective rulers 
would have used these facets to their advantage and they would, in turn, assist in the 
‘managing’ of their militias.  More importantly and from the perspective of generating 
warfare, Gellner further believes that the intermeshing of these components feed into 
each other, resulting in ever-greater notions of the ‘nationalism’45 within 
‘statebuilding.’46  This formulaic fuels the formation of a greater belief in a 
population ‘uniqueness’ and of it being an interconnected body-politic—in effect this 
is the representation of a nascent nation-state.47  Whilst this may be an end result of a 
developmental process, what is of interest here is the interconnectivity that leads to a 
body-politic produces an enhanced ‘politico-legitimacy’ of ‘itself’ and in its ‘own 
eyes.’48
 
  
As rulers in Feudal Europe were constantly striving for loyalty, it can be stated 
warfare became a way of amplifying the political mechanisms of union.  The 
multidimensionality of the ‘legitimacy’ referred to by Gellner is elaborated on in a 
sense by Hobsbawm and Ranger.  Although the sociological paradigm is repositioned 
slightly it is in line with what a populace eventually perceives itself of being.  
Hobsbawm and Ranger extend this further by stating ‘populations seek to inculcate 
certain cultural values and norms of behaviour that have grown over time; and which 
imply continuity with the past.’49
                                                 
43 Ernest Gellner.  Nations and Nationalism. London: Blackwell, 1983, 52. 
  These inculcated norms strengthen identity and in 
keeping with this notion, communities tend to embrace a collective identity which 
44 Nations and Nationalism, 49. 
45 ‘Nationalism’ as a concept is also much debated.  It is however, stated by Kupchan in a 
straightforward way as being part of a ‘national grouping that is defined in civic terms, share a 
participation in a circumscribed political community, common political values, a sense of belonging to 
the state in which they reside, and, usually, a common language.’  See:  Charles Kuphcan ‘Nationalism 
Resurgent.’  Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe.  Edited by Charles Kupchan.  London: 
Cornell University Press, 1995, 4.   
46 Nations and Nationalism, 52-53. 
47 According to Biersteker nation-states differ from the state in the sense that nations ‘consist of 
peoples, often with a shared language history and identity, who might find themselves contained within 
states, divided between them, or granted self-determination over their own affairs in the form of the 
nation state.’ See: Handbook of International Relations, 159.    
48 Andrew Heywood.  Key Concepts in Politics. Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2000, 29.  
49 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger.  The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Canto Press, 1992, 2. 
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further assists in the development of greater social-extensions and cohesions.  
Anderson argues this identity, becomes an ‘ideal’ which the body-politic of a group of 
likeminded communities rely on and comes to fruition in an ‘ideal’ of community 
rather than its physical reality.  A reliance on these perceptions allows its members to 
more fully partake in their community, Anderson further suggests, there is an 
‘imaginary’ or enduring linking engaged in the process because in reality ‘members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.’50
 
  It 
is through these imaginary bonds that ‘community’ functions at its fullest potential as 
a body-politic and moreover, unity on the domestic front assists in the desire and 
ability for extramural expansion.   
Besides the less-tangible components which assist in the bonding process that I have 
pointed out, there are within the workings of society, more overt components that 
require mentioning to expand on what constitutes societies ‘working.’  The more overt 
components, whilst they are also interpretive, are essential in striking a balance about 
the functioning of societies.  For instance, extending the notion of cohesiveness in a 
more tangible way though from a different perspective, McNiell stipulates the precept 
of ‘belonging’ elicits a curious aspect in the body-politic resulting in an offshoot that 
binds people and it is mercantilism.  McNeill argues a large part of the ‘making’ of a 
cohesive body-politic is hinged on fiscal wealth, which has a mobile and expansive 
capital at its mercantile ‘base.’  It is here that entrepreneurialism becomes a part of the 
bonding of groups and encourages cohesion within societies.  Entrepreneurialism, 
when steered by the elite (and its formalized institutions) systematically encourages 
an ‘allegiance’ of the elite to their territory; and is generated in the general population.  
Wealth production definitively encourages and reinforces a formal ‘centre’ which acts 
as a motivator for the populace to embrace cohesiveness.51
                                                 
50 Benedict Anderson.  Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.  
New York: Verso, 1991, 6.  
  There is an historical 
cross-over here which needs attention otherwise the argument of ‘wealth production 
equalling loyalty’ can be seen to be tentative in such a broad application.  As the 
attempt here has been to introduce a more tangible base to the argument, it is well-
known that prior to the formal definition of the nation-state rulers who were best 
51 William McNiell.  The Human Condition. An Ecological and Historical View.  New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1980, 65. 
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equipped and far-sighted enough to embrace mercantilism significantly prospered.  
History is littered with examples of this and the two germane examples of the loyalty 
and prosperity that mercantilism in a sense ‘delivered’ are the Greek and Roman 
empires.  With this in mind a leap to nascent Modern Europe can now be made to 
emphasize the points of loyalty and prosperity because it is made relevant when 
presented in a more contemporary paradigm.  The legacy that was developed by 
mercantilism can be seen in its very application as rulers who were best able to 
develop cohesiveness ultimately 
 
[A]llowed new technologies, economies of scale, and interregional 
specialization to reinforce one another…Europe’s capacity to 
produce wealth became autocatalytic—a self-sustaining 
process…Diversification between a growingly powerful center and 
economically subordinated peripheral regions became a self-
confirming, self-reinforcing pattern.  Goods and services 
exchanged between center and periphery sustained continued 
growth of private capital at the center.52
 
 
Building on the notion that once community is established, institutions and 
bureaucracies are put into place to support them, I would argue encourages a different 
acumen to be exercised by rulers.  The ruling body-politic is able to ‘drive’ an 
institutional matrix, one that governs their populace more efficiently and thus, 
mechanisms that further instil social cohesion continue to be developed.   The 
cohesion or ‘formations’ develop within the populace which further assists in the 
creation of social identities.53
 
  As has been emphasized, mercantilism and institutions 
keep the body-politic vibrant which in turn stimulates identity formation and social 
cohesion and based on this interpretation more sophisticated militias—which were 
eventually able to be shaped into a standing army—would benefit from these 
manifestations and developments.  The evidence based on these societal components 
infers once again, that organization was well in place prior to the nation-state; and 
adroitly contributed to the ‘making’ of the nation-state.   
Along with the processes mentioned warfare was an inherent part of the mix. All of 
this taken into account, the key here is to observe that the lead up to European 
                                                 
52  The Human Condition, 65. 
53 Charles Tilly. The Politics of Collective Violence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 28. 
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statemaking encompassed diverse societal adjuncts and addendums, as well as more 
tangible aspects of territorial, government and/or governance issues; and war.  Whilst 
this remains the case and an understanding of aspects associated with militias and 
their societies has been drawn out, what now needs to be addressed is the sovereign 
nation-state did become a reality; and it did force change.  This exploration of the 
build up has dealt with numerous sociological, societal, warfare, organizational and 
militia underpinnings which I have contended, were driving forces in the creation of 
statehood and these aspects I have credited with contributing to statehood happened 
over a long and drawn out war.  I will now explore these and within the process of 
exploration I will include how one war would change the ‘face’ of warfare for 
Western Europe and in doing so, I will connect elements of the pre- nation-state era to 
the nation-state era.    
 
The Treaty of Westphalia: the birth of the nation-state 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648)54
Feudal Europe to modern Western Europe and within this a transformation happened.  
The transformation to which I allude largely comprised a suppression of the 
belligerent nature of random clash and counter-clash of ad-hoc threat and counter-
threat—at least, in theory—and due to the sheer scale and immensity of problems the 
Sixty Years War
 broadly-speaking, signalled a transformation from  
55
                                                 
54 The Treaty of Westphalia is also referred to as the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the Settlement of 
Westphalia, the Peace Settlement of Westphalia, and the Peace Treaties of Westphalia.  The Treaty of 
Westphalia was not borne of a single document as each, to some extent consisted of, and constituted, a 
‘treaty’ of sorts.  The most pertinent ones were of Franco-German intercession: the Treaty of Münster, 
and the Treaty of Osnabrück respectively.  See: Leo Gross. ‘The Peace Treaty of Westphalia.’ The 
American Journal of International Law, 42, 1, January, 1948, 20-41. 
<
 generated.  A brief chronology of the events which comprised this 
http://www.jstor.org/view/00029300>  Accessed 13 Feb 2006.  For ease of reference and 
understanding, in this thesis I will refer to the above only as the ‘Treaty of Westphalia’ and/or when 
relevant the ‘Treaty.’   
55 The Sixty Years War—which produced the outcome of the Treaty of Westphalia—is divided into 
two counts. The first part consisted of an erratic 30 years of warfare leading up to a more definitive 
Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  Although it should be noted the 30 years of warfare which ended in 
1618, was more of an ‘ad-hoc’ conflict than the Thirty Years War (sometimes also referred to as the 
Later Thirty Years War), both wars however, are usually combined by historians’ and referred to as the 
Sixty Years War—this thesis will adhere to this precept.  The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) when 
referred to in isolation is consistently seen in more contemporary terms of warfare, due to the 
sustained/protracted and face-to-face nature of the various conflicts, and the level of ‘quasi-state’ or 
‘state-like’ organization of the respective armies involved.  When this is achieved conflict patterns fit 
what war constitutes as an act when embarked upon by more ‘bureaucratically-organized’ armies.  
There is however disagreement amongst historians’ which needs to be acknowledged here.  Held refers 
to the war which produced the Treaty of Westphalia as the event which brought to an end the Eighty 
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war draws out how and to what extent the conflict drew on the belligerents.  The latter 
part of the Sixty Years War (the Later Thirty Years War) was divided into five 
distinct wars; the Bohemian War (1618-1620); the Dutch-German War (1621-1624); 
the Danish War (1625-1629); the Swedish War (1630-1635); and the French-German 
War (1636-1648).  This listing whilst accentuating the number of belligerents 
involved and the enormity of the events also exhibits all of these wars were, in a 
sense, able to ‘force’ an eventual and fundamental awareness on the part of the actors: 
that the continual belligerence must be addressed and a settlement sought due to the 
horrendous costs involved.  These costs are succinctly summed up 
 
[T]here is the irregular character of the politics [prior to the Treaty of 
Westphalia]; a country might enter the war, fight a few years, then 
go back to neutrality.  Many shifted from side to side according to 
events.  Some countries were allies in one area and enemies in 
another.  Nonbelligerents were not bound by modern rules of 
neutrality and might support one side or the other with money, 
troops, or supplies, free passage of troops or even bases.56
 
    
Considering there were also smaller wars being waged by the belligerents during the 
time of the main wars is to comprehend that the state-of-affairs—prior to the Treaty—
consisted of, ‘a world with multiple centers of contending self-help and incessant 
warfare’57 which had created an horrendous, enormous and continuous chaotic 
maelstrom.  Contributing to this, wars during this time were often long because the 
fighting was not severe enough to achieve a result and wars tended to flame and 
smoulder, stopping and starting for many reasons.58
                                                                                                                                            
Years War between Spain and the Dutch Republic and believes the Thirty Years War was only the 
‘German phase’ of the war.  See: David Held.  ‘Inequalities of power, problems of democracy.’  
Reinventing the Left.  Edited by David Miliband.  Cambridge: Polity, 1994, 78.  Finally, Sutherland 
states the Thirty Years War was not a war at all and states the ‘war’ has been developed into a 
‘‘factitious conception’ which has become an indestructible myth.’  Sutherland views the conflict not 
as a ‘war,’ but as an interminable struggle between the Habsburgs and the French royal dynasty, the 
Valois and their successors the Bourbons, which did not end until circa 1715.  See: Nicola Sutherland.  
‘The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics.’  English Historical 
Review.   Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107, 1992, 587. 
  To be sure, this was particularly 
true in pre-twentieth century times as a war was much more season-dependant 
happening, however the unpredictability of war is able to be placed in yet another 
56 The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Wesphalia, 6. Emphasis in 
original. 
57 Jean Elshtain. ‘International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force.’ Ethics & International 
Affairs. 17, 2003, 13. <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=10930441>  
Accessed 9 July, 2006. 
58 Geoffrey Blainey.  The Causes Of War.  Melbourne: The MacMillan Company, 1998, 186-187. 
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perspective by acknowledging that war is never straightforward and as Clausewitz 
averred, ‘war is subject to no laws but its own.’59  In keeping with the theme that war 
is complex and unpredictable Blainey’s assessment of ‘some wars end quickly, some 
drag on for years beyond their expected cessation date’60
 
 sums up this predicament 
further.  For instance, peripheral factors often influence the course of a war up to and 
including strategic, tactical and chronological elements associated with fighting and 
drawing on the Sixty Years War as I have it is pertinent to include a brief account of 
the devastation and trauma of the time.  The dire need for an agreement can be 
observed in the writings of Grotius who, as early as 1625 wrote  
I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world…a license in 
making war which even barbarous nations would have been 
ashamed; recourse was had to arms for slight reasons, or for no 
reason, and when arms were once taken up, all reverence for divine 
and human law was thrown away; just as if men were thenceforth 
authorized to commit all crimes without restraint61
 
  
The problems encountered forced rulers to a harsh realization: that the Sixty Years 
War was so violent and so out of control it was likely to continue to impact on them to 
a point of there being no end in sight.  Throughout the war, there had been numerous 
troublesome issues such as the sheer number of actors involved, the continual 
emergence and re-emergence of ruling elites, a lack of agreed goals among allied 
participants and the quest for advantage via independent and/or conflicting 
interdependent strategies.  All had exacerbated and prolonged the war.  From this an 
underlying danger permeated throughout the latter stages and chaos of the war and it 
comprised of a single realization: the war may fester and continue at a lesser-level 
regardless of who gained victory.  This was further amplified by the state-of-affairs of 
the ill-defined nature of laws governing post-war behaviours and this further 
accentuates the situation being untenable on many levels.  A commitment by all 
parties to an irenic agreement was desperately needed, lest continual chaos remain.  
And so it would be to the benefit of all that a treaty be sought and agreed upon and a 
                                                 
59 Carl von Clauswitz. Vom Kriege: Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals …(Gebundene Ausgabe) 
Dümmlers: Verlag,Berlin, 1832. See: Karl von Clausewitz.  On War.  Edited by Anotel Rapoport. 
Translation by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1908.  London: Penguin Classics, 1982, 402.   
60 The Causes Of War, 186. 
61 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), was a Dutch philosopher and author of De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (The 
Rights of War and Peace), [who] wrote down the conditions for a just war that are accepted today.’  
See: British Broadcasting Corporation. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/just/history.shtml>  
Accessed 22 March, 2007. 
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set of legalities, or a rule-of-law if you will—at least of sorts—should be established 
for the common good.   
 
A major component of any treaty was an inherent and recognizable ‘claim’ of 
authority over one’s bordered region—the sovereign state—and this would change the 
way in which the parameters alluded to were approached.  The core element of any 
treaty that was to be proffered lay in the essential realm of ‘equality’ that comprised 
simple mutual recognition.  To suggest it may have been somewhat idealistic 
considering the brutality of the times is a moot point, although it was the continual 
horror of events that dictated an urgency of agreement.  Hence, these key principles of 
recognition that were to eventually underpin the Treaty of Westphalia are stated thus 
 
[T]he world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial 
states that recognize no superior authority; the processes of law-
making, settlement of disputes and law enforcement are largely in 
the hands of individual states; [and] international law is oriented to 
the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence.62
  
 
Within the vision of such a paradigm were the critical elements of ‘sovereignty’63
                                                 
62 Roger King and Gavin Kendall.  The State, Democracy and Globalization. Houndsmills: Palgrave, 
2004, 34. 
 and 
from this were further understandings of unambiguous precisely defined geographical 
and nautical borders; freedom of decision-making/governance within ‘true’ borders; 
right of defence; rights of citizenship; and the endorsement of other political actors.  
Although it is a moot point whether being a ‘sovereign state’ does in fact offer all 
these ‘rights,’ the mention of the core elements of what sovereignty legally consisted 
of is enough at this point.  A further vital attribute with regard to all of the above, is to 
acknowledge that within the core of the Treaty of Westphalia statemaking and 
statehood as an entity, in and of its own right, was considerably strengthened.  A brief 
analysis of the Treaty of Westphalia, and its pertinent offshoots, will shed light on the 
European mode of warfare and how sovereign rulers and/or governments embraced its 
‘ideals.’ 
63 ‘Sovereignty’ and what it precisely constitutes is a contentious and much debated issue.  To enter the 
fray of what its limits and/or true nature consists of is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Therefore, the 
two simplest terms must suffice, and both are linked to statehood.  They are: ‘External sovereignty 
relates to a state’s place in the international order and its capacity to act as an autonomous 
entity…Internal sovereignty is the notion of a supreme power/authority within the state. Located in the 
body that makes decisions that are binding on all citizens, groups, and institutions within the state’s 
territorial boundaries.’  See: Key Concepts in Politics, 37.  Emphasis in original. 
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As has been stipulated some rulers had proved to be much more adept at the 
governing and the ‘governance’64 of their populations and could mount much more 
developed and sophisticated campaigns.  This would not change because of sovereign 
statehood.  The nascent phase of the ‘Westphalian model’ of state-building, which is 
what the application became known as, assured each and every participant ‘a new 
international order premised upon a number of sovereign states with their own 
jurisdictions, but accept no higher binding authority upon their bilateral relations.’65   
To be sure, the new level of authority once firmly ensconced, did not stop wars, 
although it did have an impact on an immediate recourse to war being the only avenue 
of solving disputes.  The way in which warfare had played a part and the depth to 
which it had become ingrained in societies processes however, is succinctly summed 
up by Tilly in, ‘the formation of standing armies provided the largest single means of 
state coercion, over the long run of European statemaking.’66
 
  With regard to the 
Treaty what has been alluded to is, previous to the Treaty, any disagreements were 
usually settled by immediate hostile clash and a diffusion of this was the Treaty  
developing and then formalizing concomitant comprehensions: borders were to be 
unambiguous and recognized by all parties within the agreement.  With the 
accomplishment and incorporation of all these facets the notion of ‘sovereignty’ 
became a reality.   
As has been observed the Treaty although it was brought about by the irregular and 
unpredictable nature of wars that had resulted in the chaos over many decades it is 
however, through these wars that a greater understanding of why warfare had to be 
‘managed’ also came about.  The Treaty is firmly about the sovereignty of the state; 
and it is with this nascent political sophistications began to filter into societies.  A 
legal-imperative of the Treaty for instance, demanded that the standing army and 
warfare must not be in constant friction with each other, which essentially meant the 
standing army had to have focus and discipline.  The paradox of this is, the standing 
army would now be a constant part of a sovereign’s political landscape, which in turn 
                                                 
64 According to Huggins ‘governance’ is the broader concept of government and refers to the 
‘processes through which social, economic and political life are organised and regulated [via the ruling 
authorities].’ See: Barrie Huggins ‘The Machinery of Government.’ Politics: an introduction.  Edited 
by Barrie Axford, Gary Browning, Richard Huggins, and Ben Rosamond.  London: Routledge, 2002, 
330.   
65 Democracy and the Global Order, 78. 
66 The Modern State, 31.   
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could be used for warfare.  Realistically however, for a sovereign having a prominent 
and omnipresent military force should not amount to a neighbour feeling threatened, 
at least this is what the Treaty paraded.  The issue with the implementation of the 
Treaty then became the militias would ‘evolve’ into standing armies and thus, the 
placement of them into societies needed to be controlled.  On the back of this waging 
war was now different than what had gone before: warfare would have new 
parameters which no government could (theoretically) defy.  Crucially however, for 
the newfound nation-state the issue also became that the military must act as a unified 
and guided force and it had to be directed by the mechanisms of the nation-state; and 
only those mechanisms.  The problem for the sovereign state became, how could it 
achieve this?   Over the time of the Sixty Years War there had been a steady 
‘replacement of muscle-powered feudal arrays with regular armies relying on 
firearms’67
 
 and because of this it was vital the state exercise its authority over its 
armed forces in a thorough and uncompromising manner and it is the way the new 
protocols of war developed that are of interest here.  The Treaty and its pertinent pre- 
and post- nation-stat crossover points, and the concomitant difficulties with regard to 
militias and standing armies having been dealt with and the ongoing processes it 
encouraged with regard to standing forces are now able to be scrutinized with the 
Treaty formally in place. From this, I will argue, it ‘set up’ the way wars would be 
fought by Europeans for centuries to come.   
The Treaty of Westphalia and warfare 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia effectively ended the Sixty Years War, a war that laid waste 
to vast areas of Europe and it is here that the Treaty, its components and mechanisms 
of the structured nation-state system—such as ‘modernity,’ which is for all intent and 
purposes a concept that is able to be linked to the Treaty, but does not define it—will 
also be scrutinized within this chapter.  To offer a more thorough perspective is to 
acknowledge here as edicts and agreements did happen prior to the Treaty which will 
be listed later in the chapter, however at this point it is enough to declare the Treaty 
was not only the end result of a series of long drawn-out wars, but also that its 
generation had disclosed the root problematics and realities of war.  Concerns had 
                                                 
67 The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia, ix. 
 41 
arisen during the times of Sixty Years War, the most prescient one was that a 
populace is simply unable to sustain enormous militia and civilian losses and continue 
to prosper.  Further to this, it had infused an empirical logic into otherwise religious, 
quasi-religious and/or orthodox thinking of the time and this was a substantial gain.  
The final painful truth that had come to the fore was    
 
[V]iolence meant that belligerents and their victims could no longer 
rely on God’s saving grace to escape the problem of war through 
salvation, but had to confront the problem of war in this world.’68
 
   
The empirical and secular reality which overrode the former pious ethos was constant 
hostilities drew on, and exhausted societies, in immense, and far-reaching ways.  The 
new direction that the Treaty prompted, and regardless of any imperfections was 
simply that it might offer a previously unheard of set of freedoms.  The freedoms 
would be inherently rooted in an a political ‘legitimacy,’ one which would comprise 
of  
 
The Westphalian settlement established a normative order based on 
the acceptance of the reality of decentralized, scattered power 
amongst sovereign states.  Sovereignty, or supreme authority to act 
in a particular sphere unhampered by any other, implies a territorial 
dimension.  It is a claim to authority over all who live within a given 
territory and to the resources within that territory, a claim which is 
validated by the act of recognition of other sovereign entities, where 
recognition is accorded to those who have effective control over a 
given population in a defined territory…The establishment of 
independent sovereign states through these processes of state 
formation gave a measure of security to the peoples within the units 
of rule.69
 
 
What this offered to sovereigns was distinct advantages with regard to war, as it 
allowed sovereigns a free will: to observe the actions of other states without 
subscribing to the necessity for, and of, intervention.  In general, they could refer to 
the political legitimacy of the Treaty and their own sovereignty, as mainstays of 
whether action was warranted and furthermore, it introduced a system of interstate 
norms upon which a sovereign could rely.  A political ‘position’ could be adopted  
                                                 
68 New Perspectives on The Thirty Years War, 244. 
69 Derek Verall.  ‘The Westphalian system and its underlying normative order.’  World Order. 
Managing International Conflict.  Editors of the School of International and Political Studies, Geelong: 
Deakin University Press, 1996, 3. 
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without an accompanying loss of status, as according to Held  
 
Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts are a private matter 
concerning only those affected; no collective interest in compliance 
with the international is recognized...All states are regarded as equal 
before the law, legal rules do not take account for the asymmetries of 
power.70
 
  
Within this comprehension the Treaty proclaimed a new lawful beginning.  The 
Treaty was an all-encompassing interregional law-of-sorts with its core strength 
heralded in a ‘formalization of borders and the importance of a shared legal  
apparatus.’71  A further auxiliary was ‘other states [gained] an equal entitlement to 
autonomy and respect within their own borders’72 which was fruitful for both 
domestic and inter-regional application, as its authority was all-encompassing and 
recognized by neighbours.  Any weaknesses inherent in the Treaty were seen to be 
redundant to the problems of not having an agreement, even though it was understood 
some sovereigns’ may exercise excessive authority over their populace. 73
 
  
Nevertheless, it was a problem that could be tolerated.  Regardless of any 
shortcomings the Treaty had, the fact that it existed and its legitimacy was able to be 
struck in times of fractiousness, encouraged new reasons and rationality to be 
incorporated into political negotiations.  The upshot of this was diplomacy between 
territorially stable states may have been embryonic; but at least it existed. 
The Treaty with its core conceptual factors that were associated with statemaking and 
the practices therein would develop from this are what is of interest here.  For instance 
an offshoot of this state-of-affairs is one Biersteker declares as once ‘national 
identities are established and set in place, they are largely unproblematic when 
territorial boundaries are clear and unambiguous.’74
                                                 
70 The Modern State, 48. 
  Arguably, when this happens it 
assists in delivering an accompanying political manumission from past feudal 
practices and most importantly, it puts in place a premise that those within the 
71 The Modern State, 62. 
72 Democracy and the Global Order, 75. 
73 Jean Elshtain. ‘International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force.’ Ethics & International 
Affairs. 17, 2003, 13. <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=10930441>   
Accessed 21 Jul 2006. 
74 Thomas Biersteker. ‘State, Sovereignty and Territory.’ Handbook of International Relations. Edited 
by Walter Carlsnales, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons. London: SAGE Publications, 2002, 167. 
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bordered regions gain a respect for sovereign principles, over and above other forms 
of orthodoxy.   Theoretically, this would lead to a lessening of rule by brutal decree 
and from this a greater semblance of ‘good governance’ would finally triumph over 
the brutalities of feudalism.  The Treaty encouraged this, if only due to sovereigns 
knowing where they stood in relation to each other.  With the Treaty intact, 
disagreement amongst bordered regions could at least be tolerated, as long as the 
critical components of sovereignty remained intact for all concerned.  A simple 
outcome of such an understanding is warfare was now able to be viewed through a 
different prism than immediate clash, because 
 
Sovereign statehood depends on territorialism, that is, on a world 
where events occur at fixed locations either within a territorial 
jurisdiction or at designated points across tightly controlled 
borders.75
 
 
Another tangible and recognizable outcome of the developments I would argue is 
mores and issues akin to morality, law, jurisprudence, rule and similar matters began 
to be debated in a more public sphere, rather than deliberations being driven only by 
the scholarly and governing elite.  Along with the various and somewhat more 
sophisticated societal shifts of the time, the way in which warfare was initiated began 
to be questioned and it is here that a more sophisticated jus ad bellum can be 
introduced to understand more thoroughly, what the concept encompasses and how 
the Treaty advanced the ethos.  The basis of jus ad bellum is an ‘ethical premise’ and 
with the advent of the Treaty, a greater ‘moral fabric’ entered society with regard to 
war; and this began to be acknowledged by the elite in particular.  The components of 
jus ad bellum were given additional rationale by the Treaty and although complex in 
its original form the concept is addressed here to gain an insight into Modern Europe 
adopting this platform of understanding. The major rudiments of warfare, and the 
corresponding components of jus ad bellum, consist of 
 
(1) There must be substantial aggression. 
(2) Nonbelligerent correctives must be either hopeless or too costly. 
(3) Belligerent correctives must be neither hopeless or too costly. 
 
                                                 
75 Jan Scholte. ‘Global Capitalism and the State.’  International Affairs, 73, 3, 427.  
<http//search.epnet.com/login.asp?direct=true&db=aph&an9709144478>  Accessed 13 June 2006. 
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Traditional just war theory assumes, however, that there are just 
causes [for war to be resorted to] and goes on to specify just means 
as imposing two requirements. 
 
(1) Harm to innocents should not be directly intended as an end to a 
means. 
(2) The harm resulting from the belligerents means should not be 
disproportionate to the particular defensive objective to be 
attained.76
 
 
Whatever the issues espoused in the ideals of jus ad bellum, the key fact remains the 
concept is one of being embellished in principle and not in statute.   Therefore a war 
and the ‘necessity’ to initiate one orbit around the notion of the initiator determining a 
war to be just and due to this, all reasons remain interpretive and therefore, subjective.  
Mentioning this introduces a perspective that an engagement in philosophy, reason 
and/or ethics came to the fore whereas previously immediate collision took place 
without (due) reference to ethics, reason or rationale.  It further denotes that the 
Treaty introduced an alternative to this precept.  To debate the depth of ethical and 
rationale input further is outside the scope of this thesis as Clark’s summation 
adequately sums up the idiosyncratic as well as the balanced nature of the principles, 
as    
 
The search for overarching principles which would justify the resort 
to war has been both a search to add moral weight to the enterprise 
of war and also a search for the restrictive principle which would 
outlaw those wars that did not meet the criteria of justness.  The 
search for overarching principles which would justify the means of 
war has likewise served both to remove guilt from the soldier 
engaged in a just enterprise and also to restrict such means as have 
been considered unjust.  Individually, therefore, the twin elements of 
just war doctrine [jus ad bellum] have demonstrated the dual 
function of just war theory both as a form of permission and as a 
form of restraint.77
 
  
The nation-state adding moral principle to warfare is by announcing it has a role in 
determining what is just is ensconced in the nascent nation-state recognizing the 
Treaty ‘altered authority patterns, staked out new roles for actors and expressed a new 
                                                 
76Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2nd Ed). Edited by Donald Borchert. Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006, 
870-871.  
77 Ian Clark.  Waging War.  A  Philosophical Introduction.  Oxford: Claredon Press, 1990, 35. 
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awareness of the destructiveness of warfare.’78  It is within this principled—though 
somewhat flawed—acknowledgement that the state also ascribes a legitimacy to its 
actions; and that the notion of just war does exist.  To wit, a war can be acted upon as 
long as it has ‘manifest right intention’79
 
 and it is up to each state to interpret this, 
whilst knowing it will incur the judgement of other states.  Nevertheless, the state 
needed legal precedent and moral weight to enact warfare in the post-Westphalian era 
and although it would embark upon warfare in this era with similar gusto, it would do 
so with a different set of pre-confrontational preponderance; and with greater moral 
imperatives intact.   
As nothing remains unblemished in politics and all is encumbered by the interests of 
the most powerful and fraught with their interpretations, the Treaty was indubitably 
spurred on by the self-interest of parties—and their desire for survival—rather than 
more compassionate and/or egalitarian motives.  The relevance of approaching how 
the nation-state developed has shown that the ideal of a ‘just war’ was also not new 
and nor was it necessarily given greater credibility because of a treaty.  Rulers of 
bordered regions, quasi-states, micro-states and empires had indulged in ‘just’ wars in 
many of their political determinations.  Hence, to say this manifested because of the 
learned and/or religious components of society is to state the obvious, as the concept 
of what ‘just’ comprised had been visited and deliberated upon in society-at-large 
over many centuries and what was on offer in the post-Treaty world was, in simple 
terms, more sophisticated parameters.   
 
A perspective of the shift is offered by observing traditional and simpler opinions 
regarding the act of warfare that were at play during pre-Treaty times and as Krasner 
avers, the advance in the Treaty was it ‘reflected and promoted foreign policy based 
on the principle of the balance of power.’80
                                                 
78 World Order. Managing International Conflict, 3. 
   The state-of-affairs it introduced, which 
was significant and proved to be an overriding one, according to Jackson caused the 
dissipation of religion as a force of reckoning and it was ‘no longer a legal ground for 
79 James Johnson.  ‘Just War, As It Was And Is.’ First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public 
Life. 139, 2005, 14. <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=15375754> 
Accessed 24 July 2007.  
80 Empires, Systems and States. Great Transformations in International Politics.  Edited by Michael 
Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 38. 
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intervention for war in European states.’81  This directly changed what had gone 
before as in the Respublica Christiania82 imperium; and the change was due to the 
prudent intellectual and societal processes that dictated transformations and the link 
here is they were underpinned by more secular societal, bureaucratic and ruling 
cultures of the time.  What can be deduced from this is one of warfare having 
remained sacrosanct as a means to an end, and it was able to be (finally) replaced by 
an irenic alternative.  Although the Treaty delivered an alternative means of causal 
inter-regional actions and thinking, and posited an alternative to war it must be said, it 
by no means stopped war.  The reason for this situation, in part, is due to warfare 
being able to be manipulated by the powerful elite and the state could view warfare 
through the prism of it being promoted as an alternative to negotiation and moreover, 
bureaucratization is able to pull together the resources that proffered violence as a 
means to an end.  The advanced level of organization the Treaty demanded allowed 
rulers to exercise greater pressure over other states.  Due to this increased 
interdependence situations could be manipulated which, according to Pierson, offered 
rulers the opportunity to turn violently ‘outwards towards other states.’83  
Bureaucratization therefore, was able to contribute to the violence which becomes 
‘encapsulated within society’84
 
 and thus, the society and its militarisation become 
interdependent. With this at play, rulers could find a way for warfare to circumvent 
the good intention that statehood was supposed to bring and from this, a more 
systemic and ordered way of fighting came to the fore.  Organization would need to 
be paramount if the state was to fight as a single entity and hence, a disciplined 
standing force was now more likely to be an accepted part of the political landscape; 
and it would need to be strictly monitored and controlled by the elite. 
During the time of the Sixty Years War there had been incremental advances in the 
way wars were fought and upon the forming of the nation-state and its attendant 
infrastructures as ascribed by Tilly, moved to embrace this thoroughly.  Several  
                                                 
81 Robert Jackson. ‘The evolution of international society.’  The Globalizaton Of World Politics. Edited 
by John Baylis and Steve Smith (2nd Ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 43. 
82 The Catholic Habsburgs controlled a dynastic and sprawling number of territories in Europe which 
they controlled under the auspices of religion—the Respublica Christiania—and often went to war in 
order to impose their imperium on other rulers, which eventually resulted in the catastrophic Thirty 
Years War.  See: The Globalizaton Of World Politics, 42. 
83 Pierson. The Modern State, 33. 
84 William McNiell.  The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, 144. 
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keystone issues the Treaty represents consist of, but are not necessarily limited to 
 
• the sanctioned formalization of the legal sovereign state; 
• organization  being a part of the normative apparatus of the state; 
• new parameters of inter-regional rationality and reasoning; and 
• a newfound legal stratagem and protocols when a state indulged in warfare. 
 
Henceforth, the Treaty was a tangible outcome of years of strife, which had 
culminated in a set of documents which were observed as agreements that were able 
to be fully implemented by all concerned.  This is, in general terms, treated by 
historians’ as ‘the formal emergence of a distinctive system of sovereign states.’85
 
  In 
order to assess its political worth and merit, particularly in the realm of its impact on 
warfare, a further brief erudite analysis is required with regard to this matter.  To 
assess this appropriately and within the context of this thesis, I now turn to the Treaty 
as a precept that would invariably change the face of warfare, rather than as a nascent 
legal document.  
The Treaty has served as a means of identifying a ‘point’ in history when the 
distinctive legal-formal Western European cum Eurocentric emergence of a system of 
sovereign states finally emerged.   The processes, it must once again be stated were 
influenced by those already in place during pre-Treaty time and some would overlap 
into the Treaty’s introduction, and some were genuinely new.  All would expand into 
what Bull has deemed to be ‘the inherent rights in the [Western] system,’86
                                                 
85 Barry Buzan and Robert Little.  ‘Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the Fall.’ Review of 
International Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, December 1999, 89. 
 and they 
became more and more ensconced into the Westphalian model of state-centrism.  The 
idea (and reality) of institutionalized armed forces became more and more ‘attached’ 
to the state and it continued being fostered.  The vital imperative of the time for the 
sovereign state became how to keep its armed forces under control, in order that they 
do not stray from these new awareness’s, and it is now pertinent to explore this aspect 
to place the ‘attachment’ alluded to in perspective. 
86 Hedley Bull.  Justice in International Relations. Hagey Lectures, University of Waterloo, 1984. 
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The nation-state and war: institutionalization, organization, and keeping 
armed forces under control 
   
The connection that is needed up front here is as government, governance and 
organization—including those of science and technology—continued to develop and 
in doing so there was an incrementally greater need for the state to control its armed 
forces per se.  Broadly-speaking, the more sophisticated a state and its bureaucracy, 
the greater the power and efficiency of its armed forces and this aspect is in need of 
elaboration.  Institutionalization of armed forces was sorely needed and this was due 
to many fundamental independent and interdependent criteria.  On the battlefield an 
(increasingly) efficient functioning of logistical, tactical, and strategic command 
centres operating in synchronicity offered optimum results and it had long been 
known functioning as one cohesive unit exponentially increased the chances of 
success in battle.  How well each ruler understood and implemented the functions of 
discipline is beyond the scope of this thesis and therefore, the issue of operating 
cohesively only needs addressing in general terms to show its merit and worth.  
Discipline had always been a core issue for rulers and this has been expressed in the 
first instance with regard to mercenaries and knights, however with ever-larger armies 
it would need to be considerably advanced upon.  What became critical was a revival 
of what had been instilled in the military forces of Ancient Rome and the banal, 
though necessary point to make is, discipline allows a standing army to operate more 
effectively in both the realms of defence and offence.  The intrinsic worth of 
discipline is reflected in Roman legions and they  
 
[W]ere trained to manoeuvre as units, receiving their orders by bugle 
call and maintaining their cohesion even in the chaos of battle.  As a 
result, any Roman commander worth his salt could deliver maximum 
force when opportunity presented itself, and retreat in good order if 
necessary.  Disciplined, coherent forces had advantage over even 
very large numbers of ferocious opponents acting as 
individuals…just 300 legionaries who had been cut off [at Gaul] 
were able to defend themselves for hours against 6,000 opponents at 
the cost of only a few wounded.87
 
  
The need to solve the problems associated with keeping armed forces under control  
                                                 
87 Peter Heather.  The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians.  New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 7. 
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was exacerbated by the large-scale requirements of a standing army as part of a state’s 
everyday existence.  In the nascent state environment monarchies and/or nascent 
governments in general and wherever possible—and if only for reasons of survival in 
what were still, relatively hostile political environments—actively encouraged 
investigation into scientific research and associated societal aspects that would 
promote military unity; and therefore regional supremacy.  These needs consisted of, 
but were not limited to, the accumulation of munitions and weapons, military 
structural and discipline protocols, logistical components, general military, societal, 
and mercantile procedures, the establishment of the rule-of-law, and other 
components which would promote positive  changes in society overall.  Numerous 
normative procedures were well established, if only due to the Sixty Years War.  
Others however, necessitated a more vigorous approach and this dire need was due to 
state’s retaining the ability to effectively interdict in regional politics, demarcate 
borders, defend territory, control domestic populations, expand into and/or occupy 
disputed territory, and/or threaten retaliation.  Succinctly placing the Treaty in 
perspective is to state the Treaty could be relied upon as a legal reference point and/or 
framework, however on the ground nothing had changed for a ruler.  
 
Critical to sustaining positive outcomes for states however, depended on the effective 
and continuing use of their armed forces and this is where the problems began.  The 
level of interaction between rulers and their subjects is far too vast for this thesis 
beyond stating that rulers engaged with their populaces on many levels and with 
varying degrees of willingness, but always with a desire to keep their power base 
intact.  Further to this, it was the populace in general and not only the actions of the 
elite, that brought about change.  Lower orders in society often intruded or made their 
way into the higher echelons of a society through artisan skill, mercantile success or 
military prowess and notwithstanding all this, it impacted on the elite’s grip; and on 
other relevant power structures in some way.  Crucially, as domestic populaces 
became more and more an indispensable and interactive and constituent part of the 
processes of prosperity of the state, there remained within this an inherent 
‘politicisation’ of the populace.  The politicisation however, had a worthwhile adjunct 
for the state as the commonality enabled a greater tolerance of the standing army and 
of equal importance which in turn, enhanced the possibility of the populace wanting 
to become part of the standing army.  The complexities of any impacts and the 
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subsequent contribution to how societies evolved in the sense of the ‘modern state,’ 
can be placed in relative terms by stating that interaction between socio-economic 
classes increased over time.  This was due to an inherent cosmopolitanism, as well as 
the pervasiveness of institutionalization which increased organization and 
bureaucratization.  Their evolvement is able to be observed, albeit in a modern day 
pretext, of 
 
[M]odern states are much more intrusive than pre-modern polities 
they continually need to communicate with their subjects with the 
result that language [via commonality and education] becomes 
inescapably politicised.88
 
 
 
The state continuously and incrementally pursued the development of the standing 
army as a formal, normative and functional apparatus of its power, and as has been 
seen, rendered all attempts by other actors to form organized militia as obsolete.  
Eventually, the potency of these organizational strengths defeated all other forms of 
political contiguity, and this marshalling of abilities allowed the state to ‘become the 
strongest form of political organization.’89   The upshot of this was the continuous 
loop it created was one of an unremitting need for ever-greater sophisticated 
mechanisms of deterrence, defence, and offence.  Standing armies within the nation-
state, and all of their needs, became a critical means to an end to a ruler’s desired 
outcomes.  The potential for an army’s efficacy required the state to exert power over 
their standing forces; and this became tantamount to an obsession. What evolved with 
the ever-increasing functionalism, of the nation-state, was an understanding within the 
political mindset that disparate groups, or ‘feudal arrays,’ could be developed into 
standing armies and this is evident in warfare being ‘increasingly fought with larger 
standing armies, under new organizational disciplines and with an enhanced military 
technology.’90
                                                 
88 Margaret Canovan.  Nationhood and Political Theory.  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, 
60. 
  It had been long recognized that a standing army, in order to operate at 
its utmost level—that of servicing the state’s needs—it must serve both the strategic 
level macro-purpose of the state, and have at its base a microcosm of single-unit 
cohesiveness.  The nation-state was faced with implementing this state-of-affairs, in 
89 Alfred Cobban.  The Nation State and National Self-Determination.  London: Oxford University 
Press, 1969, 30. 
90 Pierson, The Modern State.  49. 
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order for it to retain power as an entity and to flex power over other states.  The 
effectiveness of an army for the state, whether in the domestic realm or an extramural 
force, largely centred on it being a forthright extension of power: the standing army 
had to be an ‘arm of the state,’ one that willingly carried out the state’s power 
objectives.   The purposeful and thorough development of this precept ultimately 
allowed the state to establish a ‘culture of order’91
 
 which effectively rendered all other 
types of conflicts obsolete.  Feudal, tribal, family, and religious conflicts, to name but 
a few, were all usurped by the state in its requisite need for it to extend its influences.  
Thus, mercenaries and exogenous militias began to be drawn into, or crushed by the 
state.  Paradoxically, the end result of the state monopolizing warfare made it 
increasingly ‘dependent’ upon the army and hence, the greater the allegiance the state 
could gain from their standing army, the more effectively it could be deployed as 
force of persuasion by a sovereign ruler or government.   
To balance the role of armed force and its attachment to the state is to openly admit 
that state expansion involved territory and there is a critical codicil which needs 
mentioning here to balance the argument.  The standing army was not the only force 
to be utilized by the state, as an efficient navy also played a major part in the 
expansion of some nation-states.  This thesis has concentrated on militias and their 
role in the build up to the nation-state as well as standing armies within the nation-
state.  Whenever possible however, states were interested in control of oceanic as well 
as terra-firma locales and those with access to blue water and created a ‘blue water 
navy,’92  and also placed their sea-faring forces at the forefront of their expansionist 
tendencies.  As has been the case in previous paragraphs only one example is needed 
to emphasize the prominence of naval force.  Power on the high seas and the use of 
‘capital ships,’93
                                                 
91 William Lind. ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War.’ Military Review. 84, July 2005, 12.  
<
 played a vital role for the Spanish, Dutch, French, English, 
Portuguese and Swedish rulers over the Middle Ages and beyond.  All pursued 
http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=14796704> Accessed 21 September 
2007. 
92 A ‘blue water navy’ consists of having a navy which is able to venture into open ocean and/or the 
high seas, as opposed to littoral waters.  A navy of this kind is according to Kirtz able to defend against 
‘open ocean naval threats…and [is consistent with] gaining command of the sea.’  See: James Kirtz. 
‘Introduction.’ Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations.  Stability from the sea. Edited by 
James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen.  Oxon: Routledge, 2009, 1. 
93 The ‘capital ship’ replaced the galley as Europe’s premier warship and its origins lie in the fifteenth 
century.  See: Geoffrey Parker.  ‘Ships of the Line.’ The Cambridge History of Warfare.  Edited by 
Geoffrey Parker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 120. 
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vigorous naval presences vying for direct control of sea-trade corridors; and colonial 
conquest at one time or another.  All were at their most powerful at various times and 
with varying degrees of success.  Due to this, the role and intensity with which 
warfare on the high seas was pursued need not be scrupulously examined beyond the 
Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1652-1654 and 1672-1674, as this is enough to highlight the 
point of sea-faring as a force by a powerful nation-state.  Whilst these two wars have 
as their addendums, that the Treaty did not stop wars, it also accentuates that maritime 
and naval supremacy was sought and fought with a single-minded ferocity.  The 
intensity of a single battle relays and emphasizes the determination of these two 
nation-states which  
 
[S]aw two giant fleets of [English and Dutch] capital ships, strung 
out in single line for 5 miles or more, locked in a deadly artillery 
duel that could last for days.  The three naval battles fought in the 
North Sea during the summer of 1673 between the Dutch and the 
English fleets, for example, each involved between 130 and 150 
capital ships—now known as ‘ships of the line’—with a combined 
firepower of between 9,000 and 10,000 guns.94
 
 
 
A naval arms race for some nation-states developed and continued to be pursued, 
much in parallel with land-based standing forces.  The role and use of the navy is 
further emphasized by Thayer in stating that navies were continually involved in ‘war 
after war [as capital ships] swept the seas…[in] exhausting strifes.’95
                                                 
94 The Cambridge History of Warfare, 125. 
  This 
definitively allocates the role of navies as a force, and in a more general sense, 
emphasizes a navy’s role as part of the expansion apparatus of the state via warfare, 
and crucially, brings into stark relief the role of the cannon—which will be discussed 
later in this chapter.   The forming of navies should also be placed in perspective, as 
posing the same problems, trepidations, failures and successes as those of land-based 
forces for the nation-state.  Rulers implemented and mulled over similar financial, 
disciplinary, logistic and supply, manpower, attrition rate, strike and counter-strike 
issues—in other words, rulers faced similar stressors to that of the standing army.  
The advent of larger and larger maritime forces saw the state needing to keep them 
under control, and within this was the similar vein of stopping them from rebelling 
95 Alfred Thayer.  The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1805. London: Hamlyn, 1980, 77. 
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and/or reacting against the state in the first instance, and to expand its influence in the 
second.   
The military is refined by the nation-state 
 
As was the case in pre- nation-state times, there were underpinnings that influenced 
societies and militias that were both of a subtle and literal nature and these have been 
dealt with in detail.  What is now pertinent to focus on, because at this point in time 
the military is a totally accepted part of the political landscape, is the way in which the 
military began to be deliberately honed by the nation-state to carry out the orders of 
the elite and/or government.  First and foremost, this is fraught with interpretation and 
the examples I will give specifically apply and relate to the rise of the military; and its 
power-relations.  The examples will be used to show how the newly-formulated 
organization impacted on the military.  As this concept is a crowded field of debate 
analysing them further than using the military as a pivotal component of society 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis and therefore, an arid exercise.  A relevant 
prism through which this can be best viewed is one of observing the state and the 
strict measures of both violent and non-violent avenues of control that it utilized.  
Within this paradigm there are corrective measures available to and instituted by the 
state on their military, up to and including incarceration and execution, which were 
two of the most extreme forms of  the enforcement of discipline.   
 
During the times of the nascent state soldiers comprised ‘social drop-outs, criminals, 
dupes, and half-wits who could only be kept under control by ferocious discipline,’96 
and from this, the punishment ‘was often cruel and deserters hanged.’97  Nevertheless, 
part of the disciplinary regime of the state in the building of a professional standing 
army was that soldiers were to be at the behest of, and servants of the state.  Another 
way to enforce order was to make the common foot-soldier dig and drill, which were 
not only activities which became of enormous importance in increasing the defence of 
the state98
                                                 
96 War in European History, 66. 
 the monotonousness and mechanical aspects of these activities emphasised 
the numerous state-centric requirements for order.  With regard to control there were 
97 Kalevi Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
32. 
98 War in European History, 55. Emphasis in original 
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overt as well as subtle elements that the state employed and require mentioning here 
to elicit a further understanding of what the state had to put into place, and its 
variations on what had gone before.  For instance, according to Foucault, power in 
medieval society was absolute and exercised through a sovereign, who had complete 
control over their subjects and often used direct violence to gain obedience .99  This 
example although a stark comparison to the sovereign state is worthwhile because it 
emphasizes the direct method, although does not explain the role of the state fully 
enough, with regards to the methods it adopted in exercising power.  Although rulers 
and governments did exercise extreme measures of control at times, there were other 
factors the state applied astutely in order for its military to perform at its most 
functional level.  The state, as part of its structural mechanism, began to offer rank to 
its military and this gave status to its members and helped generate allegiance and 
loyalty, as well as an enhanced position in the state’s authoritative base.  Often what 
was also involved was fiscal remuneration by the state, which was of a regular and 
ongoing nature.  The traditional authority alluded to and the organization it subscribes 
at this juncture can be re-introduced as being a part of modernity.100
 
    
To engage with this concept further and be more specific, the ‘type’ of modernity that 
best fits the state—and its ability to keep armed forces continually under control—is 
also ensconced in Weberian modernity.  This type, in its simplest interpretation, yet 
one that fits the military particularly well, consists of it having ‘central themes of 
rationalization’101
                                                 
99 Michel Foucault.  Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. London: 
Harvester Press, 1980, 104.  
 and of bureaucracy, authority, traditional authority and legal-
100 Whilst the ‘modernity’ to which I refer in this thesis is premised on West European and therefore a 
Eurocentric model of suppositions, I do not intend to get bogged down in the crowded debate of what 
‘modernity’ consists of as it impossible to define in detail without deeper inter-analysis. A succinct 
explanation, which best defines its historical trajectory according to Bentley carries ‘a number of 
resonances and dangers as we review developments and historical thought and practice over two of its 
most critical centuries.  Not least, it invites a collapse into precisely one of those developments - the 
nineteenth-century notion of a ‘Whig’ understanding of history - which would see the period as a 
process of constant ‘advances’ towards a sophisticated present from a primitive past…It was in this 
period that history discovered its identity as a discipline: a distinctive way of organising and 
representing knowledge.  During these years its practitioners acquired the rationale, the techniques and 
the self-awareness that would lead to their displaying the characteristics that we think of as ‘modern’ 
attributes in historiography…The story [of organizing/organization] cannot be read, however, as a 
single narrative.’  See: Michael Bentley.  ‘Introduction: Approaches to Modernity: Western 
Historiography since the Enlightenment.’  Companion to Historiography.  Edited by Michael Bentley.  
London: Routledge, 1997, 395.   
101 ‘Weber, Max (1864-1920).’  The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology.  Edited by Bryan Turner.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 665. 
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rational authority102 being conjoined.  All to an extent assist in bringing and then 
keeping armed forces under control.  There are also however, definitive and systemic 
aspects that the state employs in conjunction with the ‘traditional authority’ ascribed 
to by Weber and according to Powers’ the authority of a ruler stems from a further 
widespread commitment of ordinary people to their historical precedents.103   Hence, 
the state continues to utilize these mechanisms as they reinforce order and gain greater 
functionality and expansion.  Mobed follows the Weberian analysis, although 
broadens it somewhat, by arguing the state comes to be literally defined by its 
monopoly on force, and the subsequent strength that it inflicts via the possession of 
this monopoly.  The use of armed force is treated by the state as a resource that is 
needed by governing authorities as a respected avenue of control, whether used 
domestically or externally.104
 
  A standing army legitimizes and reinforces the notional 
underpinning of the state because it has, as its adjunct a ‘legitimacy’ that is defined by 
the parameters the state continually sets in place. 
The state also institutes and reinforces cultural normative behaviours and commits to 
those which emphasize and re-emphasize the accepted body-politic. This is, in many 
ways, a less-violent way of getting results because it contributes to the state utilizing a 
subtler way of gaining and keeping control of its armed forces.  The  socialization of 
people for instance, as per Parsons ‘meshing together’ of participants in an orderly 
way achieves positive inputs into society, which the state approves of and comprises 
people having been continuously ‘socialized’ into a common culture.105  The 
influence of this, is able to be seen when observing the interaction of armed forces 
with their domestic population, and the notion is reinforced when taking into account 
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus.’106
                                                 
102 Joan Ferrante-Wallace.  Sociology.  A Global Perspective.  Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, 
387-388. 
  The relevant habitus, involves similar structured practices or 
103 Charles Powers.  Making Sense of Social Theory.  Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2004, 102.  Emphasis in original. 
104 Naomi Mobed.  ‘Culturalising  Security: Narratives of Identity and Politics of Exclusion in the 
Arabian Gulf.’  The State and Identity Construction in International Relations.  Edited by Sarah 
Vandersluis. Houndsmills: MacMillan Press, 2000, 163. 
105 John Scott.  Sociological Theory. Contemporary Debates. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
1995, 195. 
106 Bourdieu’s definition of habitus is complex and need not be dealt with beyond the way in which the 
organizational mechanisms of the state generate self-perpetuating practices which ensure its survival, 
through its society.  The merging of events which allow societies to continually develop along the lines 
alluded to with regard to the state and the acceptance of its place are addressed in Bourdieu’s 
summation that the ‘habitus - embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as 
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an internal law through which external necessities are exerted107 in this instance by 
the state, which encourages and nurtures these practices in varying degrees.  It is safe 
to argue they would flow through to the military.  Interpreting Bourdieu further, the 
argument can be made that the military throughout post-Treaty times has developed 
into a bastion of structured practices and enmeshed behaviours, which are approved, 
and are at the behest of the state—it nevertheless, is a passive form of control.  
Conjoined to this is Habermas’ “lifeworld”108 in which individuals are colonized or 
‘invaded’ by the state and its accompanying administrative apparatus becomes so 
intermeshed with individuals they ‘penetrate the core domains of cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization.’109  What this means from a state-
centric perspective is the state was able to exercise ever-greater controls through its 
authority and bureaucracies due to a systemic, inherent and vibrant belief that it is the 
only legitimate governing body.  The rationale of the state as an entity develops 
beyond an individual’s logic and therefore, builds itself into a cultural behemoth, from 
which those outside of its politico influence become fearful.  Modernity—or the 
state’s continuing organization of an individual’s—life reinforces the state, and in 
keeping with this theme of institutions being a visible arm of organization, the 
‘hallmark of modernity is ever-increasing integration and complexity in the 
impersonal institutions [of state].’110   Whilst state-run institutions continually 
‘impose their expertise on the population’111
                                                                                                                                            
history - is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product.  As such, it is what practices 
their relative autonomy with respect to external determinations of the immediate present.’  See: Pierre 
Bourdieu. ‘Structures, Habitus, Practices.’  The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory.  
Edited by Anthony Elliot.  Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999, 111. 
  through constant mechanisms of 
modernity being in place, the intermeshing of the populace is a dynamic that allows 
the state to survive and more importantly, evolve.  To what extent it accurately 
107 Contemporary Sociological Theory, 278. 
108 ‘Lifeworld’ is not a simplistic concept and deserves further, albeit brief, analysis as it encompasses 
much more than the mechanisms of the state impacting on the individual.  Habermas stipulates the 
complexity of  lifeworld—the rationality ascribed to oneself in the interdependent state system—grows 
as the system mechanisms [of state bureaucracy] get further and further detached from the social 
structures through which social integration takes place.’ See:  Anthony Elliot. ‘Introduction to the 
writings of Habermas.’ The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, 172.  
109 Jügen Habermas. ‘The Normative Content of Modernity.’  The Polity Reader in Social Theory. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, 150.   
110 The broad-brush heading Giddens gives this type of complex institutional and public/population 
interaction is ‘Structuration,’ in which people make their own society in order to be as free as possible, 
but are also constrained the society they have formed.  See: Anthony Giddens.  ‘Some New Rules of 
Sociological Methods.’  Contemporary Sociological Theory.  Edited by Craig Calhoun, Joseph Gerteis, 
James Moody, Steven Pfaff, and Indermohan Virk.  Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, 226-228.   
111 ‘The Sociological Theory of Anthony Giddens.’  Contemporary Sociological Theory, 223-224. 
 57 
reflects the wishes of the populace is a moot point and it only need be reaffirmed here 
that the mechanisms of statecraft are deeply imbedded in, and reinforced by 
modernity (and vice-versa), and that the standing army’s evolvement as an arm of the 
state, is part of this process.  Whichever particular thrust of order the state embarks 
upon, and whatever mechanism it utilizes in concert with others is not important, as 
they are in a constant flux.  As has been stipulated however, the often intermeshed 
processes are definitively run by the power elite of the state,112 and ultimately the elite 
strive for certainty that their power base will continue to exist.  The most successful 
application for a nation-state in terms of warfare, is the harmonious integration of 
government, army and populace when called upon for either offence or defence, 
obeys.113
 
 
To wit, the mechanisms and organization of the nation-state suggest a functional 
imperitive that its standing army operate as cohesively as possible at the platoon-level, 
regiment-level, brigade-level and beyond and it must operate coherently and 
                                                 
112 Understanding the intermeshing of society is enormously complex and it is not only restricted to the 
power elite of the state being able to force particular elements of power.  The complexity of society can 
be observed in the work of Pierre Bordieu, in which he asserts society has within it ‘taste.’  The taste 
that is of importance here is the ‘taste for order.’ See:  Pierre Bordieu.  Homo Academicus.  Translated 
by Peter Collier.  Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988, 51.  This is, in many ways, able to be applied directly 
to the military as it reflects the needs of those concerned with temporal power and the hierarchical 
aspects of the state and are expressed in the ‘modern faculties of medicine and law’ which have to a 
large degree come to underpin the organizational and functional aspects of society.  Bordieu further 
argues the taste for order generates individuals who are significantly interested in the ‘smooth running 
of the dominant order’ of society and have a ‘commitment to the spirit or ideal of élite, a visceral sense 
of its own importance…’  It is at this point that Weber’s concept of party, status and class can be linked 
to Bordieu’s four types of capital social, symbolic, cultural and economic although with a separation to 
Weber.  Unlike Weber, Bordieau argues that in modernity these are not accidentally connected but - 
over time - necessarily linked.  See: Bridget Fowler.  Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory. Critical 
Investigations.  London: Sage Publications, 1997, 30-35.     
113 There is a need here to refer to Weber and power and authority elements within society that enable a 
standing army to obey.  Weber casts power prior to modern Europe as being ‘charismatic’ and that this 
allowed one person (usually male) to rule over others ‘due to their belief in the extraordinary quality of 
the specific person…The legitimacy of their rule rests on the belief in and the devotion to the 
extraordinary, which is valued because it goes beyond the normal human qualities, and which was 
originally valued as supernatural.’  Weber argues the legitimacy alluded to passed through the prism of 
the Roman Principate of freed slaves developing legitimacy when acting on behalf of their ruler’s 
orders to a limited extent, and those of the Early Middle Ages or the Occident were clerics and the 
modern Occident comprised jurists.  Weber argues that although power is a fluid component with the 
advent of ‘formal’ rationalization carried out by trained jurist ‘the triumph of formalist juristic 
rationalism, the legal type of domination appeared in the Occident at the side of the transmitted types of 
domination….Submission under legal authority is abased upon an impersonal bond to the generally 
defined and functional ‘duty of office.’…and is fixed by rationally established norm, by enactments, 
decrees, and regulations in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority become the legality of the 
general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal correctness.’  See: 
‘Weber, Max. Types of Authority.’  Lewis Coser and Bernard Roesnberg.  Sociological Theory.  A 
Book of Readings.  New York: the Macmillan Company, 1964, 129-134.  Emphasis in original.    
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efficiently in combat.  The army must also be at the behest of the state and at times 
undertake dangerous and difficult operations on behalf of the powers-that-be.  In order 
to attain the requisite level of obedience the ruling powers of the nation-state employ 
methods and practices to circumvent discontent and other negative actions such as 
mutiny.  The mechanisms applied comprise and affirm ‘common traditions, social 
cohesion and state-controlled patronage’114
 
 that are already in place.  To achieve this 
aim the laws of state must have clear and precise disciplinary methods in place to 
ward off any chance of non-compliance, and to ensure that the force acts within the 
parameters set by the respective ruling powers.  This pretext developed and increased 
incrementally for the powers-that-be as standing armies became larger.  The upshot of 
this was there was more at stake for military commanders on the battlefield as an 
army acting in unison exponentially increased either negative or positive impacts and 
moreover, the elite had more to lose if an army became dysfunctional and resistant.  
As the post-Treaty world began to expand and the sovereign state gained credibility 
and recognition it required and actively sought, a new ‘type’ of army and as the state 
‘progressed’ it would become less reliant on mercenaries.  With this state-of-affairs 
the state was faced with the need to keep discipline omnipresent and within this realm 
there was a further need to ‘educate’ their military in what had become a rapidly 
changing environment.  The new army was to consist of ‘well-drilled and disciplined 
soldiers and a large number of professional officers to train the men and lead more 
articulated formations,’115 and institutionalization was deemed an excellent way to 
accomplish this aim.  Concomitant to this and as been alluded to, discipline and drill 
taught units respect for authority and tactical co-dependence as ever-growing armies 
and the units within them needed to ‘co-operate and manoeuvre on the battlefield; an 
operation of great difficulty, which needed not only clear-sighted and quick-witted 
commanders but an integrated structure of hierarchical control and instantaneous, 
disciplined response.’116
                                                 
114 War and the State in Early Modern Europe, 31. 
  The aims of institutionalized training and control via 
bureaucracy and the incorporation of a professional ethos into the standing army, 
eventually resulted in general terms, of it being regarded as ‘not part of the royal 
115 War and the State in Early Modern Europe, 45. 
116 War in European History, 59-60. 
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household [or ruling government], but as the embodiment of the Nation.’117
 
  A 
clarification is needed here to reinforce what has been mentioned earlier in this 
chapter.  Accepting that the ruling elite succeeded in aligning their standing forces to 
their overall requirement of the state, and the extent to which each was successful in 
the immediate post-Treaty times remains a moot point.  What this explicitly 
announces is the mechanisms of state, and the inherent improving modernity within it, 
was successful for all intent and purposes, in the integration of the standing army into 
the model of the nation-state. 
The outcome of the time and effort for the state after the Treaty was a decisive one 
and comprised that the duty of the armed forces was to do as they were told and upon 
proper and astute tutelage not backlash against the state.  Institutionalization was 
complete, in the sense that, the merit of such practice can be traced and is reflected in 
the dispersal of confident brigades, corps and decentralised units patrolling throughout 
a region or distant territory.  The success, to which I refer, is of a standing force 
remaining loyal to their sovereign ruler and/or government in the exploration, 
occupation and then (possibly) colonising processes.  History is littered with examples 
of this precept and no greater is needed—in terms of the Western European 
tradition—than Admiral Christopher Columbus acting on behalf of the Crown of 
Castile monarchy; and Captain James Cook with regard to Great Britain.  To be 
precise, institutionalisation of both a decisive and functional nature achieved excellent 
results and it excelled at what it was supposed to have achieved as per the European 
model.  Standing armed forces in general, changed in light of wider societal 
requirements, became a respected part of society in peace time as well as war, and 
eventually fulfilled a role in the protection of their domestic society.   
 
While this has not been an exhaustive analysis, what has been discussed in the  
previous paragraphs is the sociological and military dynamics associated with what I 
have deemed a militia-to-military transition.  The analysis has set about interlinking 
relevant institutionalization and other themes to what were essentially, avenues of 
transition that the ruling elite exercised towards their military, and vice-versa.  It is 
now time to turn to the science and technological aspects that also promoted rapid 
                                                 
117 War in European History, 110. 
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change within the military environment.  This is necessary, in order to observe its 
impact on standing forces and especially, with regard to warfare.  The monumental 
change I will deal with is ‘artillery’ because it prompted stark and systemic changes in 
the military and I will further argue, artillery played a major and urgent part in the 
need for the mechanisms of state to work even more effectively.  As has been the case 
throughout this chapter, and will remain a persistent theme in terms technology ruling 
the day, the cannon has been given a particular prominence as an analysis of the 
cannon because it plays a major part in setting up following chapters with regard to 
science and technology with regard to warfare is needed.  This is only able to be 
adroitly analysed by cross-referencing its uses both before, and after the Treaty.  With 
this understanding firmly in place, artillery can to be introduced into the milieu of 
warfare and the extent of change it prompted can be observed.  
 
Artillery and its ramifications 
 
The ramification of artillery highlights the direct way science and technology added to 
the massive force-of-persuasion that the state could muster; and one that assisted the 
state in its expansive tendencies.   What organizational requirements were needed to 
actually get artillery operational and effective is what is of particular interest here, and 
singling out artillery and giving it such a prominent place signals that it demanded 
new, and higher levels of organization, which many of the sovereigns of Western 
Europe completely and thoroughly put into action.  The historical imperatives of 
artillery and the change it triggered can be vividly represented when observed in 
parallel with the corresponding organization it encouraged, and then continually 
produced.  The pathway of understanding to which I allude, is relatively easy to map 
when the use of artillery is definitively conjoined to organization; and modernity. 
 
A step back to times before the Treaty of Westphalia is required here as prior to the 
invention of artillery tactics on the battlefield were much more ‘defence-centred,’ 
which according to Rogers, resulted in the ‘slow and uncertain besieging of towns 
[which] led to long wars.’118
                                                 
118 The Military Revolution Debate, 74.   
  Hence, interference in another’s territory and affairs had 
developed a codicil and then a perception—which often turned into reality—of an 
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inability to achieve victory quickly.  Incorporated within the perception was that an 
offensive would be somewhat impacted upon and then moderated by the already well-
placed and well known traumas of long costly campaigns: siege warfare.119  The 
advent of artillery and all of its associated advantages meant first and foremost, that 
only wealthy monarchs and rulers could indulge in artillery-driven conquests.  
Commensurate with the ability to operate the technology of artillery however, 
produced a type of ‘guarantee,’ that a conquest would pay off and it was this notional 
ideal of what this technology could bring forth that began to drive European warfare.  
As early as the first half of the fifteenth century artillery ‘came of age’ and those 
rulers who were proactive, had a relatively disciplined militia force (and later army) at 
their disposal and were fiscally wealthy, were able to incorporate the technology into 
campaigns.  Artillery, or the ‘Artillery Revolution’120
 
 as it became known, changed 
the face of warfare completely, as it invigorated a strategy of a more deliberate 
offence.   
To give this a perspective, what in Modern Europe, would become France and 
Sweden, were in pre-Treaty times ‘quasi-states’ that were able to meet the expenses of 
the invention, and they can be used as examples of artillery’s acceptance and 
promotion here.  France and Sweden were relatively well-established and somewhat 
more fiscally sound in comparison to other parts of Feudal Europe.  Recognizing how 
the fiscal and military benefits outweighed the associated costs with regard to 
artillery, is able to be observed in  
                                                 
119 To lay siege to a fortification implies a straightforward securing of the area around the fortification 
and await a favourable outcome: the surrender of the inhabitants.  Siege warfare however was vastly 
complex.  France avers ‘Sieges were simply a very specialised form of battle. They did what battle in 
other societies was meant to do - to destroy the basic strength of the enemy and acquire it for your own 
use.  Strong central authorities absorbed cities and castles and used them where appropriate for large 
scale confrontations of their own.  But where an attack on a fortification was necessary it remained as 
hazardous and difficult as ever, because no development or set of developments in the course of this 
period [the siege itself] altered the balance between defence and attack.’  See: John France.  Western 
Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300.  Routledge, 1999, 126.  
<http://reader.eblib.com.au.ezproxy.ballarat.edu.au/Reader.aspx?p=165216> Accessed 15 December, 
2009. 
120 The ‘Artillery Revolution’ is referred to by historians’ in the context of artillery making a sharp 
difference on the terms with which battles were fought.  Gunpowder for Europe had existed since circa 
1260 though it did not take hold for another 150 years.  Crucial to the artillery revolution, is that 
artillery did not have to be actually used in order for it to play a decisive role in a campaign. This is 
given credence according to Rogers as ‘around the 1420s, however, we begin to hear of garrisons 
surrendering, not because of hunger, but because of the besiegers’ guns have rendered their position 
indefensible.’ See: Clifford Rogers.  ‘Impact of the Artillery Revolution.’  The Military Revolution 
Debate.  Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe.  Edited By Clifford 
Rogers. Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, 66. 
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This [advent of artillery] created a self-reinforcing cycle, which 
continued to spiral upwards…[in which] central governments of 
large states could afford artillery trains and large armies.  The 
artillery trains counteracted centrifugal forces and enabled the 
central governments to increase their control over outlying areas of 
their realms, or to expand at the expense of their weaker neighbors.  
This increased their tax revenues, enabling them to increase their 
centralization of control and their tax revenues still further and so 
on.121
 
 
The reality of this technology was the distinct possibility that war could be waged in a 
more decisive way.  As the technology of the cannon developed it had the obvious 
auxiliary of continual improvements.  For instance, the advances in the science and 
transport of shot   
 
[E]nabled those rulers who could take maximum advantage of the 
technology to do so; and for regional powers they lost their ability to 
defy central authorities; small states and semi-independent regions 
were gobbled up by their neighbours’ and ‘tax revenues of the 
central governments in Western Europe doubled in real, per capita 
terms between 1450 and 1500; [and] this feedback loop between 
military capability and economic mobilization ability helps account 
for that [fiscal] phenomenon.122
 
   
The auxiliary of warfare ‘at a distance’—a concept which will be addressed more 
fully later in this thesis—allowed for the possibility that one’s own manpower losses 
per campaign could be reduced to levels lower than had ever been thought possible.  
This was due to the attrition rate the cannon was able to bring down upon the enemy 
and perhaps of equal importance, the fear artillery was able to instil in opposing 
forces.  Before artillery became an efficient interdictor on the battlefield methods of 
fighting had been incrementally developing into what had become, by necessity, 
longer and more drawn-out confrontations of attrition, in the style of siege warfare 
already mentioned.  The way of fighting wars had developed into ‘set-piece’123
                                                 
121 The Military Revolution Debate, 75. 
 battles 
122 The Military Revolution Debate, 74-75.  Emphasis in original. 
123 A ‘set-piece’ battle is a method of warfare that is a uniquely Western way of warfare, one in which 
the enemy is engaged face-to-face along a defined perimeter which allows for the opponent 
 to be outgunned—usually via artillery or some type of human mass assault of an opponent—and has 
its roots in the mid-1850s.  Briefly, the novel by Leo Tolstoy, The Cossacks tells the story of the 
warrior’s of Imam Shamil who sought to mould the Caucasian people into an Islamic state. ‘When 
fighting the Russian’s he departed from the usual guerrilla tactics and took a stand in order to protect 
his artillery as per the British model.  He was summarily overpowered and destroyed by the superior 
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which had come to require exponentially greater amounts of manpower, in order to 
fight a campaign or war.  Although this type of warfare would become widely 
accepted and would be driven to its zenith by Western Europeans it was nevertheless, 
a costly and onerous way to fight wars and artillery, by all accounts, could improve 
upon this situation.  Artillery, from its inception on the battlefield (of both ground and 
oceans), became a vital component of military strength, territorial expansion, tactical 
offence and defence; and fiscal reward.  To be specific and to draw a balance to the 
phenomenon of artillery, the rapid escalation of offence-driven warfare was in time 
tempered by advances in the defence against artillery, however the precedent that 
artillery was a decisive tactical and strategic advantage had been set and there was no 
turning back.   
 
The use of artillery prompted and demanded many facets associated with planning 
and they centred on improvements in logistics, supply chain ability and coordination 
and decisive battlefield manoeuvrings that encompassed drill and orders.  Crucially 
however, a more pro-active approach to organization was what the cannon created, 
and an insight into this, and why it generated articulate organization, is ensconced in 
the sheer effort that was needed on the battleground.  Implementing the technology 
often required forty horses apiece in the moving of cannon into position.124
 
  These 
related components to some extent, found their ‘trigger’ when the technology of 
artillery was acquired both on land and at sea and as uneven and erratic as its 
implementation may have been, the benefits of its worth could easily be 
comprehended by all.   
Although efforts needed to change over time, as the cannon became more advanced, it 
was the order and magnitude of artillery as tactical advantage in campaigns that 
requires additional investigation.  The developmental mechanisms which contributed 
to governance, bureaucracy, and the standing army in a unique way is also what is of 
additional interest when attempting to come to grips with how the technology-
organization  components intersected, and therefore, ‘worked.’  As a more 
comprehensive understanding of logistics, rationale and order, inevitably filtered into 
                                                                                                                                            
Russian forces, which were able to employ a greater mass of troops against a static enemy.’  See:  
Christopher Coker.  Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture Of Military Conflict. 
London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002, 102-103. 
124 War in European History, 16. 
 64 
society—many of which have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs—and as the 
establishment of armies reliant upon varying levels of relatively sophisticated 
organization progressed, this technology generated many more conditions needing 
change.  Campaigns required a combination of political, military, civil and logistical 
command structures which, in their most successful combinations, are synchronized 
as one.  The component of artillery when juxtaposed on what the state and 
statemaking could and would harness in the building of its apparatus for war, is 
reflected in the use of the cannon by Napoleon Bonaparte,125 and it is relevant here to 
include how Bonaparte measured ‘victory’ for the French.  Bonaparte considered it to 
comprise the enemy being ‘hammered and hammered again’ and of the French 
gaining dominance both during and after the battle—as happened in the Battle of 
Austerlitz (1805)—of victory being to ‘smash’ the enemy, and of the Russian 
surrender being ‘brutal and humiliating.’126
 
   
The continuing rise of the modern military is able to be shown in its acquirement of 
technology and moreover, how its components continued to be used.  I have stated 
that from a military perspective, it is the invention of the cannon and the revolution it 
struck which changed things in an immense and far-reaching way for land- and sea-
borne conflict, and it is here a firm supporting statement can be made.  Artillery 
required strict organization and then institutionalization of those that would manage, 
support, reinforce and protect it: this would go a significant way to establishing the 
‘standing army’ and the ‘European way for warfare.’  Napoleonic time’s best reflect 
not only the reality of what the Treaty of Westphalia intended to achieve upon fruition 
but also the technology of artillery, why it contributed so decisively to the European 
                                                 
125 Although Napoleon Bonaparte is largely credited with using the cannon deftly and of organizing his 
army astutely, it is timely to take account of whose expertise he utilized and appropriated.  Bonaparte 
drew heavily on the methods of Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Wallenstein (1583-1634) who gave his 
services as a soldier and politician to the Danish period of the Later Thirty Years War (1625-1629), and 
it is he who is credited with organizing what would in more contemporary times be considered a 
‘modern’ army.  This is given credence by Creveld who states ‘the second half of the sixteenth 
century…the growth of armies far exceeded the growth of their governments’ financial 
possibilities…Consequently, it was necessary to resort to a system of contribution…Though ultimately 
adopted by all the belligerents [in the Later Thirty Years War] it is generally recognized to have 
originated with Wallenstein.  Instead of demanding provisions from local inhabitants which were to be 
paid for with treasury receipts, Wallenstein extracted large sums in cash which then went to the Army 
cashier, not to the individual soldier or unit.  While frankly based on extortion, the system had two 
distinct advantages: it assured the soldier of regular pay on one hand; and relieved him of the need to 
rob for his own personal benefit on the other.’  See: Martin Van Creveld.  Supplying War.  Logistics 
from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 9. 
126 Susan Conner.  The Age of Napoleon.  Greenwood Press: Westport, 2004, 111-112. 
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way of warfare; and why it continued to hold sway.  The French Army in the 
Napoleonic Wars  
 
[W]ere well equipped and its gunnery excellent…The [12 pounder] 
guns could fire a ball at long range - about 1,000 yards being the 
maximum effective range - or canister for close work.  Smaller-
calibre guns accompanied the divisions or were formed into horse 
artillery batteries to accompany the cavalry.  From 1806 onwards 
these guns were increasingly used in massed batteries designed to 
smash a hole in the enemy line, which the infantry and cavalry could 
exploit.127
 
 
However, in order to contextualize artillery and its ramifications further, there is a 
requirement for an historical step back to pre-Treaty times, which in turn offers 
reasons to why it was retained as a pivotal and comprehensive force.  The use of 
artillery and the new tactics it prompted in order for it to be used to maximum effect 
vividly portrays the way in which this technology needed a significant number of 
changes to take place if it was to become a mainstay of operations.  Artillery’s 
effectiveness was not only due to its deployment in the battlefield as a tactical 
weapon, but because it directly affected the way in which an army could be utilized 
and this is what is of significant importance, as it gave additional and immense power 
to the state.  The reality that stemmed from this is, I argue, that artillery as a 
technology needed constant personnel and technological support and its ramifications 
continually demanded, and then reflected, far-reaching change in both warfare and 
organization. The organization that was affiliated with the efficient use of the military 
would also continue to affect the European elements of warfare in which a standing 
force Foucault avers has within it ‘permanent coercions…indefinitely progressive 
forms of training, not to general will but to automatic docility,’128
                                                 
127 Jonathon Riley.   Napoleon as a General. London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007, 82-83. 
 which Napoleon 
largely managed to perfect.  All of these elements interface and interlink with each 
other at various times, and in varying degrees, in order to refine what it was to have a 
bordered region and a standing army to defend it in the first instance, and expand on it 
in the second.  The continual development of armed forces and the way in which they 
grew in the Western European context has been acknowledged throughout this 
chapter; as has the way in which it expanded.  
128 Michel Foucault.  Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison.  New York: Vintage Books, 1997, 
169.  
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Conclusion to ‘The Rise of the Modern Military’ 
 
Throughout this chapter I have argued that the rise of the modern military has been 
attributed to many literal factors such as organization and bureaucracy, as well as 
other valuable though less-visible components, such as functionalism and societal 
governance.  Moreover, I have also argued the Treaty produced the notional 
understanding of a less-reactive stratagem, as it offered sovereigns the opportunity to 
revert to newfound legalities when frictions arose.  Agreements prior to the Treaty 
such as the Edict of Nantes (1598), the Edict of Restitution (1629), and the Peace of 
Prague (1635) to name only several, whilst being of considerable worth on the 
pathway of constitutional and legal recognitions, I argue they although may have 
altered political and politico-military structures in many ways they did not have the 
grand and profound effects of the Treaty of Westphalia.  The debate about the 
ongoing worth of the Treaty is now far beyond the scope of this thesis as the key point 
of its (eventual) merit rests on what Asch terms of as being, ‘juridified,’ and of it 
firmly supplanting and establishing the processes of state, of public law and of a more 
meaningful interstate communication.129   What must however, also be acknowledged 
and declared, is this state-of-affairs did not always constitute non-hostile outcomes 
and this becomes apparent in the simple recognition that ‘states strove to first to equal 
and then to surpass the [governance and/or technological] innovations that had 
defeated them.’130
 
  As has also been stipulated, power-stakes did not stop with the 
implementation of numerous technologies, bureaucracies gaining additional powers 
and the institutionalization of armed forces and all their trappings.  
I have argued that the Treaty did not reduce the penchant for going to war per se, 
although it did ‘mature’ the state and with this came a different set of parameters to 
consider when war either beckoned, or was initiated.  War remained a very real 
possibility even within the Westphalian order and this is evident in the analogy of 
Levy, in which there exists a paradox of ‘a state which prefers war to likely adversary 
concessions but which wants to create a favourable diplomatic or domestic political 
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2nd Edition.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 160. 
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climate for war might deliberately initiate or provoke a crisis.’131
 
  As can be seen by 
this statement, although the Treaty brought an end to a massive and destructive war 
the new set of freedoms it could also be used to initiate a war.  What the Treaty 
therefore, became for the nation-state overall, was a common denominator that 
allowed each state to independently assess the other when frictions arose.    
From a Western European monopoly the state had achieved power over and above all 
other forms of orthodoxy has also been traced and I have shown this resulted in a 
more focussed use of warfare as an apparatus of state; and the expansionist aspirations 
therein.  Clausewitz132 who famously identified this peculiar ambit of the state using 
warfare for gain being, ‘a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other 
means,’133  suggests that regardless of the how much a state matures through legal and 
moral avenues—or is bound by a collective agreed on by other states—warfare 
remains a part of its modus operandi and warfare had warfare obtained a crucial and 
greater adjunct.  Sayigh identifies this as the political leadership within a nation-state 
having a choice in deciding internal contests over political program, and of whether to 
use military and diplomatic means in the solving of them.134
 
   Whilst Sayigh applies 
this principle to contemporary times, the choice offered remained with the time of the 
Treaty of Westphalia as crucially, it did not rule out war as a legitimate act.   
The rise of the modern military meant the nation-state could mass an army with 
relative ease due to the abilities that were largely in place and could be drawn upon, 
and this in turn helped produce a single end result: the state and warfare remained 
inexorably welded together.  Whether this further supplied impetus for the state to go 
to war more often in order to settle domestic as well as interregional frictions remains 
a moot point, as what has been dealt with here is the nation-state being born through 
particular events and the Treaty supplying an eventual logic and requisite legal 
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parameters for a sovereign in the going to or refusal of, war.  The ‘nation-state’ and its 
description by Giddens’ as ‘a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated 
territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by 
the state internal apparatus and those of other states’135
 
 is what the Treaty put 
definitely in place.  This produced I argue, not only an ability to create enormous 
coordinated wars, but also the mindset of the way wars would be fought in the future, 
and that wars could only be won on the back of these massive collisions; and 
moreover the mindset would filter through for centuries to follow.   
The rise of the modern military although having a convoluted history was an end 
result of all of the elements mentioned in this chapter and Modern Europe was 
instrumental in dictating what a modern military comprises and the types of war that it 
would fight centuries to follow.  Whilst this chapter has been by no means exhaustive 
in its representation of the pre- nation-state and the milieu that contributed to 
statehood, it has dealt with the importance of conflict and the relevant codicils and 
concepts that generated ever-greater organization in order for warfare to flourish; and 
become a mainstay of persuasion.  Within the development of the organization of 
militias, although driven by dynastic rulers and victorious hegemonies, the ability 
and/or desire to organize became firmly supplanted in Western European societies 
overall.  The maturation process, albeit initially as a movement toward absolutism,136 
or as Pierson avers a ‘commitment to constitutionalism’137 remained vibrant as the 
comprehension of unity continued to grow.  The growth of the more tangible aspects 
of territoriality, bureaucracy, sovereignty, taxation and a central authority exercising 
control, along with the less-overt sociological components continued after the Treaty.  
The components continued developing into what Giddens deems the ‘primarily 
psychological phenomena’ of nationalism,138
                                                 
135 The Nation-State and Violence, 116. 
 and they grew alongside the more 
136 The sheer breadth of ‘absolutism’ as a conceptual and developing mainstay of statehood need not be 
thoroughly analysed here as only the main points are in need of mentioning to establish what it 
comprises.  According to Anderson five criteria fit the advent of absolutism and they are, ‘a standing 
army (or in the case of England a navy), a centralized bureaucracy; a systematic and state-wide taxation 
regime; a formal diplomatic service with permanent embassies abroad and state policies to promote 
commerce and economic development.’  See:  Perry Anderson.  Lineages of the Absolutist State.  
London: New Left Books, 1974, 19. 
137 The Modern State, 53. 
138 The Nation-State and Violence, 116. 
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tangible elements of territorialism and to argue them further here would be an arid 
exercise as the platform the nation-state utilized for war has been established.   
 
Upon the recognition of the various elements of organization, bureaucracy, 
sovereignty and the nationalism referred to by Giddens, a chronological leap can now 
be undertaken to further exhibit the thrust of the argument that war is a dynamic in 
which technological, strategic, tactical, and societal factors constantly orbit around 
each other.  Knowing this and accepting the factors mentioned in this chapter, war is 
able to be propelled into more contemporary times to explore how Western European 
nations incorporated elements of what had gone before into another massive war.  The 
style of warfare that Feudal Europe developed and Modern Europe expanded upon—
traditional symmetrical warfare fought on wide fronts—can now be linked to the latter 
part of the twentieth century.  In doing this, I will show how the ingrained notions of 
war and warfare that have been discussed in this chapter continued to play out in the 
twentieth century.  This will be briefly expressed via the ‘total war’ of World War II 
(WWII), and then established through relevant components of WWII, especially those 
of technology defining power.  The specifics of how technology continued to play a 
vital role in it will be a central theme in the sequence of events that allowed the 
European allies—and in the latter phases of the war the US—to refine power and then 
continue to exercise it throughout the years after WWII.  As has happened within this 
chapter a revisiting of the past and allegorical examples will be used to connect 
concepts and realities.  This will be set about within the interconnecting of history that 
I have argued and shown that just as the Treaty defined the legitimate actions of the 
nation-state and the cannon defined warfare, the US developed organization and 
technology throughout WWII which would redefine and reinforce its role in warfare; 
and influenced its expansionism after this time.  
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During and After World War II: Warfare in 
Contemporary Times   
 
Preamble 
 
Having established how Western European societies advanced via warfare and its 
relevant addendums, this chapter will examine the way in which the European way of 
war was extended upon, during and after WWII.   The technological and 
organizational factors that came to the fore in this war will be examined on the back 
of what the Allied bloc of nation-states required with regard to war in the European 
theatre, including the considerable rise in the technology-driven stakes of this time.  
The type of warfare the Allies used along with mutually supporting sociological 
features, including the way in which symmetrical and force-on-force collisions were 
supported by science and technology.  All will be drawn together to show the 
robustness of the European way of war; and how it survived into the mid- twentieth 
century.  Therefore, a primary aim of this chapter is to firmly establish that 
technology continued to reign supreme and just as artillery had developed its own 
status in fighting wars prior to the twentieth century, the introduction of airpower 
would be brought along and require similar aspects that have been addressed in 
chapter one.  This chapter will illustrate relevant transformations the advanced 
technology of airpower went through and show how this changed the warfare 
environment—not unlike artillery in previous centuries—and in particular, how it 
would influence warfare and its codicils of power projection in more contemporary 
times.   
 
In order to offer integrity to the exponential advances of organization that 
accompanied the (relatively) new technology of airpower the processes that informed 
and continually filtered into military-technological and military-organizational arenas 
and derived explicit outcomes will also be addressed.  The multifaceted tensions of 
the Cold War will be drawn upon in order to show it as a conflict environment had 
generated an ever-greater reliance on airpower, and to emphasize the geo-strategic 
manoeuvrings after the end of WWII.  These parameters will be shown to have 
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strengths deeply rooted in the technology of airpower due to it being ‘the force’ that 
had delivered exponentially greater results in WWII.   Therefore, and by necessity, the 
Cold War will be viewed through the prism of airpower.  Although it must be 
acknowledged artillery and the force-on-force collisions of ground troops remained 
relevant and decisive forces during WWII, it would be airpower that would rise to its 
zenith and become the force to be reckoned with and in doing so, firmly establish that 
it would be the winning element in future hostile exchanges.  Airpower will thus, be 
brought into the milieu of warfare in order to illustrate how it changed the face of 
warfare, and how the evidence of its strategic and tactical effects went on to influence 
geo-strategic thinking from the end of WWII, and throughout the Cold War.  The 
various contrivances and convergences of airpower and its strategic, tactical, and 
organizational spheres can now be fully addressed.  
 
Artillery as advantage 
 
As stipulated in chapter one of this thesis artillery—the artillery revolution—was an 
aspect of warfare that drastically changed not only the face of warfare as per each 
campaign, but also how warfare would be pursued from this point on.  The revolution 
has been deemed by Rogers to be a ‘self-reinforcing cycle…spiralling upwards’139
 
 
and with this knowledge in place comparisons are able to be made to airpower and 
how it gained in credibility as artillery had done over the centuries before.  First and 
foremost however, a digression needs to take place and a brief explanation with 
regard to World War One (WWI) and why artillery had retained its place in the 
scheme of assault and attrition in warfare, and this will firmly establish the hold 
artillery had developed in more contemporary times.  The devastation that artillery 
was able to deliver on an enemy location is the simple reason why it had retained its 
place in the tactical advantage for armies and is vividly portrayed in Keegan’s account 
of a battle on the Somme in 1916, where 
At Verdun, on the Somme and in the Ypres salient whole villages 
had disappeared, [due to the shelling] leaving a smear of brick-dust 
or a pile of stones on the upturned soil.  Ypres and Albert, sizeable 
small towns, were in ruins, Arras and Noyon badly damaged, the city 
of Rheims had suffered heavy destruction and so had villages up and 
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down the [front] line.  Beyond the range of the heavy artillery, 
10,000 yards at most, town and countryside lay untouched.140
 
   
Airpower, whilst it had gained momentum over the entirety of the WWI would not 
play a decisive part in any battle.  Keegan avers, when referring to the Third Battle of 
Ypres in 1917, the outcome ‘would be decided however, on the ground, not in the 
skies above it.’141
 
  This posits artillery firmly in the role of advantage in WWI and the 
reference reduces airpower to that of a peripheral and not a vital component of this 
war.  This would change in WWII.   
The introduction of airpower as a strategic and tactical weapon, acknowledges that 
although airpower did offer considerable advantage, it did not give Britain initially—
or the US when it entered the war after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7th 
1941—the incredible gain artillery gave to rich and powerful rulers of earlier 
centuries.   The simple premise of this statement is airpower was able to be met with 
airpower, whereas in previous centuries not all armies and navies were able to access 
the cannon.  The overall advantage airpower gave however, was one of being able to 
cover distance in the application of offence, defence, firepower and/or campaign 
support.  Moreover, a strategic as well as tactical saturation from the air could be 
employed as a mainstay of operations.  Although this was to be the case in the latter 
phases of WWII in particular when used in tandem with land- and sea-borne assets it 
proved to be an even greater force than previously thought possible.  This 
acknowledgement is crucial to the focal point of the remainder of this thesis.  I will 
argue it heavily influenced the way in which warfare would be approached in WWII 
and beyond; would increase the likelihood of intervention by force; and ultimately 
change the geo-strategic thinking of powerful (Western) nations—in particular, the 
US. 
 
It is here that a tangent is encountered and one that must be dealt with in order to give 
clarity to how the assets of airpower were able to be so positively deployed, and 
therefore exploited, and in doing so the evidence of airpower’s ascent will be self-
sustaining—not unlike that of the cannon in the centuries before.  Furthermore, upon 
examining the astute exploitation it will offer a unique understanding of how it 
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remained such an intricate part of post-war preponderances.  Central to 
comprehending the use of airpower requires however, a brief revisiting of 
organization, its ‘progress’ and in particular an ‘isolation’ of the particular ‘type’ of 
modernity that intensified its effectiveness, and exponentially increased its 
performance.  Once again, sociological factors in times gone by, and that were 
expressed in chapter one, contributed to the scientific and technological factors.  
Airpower, as with the artillery revolution, introduced and demanded significant 
changes in the military and politico-military landscapes.  By scrutinizing how these 
changes were driven, the results they offered, and how it remained a vibrant part of 
the mechanism of warfare is crucial, in order to illuminate airpower’s magnitude; and 
continued pre-eminence.   Identifying what ‘type’ of modernity was in place and how 
it interacted with the asset of airpower is of most importance here and a brief analogy 
of the relationships to airpower will posit the efficacious use of the assets into a 
specific framework.  From this premise a deduction about what was gained by its 
conjoining to organization will be made.   
 
The ‘organization’ of airpower 
 
The type of organization that best reflects both the British and American 
governments’ utilization of airpower at the time of WWII, and with regard to the 
enabling of airpower, comprised essential underpinnings of organization that had 
progressively been encouraged in Western European societies.  I will further argue 
they have roots in, and are expressed through the Treaty of Westphalia.  I make this 
reflection, in the sense that the institutionalization and bureaucracy that the Treaty 
overtly encouraged excelled at the time of WWII, because it had been progressively 
encouraged in Western European societies.  The model of organization—which at this 
time is able to be more definitively assigned the title ‘modernity’—and to which I 
allude, is the one ascribed to by Weber.  This ‘model’ is introduced here and will be 
addressed in the following paragraphs, as it is vital to developing the theme of what 
‘modernity’ consists ‘of,’ and the way in which it was utilized with regard to 
airpower.  Although the theme remains heuristic, and is to some extent interpretive, I 
argue it forms the basis that underpinned and augmented airpower’s rise.  The rise in 
turn, helped the Allies to win WWII and I further argue Weberian organization should 
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be viewed as a concept that assisted in ‘shaping’ airpower, and its affiliations.  The 
organizational matrix that exponentially thrust airpower to the fore in warfare, and 
allowed the British and US to exploit the continually advancing assets, was because 
these models of organization had helped its continual progress had remained 
somewhat consistent throughout the progress of the relevant technologies.   
 
The Weberian organization referred to has its historical links in Western European 
functionalism and as a result, the military was a recipient of these ongoing processes, 
of which the various interweaving and development has been expressed in chapter 
one.   The core underpinnings that were already in place such as the establishment of 
an industrial complex, and because the Industrial Revolution had been a part of 
England’s history, these aspects were able to be accelerated by the US in order to 
exploit the air advantage.  Moreover, the way in which the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
and US Eighth Air Force142
 
 and the military in general, operated in WWII, reflects 
tangible and hierarchical Weberian structural-functional imperatives in action.  They 
are incorporated in the history of Western European and Eurocentric societies in 
general, and the various logic-rationale processes consistently developed the military 
along these lines.  Further proof of the incorporation of these elements is the actual 
function and mass movement of armies, as well as strategic and tactical bombing.  All 
exhibit numerous organizational components inherent in Weber’s theory.  However, 
although WWII could be deemed an ultimate announcement of the ‘functions’ Weber 
ascribes, other theorists are able to be conjoined to Weber, which give more weight to 
the functionalisms that reinforce and apply to the military.  They must be considered 
in order to endorse and deliberately show the ascent of airpower as a strategic and 
tactical weapon. The functions will be able to be interlinked and articulated by way of 
relevant theorists, and will give further clarity to the concepts and this will in turn, 
assign additional credibility to the Weber’s theories.  It is through this prism the 
efficiency of airpower as a weapon of strength will be exposed.   
The development to which I have referred allows, in the first instance, for the  
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Weberian ‘model’ to be linked to Giddens’ theory of ‘commodification’143
 
 which 
relies on interacting levels of organization and in doing so reinforces Weber as the 
specific application of commodification displays aspects of strict organization.  These 
saw the evolvement of technology incrementally and exponentially advance, 
becoming a powerful advantage when applied to warfare.  With this in mind, I now 
turn to the way in which airpower began to be refined over the time of WWII, and 
how it was utilized and improved upon over the course of the war, and how its 
provision for destruction helped win the war for the Allies.  At its core, is a 
foundation and premise of Weberian notional understandings and of how modernity 
‘works,’ and they can be drawn into the argument in order to crystallize the various 
points of commodification.   
Airpower during WWII, operated successfully because a unique set of interweaving 
and interactive pre-conditions were in place, including the science and technology of 
aeronautics having been continually developed since WWI.  Other sciences (including 
social) were also able to be exploited along with this due to the enduring requirements 
of war.  As complex a task as this is to isolate, there were definitive components that 
came into being, some in extreme ways during the war.  Over the span of WWII 
airpower had developed strict systemic features of control and they remained present 
in the role of utilizing it as a military contrivance.  Hence, they could be seen of as 
examples of the state exerting its authority when it seeks a rigid compliance to a 
prescribed set of ideals which demand the actual forming of a fighting force into a 
strike force, and more importantly, of keeping it as a focussed force.  To be specific 
this required the state—Britain and the US—in this instance, performing repetitive 
acts which necessitated constant pressure to be put into place: systemic and systematic 
area and precision bombing over vast travel-to-target distances.  All requiring a high 
degree of management, bureaucratic and structural functioning per se and the level of 
compliance demanded by the state during this time, and in order to achieve its ideals, 
when held up to scrutiny, I argue comprise an extreme version of control.  
Nevertheless, the efficacious use of airpower demanded—as part of its root 
functioning—the inclusion, creation and implementation of strict rationales and 
clinical decision-making processes.  The inflexibility of the military command 
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structure in many ways not only reflects the gravity of the task-at-hand, that of 
defeating Nazi Germany and its allies, but also that Allied Bomber Command (and its 
associated bureaucracies) embraced rigid hierarchical structures because they enabled 
the clinical decision-making processes to be made with greater determination.   
 
The processes of decision-making were centred on gaining winning results in both the 
military and politico-military spheres.  Utilizing the mechanisms of airpower in the 
most efficacious way therefore, involved the strictest form of the Weberian modernity 
which Coser avers, consists of bureaucratic coordination of activities, their 
organization according to rational principles, offices being ranked in hierarchical 
order, and their operations characterized by impersonal rules methodological 
operation of jurisdiction and delimited spheres of duty.144   Weber’s version of 
modernity is further supported by Wrong, in that the ‘strict form of hierarchical norms 
of social organization exemplifies the process of rationalization’145 and this was also 
employed to the fullest extent by Bomber Command.  To advance on this and 
emphasize how ingrained bureaucracy had become and then manifested itself in an 
associated rationalism which offered the state further license to apply ever-stricter 
rationales in times of war than in times of peace.146   The Weberian notion of 
rationalism and the modernity that it ‘shapes’ is reflected in Bomber Command as it 
was seen to be at a ‘national level,’ which in itself acknowledges it was formed by the 
government with the near-total consent of the populace.  Wagner’s interpretation of 
how these types of organizations are able to develop to this point, is due to institutions 
of this ‘type’ already having Weberian underpinnings present in their mechanisms.  
Sets of institutional rules and practices are thus supported and reinforced by the 
institutional components that stress coherence, long-term stability, and solid 
progressive developmental perspectives.147
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   The end result is a mutual self-
reinforcing cycle, in this case, of the people supporting Bomber Command, and vice-
versa.   
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Reflecting on this history presents readily the way in which military command, 
especially Bomber Command operated, and to place this in perspective and to further 
understand how these aspects were so much a part of European societies, can be 
readilylinked the centuries before WWII.  The proto-modernity already alluded to, 
that of the pre-Wesphalian era began the process and application of these principles.  
Hence, this informs the progress in general terms as the functionalism of the West and 
its stratified European-Eurocentric lines. The strictly-coordinated regimented 
procedural manners, patriarchal, unyielding hierarchical chain-of-command structures 
of rank, discipline, regimentation, task-coordination and implementation, and more 
importantly, the associated bureaucracies that allowed it to operate as a cohesive unit 
are a direct reflection of Eurocentrism that was in the making up to the Treaty of 
Westphalia—and continued after its inception.  All of the ‘organizational’ lessons 
imbued by this history would be required to support and sustain airpower; and its 
components of force during WWII.  For instance, the efficacious organization did not 
involve any non-bureaucratic or non-military input into the type of warfare engaged 
and what is more, the increased synthesis and reliance on such strict measures of 
control in the eyes of the general populace were largely welcomed.  In general terms, 
this allowed an unmitigated organizational component to develop in such an extreme 
way simply because there were no sociological rationales in place to retard its growth.    
The necessity can be harnessed to Bomber Command having a free rein because of 
the ‘typefications,’ or the ‘general rationality’ actors use in the construction of their 
reality,148  which in this case, would have involved the populace of Britain knowing 
invasion was imminent if Germany was not stopped.   This deep-rooted understanding 
for the population of Britain would have been entrenched and premised on German 
belligerence and the ‘mutual knowledge’149 that had formed within it, and as ascribed 
by Giddens, would exist in the population because of its history.  Expanding upon this 
the ‘memory traces’150
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 which formed part of this knowledge would be a residual of 
the terrors of WWI, and as such Nazi Germany winning would comprise the 
population understanding this would end in their enslavement.  Direct evidence of this 
is reflected in Bomber Command being able to deliberately bomb German urban areas 
149 ‘Agency, Structure.’ Contemporary Sociological Theory, 234. 
150 ‘Agency, Structure.’ Contemporary Sociological Theory, 234. 
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in order to ‘kill, wound, de-house and terrorize the population.’151   In carrying out the 
onerous ‘duty’ of warfare it would culminate in the latter days of WWII of generating 
an incremental and ‘progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic zones and the direct support of land and sea forces’152
 
 by 
Bomber Command.  With these rationales in place and the actual advent of airpower 
as a strategic and tactical weapon, are made more omnipotent.  
In the timeframe of the latter phases of WWII the notions of Weber and the 
interpretations of Wagner, Wrong and Cosin, highlight what the bureaucracy consists 
‘of,’ and moreover, illustrates the structural functionalisms associated with Allied 
airpower.   Simply stated, it emphasises how airpower was able to operate so 
efficaciously when driven by a focussed military.  Finally, strengthening the 
interpretations of the Weberian modernity alluded to, is the notion of what Giddens 
refers to as ‘militarism,’153
 
 which adds another component to the effective, positive 
and largely unrestrained exploitation of airpower.  Militarism, in a sense provides a 
contribution to domestic harmony via jobs, structure and similar purpose, and this 
provides the state with the tools to fight a war and airpower as part of the mix for 
Western Allied forces then (and now), is closely interweaved with these factors.  
Therefore, it is fair to deduce at all levels of the Weberian ‘position’ reflects how the 
state acts and reacts, via its bureaucracy and its servants, whilst admitting that it is 
driven to an extreme in total war.  Nevertheless, Bomber Command as an institution 
accurately reflects these various Weberian positions as an organization.   
The sociological components referred to, are in many ways, the active and 
contributing factors which gave Bomber Command a tremendous license to 
accomplish the task-at-hand.  Although they are heuristic by nature they nevertheless, 
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represent historical markers that show how western European society harnessed and 
interconnected organization and technology from a sociological perspective and used 
factors to reinforce each other.  There were as a result no colliding factors, either 
sociologically or technologically, which inhibited the expansion of the Allied 
campaign against Nazi Germany as Bomber Command exercised almost complete 
control over its campaigns.  Thus, airpower came to be used as an overwhelming 
force in every sense of the concept, and it is with this in mind that the literal and 
quantifiable evidence is able to be presented, including those which would go on to 
shape the post-WWII attitudes.  
 
Artillery then, airpower now: technology as overwhelming force in World 
War II 
 
There are pivotal moments in the ascendancy of airpower from the days of WWI 
which through its development post-WWI resulted in its undeniable show of strength 
during WWII.  The straightforward pathway airpower gained was via scientific 
technological inputs and they built up an air force on the part of England, (some) 
Europeans and the US in the post-WWI era.  It is not necessary to document the 
expansion of airpower as a weapon up until WWII in this thesis, as what is of 
importance here, is when airpower gained its stranglehold as the weapon of 
overwhelming force.   From the early days of WWII, Nazi Germany had used 
airpower and air superiority as a mainstay of its post-invasion operations and as it 
moved into Eastern Europe.154
                                                 
154 The German military’s push into Eastern Europe and the role airpower played can be seen in the 
1942 ‘Operation Bustard Hunt.’  In May-July of 1942 the Luftwaffe air wings Fliegerkorps VIII and 
Fliegerführer Süd reported bombing Sevastapol and ports in the Kerch Straits, ‘sinking 68,450 tons of 
enemy shipping…and two submarines…critically damaged another submarine…and less seriously 
damaging a large number of ships including 42,000 tonnes of merchant shipping , one heavy cruiser, 
one light cruiser, four submarines and a tug… Fliegerführer Süd also reported that it shot sown as 
many as 204 enemy fighters and bombers and smashed another 30 on the ground…It knocked out no 
fewer than 64 tanks damaged another 29, put 98 trucks of the road for good, and left a further 36 
damaged’  See:  Joel Hayward.  Stopped at Stalingrad.  The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East, 
1942-1943.  Kansas: university of Kansas Press, 1998, 78.  
  From an historical perspective however, airpower on 
the part of the Allies was first established as an overwhelming presence, and it was 
the Allied forces that were able to exploit this capability to its maximum.  It was a 
concentrated bombing raid by the RAF on the 31st of May, 1942 on the German city 
of Cologne which was dubbed Operation Millennium that mass airpower showed 
what it could offer.  The significance of this raid amounted to the twin-pillars of 
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strategic excellence being achieved which comprised overcoming the sheer 
complexity of the mission from an organizational perspective; and demonstrating 
what airpower could accomplish when used as a strategic weapon.  The mission 
comprised 1,047 RAF aircraft dropping 1455 tons of high-explosive and incendiary 
bombs on the target which destroyed 600 acres of the city.155  Although this raid was 
as much a ‘publicity exercise’ to show that Britain was ‘fighting back,’156
 
 and 
although it would be superseded numerous times throughout the war in terms of 
numbers of aircraft flying on a single mission, tonnage of bombs dropped and 
wholesale destruction achieved, it was nevertheless, a massive undertaking.  What 
Operation Millennium confirmed was, airpower could achieve results far beyond the 
capabilities of other immediate available military resources and in doing so, set the 
stage for distance intervention and enhanced levels of destruction in which favourable 
results were achieved.   
Using an incident such as a single bombing raid, whilst practically proving a point 
require extrapolation, in order to show the pathway of airpower and its development, 
at this period in history.  A focus on the latter part of WWII necessitates recognizes 
Allied airpower at its zenith, and in doing so exemplifies how it gained its unique 
place in history; and why it was pursued so vigorously by the Allies.  The tangible 
application of airpower from the time of the first raids into Germany, and how they 
went on to produce astounding tactical and strategic results, is all that is needed here.  
The progressive improvement in these results went on to form and then inform the 
typology of the war.  As the war progressed the application of targeting over Germany 
by both RAF Bomber Command (see Figure 1), and the US Eighth Air Force (see 
Figure 2), shows evidence of a progressive dynamic of success.  
  
 
                                                 
155 John Simkin.  ‘Bombing of Cologne.’  Spartacus Educational. 
<http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWcologne.htm>  Accessed 24 July 2009. 
156 ‘The War in the Air Over Europe September 1939 - May 1945.’  The World War Two Multimedia 
Database. MFC Productions. Producer: Jason McDonald. New York, 1999.  
<http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/airwar.htm>  Accessed 29 March 2008. 
 81 
 
  
Figure 1. RAF Bomber Command Accuracy.  Reprinted from: Hays 
Parks.  ‘‘Precision’ and ‘Area’ Bombing: Who did Which, and 
When?’ Airpower Theory and Practice. Edited by John Gooch. 
London: Frank Cass & Co, 1995, 159.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. [US] Eighth Air Force Bombing Accuracy. Reprinted from: 
Airpower Theory and Practice, 167. 
 
 
As has been stipulated, such an acute and finely-tuned demonstration of airpower and 
its implementation—as a grand strategy—began to be perfected in the latter phases of 
WWII.  Within the processes of building such a strategy, it can be reasonably assessed 
that all four of the functioning components referred to by Giddens, fall neatly into 
place, and in doing so focus the clinical approach to the task of bombing the Allies 
took. The approach to bombing would continue to be a part of a deliberate and 
specific purpose, especially as an Allied invasion of Europe loomed.  The bombing 
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essentially centred on reducing the number of Allied ground troop casualties, of 
stalling and degrading German troop movements through various ‘choke points’ 
toward the French coast; to pulverize German petrol-oil-lubricant centres; and to 
continually retard troop and mobile armour movement.  Moreover, as the war 
progressed in favour of the Allies after the D-Day landings of 6 June, 1944—
Operation Overlord—which saw the ‘Allied air forces drop a staggering 200,000 tons 
of bombs on targets in France damaging the Germans ability to reinforce the 
beaches.’157  The dominance of airpower and its contribution to favourable battlefield 
outcomes gained increasing status.  The post-D-Day Saint Lô breakout of 25 July 
1944 in France—Operation Cobra—saw Allied ground forces supported by 2000 
heavy and medium bomber aircraft and 700 fighter bombers158 break through a 
determined German resistance, which was later referred to by General Eisenhower, as 
air superiority never having been deployed so effectively in support of a ground 
offensive.159  The technology employed by the Allied forces, and its accompanying 
rigid adherence to Weberian organizational imperatives, became an omnipresent 
feature in defeating their enemies, and this was not restricted to the European theatre 
of operations.  Airpower, its reach and its capabilities, increased exponentially as the 
war continued and all of its potential is summed up in a straightforward statistic.  
Parks states the RAF from ‘1943 to the end of 1944, relative density (per 1,000 tons 
dropped) at the aiming point increased five fold’160
 
 in terms of both capability and 
accuracy, and is expressed in figure one.    
A brief example of how well entrenched the organization and the technological 
advances is now needed, in order to show exactly how expansive airpower became 
and this will also add credence to the organizational imperatives alluded to, and the 
ongoing extent of airpower.  For the US Eighth Air Force the figures were not 
dissimilar, and are able to be observed in figure two over the progression of the war.  
Within these examples are exponential, systemic and methodical (although heuristic) 
                                                 
157 ‘Animated Map : The D-Day Landings.’ World Wars in-depth. British Broadcasting Corporation. 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/interactive/animations/wwtwo_map_d_day/index_embed.shtml> 
Accessed 24 May 2009. 
158 John Chambers.  ‘St. Lô Breakout.’ The Oxford Companion to American Military History.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000.  <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O126-StLBreakoutat.html> 
Accessed 12 January, 2008.  
159 David Eisenhower.  ‘The Broad-Front Controversy Revisited.’  World War II in Europe.  The Final 
Year.  Edited by Charles Brower.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, 71. 
160 Airpower. Theory and Practice, 158. 
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indices that technology and organization, when applied comprehensively by a 
bureaucratic institution in the first instance, and as a force in the second instance, 
become interactive components to a single purpose.  For the Allies there was a 
successful end result.  At this point, and because of the phases that were progressed 
through, the ongoing ascendancy of airpower shaped the military and the politico-
military spheres over the duration of the war. 
 
The Pacific phase of WWII also incorporated the same systemic methods of 
employing airpower over long distances.  This is demonstrated in the coordinated fire-
bombing of Tokyo161
 
 on March 10, 1945 by the United States Air Force (USAF) (see 
Figure 3), and although the missions encountered similar problems and losses to those 
of the European theatre they were nevertheless, deemed successful overall.  
 
 
Figure 3. The Tokyo Incendiary Raid March 9-10, 1945. Reprinted 
from: Wings of Judgement,1. 
                                                 
161 Public Broadcasting Service. Victory in the Pacific ‘The Fire Bombing of Tokyo March, 1945.’ 
<http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/amex/pacific/maps/maps_04.html> Accessed 17 December, 2008.  
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The latter phases of WWII and the successes airpower brought about would go on to 
heavily influence military stratagems in the post-war era.   
 
With this in mind the Cold War can now be addressed with the advent of airpower 
being a vibrant part of both the military and the politico-military spheres of the newly 
formulated Superpowers—the US and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)—
and to show how the influence had come to manifest itself so deeply into their 
strategies. The perspectives that will be unearthed by the approaching geo-strategic 
preponderances will incorporate the potentials of airpower to strengthen their 
respective manoeuvring and bargaining positions; this will in turn illustrate the 
tactical and strategic dominance airpower had triggered; and emphasize the new ways 
it informed geo-strategic securities.  The points enumerated will allow for ‘total war’ 
with respect to the Cold War to be refined and understood with greater clarity and 
definition, rather than it being only seen through the prism of WWII.  
 
The Cold War 
 
In the immediate post-WWII world the US and the USSR were developing into what 
would become known as ‘superpowers’ and in the process they sought military and 
political allegiances, as was typical of other powerful actors in the centuries before 
this era.  The prism through which airpower was projected by the US and the USSR 
was primarily to reassure or menace each other, and secondly to influence lesser-
powers. Exploring this albeit briefly, addresses the pre-eminence of technology and 
exposes how the Superpowers embraced this ‘new’ type of warfare, and the newfound 
dilemma that accompanied its presence.  Accessing the technological and 
organizational components that underpinned this pre-eminence means drawing out 
pivotal factors that were influential during WWII, and to show how they evolved a 
new set of strategic dynamics in the post-war era and crucially, how airpower was 
perpetually reinforced.   
 
As WWII had established new frontiers in warfare the two countries that emerged as 
‘superpowers’ from this war embraced them.  The respective pursuits of dominance 
the two major world players would have open to them at this time, in terms of 
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hostility, would consist of both ‘total warfare’ and the ages-old, ‘limited warfare.’  
Total war at this time constituted the two superpowers and any wars which did not 
involve a direct exchange between the Soviets and the Americans would by necessity, 
be deemed a ‘limited war.’  There is a vital separation required here—which sets up 
the parameters for the following chapters—and it is the US will be treated as the 
Superpower which exercised the greater post-WWII control over limited warfare as an 
avenue of expansion.  The relevance of such a categorization is to understand and 
mention that the USSR also expanded via the astute use of limited warfare after 
WWII, although what this thesis is dealing with is the expansive nature of a 
Superpower which had thoroughly embraced their newfound status via a more 
decisive win; and display of power in WWII.    
 
A conceptual and practical insight into these two types of warfare—‘total’ and 
‘limited’—will mean submerging them to a certain extent back into the realm of 
WWII in the first instance, as force was consistently employed via technology which 
will in turn tease out and expose the tangible tactical and strategic intents that 
informed US actions during WWII; and which further inspired post-WWII practices.  
In adopting this approach I am deliberately excluding the practices of the Nazi 
Germany’s methodical campaigns because they were in the end unsuccessful, and also 
the Soviet campaigns on the Eastern Front because although they were massive they 
did not incorporate a strong Allied presence.  I am also excluding Britain, due to the 
fact that as a nation-state, it was militarily exhausted at the end of WWII.  Moreover, 
scrutinizing the macrocosm of the Cold War is made easier and has greater clarity 
when viewed under the guise of military and politico-military practices drawn out by 
what had happened in WWII.  Finally, analysing the statecraft at play within the 
framework of the two ‘types’ of warfare and remained in the post-war era gains a 
more precise understanding of airpower’s ongoing influence.  What it brought to the 
fore comprises a crucial component of this thesis: the continuing and ever-greater 
geo-strategic pervasiveness of the military, and its conjoining to warfare in the 
expansion of the nation-state after WWII.  
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Warfare and the Cold War 
 
Broadly speaking, during the time of the Cold War the spheres of influence each  
superpower wished to exert, became more and more tied to the military.  A robust and  
omnipresent military—not unlike that exhibited by the superpowers of previous 
centuries—was needed in order to define allegiances, influence demarcation and to 
reinforce protectorate associations.  What the accompanying policy achieved, in the 
minds-eye of both the US and the Soviets, during post-WWII times was an 
announcement of, the massive retaliatory stratagems available if the kinetic phase of 
warfare suddenly occurred.  The US had an advantage over the USSR as, over the 
previous decades, and in particular with its involvement in the two twentieth century 
world wars came to understand an overriding principle: that direct military 
intervention and/or prolonged fractious engagement could and should develop into a 
fundamental component of their geo-strategic policy.  As would be expected from its 
history, and which is vital for the underpinnings of this thesis, the US had, over many 
decades slowly acquired the fiscal, material, and personnel wealth, to fight wars of 
great duration and destruction.162   This had over time come to be known as the 
‘American Way of War.’163
 
  The Cold War (1948-1989) fits neatly into this 
expectation and the US was at least historically, well-versed in dealing with the kinds 
of conflict it would potentially throw up.  
The US-USSR potential crisis evolved around who was ‘better prepared’ and as such 
the military apparatus through which both sides planned any reaction to a 
(conventional) non-thermonuclear war was one of confronting any potential clash in 
several pivotal ways: by the assembling of a standing and reserve army; development 
of a comprehensive blue-water navy; the creation of an air force consisting of jet 
fighters, fighter bombers, and long-range bombers; and the development of short-
range, mobile, and long-range rocket/missile programs.  Further to this, a naval 
                                                 
162 The ability of the United States to fight wars of duration and destruction is cited by Weigley who 
maintains the US achieved this capacity ‘at about the time the [American] Civil War erupted.  That 
conflict made a lasting impression on the collective conscientiousness of Americans…and it also 
suggested the complete overthrow of the enemy, the [complete] destruction of his military power is the 
object of war.’  See: Christopher Gacek.  The Logic of Force.  The Dilemma of Limited War in 
American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 18. 
163 The ‘American Way of War’ is centred on the notion that warfare for Americans resides in an ‘All-
or-Nothing’ approach to war.  In the course of war, heavy emphasis is placed on attrition and material 
in the process of force, and is in consonant with the most essential elements of American political and 
cultural history.  See: The Logic of Force, 18.      
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presence which could deliver a measure of force in concert with a large airborne strike 
capability—a fleet air arm—with the auxiliary of large troop delivery and deployment 
capabilities, were also incorporated in their planning.  The advantages and anticipated 
benefits of these determinants was a comprehensive geo-strategic military strength to 
be used as a backup to any foreign policy initiatives, and moreover expressed a 
forthright willingness to use force in, and through, strategic positioning.  
Underpinning military reach as a component of US and Soviet foreign policy is vast, 
although it can be succinctly summed up by in the single nucleus of ‘selective 
engagement.’164
 
   The usage of this geo-strategy comprised an overt expression of 
intent in guarding dominions, allies, and protectorates with the option of interdiction 
if need be, and in tandem with this strategy expressed nation-state interests as a 
central component of grand strategy on the high-seas, and in the polity of state.   
Placing the interactive precepts in perspective within a narrative of the Cold War 
allows for a sharper focus on the strategic muscle that was applied at certain times, 
and how its application to be seen in the military and politico-military spheres of 
preponderance.  Therefore, it remains to highlight how and why they emerged and to 
tease them out in order to gain a greater comprehension of the total war concept.  
Reflecting on this aspect from an historical perspective, superpower status is not a 
new phenomenon as throughout the ages powerful nations-states—and before the 
state’s existence, fiefdoms, micro-states, chiefdoms to name only several—often 
expanded through military aggression.  Although this has often been used in 
conjunction with varying degrees of diplomatic influence it has a universal feature of 
states wishing to ‘impose [internal] order on the one hand and fight their neighbours 
on the other.’165
                                                 
164 According to Art, ‘Selective engagement is a precautionary strategy and holds that military power is 
a useful and fungible instrument of statecraft…military power is useful for producing military as well 
as non-military results and therefore the United States can use its military forces to help shape the 
international environment so as to make it congenial to America’s political and economic interests.’  
See: Robert Art. ‘America’s Imperial Ambition.’ The Use Of Force.  Military Power and International 
Politics.  Edited by Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz.  Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004, 
300.    
  The reasons for fighting neighbours are many with some of the 
triggers being resource-driven, religious, ideological, based on a perceived or actual 
threat, or consist of the more arcane tenets of identity definition, as expressed by Sun 
165 Martin Van Creveld.  The Rise and Decline of the State.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, 242. 
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Tzu.166
 
  All are enough to gain the ire of a power.  The nation-state, in the context of 
this thesis, has displayed a desire for expansion and one of the most literal expressions 
of this is the gaining of territory.  Regardless of the triggers, the growth of 
sophisticated and ever-responsive armed forces is what was needed in order for the 
state to maintain its military and politico-military status throughout history, and this is 
expressed in the immediate aftermath of WWII.   
It is here that the collisions that the nation-state encounters in the quest for expansion 
are pertinent to mention, as in these interminable processes nation-states have always 
faced constraints and limitations.  Any constraints by definition must impact on the 
ability for a nation-state to expand at the rate that it wishes.  These may consist of 
underestimating a foreign army’s capability, internal dissent within their own military 
or government ranks, large scale unrest, tax, or industrial strife and unforseen 
alliances, to name only some major elements.  Hence, the prosecution of influence has 
always been a delicate balancing act and thus, the potential for failure can be 
enormous and engaging in warfare simply increases the odds.  From the perspective 
of the belligerents, and with respect to the Cold War, there existed a fundamental 
premise which heavily influenced the thinking of the belligerents in their expressions 
of preponderance: thermonuclear outcome in the environment of the Cold War would 
be catastrophic for the belligerents. This is succinctly summed up by Kaplan as, 
‘never before in recorded history have two nations had the power to destroy each 
other simultaneously.’167
                                                 
166 The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu believed warfare offered the ‘State’ or in more explicit terms 
the micro-state or feudal region, a greater definition to its existence via power.  Knox in quoting Tzu 
refers to warfare and the state being ‘inextricably linked,’ and warfare as being ‘of vital importance of 
[and to] the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.’  See: MacGregor Knox. 
‘Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy.’  The Making of Strategy.  Edited by 
Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994, 615.  
  The reason this is pertinent, and was keenly understood by 
both actors, is it had been expressed in the thermonuclear war outcome that ended the 
Pacific phase of WWII—the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the USAF, 
which fell into the realm of non-conventional warfare.  It was through this 
understanding and recognition that powerful nation-state’s, and nation-states in 
general, came to perceive limited warfare as the preferred maxim of viable future 
expansion.  Such a tenet of power stakes could be achieved without bringing to 
167 Morton Kaplan.  ‘Limited Retaliation as a Bargaining Chip.’  Limited Strategic War.  Edited by 
Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read.  London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, 144. 
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fruition the catastrophic potential of thermonuclear warfare, whilst ensuring the 
status-quo of the nation-state remained intact.  Notwithstanding, such an 
understanding does not completely rule out total war happening and nor does it rule 
out that the threat of total annihilation existed.  The military-driven agendas of the US 
and USSR used this as a cornerstone of any colossal exchange, and it is here that the 
concept of ‘total war’ can be introduced in order to comprehend the deeper issues of 
preponderance during this time; and the historical premises upon which they were 
made.  
 
The Cold War era and ‘total war’ 
 
After the joint Allied Forces victories of WWII had reached fruition, the associated  
geo-strategic agreements made during the war between the Western Allied powers  
and the USSR became deadlocked.   The annihilation and surrender of Nazi Germany 
and continual geo-strategic and geo-political manoeuvrings that followed in the wake 
of WWII eventuated in a complete and catastrophic breakdown in relations.  The 
rupture sent the Western Allies—essentially Great Britain, the US and the liberated 
west of Germany under the authority of the Americans—on a collision course with the 
USSR and finally, in June 1948 Stalin’s ‘suspicions about western [geo-strategic and 
geo-political] motives led him to impose a blockade of West Berlin…closing the 
western zones of the city to ground access and shutting off utilities.’168
 
  The 
subsequent flurry of political, military, humanitarian, and logistical crises triggered by 
the annexing of West Berlin reinvigorated and a geo-strategic platform of ‘total war.’   
The macrocosm of ‘total war’ framed in the context of the Cold War rivalries 
presented in many ways what had existed for many centuries as a ‘type’ of warfare 
which consists of a nation-state (or powerful actor) engaging with, and then forcing 
extreme strictures on another.  The extent of the impositions and threats inform the 
way in which military force, politico-military and foreign policy strategies become 
‘driven’ and in the process, give indicators of the war becoming ‘total.’  In examining 
a ‘type’ or ‘model’ of warfare draws attention to the motivations a nation-state uses 
                                                 
168 Blaine Browne and Robert Cottrell.  Uncertain Order.  The World in the Twentieth Century.  New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003, 263. 
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during the processes with regard to their respective geo-strategic manoeuvres, and it is 
these that underscore hostilities.  Although this section of the thesis is centred on the 
Cold War there is a need to establish what total war ‘consists of,’ in the broad-
spectrum sense of the term, and this is best accomplished by not referring to a specific 
war, as the goal is to observe definitive features of how a war meets this criterion.    
 
Notwithstanding, total war remains a complex event as it has many interacting 
components, and as with any war, the move toward totality is influenced in phases, as 
it may not begin as a total war.  There is however, an issue that can be extracted 
immediately which offers total war a definitive base.  Total war is largely defined by 
the extreme nature of military response and ferocity and due to this total wars or 
‘hegemonic wars’ are characterized by their ‘intensity, scope and duration.’169  
Pushing warfare to such an extreme limit according to Gray reduces the chances of a 
war dissipating as when wars are underpinned by such extremes they, ‘tend to become 
total as the price of victory rises and the quest for decision [pertaining to acceptable 
outcomes] remains unsatisfied.’170   Associated with the impending ferocity, or actual 
ferocity of warfare, the animosity between actors persists and intensifies, clashes 
increase in frequency, which inevitably drives the war to its ‘totality.’  Psychological 
parameters also accompany the clashes and collisions, as the hostilities become 
associated with a perception, that a fundamental historical change is taking place, 
which is further supplemented by a ‘gnawing fear’ that others are working against the 
dominant forces in the principal actor’s power base.171  A critical input into the power 
stakes at this point is the move toward war or an escalation in friction.  The dominant 
power seeking to minimise its own losses rather than maximise its gains, and in 
having this mindset in place often launches a pre-emptive attack signalling the course 
of events escaping human control.172
                                                 
169 War and Change in World Politics, 200. 
   Human control, in this instance, can be taken as 
a failure in negotiations, or in the recognition that war does not necessarily have to be 
a course of action.  There is however, a striking paradox in the act of pushing for total 
war which does have its place in the milieu of why wars happen.  Extrapolating total 
war out in the broadest sense exposes a critical factor in why total war is preferred, 
170 Colin Gray.  Modern Strategy.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 157. 
171 Robert Gilpin.  War and Change in World Politics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 
200. 
172 War and Change in World Politics, 200-202.   
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regardless of its cost, and there is a political enticement to generating a war to occur at 
this extreme level.  Gilpin avers entering into a total or ‘hegemonic’ war has as a 
benefit that ‘victory and defeat re-establish an unambiguous hierarchy of prestige 
congruent with the new distribution of power within the [political] system.’173
 
 
What the superpowers understood at the beginning of the Cold War was that a 
declaration of total war has a fundamental historical pre-condition present.  This 
‘type’ of warfare exists only rarely and has as a common denominator that it is only 
able to be fought ‘between equal major states.’174  The superpowers understood they 
were ‘equal’ to a large degree, and used this to their geo-strategic advantage.  By 
definition, it stands to reason that unequal states cannot indulge in total war, as the 
conditions for such an unequal violent collision mean the weaker state being usurped 
by the stronger one in a relatively effortless way.   An elaboration of the concept of 
total war and with respect to the Cold War as a war of ‘rivalry,’175
 
 means an 
acknowledgment that there are always other constituent elements present in the war 
itself that will be of influence.    
The immensity of the concept of total war however, cannot be summed up in a single 
circumstance or situation, as it remains a multifaceted event throughout its planning 
and duration.  Notwithstanding, a major component of what total warfare consists 
‘of,’ and how it would be applied in the framework of the Cold War, is able to be 
articulated in 
 
Total wars involve a high mobilization of society…Because total 
wars take on the characteristics of a fight for survival, they tend to 
mobilize resources and means to wage battle with few 
restraints…The goals in total wars are much more open-ended and 
often expand as the war progresses.  Total wars often demand the 
complete overthrow of the leadership of the other side whether 
                                                 
173 War and Change in World Politics, 200. 
174 The War Puzzle, 228. Emphasis in original. 
175 A war of rivalry is a particular type of war.  According to Goertz and Diehl rivalry broadly refers to 
‘repeated, militarized conflict between two states: rivalry is a relationship in which both sides deal with 
issues using the military tools of foreign policy…[and rivalry] signifies a hostile relationship, in which 
competition is conducted militarily…[and] expect to have future conflict.’ See: Gary Goertz and Paul 
Diehl.  ‘(Enduring) Rivalries.’  Handbook of War Studies II.  Edited by Manus Midlarsky.  Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2000, 223-226. 
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through demand of unconditional surrender as in World War II, or 
complete annihilation, as in the Third Punic War.176
 
   
In concert with strategic objectives, the ideological component that elevates the power 
stakes in total warfare must also be addressed, to observe why total war has the 
potential to be driven to its cataclysmic end.  Any outbreak that is total consists of one 
or both of the antagonists coming to believe, or believes from the start, that the cause 
of conflict lies in the character of the opponent, and the flawed character of their 
leadership, hence all of its governmental and ideological supports must be purged.177   
The fury associated with this mindset invokes a purposefulness and zealousness by 
the actors and the ‘the corresponding decisions on strategy that shape its outcome are 
both much influenced by the character of the belligerents’178 which can then be 
interpreted as developing an ever-increasing parochialism and narrow-mindedness.  
What increases the chances of the totality being reached is, the stance taken invokes a 
high ‘moral character’ in the war-at-hand, which prevents realpolitik179 intruding into 
constructive de-escalation dialogue.  Politics as a moderating force is unable to bring 
about constructive influence because politics is in, and of itself, a form of war.180
 
   
The lack of de-fusing invariably leads to frenetic, heightened and accusatory rhetoric 
in any exchange which produces a further comprehension amongst the belligerents 
that if a conventional or a non-conventional war breaks out it will inexorably drift 
toward becoming total.  From this a ‘characterization’ of what total war comprises 
becomes possible, and it is 
[C]haracterised by the unlimited means employed and by the general 
scope of the warfare.  Because all parties are drawn into the war and 
the stakes involved are high, few limitations if any, on violence are 
observed with respect the means employed; the limitations in 
violence and treachery tend to be only those necessarily imposed by 
                                                 
176 The War Puzzle, 67. 
177 The War Puzzle, 67.  
178 Modern Strategy, 167. 
179 ‘Realpolitik’ is posited in the notion of power and the desire and to a certain extent the ability to use 
it in a forum of sophisticated peers and recognized institutions.  Realpolitik is posited in and summed 
up as ‘traditional power politics...Realpolitik—is a ‘jungle’, so to speak, where dangerous beasts roam 
and the strong and cunning rule, whereas under the League of Nations [now the UN] the beasts are put 
into cages reinforced by the restraints of international organization, i.e. into a kind of ‘zoo’.’  See: 
Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen.  Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 38. 
180 Hew Strachan.  European Armies and the Conduct of War.  London: Allen & Unwin, 1983, 168. 
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the state of technology, of available resources, and the fear of 
retaliation.181
 
 
The dangers of total war 
 
Having established what underpins total war, the related interplays of the Cold War 
can now be returned to as they inform the direction of the war; and its potential for 
totality.  In particular, the pivotal role that the military plays in any exchange 
invariably means the military will be pushed to the forefront of negotiations, and/or 
confrontations in an acute way.  This, in and of itself, signals the increased importance 
of the military to the contemporary nation state in general; and the superpowers in 
particular.  What largely defined the Cold War however, was the military’s role in 
‘brinkmanship’182  as opposed to direct military action.  The militaristic pontificating 
indulged in by the superpowers supported and encouraged ideologies which in turn, 
allowed for elevated forms of nationalism to be to be attached to ideologies: of East 
European communism versus Western liberal-democracy, and vice-versa.  Whether 
the nationalism the USSR was constantly in need of, was voluntary or enforced, is a 
moot point and need not be entered into here.  The relevant point is the Soviet 
Union—from a strategic perspective—could conscript all of its Eastern-bloc citizens 
in a call-to-arms; as could the US in Western Europe and beyond.  With such a 
massive participation rate it was understood that by definition if a conventional war 
broke out it would rapidly escalate to becoming total.  Assisting an understanding of 
why a conventional war would escalate so rapidly requires a brief foray into the 
central tenets that each superpower maintained during this time, and a further prosaic 
acknowledgement that if a thermonuclear war broke out, it would be deemed total 
from the beginning.  What underpinned any potential move toward total war was a 
type of ‘culture and identity’183
                                                 
181 War and Change in World Politics, 200.  Emphasis added. 
 that Calhoun ascribes to, and these notions are able to 
be applied to the superpowers, as both presented themselves as unique and righteous 
182 According to Gochman brinkmanship becomes part of political manoeuvrings when, ‘decision 
makers perceive a dramatic impending shift in the balance of power in favour of an adversary and/or a 
substantial internal challenge to their own political position at home.’  See: The Process of War, 97. 
183 There are common features in what Calhoun describes as the ‘rhetoric of nations’ and though they 
do not completely define what a nation comprise, they include boundaries of territory, indivisibility, 
sovereignty, legitimacy, participation in collective affairs, direct membership, culture, temporal depth, 
common characteristics and special histories.   See: Craig Calhoun.  Nationalism. Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1997, 4 -5. 
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in their international and domestic arenas.  The intensity with which the culture and 
identity components were interwoven allowed for nationalism to become a bastion to 
support ideology, which in turn generated fractiousness, and then outright military 
hostility.  Supporting this state-of-affairs is Wright, who argues states afflicted by 
deep-set nationalism display obvious characteristics including the seeking of security 
from attack, take immense pride in national prestige and develop a distinctive 
character.  What is more the solidarity offered by these elements contributes to 
expansionism184
 
 and both superpowers exhibited these components in a largely 
unrestrained way.   
The ideological fabric behind the policies and tenets of the Cold War were always 
issues with military and politico-military agendas and authority by each superpower.  
This allowed for the intent of hostile engagement to permeate, and then become an 
integral arm of, their respective geo-strategic policies.  The possibility of an 
impending clash in the fractious environment that was stimulated by the possibility of 
a total war strengthened communism and liberal-democracy via the apparatus of the 
nation-state.  Whilst this reveals something of the power of the ideologies, and their 
standpoints, it is noteworthy that neither superpower questioned the legitimacy of 
each others nation-state status; or nation-statehood in general.  Conversely, the 
appeals of each superpower to their respective citizenry made them ‘symbiotic allies 
of a kind,’185
 
 in the reinforcement of their ideological positions.  Allies were 
constantly sought by each superpower as they manoeuvred in an overall tense geo-
strategic environment, and paradoxically in doing so, invigorated ever-greater and 
more sophisticated forms of statecraft.  This is made clear in the rampant and 
enduring phases in the building of their own hegemonies, they inadvertently 
reinforced nation-statehood as the only premise from which to engage in 
preponderance, and consequently they 
[S]erved a more important purpose of keeping their allies and 
client’s as well as citizens in line.  Exploiting the ubiquitous need for 
protection in the high-risk nuclear world, each had to use mutual fear 
of the “other” to maintain the integrity of their respective camps 
against [nation-state] fragmentation…[and] of fostering integration 
and fighting disintegration in their own world.  In an ironic way, the 
                                                 
184 Quincy Wright.  A Study Of War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, 212.   
185 America’s Half-Century, 241-242. 
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American and Soviet adversaries needed each other—needed the 
Cold War—to further their own hegemonic ambitions.’186
 
 
 
The constant reinforcing of their respective geo-strategies—notwithstanding the 
benefits to statecraft—the agitations began to evolve into a ‘security-dilemma’187
 
 The 
dilemma came to exist commensurate with each superpower’s growing ability to 
mobilise an effective fighting force.  The strategies of protecting the nation-state and 
its expansionist positioning became more and more symbiotically and literally fused 
to the act of warfare; or potential warfare.  Crucially for this argument, it is under 
these circumstances the military became elevated to a more prominent and definitive 
role in the expansionism of the nation-state, as the fulcrum of threat and counter-
threat were endured and moreover, each superpower sought to gain the upper hand.  
The political collisions of offence and defence during the Cold War demanded both 
the threat of robust military responses, and bureaucratic and organizational capacities 
that could efficaciously launch the threat, in real terms. 
From an historical perspective what becomes evident in the interactions of the 
superpowers I argue is what the Treaty of Westphalia set out to achieve, had reached 
an ultimate realization.  Each participant presented the appearance of a unified nation-
state and in doing so, infused into the military spheres an undercurrent which became 
critical in coercing and maintaining allies, whilst also exhibiting the surety of the 
nation-state.  A major part of creating allies for each superpower was premised on a 
chronicle of understanding: no singular militarily inferior state could hope to fend of a 
vastly superior adversary without a military and/or defence pact agreement with one 
of the superpower’s.   Allegiance to a superpower increasingly became a mantle upon 
which actual and potential threat could be evaluated, and this was viewed by less-
powerful states through a prism of survival.  Overall, the fusion of national political 
and military interests often produced a resurgent realpolitik which would be largely 
                                                 
186 America’s Half-Century, 242.  
187 Security uncertainty exists in the international arena between nation-states according to Herz in the 
form of a ‘security dilemma.’ This is a process in which each constellation/group ‘must be, and usually 
are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other 
groups and individuals.  Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more 
and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others…in such a world of competing 
units, power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on, ’  See: 
John Herz. “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.’ World Politics, Vol. 2, Jan, 1950, 157.  
<http://www.jstor.org/view/00438871/di971097/97p0057z/0>  Accessed 13 August 2007. 
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thrashed out in the UN,188
 
 even though this dynamic introduced a less-likely chance 
of all-out war, the military and politico-military remained steadfast to the threat-of-
force framework. 
Although the UN per se had no military input into the Cold War, and by this I mean  
the UN did not impose its will, via a sponsored military force to ensure separation of  
the armies should war break out.  The realpolitik between the superpowers the UN 
supported and promoted in its forums represented an overt symbol of the legitimacy 
of the nation-state even though the two were in this instance, hostile to each other.  In 
many ways the UN represents the robust and constituent components and practices of 
legality conferred on the formation of the nation-state that aspired to and introduced 
by the Treaty of Westphalia.  Returning to contemporary times of the post-WWII era 
one of the main political goals for the UN—as a functioning body-politic and with 
respect to warfare—was to avert a thermonuclear exchange between the two rival 
superpowers.  The credibility in the international arena the existence of the nation-
state had gained is shown by it being so solidly in place, even the omnipresence of 
catastrophic warfare was unable to dislodge its pre-eminence, as both a political and 
structural entity.  During the most chaotic days of the Cold War no rival sought to 
undercut the relevance of the nation-state, or its mechanisms of power and political 
association.  What the Cold War did expose however, was the rudimentary necessity 
of alliances for all nation-states and it is here that the integral link of a strong and 
robust military, that is a principal part of nation-states, becomes evident.   To be sure, 
during the Cold War the building of alliances on the part of the superpowers 
materialised largely in the form of mutual agreements, which directly strengthened 
borders and defined regions as military zones-of-control.  Any alliances were 
incorporated into strictly defined military boundaries, as opposed to the already in 
                                                 
188 The merits and/or shortcomings of the UN as a body-politic—and its forerunner the League of 
Nations—need not be debated here, as only their existence needs mentioning, and the UN as a body-
politic, explained.  Jentleson succinctly sums up the specific function of the UN, in terms of its place in 
the international arena since its immediate post-WWII inception, as it constituting ‘the world’s only 
multilaterally universal political [representative] body…[which] possesses a unique role in providing 
collective [nation-state] legitimization.  No other body or international actor can claim comparable 
legitimacy for establishing global norms and for the authorizing of action in its name.’ See:  Bruce 
Jentleson.  ‘Preventative Statecraft: A Realist Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era.’ Turbulent Peace.  
The Challenge of Managing International Peace.  Edited by Chester Crocker, Fen Hampsen and 
Pamela Aall. Washington: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 2001, 259. 
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place geographic boundaries and the positioning simultaneously forged, potent 
military and politico-military regions (see Figure 4).   
 
 
  
     
   Figure 4.  Divided Europe.  Reprinted from: Uncertain Order, 258. 
 
An historical central tenet of the nation-state is to establish legal boundaries which are 
then able to be enforced by military authority, and fostering a unified military 
response should those tenets be threatened is a core mechanism of the nation-state.  
The Cold War elevated these understandings to stratospheric heights and figure four 
exemplifies the Cold War East-West divide, how it existed in a literal sense and the 
strength and steadfastness of the nation-state via militaristic standpoints.  The 
allegiances of US-Western European nations consisted of a pivotal agreement that 
would deter the threat of advance by Soviet powers and this was the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO).  For the Soviets it was the Soviet-bloc Warsaw Pact, 
and it is timely to address that regardless of whether some Soviet-bloc/Warsaw Pact 
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and NATO-bloc members were coerced is irrelevant, as the purpose here is to observe 
the military coalitions, and the alliances that were struck because of the threat of total 
war.  The NATO agreement largely consisted of an ‘extensive mutual defence pact of 
thirteen initial signatories in Western Europe…[and for the USSR] the formation of 
the Warsaw Pact.’189
 
  Any focussed military strike-capacity and the subsequent 
retaliation on the European continent was to be largely talionic, and this zone of the 
world became an axis point of either death or survival for liberal-democracy or 
communism.  The acute and clear division of borders as drawn by the NATO and 
Warsaw Pact members represented a dyad, as one of genuine strategic reliance; and of 
the alliances under an umbrella of the military integrated into the mechanisms of a 
robust nation-state.   
At this point it is appropriate to define what other addendums that accompany warfare 
as the nation-state seeks to utilize and achieve its geo-strategic objectives.  In this case 
via the hyper-sensitive environment of the Cold War, and I turn now to an evidence-
based historical narrative to examine the issues-at-hand, because it will assist in 
teasing out deeper complexities of warfare.  The constituent parts of warfare during 
the Cold War have so far, been inextricably linked to an associated realpolitik, 
however, what the war demanded was invariably a level of intensity that required new 
skills.  A brief scrutiny of these will assist in understanding total war further, 
especially with the backdrop of the thermonuclear end to the Pacific phase of WWII.   
 
Frictions which formed and informed the various interplays of the Cold War 
becoming ‘hot’ and as have been mentioned, the world’s previous experience of 
thermonuclear zero-sum-game warfare—the dropping of the atomic bombs on 
Japan—introduced a new cataclysmic level of intervention, in terms of the aerial 
‘punishment phase’190
                                                 
189 Uncertain Order, 263. 
 of warfare.  These occurrences broached a new emphasis on 
the realities of available technologies, and brought into stark relief the real 
implications that could be applied in war, and the technological abilities of each 
superpower formulated the singular realization of ‘mutually-assured-destruction’ 
190 The punishment phase of aerial bombardment is designed to ‘inflict enough pain on enemy civilians 
to overwhelm their territorial interests’ and in doing so induce surrender, or hasten total defeat.  See:  
Robert Pape.  Bombing To Win.  Air Power and Coercion in War. New York: Cornell University Press, 
1996, 59. 
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(MAD). 191
 
   Mutually-assured-destruction presented a completely different 
framework of how warfare would ‘fit’ into the concept of total war.  In particular, it 
focussed on the actual consequences related to defeat and what this type of scenario 
would bring about should a MAD intercontinental ballistic (aerial-delivery) missile 
exchange take place.   
Placing a thorough analysis of MAD is not needed here beyond its mention as a 
theory, and to place it in the context of the arms race, that the nation-state drew upon 
whilst incorporating military technology and tactical advantages into its strategies: in 
particular that of ‘preponderance.’   Preponderance is a grand strategy of US origin 
and has been applied to both the US and the USSR.  According to Layne it consists of 
the creation and maintenance, a world order based on 
 
[P]re-eminent U.S. political military and economic power, and on 
American values; maximisation of U.S. control over the international 
system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe 
and East Asia; and maintenance of economic interdependence as a 
vital U.S. security interest…[and one] that can be used to justify U.S. 
intervention anywhere.192
 
  
A MAD exchange offered mutual and complete destruction for the first time in 
history; and in particular for the first time in the history of warfare.  The conviction to 
such a grandiose stratagem meant that a war would have to end in a complete military 
victory, which would result in a zero-sum-game193
                                                 
191 The relevant aspects of MAD are complex and dependent on model-driven analysis as it never 
eventuated in a real world event.  Mutually-assured-destruction is a singular hypothetical event and is 
dependent upon a multitude of factors associated with missile warfare—as advanced upon after 
WWII—and there are definitive and specific actions needed in order to support the hypothetical.  To 
wit, ‘underlying technical and timing factors in a simulated missile war…[and] the Richardson Model 
is one of the first analytical approaches to an arms race between two countries…This model has been 
applied in modern treatments to arms races in the missile age.’  The Richardson Model’s deals with 
warfare as a possible occurrence and because it is not posited in real world is hypothetical. This 
approach inherently offers a balanced outlook because it is less strategically-motivated, and therefore 
covers politically highly-charged MAD related aspects as well as military ones.  See: Michael 
Intriligator.  ‘Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races.’  The Journal of 
Political Economy. Vol. 83, 2, 339.  Accessed University of Ballarat  
<http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di950967/95p0006w/0>  
 outcome.  This level of extreme 
bellicosity has as an end result the malformed logic of death being better than living 
192 Robert Art and Patrick Cronim.  ‘The U.S. and Coercive Diplomacy.’  The Use Of Force, 284 -288. 
193 According to Cohen a ‘zero-sum-game’ or ‘zero-end-sum-game’ is the polarized ‘win-lose’ 
environment that is dictated by the extreme of the hostilities and is summed up ‘when one state wins 
the other must lose.’  See:  Benjamin Cohen.  ‘International Finance.’  Handbook of International 
Relations, 441.  Emphasis added. 
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under an alternative political regime.  The mix alluded to, with regard to warfare in 
the twentieth-century, was the technology-element of warfare became harnessed to 
structural realism,194
 
 or the ‘balance-of-power’ theory, which made the chances of a 
war becoming catastrophic into a certainty and therefore, the idea of what defeat 
would constitute needed to be re-evaluated.  The evidence of previous centuries in 
which opposing sides had never suffered absolute destruction when a war was 
embarked upon under the banner of total war however, remained in the forefront of 
geo-strategic estimates for both major actors.   
Placing this seemingly incomprehensible situation of total destruction into a 
manageable perspective requires an historical and allegorical grounding be given with 
regard to defeat.  What constituted ‘defeat’ prior to MAD, and how MAD was 
different to what came before is to focus on an easy to observe historical premise.  
Nation-states and rulers often fought each other to a standstill in times gone by, to the 
point of military exhaustion and population slaughter.  Hence, in the total wars of the 
past some wars resulted in a stalemate or a victory of no real strategic worth.  In 
Ancient times if winning a campaign entailed such an extreme effort it came to be 
known as a ‘pyrrhic victory,’195
                                                 
194According to Buzan, ‘structural realism’ is an advancement on the concept of realism.  Realism 
‘emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international relations…and the security dilemma.’   
Structural realism takes this notion one step further defending the ‘centrality of the state, and especially 
the great powers, exposing the partiality of some interdependence views of international relations, and 
reaffirming the primacy of American power in the international system.’  See: Barry Buzan.  ‘The 
timeless wisdom of realism?’ International theory: positivism & beyond.  Edited by Steve Smith, Ken 
Booth and Marysia Zalewski.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 49-51. 
 and although it represented a mutual-destruction in 
the military sense of the term, it constituted only a small portion of the massive 
destruction that could be produced in post-WWII contemporary times.  Nonetheless, 
there are elements in the prior ‘forms’ of total war that are present in the potential 
perils of an all-out nuclear conflict in the twentieth-century.  The ‘absoluteness’ of the 
Cold War invoked  many of the psychological, military, developmental, political, and 
narrative elements of bygone eras.  To wit, the concept and practice of total warfare is 
given a deeper perspective when examined with the military and political 
developments of the Middle Ages.  Total warfare, as a means-to-an-end was vibrant in 
195 The term ‘pyrrhic victory’ derives from King Phyrrus the ruler of Epirus who led several (Greek) 
campaigns against the Romans—finally defeating them in 279 B.C.E.  In doing so, he sustained such 
heavy casualties his power was severely compromised, the ‘victory [was] achieved at great or 
excessive cost; a ruinous victory.’   See: Random House Dictionary.  Dictionary.comUnabridged. 1998.  
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pyrrhic >  Accessed 20 September 2008. 
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previous centuries and was often harnessed to advances, such as technology 
(artillery), political sophistication (modernity), and national identity (irredentism) and 
drawing these relevant components together an observation can be made: the Cold 
War had elements that were forged in previous centuries, although the elements in the 
contemporary time of the post-WWII era were developed to and were of, amplified 
importance, due to possibility of massive destruction. 
 
The nation-state at this time and due to the inherent dangers posed to its existence 
began to incrementally put into place military (and politico-military) schemes which 
consisted of the superpowers exercising modes of control over each other.  
Paradoxically, and with a view to the hostility, this was to ensure total war did not 
break out and in accomplishing this, they needed to establish, extend and secure local 
and global reach and put policies into place which at their core produced ‘a simpler 
division and a much stronger degree of control in the world.’196   The military became 
the energy through which the two most powerful post-WWII nation-states managed 
their geo-strategic affairs, and it is at this point in history where the military adjunct 
reaches its most concentrated point in the actual potential of the nation-state.  This is 
borne out in the acquisition of territories via invasion and/or the consolidation of 
territorial allegiance via pacts and any subsequent political collaboration.  The 
superpowers understood if they were to extract maximum success they would have to 
use war to gain the upper hand, yet not let total war be the outcome.  War, would have 
to encompass certain strategies in order to guarantee greater success in any hostilities 
and both would attempt to incorporate in their preponderances the ‘Napoleonic 
model’ of unity which constitutes a ‘trinity’ of ‘the people, the army, and the 
government’197
                                                 
196 What is meant by this is relevant policies-of- containment established a more secure position for 
statehood—regardless of alliances—in the world. See: The Causes Of War, 166. 
 operating as an integrated and cohesive force.  Both superpowers 
were able to adhere to the maxims within the trinity that effectively had encouraged a 
movement toward total war in their domestic, as well as international arenas in WWII, 
and beyond.  Another factor which pushed the irredentism boundary beyond the 
domestic populace was the respective superpower placing itself in the role of martyr.  
To a certain extent, and this can be observed in the case of the West having a formal 
though not legal understanding, the US would in any altercation ‘shoulder the burden 
197 John Nagl. Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya And Vietnam.  Learning to Eat Soup with a 
Knife.  Westport: Praeger, 2002, 16. 
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of confrontation with the USSR,’198
 
 on behalf of all western liberal-democratic 
nation-states, as would Russia for Eastern-bloc nations.  The culmination of all of 
these societal forces operating in unison improves the chances of victory if the 
military option is embraced.  Observing these two examples allows for them to be 
seen as the military and cultural template upon which the stratagems of both the US 
and the USSR were employed.   
The Cold War, with its curious blend of reinforcing statehood, elevating force, and 
infusing people with nationalistic state-driven ideologies, although it can be argued 
these combinations did nothing to discourage a maxim of total warfare, it never broke 
out.  The threat, as all-pervasive as it was, simply did not result in a war.  Thus, the 
superpowers with their own particular thrust of the military driving their statehood 
continued with their intermingling of preponderances and alliance-making in a robust 
manner.  From within this milieu there was a change in pace needed for the nation-
state, if it was to achieve its geo-strategic goals, and this would be accessed under the 
auspices of ‘measured’ responses; and it was this political stratagem acted to limit the 
collision-potential of their geo-military and geo-political expansion strategies.  The 
critical issue for the state in this process was to deploy its military and politico-
military persuasiveness to maximize on success whilst continuously assessing, and 
reassessing, the quest for victory.  The reason for all to be shrewdly calculated is any 
state embarking upon expansion may push things too far and default to war, which as 
Blainey succinctly asserts ‘is often unintended [as] is the length and bloodiness of the 
war. Defeat too is unintended.’199
 
 
 The superpowers with access to thermonuclear capability recognized that a change in 
geo-strategic political thinking needed to evolve, and another would need to be put 
into action if the extramural desires of the nation-state were to be continually 
satisfied.  The superpowers (and their regional allies) needed a new approach when 
embarking upon power-struggles after the ravages of WWII.  The increased potential, 
if only from a technology point-of-view meant a thermonuclear collision compelled a 
change in practices.  In achieving their aims another stratagem rapidly needed 
presenting, and it would have to be a more honed and skilled version of warfare than 
                                                 
198 Uncertain Order, 263.   
199 The Causes of War, 249.   
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the massive retaliatory actions that had been borne of the latter phases of WWII, and 
which has already been expressed were still current.  Although it would take more 
time to achieve satisfactory outcomes it would keep preponderance manageable and 
the power base and power stakes of the superpowers intact.  What came of this geo-
strategic contemplation was the only decisive and relatively risk free option that 
remained after WWII: ‘limited war.’200
 
  
 
Limited war and the ambitions of the nation-state 
 
Although total war is complex in itself, limited war, when compared to total war is a 
much deeper and multifaceted phenomenon and thus, one which constitutes a greater 
complexity than total war.  Simply yet accurately stated, at the end of the day total 
war has a more definitive, calculated and specific culmination, and due to this 
categorizing and labelling its definition is largely unproblematic.  In precise terms, the 
destruction wrought by the victor is massive and the pathway to achieving this 
militarily is to engage strategic military actions that ensure this outcome, with the 
final ‘point’ being a total submission of the enemy.  This simple snapshot of total 
warfare makes limited warfare, in and of itself, much less ‘definable’ when compared 
to the relatively straightforward, logical and precise avenues and terms of total war.  
The problematics of limited war are that it has within it conceptual tensions: how 
much of a commitment is ‘limited,’ and by what ‘means’ should they be measured?   
It is nevertheless, suffice to state that warfare after WWII has failed to escalate into 
total war, and hence by definition, any war that has taken place in the post-WWII 
era—other than the crowded debate associated with the Cold War and its 
deliberations—must be categorized as ‘limited.’  But this is a banal observation only 
and the conceptual tensions I point to run deeper.  To be more specific, Osgood 
enunciation of the pivotal discord, within the concept stresses the inherent difficulties 
of what ‘limited’ actually consists of, and further stipulates engagement in hostilities 
incorporates the following dichotomy: ‘war may be limited from the perspective of 
                                                 
200 Limited war had been recognized by many strategists, writers, administration and government 
advisors and it had gained credibility as a ‘force,’ and put into place prior to (and during the various 
military and diplomatic engagements of ) the Korean War.   It was premised on an overall 
acknowledgement that after the ravages of WWII that ‘conflicts of the future would have to be limited 
if civilization were to survive and war were to retain some rational purpose.’  See: The Logic of Force, 
132-133. 
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one belligerent, yet virtually unlimited in the eyes of another.’201
 
   The complexity 
within the discord when explored within an historical framework or overarching 
strategy, allows for the nebulous aspects of what comprises ‘limited’ to be reduced to 
a series of conduits, and in doing this a yardstick of ‘measure’ may be applied.   
Limited warfare, when viewed as a strategy consists of a set of tactical actions that are 
applied as part of a focussed, deliberate, and systemic stratagem, one that necessitates 
continued and/or graduated involvement dependent on circumstances.  Limited 
warfare’s ultimate ‘measure’ however, has one pivotal component that dictates what 
‘limited’ sums up, and that is complete destruction is not a part of any stratagem.  It is 
with this in mind that the tensions alluded to can now be analysed and grounded.    
The complex chain of events associated with limited war needs to be given an 
historical grounding, in order to extract pertinent and tangible aspects that will aid in 
the understanding of its application.  This can be achieved readily by using the 
example in which Britain employed limited war in both, times gone by and in more 
contemporary times.  Due to the power of the British and the subsequent compilation 
and abundance of record-keeping—and in no small measure that the US adopted 
similar practices in the post-WWII era on which the latter part of this thesis will 
concentrate—it is relevant to access the British and their modus operandi when 
engaging in limited war.  Limited engagement has been the method by which war has 
been fought by the British over several centuries, and comprises what Liddell-Hart 
deems an ‘indirect grand strategy.’202  The ‘indirectness’ alluded to constitutes 
practices which default to a lack of direct, head-on and/or grand-scale confrontations 
and hostile collisions.  This strategy, employed by the British was an exercise that 
effectively and actively safeguarded Britain from where it was weakest, and exerted 
its strength (via sea power in this instance) where the enemy was weakest.203  
According to Lewis, the limited engagement associations of the indirectness evolved 
into and became a ‘limited-war exhaustion strategy’204
                                                 
201 Robert Osgood.  Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1957, 2. 
 and the merits of this strategic 
blueprint is summed up  
202  Basil Liddell-Hart.  When Britain Goes to War: Adaptability and Mobility. London: Faber and 
Faber, 1932, 29-42. 
203 When Britain Goes to War, 29-42. 
204 Adrian Lewis.  Omaha Beach:  A Flawed Victory. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001, 34-35. 
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The British practice of warfare from the sixteenth century to World 
War 1 was to employ…[a] way of war [which] de-emphasized direct 
confrontation, concentration, mass, and battle and emphasized 
surprise, mobility, manoeuvre, peripheral attacks on the enemy 
weaknesses, dispersion, conversion of resources, and negotiated 
settlements.  War was to be conducted in a “businesslike” manner 
and was to be profitable.  The British used sea power primarily to 
achieve their limited strategic objectives.  They traditionally fought 
low-expenditure, high-gain wars that took advantage of Britain’s 
geographic circumstances that exploited those of its enemy.  The 
British way of war was to destroy when possible the enemy’s fleet; 
attack enemy trade; block the enemy’s coast and conduct raids on the 
enemy’s ports, coastal towns and colonies; seize, when possible, the 
enemy’s colonies; subsidize allies on the Continent; wait for the 
attacks on the enemy’s economy and peripheral areas to erode its 
capacity to resist; exploit opportunities through the use of surprise 
made possible by the superior mobility of the fleet; deploy limited 
expeditionary forces on the Continent to fight alongside the larger 
forces of the allies; and finally, to manoeuvre the enemy into an 
untenable position in which it had no other option but to conclude a 
peace agreement on terms set by the British and their allies.205
 
 
 
What the above description constitutes, with regard to a mode of warfare, highlights 
the way in which Britain exploited a specific strategy to its fullest extent.  In doing so, 
it offers a contextualization which pulls together the concept of limited war and how it 
remains ‘limited.’  The use of the strategies of indirectness and exhaustion, as pointed 
out by Liddell-Hart and Lewis, indicates the direct benefits this ‘type’ of warfare 
offers when astutely and selectively applied.  A brief explanation of the benefits 
alluded to are required at this point to further hone the notion of how warfare could 
possibly be of ‘benefit,’ and therein illustrate why it is productive beyond the 
necessary strategic input.   
 
For Britain, in the period from the sixteenth century to the outbreak of WWI, meant 
that it did not need to place its military forces on a stationary- and/or static-footing.  
What this amounts to is British forces did not need to remain on their home island or 
maintain an intra-regional focus and defence-centred security.  Due to the freedoms 
this strategic positioning allowed for, it could extend its range of power projection 
beyond its shores.  By using this particular approach and deploying its naval forces in 
                                                 
205 Omaha Beach, 34-35.   
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a tactically astute manner, in both the defensive and offensive spheres, it was able to 
exercise geo-strategic power far beyond its shorelines.  What is more, Britain could 
plan for future extramural engagements and extramural assaults because of the 
inherent inbuilt freedoms the indirectness of the strategy allowed for, and when 
employed sagaciously it offered Britain an enhanced security, whilst menacing others.  
This was due to the force-projection configuration of only applying direct and equal 
confrontations when absolutely necessary.  The crucial benefit for Britain was that 
limited warfare fought in this way, directly allowed for ever-greater strategically 
orientated freedom-of-movement outside the British Isles and therefore, a constant 
increase in strengths.  In employing such tactics Britain exemplified a powerful 
nation-state’s successful prosecution of limited warfare in two of its multitude of 
ways; and its ongoing successes illustrates the direct and positive repercussions of its 
astute use.  The actions stipulated, guaranteed a greater rate of success on the part of 
Britain as it did not have to constantly defend itself in its region and crucially, in 
doing so did not need to plan only defence-orientated wars.  Broadly speaking, having 
to fight defence-orientated wars generates offshoots of fortress and bulwark strategies 
against foes, which generate notions of non-expansionism and of needing home-based 
protectionist strategies.  What this analogy has exposed is that the astute application 
of limited war has an ‘inbuilt safety’ mechanism, which over the centuries, has been 
moulded into a viable strategy.  Total annihilation by its very nature, requires massive 
resource input on many levels that limited warfare does not, and limited war can be 
more easily manipulated to get favourable results.   
 
When applied astutely, limited war offers a shrewd and intelligent fusion of the twin 
pillars of another successful strategy: direct military power and politico-military 
influence.  More importantly, when utilized and synchronised effectively the fusion 
offers considerable strategic advantage as the Anglo-Spanish War (1585-1604)206
                                                 
206 The complexity of sea battles and the actual numbers that ended in victory for England need not be 
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at sea-lane rule, and therefore, limited war.  In 1588 for instance, England and Spain formally went to 
war against each other. The English employed attacks designed to unnerve the Spanish in the English 
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across the Channel due to the irregular nature of the attacks and the ferocity of them and the ruse 
worked.  The tactics were designed to harry the Spanish armada rather than engage in a full-scale 
confrontation which would induce a great number of English casualties.  See:  Chris Trueman. ‘The 
Spanish Armada.’ HistoryLearningSite, 2005. 
 had 
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shown Britain and moreover, the advantages in taking this strategy are far beyond the 
cost of any single action.  Two further, simple and telling examples which highlight 
the positive benefits and the low opportunity-cost of this stratagem are evident in the 
British occupation of India (1750-1798 and for many years beyond).  With regard to 
India  
 
[T]he search for trade took the British East India Company to India it 
was its armies that kept it there, both as trader and ruling power…[I]t 
was possible to gain influence and even control at the courts of 
Indian Princes or their rivals.  In addition to its own armies the 
British East India Company had regiments and officers from the 
regular English army sent to assist them…[England and] its armies 
were always the potent force that established and maintained its 
power.207
 
   
In more contemporary times, what the 1982 Falklands Islands/Islas Malvinas War 
directly represents is a successful limited war being fought in a strategically 
opportunistic way.  Within the scrutiny, it is useful to observe the politic-military 
environment it created.  The war was premised on a long dispute associated with 
sovereignty between Great Britain and Argentina with regard to island ownership in 
the south Atlantic.  After a ground invasion by Argentinean military forces on the 
main east Falkland island via Port Stanley the British exercised a thorough and 
focussed campaign, one that consisted of in real terms, of very little military cost with 
a concomitant enormous show of strength and resolve.  From the time the military 
junta that ruled Argentina ordered an invasion of the islands  
 
Great Britain refused to accept the invasion.  The Royal Navy put 
together a task force to retake the islands at the same time British 
diplomats persuaded the United Nations to condemn the Argentine 
invasion…[and] established a war zone around the islands…British 
soldiers landed on East Falklands on May 21 [1982]…[and] 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/spanish_armada.htm>  Accessed 30 May 2008.  Moreover, the 
tactics of defence and of using the English Channel as an opportunistic zone-of-control and of 
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207 Encyclopaedia Of India. (Volume 1).  Editor Stanley Wolpert.  New York: Thomson Gale, 2006, 
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following heavy fighting…the Argentine garrison in Port Stanley 
surrendered on June 14, bringing an end to the conflict.208
 
   
The end result for the British was winning this limited war would stamp their 
authority on the islands once and for all; and secure a strategic footprint in the South 
Atlantic Ocean.  Maximum gain at relatively little cost was the mainstay of the limited 
war strategy that the British undertook on both these occasions.  The actions however, 
exemplify the opportunities limited warfare can generate providing it is able to be 
monitored; and kept within well-defined parameters.  In the case of Britain the 
‘monitoring’ which produced such a favourable outcome consisted of strong 
government/military support of a private company in the first instance, and in the 
second instance the efficacious use of a focussed military presence.  These were 
conjoined to favourable geo-strategic offshoots.  What is more, and is a pivotal point 
in why the wars were immensely successful is the British in both instances, were 
certain that the wars would not escalate beyond the limits they had imposed on them.   
 
What this emphasises is that regardless of the propensity to invoke the military option, 
simply stated and as shown by the Falklands War, limited warfare in contemporary 
times is underpinned by ‘limits’ rather than ‘excesses.’  Hence, due to the level of 
politico-military interaction, conflict around actual and potential limited war has since 
post-WWII times, taken on ever-more sophisticated diplomatic and political forms, 
most notably in contemporary times within the UN itself.   Giving this a grounding 
acknowledges that limited warfare in the previous centuries often had boundaries of 
constraint set by rulers, and they would evolve through military pontificating, 
religious intervention, via some forms of (nascent) diplomacy and/or  because of 
personal ambitions being tempered.  This is nothing new per se, as throughout the 
ages the use of limited warfare has involved the maximum degree of force that limited 
war allows within the somewhat nebulous parameters of what constitutes ‘limited,’ 
and, as part of an overall strategy, of a ruling power.  The ongoing development of 
limited warfare and its application have often been in tandem with some level of 
politico-military involvement and function due to the desire for a war not to escalate: 
the two wars mentioned illustrate limited war’s presence reinforcing this notion, albeit 
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with different levels of sophistication.  Limited warfare therefore, and particularly in 
its application in the post-WWII era, can now be grounded in the state-of-affairs of 
  
Modern limited war was an artificial creation caused by the 
development of nuclear weapons.  The limited wars of the past, those 
prior to the advent of the modern nation-state, were limited because 
they lacked the social and political organization; cultural cohesion; 
nationalistic ideology; military organization and theory; and 
industrial, logistical, and technological capabilities to fight more 
total wars.  Modern limited war required a nation-state to place 
artificial restraints in the conduct of war to preclude it from 
escalating into more total war, nuclear war.  Artificial limited war 
required nations to place limitations on the objectives sought; 
weapons and manpower employed; the time, terrain, and geographic 
area of hostilities; and the emotions, passions, and energy, and 
intellect committed by a nation.209
 
 
Nevertheless, limited war is underpinned by powerful nation-states wanting to 
exercise power and influence via military force and in doing so, tend to keep it within 
the constraints alluded, so as not to escape the human ‘control’ mentioned earlier.  As 
difficult as this is in times of frenetic activity, warfare brings with it ways of ensuring 
it does not spill over the parameters set by the nation-state.  Osgood stipulates this 
balancing act requires a deliberate intermeshing of politics to the military on the part 
of the nation-state, in order that it applies the correct amount of force at the correct 
time.  This is summed up in  
 
[A] strategy [of limited warfare] would harness the nation’s military 
power more closely to the attainment of its political objectives.  A 
variety of military instruments, including conventional forces, would 
be readied to respond to different threats at different levels.  The 
amount of force employed in any situation would be limited to that 
necessary to achieve political aims.  The objective would be not to 
destroy the opponents but to persuade to break off the conflict short 
of achieving their goals and without resorting to nuclear 
war…Limited war must be directed by the civilian leadership…[and] 
the military must be a controllable instrument of national policy.210
 
 
                                                 
209 Adrian Lewis.  The American Culture of War.  The History of U.S. Military Force from World War 
II to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  New York: Routledge, 2007, 203.  Emphasis in original.  Whilst  
210 Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, 22-27.  Osgood’s limited war theory is precise in 
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The overall role in the use of force in the prosecution of limited warfare under these 
conditions ostensibly, remains in the realm of the participants manoeuvring 
adversaries into an untenable defensive position, rather than annihilating them.211  The 
upshot of such a state-of-affairs places the state in a predicament, of how to stop the 
potential of war escalating.  In order to achieve this it has been historically (and in 
more contemporary times) to gain the upper hand as quickly as possible and exercise 
force ‘at whatever level may be necessary to efficiently and decisively achieve the 
[limited] military and political objectives of the state.’212
 
  This is in part, was (and is) 
due to the somewhat limited windows of opportunity limited warfare provides.  The 
aim of prosecuting direct force in such a focussed and unambiguous manner, is for the 
war to be as chronologically short as possible; to take full advantage of the limited 
windows of opportunity that are provided.  The efficacious elements of limited war 
dealt with, and as viewed through the prism of Great Britain’s use of it, the dangers 
associated with prolonged limited warfare, particularly for powerful nation-states are 
now able to be expanded upon.    
The dangers of limited war 
 
Exploiting what limited warfare offers, entails the nation-state taking advantage of 
opportunities in a timely way and regardless of its ability to efficiently engage all of 
the requirements necessary to win a war this remains the case.  Clausewitz refers to 
this dilemma as ‘the harsh realities of war,’213and bearing in mind ‘no plan survives 
first contact with the enemy’214
                                                 
211 The State, War, and the State of War, 29. 
 there is a need to acknowledge some issues with 
regard to limited war have remained the same throughout history.  Uncertainty in 
warfare remains omnipresent, no matter what tactical and strategic advantages one 
participant may have over the other and this has existed since time-in-memoriam.  An 
introduction into the numerous possibilities for things to go wrong is relevant, because 
they can, and do, whether the war is well-planned or driven on the back of reaction.  
To be specific, wars are engaged on the pretext that they are eminently winnable and 
this remains true in the minds-eye of the initiator.  However, because warfare can 
212 The Logic of Force, 5. Emphasis in original.  
213 On War, 402 
214 The Fall of the Roman Empire, 177. 
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involve and evolve into a series of predicaments regardless of the amount of planning, 
a brief analysis of reasons contributing to this needs inclusion, in order to gain a more 
balanced understanding of limited war as a phenomenon.  The nation-state initiating 
limited war may make tactical gains without necessarily achieving a quick outright 
victory.  The first phases of limited war generally have within it the benefit of 
immediate expansion and a concomitant sphere-of-influence to some degree.  There 
are however, always other influences which are dormant in the initial stages and come 
to light as the war progresses.  As additional phases come into play they may diminish 
early advantages and produce implicit dangers in commitment.  A war can negatively 
impact on a nation-state’s power base if the gains are not continued thereby, reversing 
the advantages that it offered in the first place.   
 
The tangible and empirical aspects of warfare and the supposed guarantees they offer 
are not the only aspects that govern the direction of warfare as these dynamics often 
give way to less-tangible elements and ‘winning’ strategies.  To enunciate this further, 
requires acknowledging ‘winning’ strategies dredge along with them a milieu of 
negative impacts on the ability to ‘win’ a war.  Reflecting on history will help to 
access and assess this milieu, and address these strategies.  What is meant by this 
statement resides in the hidden complexities that influence a war come to the fore and 
have their own peculiar driving forces.  Osgood assesses that limited warfare, as a 
strategic practice, stimulates complex and sometimes bizarre outcomes.  For instance, 
the US, according to Osgood ‘lived with many illusions of strategic importance that 
damaged the country’s ability to achieve its political objectives through the use of 
military force,’ which in turn, generated actions triggered by illusory and somewhat 
ill-defined notions.  These notions if not tempered infiltrate thinking and eventually, 
fall under the heading of ill-considered ‘strategic objectives.’215  Powerful states that 
embrace these notional, and at times nebulous facets, form perceptions from perceived 
military intrusions and build-ups rather than actual events.  Osgood suggests they 
overtly encourage ‘security dilemmas,’216 that persuade actors to engage in warfare 
‘via multiple means in regions of the world not strategically important to their 
[domestic] security.’217
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  Moreover, indulging in notional objectives results in the state 
216 The American Culture of War, 207. 
217 The American Culture of War, 207. 
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often fighting small and large-scale conventional limited wars simultaneously and this 
is because of the powerful state’s inability to clearly define what is of most 
importance to their security.218
 
  An outcome for that nation-state is that fighting at 
multiple points assists in diminishing the overall ‘threat,’ although the ‘threat’ may 
not constitute a threat in the factual sense of the term.  Hence, there are drastic 
shortcomings in the use of limited war as a strategy and some have been stipulated 
and these risks exist for powerful nations-states as they do for the lesser of the 
adversary.  There are and have always been substantial dangers of engaging in more 
than one war, or a war far from a home base, and this has existed since the beginning 
of ‘organized’ warfare.  Nevertheless, this has not discouraged the nation-state, as the 
power stakes from accessing the supposed advantages of limited war have remained 
vibrant. 
Conclusion to ‘During and After World War II: Warfare in Contemporary 
Times’ 
 
With all the perils of preponderance that total war brought about, the emergence of 
limited war as the preferred modus operandi when the nation-state wished to expand 
is a banal observation.  There were other factors involved in the positioning of limited 
war by the superpowers, as throughout the Cold War the US constructed platforms of 
détente and ensured policies-of-containment were in place.  There were positive 
progressions made in the wider Cold War conflict by different agreements and phases 
of détente.219  Paradoxically, and according to Vadney, this in a sense ‘freed up’ the 
US to pursue many post-WWII strategies directly because a nuclear clash was no 
longer at the forefront of military pontificating.220
 
  This can be observed in the 
negotiations that lessened the chances of a thermonuclear exchange and generated a 
strong understanding that there would not be a hostile clash between the superpowers.  
Moreover, the USSR had its own problems in the Baltic States and did not want to 
engage in a full-blown war with the US.  A step across history timelines is once again 
required in order to see limited war in context. 
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The negotiations of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) need a brief  
acknowledgment here, as they are proof of a solid outcome to a long period of 
politico-military dialogues that had taken place over the time of the arms-race.  These 
it would suggest, encouraged limited conventional war to be brought to the fore.  The 
fact that the US and USSR engaged in talks for decades shows that, although limited 
warfare had always been seen as a viable option associated with regional control, both 
only entered negotiations as long as military pontificating could still be accessed; and 
without it increasing the chance of total war.  The substantial progress which 
eventuated in the early 1970s involved a watershed agreement between the US and 
USSR which is summed up 
 
In 1972 [President] Richard Nixon and Soviet Leader Leonid 
Brezhnev signed SALT 1, which established parity on the number of 
ABMs, while allowing the Russians to expand its lead in the number 
of ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] and keep its 
advantage in SLBMs [Short and Long Range Ballistic 
Missiles]…SALT 1 thus allowed the arms race to continue in a 
different form – technological virtuosity rather than the number of 
delivery systems became the new game.221
 
 
What the outcome of SALT generated was an effective ‘guarantee’ that the limited 
war that—at the time of the agreements—was raging in Southeast Asia would not 
escalate; and nor did it have a strong chance of this happening over the following 
decade, as long as talks were in place.  I argue, this allowed for an understanding that 
limited war could be escalated to whatever the two superpowers deemed to be 
‘limited,’ as long as it did not threaten to cause a superpower clash.  The claim I am 
making here is the talks which resulted in an agreement, whilst having the integrity of 
lessening the chances of total war, were also veiled in a more subtle condition desired 
by the US: that it was free to pursue a limited war in the ambit of Southeast Asia 
without it being interfered with by a boots-on-the-ground presence by either the 
Soviets or the Chinese.   
 
Hence, the US came to see Southeast Asia as the next bastion which would avail them 
of a means-of-control over communism; and from a more general geo-strategic 
perspective allow a greater strategic footprint in Southeast Asia through the prism of 
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limited war; and it further enabled the US to actively and effectively use limited war 
to announce it was a force to be reckoned with.  It is with this in mind that the seismic 
shift that took place is able to be fully drawn out.  Limited war is a reality of state 
expansion and in this case its sophistications, and due to the interactions between the 
superpowers, it now came with a ‘guarantee,’ that it would not escalate; and this was 
the ‘key’ that was needed for the US to enter Southeast Asia.  The US came to 
perceive the need for intervention in Southeast Asia on the back of the dual 
foundations of its regional security being threatened; and its general global geo-
strategic security being displaced.  What is more, the US sought to ‘project’ its geo-
strategic influence in a more a deliberate way and it embraced the use of limited war 
and its ‘guarantees’ in both the tangible way of using it to its advantage in order to 
expand; and in the more illusory ways alluded to in the description of Osgood’s, of 
securing its future placement against any security dilemma.  The use of limited war 
and its geo-strategic offshoots consisted of the US having already come to terms with 
an ability to win a limited war—the Korean War—although, I argue this caused the 
more illusory components to be elevated to the forefront of their geo-strategies, and 
this will be dealt with in the next chapter.   
 
In summing up, from a geo-strategic perspective at the height of the Cold War the US 
saw Southeast Asia as the next leaping off point for communism and hence, focussed 
on Vietnam to stop the ‘march’ of communism.  Reaching the objective of stopping 
communism in Vietnam would entail strategic measures on the part of the US, not 
least the mobilising of a ground army to fight an intense limited war.  The US 
government at the time—from 1954, and in earnest from 1962 onwards—was able to 
utilize the incumbent support of the population that had been forthrightly instilled 
during the Cold War confrontations, and adroitly transfer the focuses of this force to 
another war.  A national policy of conscription would need to be constructed in order 
for the personnel required to provide support and as an overt expression/instrument of 
national policy.   Harnessing the same military might that was available for the larger 
war to the smaller one was essentially, a simple transfer process in the eyes of the US.  
By this I mean, the frameworks that were solidly in place at the time of the pending 
encounter in Southeast Asia, and reflect how successful the US had been in adopting 
all of the constituent and binding elements of statehood when successful expansion is 
required.   
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Throughout the next chapter, the degree of confidence that this war would temper and 
the subsequent impact the Vietnam War created on the military, military mindset and 
geo-strategic intent of the US and when the failures of its venture became evident will 
be duly observed.  Although the Vietnam War was not the only post-WWII 
intervention by a powerful nation-state its ramifications were immense, and thus 
proved to be an acid test for future conflicts.  Ignoring the Vietnam War would 
therefore, impede an understanding of the significant changes it triggered in the 
application of limited force and the change it created in the military agenda of it as a 
powerful nation-state, and for powerful nation-states in general. 
 
Developing this argument with regard to limited war I will introduce the US as a 
template to examine limited war per se in the post-WWII era, as it offers the most 
relevant example of a powerful nation-state exercising enormous influence.  Offering 
up the US under this guise will allow for the conjoining of many a group of 
happenings and will expose the preordained patterns, strategies and influences that the 
US had built up over time—under the influence of the highly-mechanized attrition-
driven European way of war—which the Americans embraced and within their own 
peculiar frameworks further developed further into an ‘American way of war.’ At first 
glance, this comprises quasi-frontlines supported by artillery from and airpower land- 
and sea-borne assets from which the enemy in attempting to penetrate the frontline is 
able to be decimated by call-in fire power; and the high levels of organization and 
coordination that is required for this to happen.  These aspects will be dealt with by 
observing the associated strategies and the tangible and real components of warfare, 
as well as the less-tangible and subjective components that of conflict.  This will be 
accomplished by revisiting the concept of limited war—and of it being less 
‘definable’ than total war— in the opening phase of the chapter with a greater depth 
of understanding will be had by exploring these dimensions.  It will also reinforce the 
simple fact that there exist clear and present dangers associated with employing 
limited warfare as a means-of-expansion, regardless of any so-called ‘guarantees.’   
 
Moreover, for this thesis the Vietnam War is the most relevant example of limited 
warfare which exposes other problematics.  The inabilities of a powerful nation-state 
to prosecute successful expansion in a direct manner—as had been its ethos since the 
days of adopting the European way of warfare—will expose the delicate balances and 
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other elements that influence limited war, and as have been alluded to earlier.   The 
Vietnam War is pertinent because it involves the fundamental components of a 
conventional army and its accompanying organization and technology, and the race 
for nation-state expansiveness via a limited war.  Just as examining the Cold War 
exposed critical geo-strategic plans with regard to persuasion and control that the 
superpowers drew upon in a (potential) total war, Vietnam will show what the US had 
at their strategic disposal in a limited war that it was ‘guaranteed’ to win.  
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Contemporary Limited Warfare: The 
United States and Vietnam  
 
Preamble 
 
Bearing in mind that the American people after WWII had moved on from the post-
WWI of having seen the redrawing Europe’s boundaries as a type of ‘international 
entanglement’ to which there was a vast amount of domestic opposition222 the 
successes of WWII and the Korean War the US had placed the US in a new and 
definitive geo-strategic position.  What is more the argument of ‘intense nationalism 
and ‘American exceptionalism’’223 combined with associated ideologies and the 
projection of those ideals into other regions—in this case Southeast Asia—provides 
the grounds for entry into another region and another war.  Having firmly accepted the 
‘European way of war’ of ground forces supported by artillery and airpower being 
able to gain decisive and overall victory, the notion that winning another conventional 
limited war as had been done in Korea became the fuel for America’s expansionist 
tendencies to be satisfied and in the back of communism being blunted.  From this, 
and due to the geo-strategic pressures the Cold War was still placing on the US in the 
early 1960s, the US looked upon the rising violence in Vietnam with a view to it 
providing a favourable geo-strategic platform to enter the Southeast Asian region.  To 
wit, the Kennedy administration, ‘greeted the expanding civil war in Vietnam with 
some degree of confidence, even anticipation,’224 as it perceived the war would 
generate significant progress against communism in the region.  Involvement in 
Vietnam had continued as far back as 1961 and according to Chomsky at this time 
President Kennedy ‘raised the level of US attack from international terrorism to 
outright aggression,’225
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 to support a complicit government in South Vietnam; and 
deter communism in both Vietnam and the region.  The broad-brush and 
straightforward observation that can be made is the US was certain that its 
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involvement in South Vietnam would enhance its geo-strategic ambitions in the 
region; and its military preponderance would be a signal to others that it was able to 
back up foreign policy with direct input; and at this point in time the US saw Vietnam 
to be its new frontier of influence.  As the Americans planned on becoming more and 
more involved in the civil war in Vietnam, I now turn to the Vietnam War226
 
 in the 
context of it being a limited war that would involve airpower as overwhelming force 
and thus, pave the way for modern warfare in contemporary times.  
As has been stipulated, all wars throw up their own peculiarities and Vietnam would 
prove to be completely different than what had gone before, and it is for this reason 
that the limited war should be seen of as an indicator of future intervention.  In order 
to gain a deeper understanding of American involvement peculiar elements of the war 
will be pulled together including the nomenclature of what was driving the military 
and government of the time.  Bringing these factors together will not only draw out 
the uniqueness of the Vietnam War, it will allow the trajectory of the war to be 
astutely placed in a perspective through the careful placement of events.  Importantly, 
the astute cross-referencing of events will precisely show how the war escalated and 
evolved whilst remaining within the parameters of a limited war.  Moreover, 
analysing the somewhat difficult notions of what limited war, in and of itself, actually 
‘comprises’ against the backdrop of a hi-tech contemporary war is of vital importance 
because the trajectory of the war exposed weaknesses of a powerful, developed and 
modern day (imperialist) nation-state when fighting a less-developed and/or 
‘undeveloped,’ ‘Third World’227
 
 nation-state.   
Scrutinizing particular aspects of the war requires the pathway the US took to be 
juxtaposed against the course of actions the defender, was either forced to take, or 
                                                 
226 The Vietnam War is ‘known as the “American War” in Vietnam.’  See: British Broadcasting 
Corporation.  Timeline: Vietnam.  
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1243686.stm> Accessed 11 April, 2009.   
227 The notion of a less-developed/undeveloped or Third World country is a measured imperial 
representation of a nation and there is much written about this subject.  Only a brief explanation need 
be entered into here and the Imperialist notion alluded to and the developed sensibilities from which it 
emanates smacks of arrogance and ‘development.’  Newsome places this in context in the description 
‘Call them developing nations, new nations, emerging nations, or the Third World...The Europeans 
[from 1434 onwards] however, treated the world as though it were empty.  Explorers led the way, 
followed by missionaries, merchants, administrators, soldiers and settlers.  They recognized that the 
indigenous peoples were there—but to be converted, exploited, enslaved, massacred and controlled as 
the imperial powers saw fit.’  See: Davis Newsom.  The Imperial Mantle.  The United States, 
Decolonization, and the Third World.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001, 1-13.    
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took proactively.  By linking these throughout the chapter brings to light the pivotal 
shifts in what had gone before and especially those which impacted on the more-
powerful of the adversaries, in both a military and politico-military manner.  The 
outline that can be given here which will be followed through is the inherent tensions 
the US encountered in fighting two symmetrical campaigns against the North.  The 
campaign against the North Vietnamese (NV) forces north of the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ) which would largely be fought by the airpower of the USAF, and another 
which would be fought by ground troops, and airpower—in an increasingly 
asymmetrical228
 
 environment—south of the DMZ.   
The raising of these issues whilst they point to the ‘historical norm’229 of erratic and 
disjointed actions forming the basis for war in the post-WWII era there is also the 
issue that the war proved to be iconoclastic to the previous (proven) winning tactics of 
warfare on the part of the (most) powerful adversary.  This further exposes the 
presumption that the US held at this time, and one which powerful Western nation-
states had maintained toward ‘Third World’ developing nations that they would 
confront a rabble army which would not exhibit the ‘tightened structures’230
                                                 
228 Asymmetrical conflict has within it similar intangible components as limited war. For example, in 
order to fight a conflict in a largely asymmetrical way some aspects of conventional conflict may need 
to take place.  Asymmetrical war in contemporary times has the traditional aspects of allowing a 
situation to be developed where ‘an adversary, is able to take advantage of its strengths and an 
opponents weakness.’  This stated, a microcosm of this in contemporary times is that of terrorism 
which acts ‘outside the limits imposed on the use of force’ which is the use of asymmetry in conflict. 
See: Roger Barnett.  Asymmetrical Warfare.  Today’s Challenge to US Military Power. Washington: 
Brassey’s Inc, 2003, 53.  Emphasis in original. 
 of astute 
229 The ‘historical norm’ I am referring to, and one that has been addressed in the main text but can be 
expanded upon here, is that components like chain-of-command structures and organization exist 
within irregular forces, as well as regular forces and this can be applied to Vietnam.  However, the 
most pertinent aspect to illustrate the post-WWII ‘historical norm’ I have pointed out is that wars have 
a different basis after the decisive total world wars of the early- and mid-twentieth century.  Holsti 
articulates this as a ‘typical war since 1945 has a very different profile [than those that had gone before].  
No single crisis precipitates them, and they typically do not start at a particular date.  There are no 
declarations of war, and there are no seasons for campaigning, and few end in peace treaties.’  See: The 
State, War, and the State of War, 20. 
230 How the forces of the North managed the war is complex and multifaceted and only a brief 
explanation is needed here to emphasize the point.  Karnow states that by the ‘fall [Autumn] of 1964, 
northern troops infiltrating into the south were enlarging the Vietcong contingents, and strengthening 
them with commanders, political commissars, communications experts, ordnance technicians and other 
experts…and the overall Communist command structure was tightened.’  See: Stanley Karnow.  
Vietnam: A History.  The First Complete Account of the Vietnam War.  New York: Penguin Books, 
1984, 401.  The seriousness which the US was to view the effectiveness of the asymmetrical campaign 
exercised by the North is reflected in the bombing campaign waged by the US in 1965 north of  the 
Demilitarized Zone, which was designed to ‘reduce the flow of Communist supplies and men to the 
South…destroy the overall capacity of the North to support the insurgency…[and] compel Hanoi’s 
leadership to stop supporting the Viet Cong.’  See: Herbert Schandler.  The Unmaking of a President. 
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military command—in simpler terms, victory would arise in a very short time.  With 
the presuppositions the US—with all of its sophisticated modernities intact—had in 
place, and the supposed ill-organized and undeveloped nation it was to meet in battle 
having been introduced and briefly illuminated, the military strategies and tactics and 
their accompanying politico-military aspects can now be delved into, including the 
‘collision points’ of where and when the symmetrical and asymmetrical manoeuvrings 
overlap.  For instance, shattering of the population’s supply resources via airpower 
was supposed to deter and retard the application of NV force at the farthest point of 
battle—the Mekong Delta—as were the coordinated armour supported, search-and-
destroy missions in the immediate vicinity of other operations and this plainly did not 
happen.  Whilst this highlights the unpredictability of war and of it being an ever-
moving dynamic the use of airpower is of most importance as it was utilized with 
presuppositions intact and it is these that expose not only the blind faith in the 
supposed outcome but also the increased reliance on it to achieve desired military and 
politico-military results.  With the tangible and less-tangible aspects now in place the 
Vietnam War can be more fully analysed. 
 
The limited war in Southeast Asia 
 
The reasons for choosing Southeast Asia at the time of the Cold War illustrates the 
dyad which the US had at the time: of it being seen to be shouldering the ideological 
components of liberal-democracy, and its (historic role) ‘good governance’ being 
continued.  There is a further dimension of international relations worthy of mention 
here because, in its own way, it impacted on societal components of the time and 
affected the ‘natural order’ that liberal-democratic governance had tended to set up as 
per strong historical tethers.  The principles inherent within the post-Westphalian 
‘righteousness’ of warfare—as per the European model—that had been constructed 
over previous centuries allowed the Vietnam War to be assigned a jus ad bellum from 
the outset of US involvement.  From the early days of US involvement it was not, in 
general terms deemed an illegal/unjustified act by respective US administrations, or 
the populace in general, which I suggest, is due to the inculcated norms that 
imperialism brings with it.  The prosecution of the war encouraged and then enabled, 
                                                                                                                                            
Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 241.  A definition of the 
Viet Cong is located in the main text of the thesis. 
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a direct intervention in response to the allegedly unopposed ‘march’ of communism 
throughout Southeast Asia.  The ‘march’ was perceived by the US as a ‘substantial 
aggression’231 from which a jus ad bellum could be justified.  This premise fits a more 
general rationale that mounting a defence without a military response falls into the 
category of ‘nonbelligerent actions would be either hopeless or too costly’232 and 
therefore, liberal-democratic freedoms would be compromised.  Hence, under the 
criteria of a loosely-interpreted and European constructed of the terms of 
‘righteousness,’ a jus ad bellum-of-sorts was fulfilled.  In other words, the domino-
principle,233
 
 as espoused by Eisenhower became the basis for the US from which to 
launch direct military campaigns.  As tenuous a mantle on which to launch a limited 
war as this may be, in the sense of the diplomatic sophistications of the time, the 
principle on which the jus ad bellum hinged was that of protecting liberal-democracy 
per se.   
The notion of one Southeast Asian nation after another crumbling under the 
communist juggernaut in a politically hapless way—regardless of the Eurocentric 
and/or inherent imperialism and the perceived political ineptness with regard to 
Asia—announced and raised the geo-strategic stakes of the region.  The security 
dilemma that was constructed by the US in Southeast Asia demanded a response and 
the level of concern becomes evident in the words of President Kennedy in his 
postulation that if Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam fell to the communists, this would 
result in the gates of defeat for liberal-democracy being ‘open wide.’234   The politico-
military suppositions which dictated this mindset were borne of, and resided in, an 
endemic and ongoing response to ‘any hint of Soviet expansion wherever it 
occurred’235
                                                 
231 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 870-871. 
 and fitted the accepted template of according to Meernik, ‘any gain for 
232 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 870-871. 
233 President Eisenhower ‘identified Indo-China as a region where the United States must, if necessary, 
resist the communists with its own military forces,  If any one country of Southeast Asia –Laos for 
example—fell to the communists, all the rest would tumble over like a row of dominoes.’  Hence, the 
‘domino-theory’ was born.   See: Hugh Brogan.  The Penguin History of the USA. London: Penguin 
Books, 1999, 649. 
234 John Kennedy. ‘Address in New York City before the General Assembly of the United Nations.’ 
September 25, 1961. United States Government Public Papers. 
<http//www.jfklinl.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk387_61.html>  Accessed 23 April, 2008. 
235 John Newman.  JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue and the Struggle for Power.  New York: 
Warner Books, 1992, 323. 
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the USSR meant an equivalent loss for the US.’236
  
  Bearing in mind the two decade 
long policies-of-containment that the US had in place toward the USSR, there was 
undoubtedly a considerable fear associated with the ‘threat’ of communism.  The fear 
is however, a key to the actions of various US administrations pursued during the 
Vietnam War—and these will be expanded upon later in the chapter.  Regardless of 
any underpinnings, it should be duly noted that extending a military response was 
primarily justified on the pretext that the war was ‘winnable,’ and from this good 
governance would prevail. 
Limited war in Vietnam 
 
From an historical perspective although the war that was waged south of the DMZ 
would constitute a protracted version of asymmetrical warfare, it is pertinent to note 
that as a tactical apparatus this type of warfare had been continuously and 
incrementally developing on a larger and larger scale after the highly symmetrical 
wars of WWII and Korea.  Northern communist operatives were in place and 
expanding their network in the south, via coordinated asymmetrical tactics at the time 
of the arrival of US advisors.  These tactics directly impacted on the first US military 
advisors as early as 1961 and by the time of full-scale American involvement in 
Vietnam, asymmetrical warfare was already part of the landscape of war in general 
and therefore, its inclusion in Vietnam can be construed as part of an evolving warfare 
norm.   
 
Placing the expanding nature of this type of warfare particularly against powerful 
nation-state actors can be observed by the tactics of the Armée de Libération 
Nationale (ALN), which began fighting the French in Algeria, and had been doing so 
since1954.  A brief example that highlights the conversion to the tactics of 
asymmetry, from which the NV government would draw upon, is succinctly 
illustrated by observing the highly-coordinated, decentralised ALN operatives 
roaming with relative freedom in Algeria.  Their tactics when going into action 
against French forces they comprised  
                                                 
236 James Meernik.   The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy.  Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004, 64. 
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[S]mall, highly trained packets, taking advantage of electric 
storms…Using its increasing fire-power the A.L.N would harass the 
French Army with repeated painful “pin pricks,” shelling and 
mortaring units from the relative safety of their Tunisian and 
Moroccan sanctuaries…[and] just to keep the pot simmering with an 
occasional grenade thrown into a café here [in the capital El-Jazair or 
a main town such as Oman] a burst of machine gun fire on the beach 
there.237
 
    
With this in mind, and in order to clarify that there is an accepted risk to a heavy 
military presence on the part of the invader cum occupier on foreign soil, there are 
also subsequent ‘cause and effect’ factors that were generated and are of further 
interest here.  By this, I mean the actual fighting of the war must be observed in a 
‘mix’ of not only the actual day-to-day fighting, but also to draw in a macro-view of 
what is ‘driving’ the war.  The macrocosm to which I allude—or the culture if you 
will—that was ‘driving’ the Vietnam War in many ways forces the microcosm of the 
way in which the war is fought on the actual battlefield to be brought to the fore, 
which in turn reflects certain cultural predispositions.  The tactical manoeuvrings in 
the actual fighting are representative of, and reflect a deeper constituent ‘culture’ 
when fighting a war.  Historical impetuses, I will refer as the ‘causal’ factors and the 
follow-up tactical manoeuvrings and strategic interplays, I will refer to as the ‘effect’ 
with regard to Vietnam   
 
A mainstay of the macrocosm to which I allude and can now be addressed resides in 
overarching cultural precepts on the part of the US; and they exhibit strong 
underpinnings of the Cold War—this is the cause factor.  At the very outset there was 
a fundamental non-acknowledgement by the upper-echelon of the US that warfare had 
‘moved on’ from the Korean conflict, and whilst this will be expanded upon with 
regard to the actual fighting of the Vietnam War later in this chapter, it nevertheless 
reflected a prevailing attitude: that any limited war embarked upon by a powerful 
nation-state was eminently ‘winnable.’  The assumption was automatically conjoined 
to a set of beliefs, that any feasible and then cogent courses of action that were able to 
be prosecuted, were reinforced and thus, linked to a belief that the final outcome 
would be favourable; and that success and victory would be ‘assured.’  The strength 
                                                 
237 Alistair Horne.  A Savage War of Peace.  Algeria 1954-1962. New York: New York Review Books, 
2006, 413.  
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and temerity of this belief with regard to the Vietnam War was premised on 
assessments the US political leadership and their military made at the time.  A large 
contributor to the premise and belief had been supplanted in the vast amount of effort 
that had already put into the Cold War.  The Cold War had demanded throughout the 
previous decade and a half—and was still demanding—a massive amount of logistical 
and technological applications.  An offshoot of this state-of-affairs was that it 
presented a misinformed ‘logic’ to, in the first case President Kennedy, and the 
incumbent presidents that would follow, and it was contained in a belief that the sheer 
endeavour it took to sustain the Cold War could be applied to a war in Vietnam.  The 
demands of the Cold War, in the minds-eye of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon 
administrations respectively could therefore, be seamlessly transferred to a completely 
different type of war in another locale.  Reinforcing this mindset, and the inculcation 
it provided, was that warfare for the US since the beginning of the Cold War and to 
the opening phases of the Vietnam War, generally consisted of an instrumental238
 
 and 
comprised a ‘logistic-statistic’ approach to any impending clash.  Hence, the approach 
taken in the nascent phases of the Vietnam War by Kennedy was indicative of what 
was already in place.  This remained so at the outbreak of full-scale hostilities, to the 
bitter end when Nixon was president and had been ingrained into the psych of 
(powerful) nation-states per se after the Korean War.   
Although the term ‘powerful nation-state’ is a notion laden with interpretations, it is 
nevertheless true that powerful nation-states had continued to face foes after WWII 
and in the process fighting profiles had changed.  The French fighting in Algeria and 
other nations were experiencing asymmetrical wars although symmetrical warfare was 
still the ‘accepted’ profile of fighting accorded to and by powerful nation-states in 
general.  Certainly within the hierarchy of the US, this is where their seeds of 
weakness were sown.  The US had remained steadfast in its traditional approach to 
warfare and of large-scale conventional battles ruling the day, even though the ‘new’ 
or post-Korean mode of warfare exhibited none of these facets.  The new way of 
warfare that had developed over time and over the duration of the civil war in 
Vietnam, prior to the entry of the Americans is summed up, in the straightforward  
                                                 
238 Instrumental warfare is determined by what it takes to ‘kill’ members of the opposing side and is in 
many ways a clinical cum statistical approach that is deemed superior to the necessary modes of 
warfare.  See:  Waging War Without Warriors, 59.  
 125 
précis of  
 
Decisive [conventional large-scale] battles are few.  Attrition, terror, 
psychology, and actions against civilians highlight “combat.”  Rather 
than highly organized armed forces based on a strict command 
hierarchy, wars are fought by loosely knit groups or regulars, 
irregulars, cell and not infrequently by locally-based warlords under 
little or no central authority.239
 
   
The evidence of war having ‘moved on’ from WWII and Korea, although well 
established, was not reflected in the decisions that were made at the launching point 
—and throughout—the Vietnam War by the Pentagon, and their decisions would 
continue to reflect a strong culture of blanket non-acknowledgement of what was 
evidently in place.  Moreover, the security dilemma that the Cold War triggered 
would be transferred to the Southeast Asian region.  From a conflict perspective, what 
had occurred in Korean War and were reinforced in the approach to the Cold War 
(should it turn ‘hot’), was the Pentagon would use components of the Korean War to 
plan for actions in Vietnam: enemy movements would be immense, easy to monitor 
and chronicle and would be met with massive airpower and artillery intervention, 
followed by ground troop assault.  These aspects were to blind US strategic planners 
as according to Nolan and Stupak the post-Korean War strategies that were in place 
although fundamentally flawed, were so strong and focussed they became harbingers 
of ‘the way American military force would be used to support foreign policy during 
the decades of the [late] 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s…operational decisions were made 
by the civilian leadership at the expense of contravening advice provided by their 
military advisors.’240
                                                 
239 The State, War, and the State of War, 20. 
  This grouping of factors further underscores a principled and 
driving force: that the war could be won by well-worn conventional tactics, 
technological and firepower superiority; and with relative ease.  To wit, the 
superiority and aggrandizement the US had gained due to past successes was to 
prevail; and it would be expanded upon by the arrogance of politicians and military 
strategists.  Summers evinces, that the underpinnings of actions were so preordained 
by politicians and their strategists it was inculcated to such an extent they never 
240 David Nowlan and Ronald Stupak.  War as an Instrument Of Policy.  Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1998, 2. 
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‘dreamed that a tenth-rate undeveloped country like North Vietnam could possibly 
defeat the Unites States, the world’s dominant military and industrial power.’241
 
    
With such strong evidence in place, it is reasonable to deduce it was not a problem for  
the US to strategically ‘place’ Vietnam as a bulwark against communism in Southeast  
Asia and used the pending demise of communism in this region as a warning to the 
rest of the world.  The preordained rationales with which the US military and their 
political masters saw as eminently predictable lead them to unwittingly take the 
‘conceptions for which the US army had trained—namely preparation for massive 
conventional or nuclear war against the Soviet Union—to the ‘highly politicized 
guerrilla[242] war in the difficult terrain of  Southeast Asia.’243
 
   The strategy not only 
reveals something of the strongly inflexible nature of the US political mindset of the 
time, but also deftly signals how the war would be prosecuted.   
An acknowledgement of the ‘attitude’ to which I refer, is relevant not because it 
constitutes one or a number of beliefs, but because it denotes that the application of 
limited warfare had progressively and assuredly gained, and brought together military 
and politico-military facets which had historically, proven to be effective.  The culture 
and the pre-eminent thinking, which governed US actions, had its antecedents firmly 
ensconced in the victories of WWII and Korea, and they bound these parameters into 
a framework of attitudes that were further reinforced by already inculcated beliefs.  
The dynamic of limited warfare in this milieu not only utilizes and emphasizes the 
military but in doing so, further indicates how calculated warfare had become as a 
mainstay of persuasion for the US.   Knowing this, a further scrutiny of the Vietnam 
War can now be undertaken with the knowledge and strength of the prevailing attitude 
of the time being firmly in place.    
 
Fundamentally, the faith that existed in the ability to wage large-scale war was posited 
in a capability to direct and sustain munitions delivery.  The use and successes of 
aerial bombardment during WWII had shown exceptional results and a sustained 
                                                 
241 On Strategy : A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War, 120. 
242 Guerrilla warfare aims to ‘gain control over a population, usually beginning with villages located in 
remote areas and uses these as anchors to control still larger segments of the population, and thus 
undermine the support for the government.’  See: Bombing To Win, 30. 
243 John Lynn.  ‘Nations in Arms.’  The Cambridge History of Warfare, 376, 377. 
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belief in its worth had been encouraged throughout the post-WWII era.  Advances in 
munitions delivery technology had also encouraged an increasing dependence upon it; 
and with this came an accompaniment of favourable historical adjuncts, which further 
developed an all-encompassing palpable faith in it.  Therefore, the faith in the high-
tech aspects of warfare had a solid merit which can be traced to the successes of 
combined Allied aerial bombing campaigns against Nazi Germany which have been 
addressed.  What emerges at this point is the practice of airborne munitions delivery 
and static call-in firepower which had been honed and proved successful over many 
years, had evolved a ‘steel-to-target’244
 
 mindset in the political and military of the US; 
and they were bound to hold sway throughout the Vietnam War—this is the ‘effect’ to 
which I allude  The overriding culture that influenced and drove the war immediately 
becomes visible by the automatic adoption (and retention) of this type of military 
strategy, which in turn indicates the extraordinary faith the US had in its military 
prowess after the victories of WWII and Korea; and crucially, why it had no plausible 
reason to abandon the approach.   
A steel-to-target modus operandi consists of a combination-package or singular unit  
massive delivery of high-explosive munitions via seaborne, airborne, and/or ground 
methods on a designated and (relatively) immobile target.245  From a tactical 
perspective, the operation and subsequent suppression246
                                                 
244 Military Review, 12. 
 offers an all-pervading 
short-term means-of-control, from which a follow-up strategy is given a launch 
window.  The concept deserves a further brief historical analysis in order to 
contextualize it within the parameters that had been set, and to ground the strategies 
used in Vietnam in history.  One of the main tactical objectives when utilizing a steel-
to-target pre-invasion barrage is to, in the first instance clear a path for ground troops, 
and to provide a window of opportunity for the ground forces to establish a foothold 
in the second instance.  The 1944 D-Day operation and subsequent invasion of 
mainland Europe exemplifies the use of this tactic.  The invasion had been preceded 
245 Military Review, 12-13. 
246 Suppression as a tactical manoeuvre has undergone change over time although at this point and with 
regard to airpower and artillery suppression comprises a ‘neutralisation, rather than destruction of 
forces through the psychological effect of firepower.  Typically suppressive fire forces an enemy to 
remain in cover, pins them and prevents them from firing themselves by rendering them unable 
(through shock or disorientation) or unwilling (through fear) to expose themselves.’  See: David Jordan, 
James Kiras, David Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck and Dale Walton.  Understanding Modern 
Warfare.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 348.  Emphasis in original. 
 128 
by fleets of Allied bombers delivering thousands of tons of bombs onto German 
coastal defences, and these raids were immediately followed up by a naval 
bombardment.  Both the air and naval operations had been planned to precede an 
amphibious landing and then a glider-borne ground invasion.247   The steel-to-target 
actions were deliberately designed in this particular instance to assist the 
establishment of beachheads via the amphibious invasion, from which a decisive 
spearhead deeper into mainland Europe could be launched.  An operation which 
exhibits a similar continuum was repeated in a decisive amphibious assault and 
intervention by US forces at Inchon in 1950 during the Korean War, which was 
supported by ‘preliminary naval gunfire and aerial bombardment’248
 
 and this too was 
successful.  The aim of this particular operation was to assist in outflanking and then 
cutting off the Chinese Army in its southward push to Seoul.  The strategic foothold 
gained by US amphibious forces would impede supply lines and force the Chinese to 
address and then counter their weakened position.   
In general terms any strategic ‘foothold,’ that large-scale invasions set up and 
establish, and upon an adequate defence perimeter being in place logistic and supply 
measures are able to be maintained, and a more long-term strategy of occupation is 
able to be mounted.  From this point of gain a ‘push out’ from the particular 
geographic locale is usually attempted in order to exploit the window of opportunity, 
from which a greater strategic stronghold and reinforced tactical advantage can be 
established.  The inherent worth of the steel-to-target tactic had thoroughly measured 
up to expectations in the eyes of strategic analysts in WWII and the Korean War, and 
had therefore, fulfilled all the criteria of successful engagements up to the Vietnam 
War.  Hence, the legacies of WWII remained vibrant in the US military mindset and 
to be precise, the faith was inexorably harnessed to advances in, and the use of 
technology; the positive results of high-tech warfare were there for all to see.  Whilst 
these aspects constitute in many ways a revisiting of history in terms of a well-
disciplined force being able to be increasingly depended on by commanders—a 
concept which will be drawn out later in this thesis—the Vietnam War stemmed from 
                                                 
247 Brian Williams.  ‘Utah Beach.  Aerial and Naval Bombardment.’  MilitaryHistoryOnline.   
<http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/dday/utah.aspx>  Accessed 11 May, 2009.  
248 Department of the Navy.  The Inchon Invasion, September 1950.  Washington: Naval Historical 
Center. 
<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/inchon.htm>  Accessed 18 July, 2007.   
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similar reliance’s and it is pertinent to delve deeper into history and point out that this 
is what sovereign state’s had in mind with the Treaty of Westphalia.   The ability of a 
well-disciplined military, a belief in the military-technology adjuncts, and its steel-to-
target outcomes would deliver excellent results, as per the historical norm, was the 
perception the US retained as it became more and more immersed in the strife of 
Vietnam.       
 
Vietnam and its impact on the ‘face’ of warfare 
 
The Vietnam War would impact greatly on the ‘face of warfare’ that had come to 
fruition in the latter days of WWII and which had continuously developed on the back 
of the military-industrial complex, to which President Eisenhower had referred.  The 
fractures that were created by the Vietnam War need to be posited precisely to 
decipher the deeper elements of what ‘went wrong’ for the US and position them in 
relation to a larger schema.  For instance, the American industrial complex, at the 
outbreak of full-scale hostilities had underpinnings in place which broadly consisted 
of, if specific strategies failed the industrial complex would ‘take up’ any slack and 
steer the war in favour of the US and its allies.  From the very beginning of ground 
operations, the approach the US took was to adopt a derivation of the conventional 
and symmetrical warfare legerdemains learned in WWII.  This was utilized because it 
had the historical bedrock of actually winning battles, and the application of the 
technology had a further favourable politico-military saturation, which could be used 
in tandem with actual on the ground military successes.  To absorb the temerity of 
involvement by the US, and the accompanying faith in the technology and inculcated 
tactics is best able to be understood by placing them in an overall schema, and then 
contrast it with the tactics, that were adopted by the NV to counter the US effort.   The 
mixing of these factors will reveal pertinent evidence about the way in which the war 
was being shifted incrementally to an asymmetrical exchange, and how this would 
throw up unforseen problems for the US.   
 
The underpinnings of how the war would be fought were revealed from the very first  
 130 
stages of full-scale engagement by the US in March of 1965.249
US Marines at Danang and their armoured support, were immediately positioned at a 
local airbase, and were commenced under the pretext of giving the Army of the 
Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN)
   The deployment of  
250 forces more flexibility in operations 
extramural to the city limits; and out into the countryside.  This type of deployment, 
even at this early stage, indicates the legacies of WWII were robust as the arrival of 
armour and the subsequent immediate reliance on it as a method of protection and 
enforcement, largely signalled conventional and symmetrical tactics would prevail 
throughout.  The US deployment of more and more forces in relatively static 
positions—initially of city/regional bases, and then extending outwards to 
interconnected outposts or so-called ‘fire-bases,’251
 
 further exposes strategies learned 
from previous encounters were in place.  Although the positioning of forces in such a 
way does not constitute a rigid frontline, it conforms to a quasi-frontline and/or has 
elements of traditional practices within it in a literal sense, and in doing so signals the 
strength of conformist thinking underpinning the decision-making.   
The addendum that needs addressing here and it is that the US had learned about this 
type of warfare from Medieval times, which comprised the castle being the source of 
power and an army would ride out from it to exercise its authority on the populace or 
enemy.  In more recent times however, the US had learned a ‘moderation’ of the 
strategy, that of being able to apply focussed force in any direction from a fixed locale 
from the French fighting the NV in the Indochina War.  The French forces used the 
base aéro-terrestre,252
                                                 
249 The National Archives Learning Curve.  ‘British news film showing US marines landing at Danang 
1965.’  Focus on Film. United Kingdom.   
 which comprised a heavily fortified large outpost that was able 
to deliver tactical repercussions to any engagement using the rapid deployment of 
<http://www.learningcurve.gov.uk/focuson/film/filmarchive/filmID=15>  Accessed 19 July, 2007. 
250 Although the ARVN is sometimes referred to as the South Vietnamese Army this thesis will remain 
with the single term ‘ARVN’ throughout. 
251 Firebases were static locations ‘from where formations ventured to conduct search and destroy 
operations [and] provided artillery and mortar support’ to those venturing from the base.  See:  Carter 
Malkasian. A History of Modern Wars of Attrition.  Westport: Praeger, 2002, 191. 
252 The base aéro-terrestre is able to be of both strategic and tactical advantage because of its flexibility 
when deploying forces and the abilitu control large areas outside of its perimeter.  This is able to be 
observed in the Battle of An San in which General Giap, a North Vietnamese commander inflicted ‘a 
shocking defeat on the [French] Expeditionary Corps in October 1950…Encouraged to gamble by an 
apparent collapse of French morale, he had soon brought his divisions down into the Delta flatlands - 
where in spring 1951 they had been smashed into ruin by French artillery, fighter-bombers and tanks 
[from the nearby base aéro-terrestre].  See: Martin Windrow.  The Last Valley.  Dien Bien Phu and the 
French Defeat in Vietnam.  London: Cassell, 2005, 62. 
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ground forces with airpower, tanks and static artillery support on call.  This had 
proved to be very successful in the Battle of Na San in 1950 in which French forces 
decimated NV forces; although it was to prove a dismal failure four years later at Dien 
Bien Phu.   From a tactical perspective the strategy behind the thinking was that the 
positioning of interlinked bases would to encourage engagement on terms favourable 
to US forces.  However, it must be stipulated this is not by any means, a unique 
approach to warfare in and of itself, as all forces are positioned by their commanders 
to achieve the highest advantage possible over what a battle will throw up.  What is of 
crucial importance to understand here is the quasi-frontline to which I allude was not 
designed to engage the enemy in a force-on-force conventional way although it 
retained elements within it of allowing maximum efficiency in any steel-to-target 
engagements.  All of this would prove worthwhile, providing pre-determined 
‘conditions’ were met, and within this were deep-set problems.  The pre-conditions on 
the part of the US were that the enemy forces would assault the fire-bases in a 
conventional frontal force-on-force manner and in doing so, could be targeted.  
Inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy was the main aim of these planning strategies 
and tactics, and a reliance on firepower as the mainstay of operations remained 
supreme; and the core of this foci was to increase enemy casualties whilst minimizing 
US casualties in the process.253
 
  Consequently, the strategies in place were to collide 
directly with the ascent of asymmetrical warfare and its purposeful adjuncts, and it is 
here, where the actual failures of strategies can be addressed in the events of the war.   
As stipulated a crucial tactical blunder was the bases were set up to draw the enemy to 
them, whereupon air and ground assets—the steel-to-target modules—could be 
enacted and call-in firepower would decimate the enemy.  These patterns were learned 
in WWII and Korea and subsequently, carried through to Vietnam, and are closely 
tied to the large-scale attrition of the enemy, and this doctrine of US strategy, was to 
remain throughout the war.254
                                                 
253 A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, 191.   
  The singular difficulty for the US forces located in the 
fire-bases became, what if the enemy chose not to be drawn to them?  Moreover, the 
bases were vulnerable in the extreme to artillery as they were static targets, which 
could be easily monitored and were relatively if not completely, isolated at times.  
Furthermore, the forces that exited the perimeters of the bases on patrol and push-outs 
254 A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, 197.  
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were vulnerable to ambushes, as were any reinforcements sent to their aid.  United 
States forces could not utilize the bases as havens from which they could enter and 
exit at will and in relative safety, as they were regularly weather-restricted in their 
operational boundaries and the defence mechanism was of a return fire only 
positioning.  Nevertheless, the US adopted the approach of fire-bases offering the best 
advantages in controlling infiltrating NV forces and this approach either individually, 
or when merged collectively, with other tactical and strategic misunderstandings 
severely impinged on progress for US forces.   
 
As stipulated, the military issues which strongly influenced any post-Korean conflict 
war were already in place by the outbreak of the full-scale hostilities between the US 
and NV forces.  The forces of the North would not be an exception to the rule, and 
actively implemented tactics to circumvent the power balance that had been forged by 
the Americans.  On the part of the US, the strategy of establishing static outposts, or a 
frontline-of-sorts proved to be a reductive one, as the strategic foothold that was 
established by these outposts would not be able to generate the decisive use of the 
technology available; nor would it lend itself to an overall tactical advantage.  This 
state-of-affairs is reflected in the tactics of the forces of the North, and can be 
contrasted to what the US expected to happen in order for it to be fully appreciated.  
As early as 1962 and prior to a more direct entry into the conflict, American 
strategists had been alerted to the tactics of the northern guerrilla forces fighting in the 
south by one of their adviser’s John Vann, who stated that northern guerrillas could be 
defeated “if they would only stand and fight.”255  The state-of-affairs alluded to is 
succinctly summed up by Frizzell who reiterates, the ‘enemy rarely stood and fought 
set-piece battles at which the US would have excelled’256
                                                 
255 Vietnam: A History, 260. 
 and moreover, relying on 
bombardment as the technical mainstay of execution in a singular microcosm of battle 
is automatically constrained by, and at the mercy of other mechanisms.  That is to say, 
the tactic remains able to be pursued, and has merit, only if the destruction of the 
enemy is completed and this is wholly dependent on many  constituent parts falling 
into place.  This statement does not infer the US lacked the capability of delivering a 
massive response, as it was plainly within their capabilities, it simply places in context 
256 Donaldson Frizzell.  ‘The Strategy of Attrition.’   The Lessons of Vietnam.  Edited by Scott 
Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell.  St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977, 77. 
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that massive bombardment in the process of eradicating an enemy become an 
outmoded method of engagement at this stage in the history of warfare.   
 
Warfare had ‘moved on.’  What is more, attrition as a modus operandi in the Vietnam  
War was ineffective because the notion itself ‘rested’ on three palpably false premises 
which are able to be observed as having manifested over the previous decades, and 
herein is the root of the problem.  For the US they had steadfastly remained 
unquestioned and were not modified.  According to Kinnard, the auxiliaries pertaining 
to attrition presumed ‘that there was a communist manpower breaking point within 
reach of U.S. firepower; that the United States could acquire and maintain initiative 
on the battlefield, thereby forcing the enemy to lose control of his own losses; and that 
attrition’s losses could be measured.’257   The lack of an effective strategy associated 
with the use of call-in firepower and its association with attrition is further 
emphasized in that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Southern Liberation 
Army/Viet Minh,258 or the Viet Cong (VC )259  as they were later relabelled, were 
able to target the static bases or the search-and-destroy missions emanating from them 
almost at will; and they were able to kill large numbers of Americans and their allies 
in the process.  The germane end result of being drawn into and responding to single 
asymmetrical encounters was on the part of the Americans, to hope that the continual 
contacts, no matter how brief, would draw NVA and/or its guerrilla forces into a 
prolonged engagement that would allow call-in firepower to decimate them.   Call-in 
firepower and its accompanying steel-to-target paradigm however, descended into a 
fiasco.  This is borne out in the summing up of Record who states it was the actions of  
the ‘communist guerrilla forces of the North, and not the searching-and-destroying 
Americans, who initiated 80 to 90 percent of all firefights, most of which were brief 
hit-and-run affairs, with communist forces breaking contact to escape the full weight 
of certain, if delayed US (steel-to-target) artillery and air responses.’260
                                                 
257 Douglas Kinnard.  The War Managers. , American Generals Reflect on Vietnam 1965-1973. 
California: Presidio Press, 1984, 86. 
   The overt 
tactical measures employed by the US and its allies were problematic overall, 
258 The Ten Thousand Day War: The Turning Point. Produced by Ian McLeod. Middlesex: A Cinequity 
Production. 1985, [Videorecording 3]. 
259 Rethinking Camelot, 49. 
260 Jeffrey Record. ‘How America’s own Military Performance in Vietnam Aided and Abetted the 
North’s Victory.’ Why The North Won The Vietnam War.  Edited by Marc Gilbert.  New York: 
Palgrave, 2002, 125. 
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although they were amplified by the litany of ongoing failings, in which there resided 
deeper issues, and a misreading of the war continued.  
 
Further to the tactical dispositions already mentioned, the ground offensives of the  
war on the part of the Northern forces were being supported by other measures of a 
less-obvious nature.  The ground offensive that was being pursued by the NVA 
became an ever-increasing problem for the US and the ARVN.  Along with the 
unrelenting and non-traditional asymmetrical approach to tactical advantage, there 
existed deeper within this a strategy of a continually developing low-intensity261 
approach to the conflict-at-hand.  What this type of approach generated was an 
involvement that began to ‘stretch’ US forces as they sought to extend influence 
beyond their well-tried conventional capabilities,262
 
 whilst responding to growing 
local hostility.  Low-intensity activity tends to lend itself well to more overt 
asymmetrical tactics, especially when traditional forces are extended beyond their 
‘capable’ range. From a general perspective the difference between asymmetrical and 
low-intensity tactics is that, in a more pure form, asymmetrical tactics are associated 
with and tend to centre on kinetic tactical engagements, the fluidity and direction of 
the actual engagement, and how long to remain engaged and when to break-off 
actions.  The latter decision points tend to remain the most critical because they 
dictate the level of losses in an engagement and reduce losses if break-off points are 
precisely monitored when introduced.  Low-intensity activity, on the other hand, tends 
to be posited in an overall approach to how each individual strike will pan out, in not 
only the actual engagement but also in the public sphere of influence, and thus 
maintains a greater level of general awareness of the politico-military adjuncts.   
In tandem with the low-intensity approach that was implemented and/or forced on 
wider civilian communities, the Northern forces also persistently indulged in ‘cross-
                                                 
261 According to Thompsen, ‘low-intensity’ conflict is associated with a ‘diverse range of politico-
military activities less intense than modern conventional warfare.   The types of conflict most 
frequently associated with the concept are insurgency and counterinsurgency and terrorism and 
counterterrorism.’ See:  Loren Thompsen.  Low-Intensity Conflict.  The Pattern of Warfare in the 
Modern World.  Massachusetts: Lorington Books, 1989, 2.  Further to this, and in a more practical 
military sense, the ‘essential features of [low-intensity] guerrilla warfare are avoiding the enemy’s 
strength—his main fighting forces—whilst striking at outposts and logistical support from unexpected 
directions.’  See: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam, 15.  
262 Brian Steed.  Armed Conflict. The Lessons of Modern Warfare. New York: Ballantine Books, 2002, 
50. 
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tier’263 methods of fighting.  The explanation required here, with regard to cross-tier 
fighting, stems from the recognition that various co-dependent and cross-functional 
components are in use, and it can be used in asymmetrical or on conventional 
battlegrounds.  The one which is of interest here is, the type of fighting that was 
indulged in specifically by Northern forces in the tactical components of respective 
campaigns had a broader historical aspect driving them.  The tactical components that 
need to be conjoined to the fluidity of battle, and to those which I refer, have at its 
base incremental and extrapolative elements that must be connected in order for 
success to be achieved.  To be precise, when engaging with a high-tier nation, a less-
powerful nation, or in the case of this war the brigade, platoon, or unit, that is 
indulging in low-tier activities must establish a thorough understanding of their 
immediate capabilities.  Simply stated, if this is not recognized early the less-powerful 
force will be faced with (almost certain) defeat as the low-tier participant is more able 
to have their abilities stretched beyond their overall capabilities.  This situation exists 
because a ‘high-tier’ nation or in this case those with technical/high-tech or some 
other relevant vastly superior element, have an advantage which, by its very nature 
and due to its technical capability and firepower has the capacity of defeating the low-
tier nation.  Thus, the low-tier force face the prospect of being extended to the edge of 
its fighting capabilities unless appropriate countering strategies are put into place, in 
order to moderate the advantages of their high-tier adversary.  To wit, the high-tier 
force is able to deliver overwhelming force because delivery is, well within their 
technical capabilities, and the low-tier nation must recognize this and counter it in 
order to survive.  The countering strategy in its simplest and most straightforward 
form is the low-tier/low-tech force must attempt to neutralize the abilities of the high-
tier force as much as possible and therefore, decrease the overall level of technology 
available and to, and through which the conflict is being fought.264   The low-tier 
force must remain as close to its high-tier adversary as possible and continue to move 
in ever-closer proximity to it with the intent of intermingling personnel, and therefore 
negate the precision and effect of long-range firepower.265
                                                 
263 Cross-tier methods of fighting can entail ‘high-tier’ or high-tech developed nations engaging in 
limited wars with ‘low-tier,’ or low-tech developing nations.  Apportioning capabilities of nations by 
necessity must recognize there are relevant degrees of ability that need to be taken into account in 
which low-tech nations must redress the advantage high-tech nations have.  See:  Armed Conflict, 50. 
   The result of this, if it is 
able to be applied astutely and extended upon in an engagement, is a continual 
264 Armed Conflict, 50. 
265 Armed Conflict, 50. 
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downward moderating of high-tier forces their strengths and force projection.  From 
the aspect of physical proximity the downward moderation is a direct result of the 
closeness of low-tier forces, and that call-in firepower cannot be utilized without 
impacting on the high-tier force as well and thus, the abilities of the high-tier forces 
are continually undercut by the proximity of the low-tier forces.  In summing up, the 
close approximation of force whilst dangerous in the extreme for the low-tier 
participants, must be embraced in order to generate an upward momentum of success, 
as it has the effect of severely mitigating immediate high-tier strike potential, and 
more importantly, impacts upon the overall power of high-tier forces.  In not coming 
to grips with the dynamics of this new type of limited warfare, and by basing the 
Vietnam War on pre-conceived ideas, the US was forced to participate in 
unfavourable conflict conditions on many levels, which further compromised their 
abilities and exacerbated their losses.   
 
Summing up the actual fighting which produced the casualties for US and ARVN 
forces is to state that the fluidity of the fighting the Northern belligerents persistently 
pursued deeply affected American forces, which means US and ARVN forces had to 
come to terms with  
 
Persistent downward moderations of battle tactics by Northern forces 
remained throughout the Vietnam War producing a simmering 
discontent in a military which had previously been part of many pre-
Vietnam War successes.  An inability of US forces to respond to 
NVA forces is reflected in the acknowledgement that their forces 
were fighting ‘in a war in which nothing seems to work, where the 
[conventional] rules either don’t exist or obviously don’t apply, and 
where they are confronted by impotence and failure day after day.266
 
   
In conjunction with asymmetrical tactics and the conjoining of numerous low-
intensity campaigns with low-tier engagements Northern forces fighting in the south 
of Vietnam, exacerbated problems for US forces.  This was accomplished by 
implementing and constantly promoting their placement in the war to the point of it 
becoming a war of a ‘third kind.’267
                                                 
266 Papers on the War, 249.  
  Labelling of a war in this way, once it is able to 
267 A war of the ‘third kind’ is a complex event and has a multitude of factors involved.  In relation to 
the Vietnam War and the resistance displayed by the North, the notion of ‘third way’ warfare is 
eminently traceable and involved the guerrillas being ‘indistinguishable from the general population 
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be generated effectively, broadens vital components of fighting including the 
populace being connected in an ideological way to those actually engaged in the 
kinetic phases of the combat; and this is often accomplished on the back of 
irredentism and nationalism.  An example of the positive exploitation of these 
unifying factors is those fighting the bombing campaign by the US in the north of 
Vietnam, beyond the north/south DMZ, believed their actions were as righteously 
motivated as those who were engaged in the ground war of the south.  The stratagems 
underpinning a ‘third kind’ developed broad spectrum advantages for the North 
including taking aboard the psychological and constituent components of a ‘people’s 
war’ with the profound social and political underpinnings of the underdog employed.   
 
The tactical moderations were deliberately set in place many times by the NVA and 
the VC, both when in direct contact with US and ARVN forces on the battlefield in 
order to minimise the effects of call-in firepower; and crucially, from an overall 
strategic sense, to minimise any discovery of their military assets and resources when 
not on the battlefield.  These tactics were consistently employed by the North as an 
overall effective stratagem.  Hence, the processes which had worked for the West—
and the US in particular—from a military perspective in the lead up to the Vietnam 
War could no longer reach the same goals, as it was the accompanying components 
and strategies that had moved on from the relatively easy to understand asymmetrical 
components of tactical warfare; and that warfare had fundamentally moved beyond 
the parameters set by WWII and the Korean War.  Strategic bombing268
                                                                                                                                            
[and] engagements must be sporadic and their perpetrators unobserved and unidentifiable…The deadly 
game [of direct combat and psycho-political interplays] is played in every home, church, government 
office, school, highway, and village.’ See: The  State, War and the State of War, 36-39.  Expanding on 
this description, is to note the following: ‘in wars of the third kind there are no fronts, no campaigns, no 
bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d’appui [pressure points],  and no respect 
for the territorial limits of states’ is also applied.  See: Martin Van Creveld.  The Transformation of 
War. New York: Free Press, 1991, 206.  Emphasis in original.    
  by the USAF 
for instance, did not accomplish the required aims of turning the North Vietnamese 
people against their government, as an infrastructure-dispersed and asset-decentralised 
North Vietnam, proved too difficult to bomb into submission.  Nor did bombing in the 
south prove to be effective as Northern forces referred to the strategic bombing of 
268 Strategic bombing as described by Knell ‘means one attacks far behind the battlefield to destroy 
military targets, which can be anything from a munitions dump to a weapons factory to a railway 
station; anything that will enhance and support an enemy’s war effort.’  See: Herman Knell.  To 
Destroy a City.  Strategic Bombing and its Consequences in World War II.  Massachusetts: DeCapo 
Press, 2003, 52. 
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their positions as ‘recruitment drives’269
 
 because the collateral damage was so great it 
turned the populace (in varying degrees) against US and ARVN forces.  Included in 
the attempt to destabilize persistent asymmetrical activity was the harassment of the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail by airpower.  The supply line from the north to the south which 
remained a vibrant supply lifeline for the guerrilla forces fighting in the south and the 
adaptive military skills of these combatants meant continual suppression was difficult, 
and the protracted nature of the conflict driven by the government of the North 
disallowed the war to pan out almost at every point in favour of the US.   
Warfare had moved on and had developed a new set of definitive parameters.  Perhaps 
the most tangible aspect of the war and one which reflected the exceptional degree, by 
which an asymmetrical war could be ‘measured’ in conventional terms, and therefore, 
offer the tangible evidence required resides in fixed wing and non-fixed wing aircraft 
losses.  High-technology is reflected in the use of airpower and has as its codicil 
inextricable links to the high-profile and measurable components of how a war is 
‘progressing’—as was evident in both WWII and the Korean War.  In tandem with the 
horrendous casualty rate of US and ARVN troops, losses of fixed wing and non-fixed 
wing aircraft—arguably the most tactically advantageous assets of the war—further 
dulled a pivotal component of US firepower effectiveness.  This point needs no 
greater explanation than an acknowledgement of the historic bonding to airpower the 
US had, and the resulting catastrophic reality, that comprised 
 
Vietnam was nearly as much of a disaster for the airpower services 
as it was for the land forces.  A lethal combination of Soviet-made 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), traditional antiaircraft artillery 
(AAA), and MiG fighters led to staggering losses in aircraft and 
crews.  Two thousand five hundred and sixty-one aircraft and 3,587 
helicopters fell to enemy fire, and roughly another 1,200 planes and 
1,300 choppers crashed due to non-combat causes.  Three hundred 
and eighty three Air Force F-105 fighters were lost out of a total of 
833 built.  Half of the aircrews of these lost planes were never 
recovered…the Air Force fared far worse against the Vietnamese 
fighter pilots than it did against any other adversary in its history.  
Kill ratios in the skies over Vietnam were a mere 2.4 to 1, dropping 
at times to an even exchange.  They had been 8.1 in World War II, 
and 10 to 1, sometimes as high as 14 to 1, in Korea.  The Vietnam 
                                                 
269 Thomas Mockatis.  Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict.  The Sword or the Olive Branch?  
Westport: Prager, 1999, 132. 
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War induced a real sense of failure and crisis in the airpower 
services.270
 
 
 
Compounding this was, the Vietnam War over time exposed and brought into stark  
relief the ramshackle geo-strategic and geo-political modus operandi that had built up 
and had been retained in the conducting of this limited warfare.  It is undeniable from 
a tactical and strategic perspective, devoid of logic.  The military limits on the US 
during the Vietnam War lay in methods of suppression that were inadequate and 
fundamentally flawed, as were their tactics of jungle warfare.  These factors in 
conjunction with the adaptability of the NVA and VC as an enemy, is what changed 
the ‘face’ of warfare.    
 
Moving beyond the tactical and strategic ramifications is to note that the decrepit 
approach that was the mainstay throughout their involvement, resulted in the US 
being ‘incapable of absorbing the lessons of the conflict…The American military 
would fight the war in Vietnam entirely on the basis of statistical indices: numbers of 
enemy dead and wounded, numbers of battalion-days in combat, tons of bombs 
dropped, tons of cargo moved through the ports’271
 
 resulting in further systemic 
failures.  The problematics of a deeper nature would be reinforced within the military, 
which according to Record comprised  
[A] failure [on the part] of the senior military leadership to provide 
timely and useful advice to civilian authority; an unwillingness to 
subordinate inter-service rivalry to the demands of wartime military 
effectiveness; the pursuit of a attrition strategy based on palpably 
false premises; misuse of available military power; and a failure to 
recognize the limits of airpower in Indochinese strategic 
operations.272
 
   
The nature of the engagements meant overall tactics and strategies were largely  
ineffective, resulting in an inbuilt corrosiveness of planning overall.  Exacerbating this 
was the forces of the North fought a more ferocious campaign largely because the 
technical-logistical and immediate interdictory and sustained incursion and extraction 
                                                 
270 Frederick Kagan.  Finding The Target.  The Transformation of American Military Policy.  New 
York: Encounter Books, 2006, 25. 
271 The Cambridge History of Warfare, 376, 377.   
272 Why The North Won The Vietnam War, 118. 
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facilities were not available to them.  They were much more vulnerable if a campaign 
stalled; and of being defeated outright.  Hence, retreat if it needed to be taken, would 
involve a long and dangerous walk home.  The outcome of the intensity of the North’s 
campaign for the US however, was losses both militarily and geographic, over time 
and the associated inability to suppress the insurgency turned world attention to the 
escalation of a low-intensity conflict to a ‘mid-intensity’273
 
 higher-profile regional 
conflict and nomenclature associated with the downward spiral can now be assessed.   
The downward spiral of the Vietnam War 
As has been suggested by the interweaving components of this chapter, although 
consecutive administrations suffered from a perceived ineptness on their part and 
failed in their ‘duty.’  The discontent and failures associated with the war eventually 
resonated down to the populace at large and this culminated in the late 1960s, in US 
politicians questioning if the wasting of American lives in the war theatre of Southeast 
Asia was indeed ‘worthwhile.’  This was a reversal of previously held conceptions, as 
within the relevant US presidential administrations there resided a deep belief in the 
omnipresent power of the US; and contempt for the recent history of the war.  The 
political failures of the various administrations conducting the war began to be seen of 
as being conspicuously lackadaisical, contemptuous and unresponsive to repeated and 
obvious historical ‘spikes.’  The condescension to which I refer originally emanated 
from the glaring 1954 defeat of the French by the NVA at Dien Bien Phu and the 
subsequent warning from France’s President De Gaulle that a war in Southeast Asia 
would trap America into a “bottomless political and military swamp.”274
                                                 
273According to Klare ‘regional clashes’ are in general deemed to be, from a strategic perspective, 
‘mid-intensity’ conflicts, of which the US and other developed nations have been drawn into in the 
post-WWII era.  See: Michael Klare. ‘The Pentagon’s New Paradigm.’ The Gulf War Reader, History, 
Documents, Opinions.  Edited by Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf.  New York: Times Books, 1991, 
466. 
  This advice 
rather than being ignored should have alerted strategic planners to the folly of fighting 
a conventional war, against an unconventional foe in a geographically unsympathetic 
environment.  An illustration of the contempt of the recent history I refer to is, 
reflected in the conceptual illustration of the ‘optimism’ of US administrations, which 
according to Elsberg, did not falter.  Elsberg offers the gross superciliousness of the 
274 Chris Trueman. ‘John F Kennedy and Vietnam.’  HistoryLearningSite  
<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/kennedy_vietnam.htm>   Accessed 21 May, 2008. 
 141 
administrations (see Figure 5) by presenting a schema of the war via events and a 
‘sawtooth’ graph which illustrates strategic impacts and/or events against a vertical 
gauge of ‘Optimism.’   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Optimism.  Reprinted from: Daniel Elsberg.  Papers on the 
War. New  York: Simon & Shuster, 1972, 121. 
  
 
The use of this scale highlights events which should have triggered articulate, precise, 
definitive and flexible strategic responses to the war being fought yet were ignored.  
Any peak after Truman’s program should have initiated a decline in ‘Optimism,’ as 
per the vertical graph-line, if the previous point in history was eruditely examined and 
a degree of insightfulness gained.  The ignoring of the peaks in figure five signal the 
way in which the war remained ‘winnable’ for each administration, as the optimism 
level—as evident in each peak—remains level in the thoughts of each administration.  
As each peak represents a lucid phase in the war inexorably drifting toward failure, 
there still remained a belief that operational success was near-at-hand which was due 
to the abstract notion of success and aggrandizement overruling the logic and 
strategies needing to be changed due to the continual defeats.  United States ground 
forces comprising the major part of planned offensives against the North, as per 
‘Kennedy’s Program’ onwards, faced glacially slow progress in terms of measurable 
successes; and yet the commitment to the war remained constant over time.  The 
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations were content to allow their military, 
particularly the ground forces, to remain embattled until a ‘turning point’ would 
happen. The turning point did eventually happen, although it was to pan out to the 
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detriment of US and ARVN forces; and even with this event Johnson still clung to a 
hope that another turning point would happen.  Whilst there remains some contention 
about whether the offensive did turn the tide for the US, it is notwithstanding, a 
pivotal moment in the war.  The power and ferocity of the Tet Offensive was unable 
however, to sway the Johnson’s abstract notion that success was near-at-hand and 
could still be ‘reached.’  The offensive was directed by the NVA to essentially shatter 
US ideas of control and whilst, it exhibits a conspicuous level of confidence on the 
part of Northern forces, it did not at its root-level of intensity defeat the US forces 
from a military perspective.  The US could still call on a vast plethora of military 
options and it is of further importance to observe the corresponding plummet in 
gaining the upper hand, did not slow an ascending belief and progress of Nixon’s 
programme; and as US optimism remained high after Johnson left office.   
 
In keeping with the direct military and politico-military concepts the1968 Tet (New 
Year) Offensive—the last peak on the graph—is considered by historians’ to be the 
ultimate defeat ‘point’ for US and ARVN forces.  Few students of the Vietnam War 
quarrel with the notion that the offensive was a major—if not the central—turning 
point of the war275
 
 which finally swung the war in favour of the NVA and the North 
Vietnamese government.  The ferocity and strategic intent by the forces of the North 
in this offensive, is able to be clearly seen  
At three o’clock in the morning on the first night of the Vietnamese 
New Year, nineteen NLF [National Liberation Front] commandos 
blasted their way through the outer walls of the American embassy 
in Saigon...In the early morning of January 31, NLF troops attacked 
almost every important American Base, every town in the city of 
South Vietnam.  The combined force of eighty-four thousand men 
simultaneously moved in to five out of the six cities, thirty-six out of 
the forty provincial capitals, and sixty-four district capitals….One 
unit penetrated the grounds of the presidential palace, four blocks to 
the south; another took over the government radio station and a third 
assaulted the Tam Son Nhut air base, breaking through the heavily 
guarded perimeter to blow up aircraft and engage in gun battles with 
American troops.  In the Delta, Front forces moved into the most 
“secure” of the province capitals—Can Tho, My Tho, Vinh Long, 
Rach Gia, and Ben Tre—entrenched themselves in the poorer 
quarters, and drove the ARVN units to the defense of their 
                                                 
275 Timothy Lomperis.  From People’s War to People’s Rule.  Chapel Hill: university of North 
Carolina Press, 1996, 334. 
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headquarters…But it was in the First Corps, where North 
Vietnamese troops joined the battle, that the offensive was by far the 
fiercest.  From a hamlet outside of Da Nang the Front troops lobbed 
rockets and mortar shells into the American air base, closing down 
the field from which most of the tactical air strikes were 
run…Simultaneously, other units moved in on other American bases 
at Chu Lai and Phu Bat...destroying scores of American airplanes 
and forcing American troops to defend their positions while they 
overran all five of the provincial capitals.276
 
  
The ramifications of such an onslaught were relayed through the popular press in  
America as it dealt with the actions of the coordinated attacks against US and ARVN 
ground troops.  Although the aftermath of the attack showed it was eventually, a 
military failure on the part of the Northern forces, in a purely tactical sense of the term 
it nevertheless, hammered the point of intent home: the perception of control US and 
ARVN forces had of the geographic locales and their associated political 
machinations was false and imaginary.  The catastrophe of the event, as seen by 
American news networks, is evident in the following account 
 
‘WAR HITS SAIGON,’ screamed the front-page headline of 
Washington’s afternoon tabloid The News.  But newspaper accounts 
paled beside the television coverage, which that evening projected 
the episode in all its vivid confusion, into the living rooms of fifty 
million Americans.  There, on color screens, dead bodies lay amid 
the rubble and the rattle of automatic gunfire as dazed American 
soldiers and civilians ran back and forth trying to flush out the 
assailants.277
 
 
As ‘Americans at home saw their boys in Saigon crying with fear because the Viet 
Cong was where they were not supposed to be’278
                                                 
276 Frances FitzGerald.  Fire in the Lake.  The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam.  Boston: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1972, 388-389.  
 the mire in which the US found 
itself in the aftermath remained multi-pronged.  The problems consisted of the 
continuous and unrelenting casualty rate of their own troops in ground war contacts; 
an inability of the air war to make solid inroads into long-term suppression; an 
inability to stem the purpose and ferocity of the guerrilla war being waged against 
them; and an accompanying political ineptitude and dishonesty when defining and 
refining the trajectory of the war when required by their own politicians.  All are 
277 Vietnam: A History, 526. 
278 Why Wars Happen, 22. 
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summed up to some extent and ensconced in the painful acknowledgement by Senator 
McCarthy during the 1968 US Congress post-Tet Offensive hearing.  McCarthy stated 
 
In 1963 we were told we were winning the war…in 1964, we were 
told the corner had been turned.  In 1965, we were told the enemy 
was being brought to his knees.  In 1966, in 1967, and now again in 
1968, we hear the same hollow claims of programs and 
victory…Only a few months ago we were told that 65 percent of the 
[Vietnamese] population was secure.  Now we know that not even 
the American embassy [in Saigon] is secure.279
 
 
United States administrations remained internally frustrated yet unresponsive to the 
lack of progress because abstract notions of winning had persistently percolated in the 
politico-psych of the administrations throughout the war.  The many reasons the US 
was losing the war were unable to be admitted because of the way in which the war 
had dragged on.  The extent of the war, and bearing in mind the US thought the war 
would be over in a short time, began to shatter any political immunity to the 
administrations driving the war.  This is particularly exemplified in the Johnson 
administration and is a relevant point of reference when searching for military and 
political points of reference (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Public Support for Lyndon Johnson and the Toll of 
Vietnam, 1965-1968. Reprinted from: Dennis Simon. The War in 
Vietnam 1965-1968.  
<http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change-Viet2.html>  Accessed 27 
July, 2007. 
                                                 
279 The Vietnam Experience.  Nineteen Sixty-Eight.  By Clark Dougan , Stephen Weiss and the Editors 
of the Boston Publishing Company.  Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983, 104-105. 
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The reason the Johnson administration was considered to be a most critical time for 
the US is because the administration was the most politically and militarily immersed.  
War fighting resources were at an optimum, yet opportunities that enabled combat 
potential to be maximized and the upper-hand gained were not exploited.  It is widely 
acknowledged by historians’ that the US was prevailing in terms of making solid  
inroads into the war in the south in 1967.280
turning.  Hastening the downward spiral toward failure saw peripheral aspects coming 
into play such as Johnson becoming increasingly intolerant of opinions that differed 
from his and opposition to the war from his staff was increasingly less-tolerated and 
he removed advisors who questioned the worth of his policies and strategies.
  By 1968 however, the tables were  
281
 
   
Ultimately, and with the admission that an air war that had been ‘designed to succeed 
in six weeks but has already lasted six years,’282 still raging and with deaths of 
approximately 58,000283 US personnel, the ‘worth’ of the war had exponentially been 
negated and reduced to an abject total failure.  The point where the US military, 
unable to change and ‘rooted in the European [conventional] tradition,’284 combined 
with the blind arrogance of ‘military leaders [who] evidently assumed that although 
their strategies were preferable, [that] the United States would prevail regardless of 
what strategy was adopted.’285  The point that had been reached and which had 
allowed Northern guerrilla forces to extend the war into ‘a prolonged and bloody 
military stalemate,’286
                                                 
280 Clark Clifford the (1967) US Secretary of Defense states, ‘We were finally prevailing…by the end 
of 1967 we were ultimately prevailing and nearing the end of this sorry, sorry enterprise.’  See:  The 
Ten Thousand Day War, [Videorecording 4]. 
 in real terms, had shattered the omnipotence of a powerful 
nation-state.  The reason for the persistent lack of support and missed opportunities, 
broadly speaking, falls into two fundamental categories.  The main cause was the 
continual deaths of US military personnel (see Figure 7) and, bearing in mind, that 
281 The Ten Thousand Day War, [Videorecording 4]. 
282 The Ten Thousand Day War: To The Bitter End. Produced by Ian McLeod. Middlesex: A Cinequity 
Production. 1985. [Videorecording 5]. 
283 William Rust.  Kennedy in Vietnam.  American Vietnam Policy 1960-63.  New York: Da Capo Press, 
1985, 181. 
284 Why The North Won The Vietnam War,130.   
285 Harry Summers.  On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War. California: Presidio Press, 
1982, 120. 
286 Why The North Won The Vietnam War,133. 
 146 
from January to July 1968 the US casualty rate exceeded that of the Korean War,287
 
 
the pain that the US domestic population experienced becomes evident.   
 
Figure 7. The War in Vietnam & President Lyndon Johnson: U.S. 
Personnel Killed in Action, June 1975-December 1968.  Reprinted 
from: The War in Vietnam 1965-1968.  
 
 
Another relevant though less obvious category is other military-related foreign policy  
goals were competing for resources, attention and effort288 and this had placed the 
Vietnam War in the unenviable position of not being the only ‘game in town.’289  
Attempts to prosecute an on-the-ground war successfully, whilst the enemy remained 
active and unreachable, inevitably tore into the fabric of cohesive policy direction.  
Casualty rates of personnel and an accompanying military inability to impose a more 
traditional mode of warfare on the northern belligerents allowed the North 
Vietnamese government to revert to a tactical defensive position and buy time.  The 
Northern forces simply waited for the erosion of US public support against the war290
rawness by General William Westmorland,
 
to evolve and produce its own outcome—as per the stalemate alluded to earlier.  This 
‘erosion’ and the constraints on the military is borne out and expressed, in all of its  
291
                                                 
287 Ronald Spector. After Tet.  The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam.  NY: The Free Press, 1993, xvi. 
 who stated  
288 James Lee Ray and Ayse Vural.  ‘Power Disparities and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes.’  
International Interactions, Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1986,12, 315-342. 
289 International Interactions, 315-342. 
290 On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War, 133. 
291 General Westmoreland was the Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), 
from 1964 to 1968.  The term MACV is used to delineate the US was assisting the ARVN in their 
battle against their northern enemy. See: Encyclopædia Brittanica  
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The Vietnam conflict was an undeclared and limited war, with a 
limited objective, fought with limited means against an unorthodox 
enemy, and with limited public support.  The longest war in our 
history, it was the most reported and the most visible to the public—
but the least understood.  It was more than a military confrontation; 
ideological, economic, psychological, political, and nation-building 
problems were involved. Our national involvement in Southeast Asia 
became an emotional public controversy and hence a political issue.  
This new and traumatic experience by our nation should provide 
lessons for our people, our leadership, the news media, and our 
soldiers.292
 
 
The outcome of why the US was not able to escalate the war to the satisfaction of 
their domestic populace penetrates to the heart of the loss, and regardless of any 
misunderstandings or missteps along the way there remained the catastrophic reality 
that an undeveloped and/or ‘Third world’ country had defeated the US.  There 
remained however, the desire to win the war and it was not confined to the US 
military as the omnipotence and trust in the military still remained—a point that will 
be expanded upon later in this thesis—and remained steadfast in the hearts and minds 
of the American people.  The underlying tenets of this according to Ellsberg were 
‘most Americans would basically accept renewed heavy fighting [if it meant winning 
the war] if it were conducted on our side mainly from the air and with few American 
casualties.’293   Throughout the war, the apparatchik and the military of North 
Vietnam remained committed to its belief it could defeat the US and ARVN forces 
and the tenacity of this belief is reflected in the statement by the commander of the 
North Vietnamese Army, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who stated “The Americans will 
lose the war on the day when their military might is at its maximum…We’ll beat them 
at the moment they have the most men, the most arms, and the greatest hope of 
winning.”294  The way in which the NVA accomplished this is evident by their 
remaining steadfast to their faith in asymmetrical warfare and when confronted by a 
powerful nation-state that was on a ‘righteous mission’295
                                                                                                                                            
<
 recognized its mission was 
supported by decrepit military thinking.  Moreover the US, holding on to deeply-
entrenched, yet deeply misleading knowledge that a powerful nation-state employing 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641131/William-C-Westmoreland>  Accessed 5 January, 
2009.  
292 The Lessons of Vietnam, 71. Emphasis added.   
293 Papers on the War, 256. 
294 From People’s War to People’s Rule, 329. 
295 Fire in the Lake, 368. 
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conventional high-tech weaponry somehow imbued along with it an omnipotence 
proved, to be their downfall.  
 
Conclusion to ‘Contemporary Limited Warfare: The United States 
and Vietnam 
 
United States reliance on high-tech and associated heavy firepower proved to be  
based on the outmoded strategies, learned in the limited war of Korean, and the latter 
days of the total war of WWII.  Employing this level of conventional limited warfare 
in a strategically unsympathetic environment fundamentally retarded its abilities to 
extract the required results.  Along with this, other core problems resided in the US 
military, including an inability to change inculcated methods borne from the successes 
of large-scale military confrontations.  However, the unbroken momentum of 
continually taking casualties and the military being unable to stem insurgent attacks, 
resulted in the domestic population of the US growing war weary and recalcitrant, 
which in turn, induced a political haemorrhage in their domestic populace that could 
not be stemmed by political rhetoric.  The final phase of the war saw the US pulling 
out of their military commitment from 1972 onwards, and upon the negotiation of a 
peace treaty—agreed to a complete withdrawal 1975.  For the first time since 1812 a 
nation had defeated the US and what is more, the most powerful nation-state in the 
world had been defeated, albeit not on its own continent.  
 
Historical literature deciphering the ramifications of the loss is vast, and only brief 
scrutiny of the US’ military and political failures has been possible here with a 
particular emphasis on tactical cause and effect factors.  Any further analysis of the 
tangible factors which contributed to the actual loss remains beyond the scope of this 
thesis, as from this point on a much more abstract politico-military dimension of what 
the war ‘consisted of,’ and the way in which it played out need exploring.  This will 
ground future geo-strategic positioning of the US, of which some will be juxtaposed 
against the Vietnam War.  The more abstract dimensions of the war, as stipulated in 
the beginning paragraphs of this chapter, when put under scrutiny tease out inherent 
tensions in real-world components of warfare.  These have been addressed in this 
chapter, and shows warfare is affected by less-obvious and deeply hidden components 
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as much as it is by its tactical, literal and operational influences.  Hidden and elusive 
factors profoundly influence war, whether they be historically rooted or more 
immediate tactical blunders and regardless of which is of most importance need not be 
addressed further at this point, suffice to say all factors offer a signal-of-sorts to what 
happens when they merge and which hide deeper problematics.     
 
In summing up, although it can be argued the loss of US personnel, and the 
accompanying political corollaries, constitute a macrocosm it can be further argued 
there are more deep-set factors involved.  One which deserves mentioning here 
highlights the internal machination within the ‘character’ of liberal-democratic 
polities per se and these impacted upon US doctrinal strategies in Vietnam.  Merom 
avers there are inherent restrictions on liberal-democracy per se which ‘impedes’ its 
own ‘abilities.’ This hampers any real potential in achieving victory in limited 
warfare.  Merom asserts 
 
[D]emocracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely 
difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality that which can 
secure victory.  They are restricted by their domestic structure, and 
in particular by the creed of some of their most articulate citizens 
and the opportunities their institutional makeup presents such 
citizens.  Other [non-democratic] states are not prone to lose small 
wars, and when they do fail in such wars, they are for mostly realist 
reasons.  Furthermore, while democracies are inclined to fail in 
protracted small wars, they are not disposed to fail in other types of 
wars.296
 
  
The ‘face’ of warfare that underwent unique changes for the nation-state—as 
emphasized by US involvement in the Vietnam War—happened during the Cold War 
era.  Contextualizing the change can be observed in the distinct shift from the 
macrocosm of grand battlefield army-against-army (symmetrical) manoeuvres, to the 
microcosm of skirmish-driven, temporary ‘firefight’ (asymmetrical) styles of strike 
and counter-strike.  The fundamental difference is as follows: the former offered an 
immediately recognizable battlefield deployment in which the strategy of winning or 
losing is incorporated and materializes relatively quickly, whereas the latter is much 
more nebulous, and remains tactically-driven for a longer period of time.  Skirmishes  
                                                 
296 Gil Merom.  How Democracies Lose Small Wars. State, Society and the Failures of France in 
Algeria, Israel in Lebanon and the United States in Vietnam.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003, 14. 
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effectively form a part of a distant yet-to-be-realized victory strategy.   
 
In the timeline of the Vietnam War there is no doubt that the US had the capabilities  
of winning the war due to its obvious military-technical prowess, sheer volume of 
firepower, and the enormous attrition rate the US could (and did) impose on the forces 
of the North, yet its forces remained mired in ineptness.  Not only had the topography 
of the battlefield changed in terms of what the US military had trained for, but also the 
political ‘underpinnings’ of warfare had changed in the sense that everybody—
military, politicians, press, and public to name only the main actors—could make their 
valued judgements and these also impacted on the abilities of the military to make 
timely decisions.  The outcomes of machinations are evident, and they would be 
debated and remembered for many years.  Eventually however, a chance to regain 
international geo-strategic and geo-political opportunity presented itself, and it would 
arrive in conjunction with the codicil, that a developed and powerful nation-state 
could still be a potent force 
 
Subsequently, the eventual loss of the war by the US, and other Allied forces297
                                                 
297 The Allied forces involved in the direct action of the Vietnam War were the South Vietnamese, US, 
Australia and New Zealand.   The Philippines and South Korea were also involved and sided with the 
US.  In comparison to other allies and some peripheral (support) actions of other nations such as Japan 
and Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea’s direct involvement was minimal. 
 that 
had engaged in the war, by its very nature impacted heavily on future engagements for 
powerful nation-states—none more so than the US and moreover, its attitude to 
‘multilateral’ actions changed with this loss and this factor will be extrapolated in the 
next chapter.  The US had learned its lesson and would be resolute in any newfound 
application with regard to limited warfare and not view them from a generalized 
viewpoint and incorporate into any limited war strategy contingent plans if it began to 
drift into difficult and hard to manage tactics and strategies.  Introspection after the 
war focussed on the flawed wisdoms Vietnam had represented and things had to 
change.  Getting locked into a ground war of attrition would not be the way of the 
future, and crucially, any future war would consist of a much more focussed steel-to-
target doctrine, one that would disallow the war to become protracted, and any 
manoeuvring of it into an asymmetrical campaign by any other actor would be 
responded to immediately.  The military would also be given much more command 
and control of situations.  Hence, a war if it came would be prosecuted and maintained 
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by more direct focus military and objective driven strategies.  Regardless of the ability 
or inability of the respective forces in the Vietnam War, the message for the US was 
clear: if it was to become involved in another comparable mid-intensity conflict it 
would not suffer from a doctrine of ‘graduation’ which had impeded satisfactory 
progress in Vietnam.   
 
In summing up, the end of the Cold War, the demise of communism and the US  
Growing to be the sole superpower presented renewed political opportunities with 
regard to the trumpeting of liberal-democratic statecraft on a grand scale, and this 
would be the new veil for a jus ad bellum.  The powerful nation-state as an entity 
needed to reassert its supremacy.  Communism had finally been defeated in its 
estimation and not long after this event another limited war would present 
opportunities—the 1991 Persian Gulf War298
                                                 
298 The 1991 limited war in the Gulf region of the Middle East, in which Iraqi military forces invaded 
Kuwait and were ousted by UN sponsored Coalition Forces headed by the United States, is referred to 
by various terms: the Second Gulf War (the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 being considered the first in 
the historical assessment) the First Gulf War, Gulf War I, the 1991 Gulf War and, the Persian Gulf War.  
For ease of reference the war in question will be referred to by its most commonly used term to the 
most commonly: the Persian Gulf War.  
 (PGW)—and the US would act 
decisively, allegedly on behalf of free nations everywhere.  The engagement would 
allow fresh opportunities for the US to flex its military muscle in a campaign 
sanctioned by the UN to oust an invader (Iraq) from another nation-state (Kuwait).  
This would be done under the pretext of a more precise jus ad bellum, and be on 
behalf of liberal-democracy per se; the re-establishment of good governance and 
‘acceptable’ order; and of respect for Kuwaiti sovereignty; and the rule-of-law.  The 
Treaty of Westphalia’s merits are once again evident.  With this knowledge, and in 
the context of the dynamics of the Vietnam War having changed the way in which 
powerful nations-states viewed limited warfare, there could however, no longer be a 
‘guarantee’ that a limited war would end in the victory that, prior to Vietnam, as I 
have mentioned was ‘assured.’  America would embark upon a different kind of war 
in order to win the PGW and underpinning this would be that although a powerful 
nation-state could lose a limited war, it would not change the notion that limited 
warfare was a positive and calculable contrivance-of-persuasion, one that could be 
utilized in a time of crisis as per its historical norm. 
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The United States and Intervention After 
Vietnam 
 
Preamble  
 
This chapter will reveal and firmly establish the contention of this thesis: the loss of 
the Vietnam War did not alter the mainstay of US geo-strategic preponderance and the 
military would remain a significant part of this parameter.  After the defeat of 
Vietnam War this would happen by establishing a new pathway in the quest for global 
supremacy.  The exploration will entail reviewing the Vietnam War and by necessity 
an examination of the immediate post-Vietnam geo-strategic dilemmas that were 
thrown up will also be required.  By revisiting the Vietnam War and the pains that the 
conflict delivered to both the American military and people will enable a tracing of 
the pathway that the American military adopted in order to never let this happen again; 
expose the most overt, subtle and/or hidden components that encouraged failure; and 
highlight specific avenues the US military adopted to regain the upper hand should 
geo-strategic intervention be required again.  Whilst understanding that, at this time, 
the US remained committed to an overriding geo-strategic presence the process to 
which I allude will be addressed on the mantle of their commitment to several new 
tactical and strategic doctrines and included in this is the dominant component which 
would continue as its mainstay of operations: airpower. All of these aspects will be 
analysed to establish the military and politico-military footholds the US would pursue 
and could immediately exploit in the decades after Vietnam and would come to 
fruition in the immediate post-Cold War environment.  
 
The US acknowledged that the strategies and tactics used in the Vietnam War were 
fundamentally flawed and a total overhaul of its military needed to be overhauled—
especially its airpower and grounds-based assets.  Moreover, after Vietnam the focus 
of the US military began to be centred on a geo-strategic ‘positioning’ of the Middle 
East as their security agenda focus changed from the Southeast Asian region.  To be 
sure, whilst geo-strategic issues required the military to be moved to the fore and the 
explicit reasons and causes will be addressed in the following paragraphs, the issues 
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that needed to be significantly changed had been present in the final throes of the 
Vietnam conflict.  In keeping with the premise that it was acknowledged after 
Vietnam that what was needed was a total overhaul of how the military was to be used, 
if the US was to exercise its forcefulness in a more decisive way, new realizations 
about the Vietnam War were sorely needed.  To be precise, the pivotal reasons for the 
loss needed to be extracted from the debacle.  Future geo-strategic positioning would 
depend on this and any sets of contributing factors need to be seen in the light of what 
they comprised.  Thus, the way in which policy was shaped after the Vietnam years 
can be understood thoroughly by revisiting those years from the perspective of the 
military, the government, and the populace.  The approach that this chapter will 
contend is through a macrocosm of the war, as this allows for overall analyses to be 
made without getting bogged down in the microcosms of tactical positioning and/or 
campaign strategies.  The reason for this approach is it allows for the driving and 
overarching influences to be accessed through a specific prism that disallows for an 
immediate attachment to military tactics.  By this I mean the influences are more able 
to be seen of as overall representations and be interpreted in a more purposeful way 
which will result in expansive understanding.  A simple contextualization can be 
drawn out at this point and one which brings together the reasons which demonstrate 
the US has a long-held tradition of intervention and thus, it was able to shift the 
refocus its military with relative ease due to its abundant history of regional and 
global preponderance  (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  Initiation of the Use of U.S. [Military] Forces Abroad by 
President, 1797-1993.  Reprinted from: Charles Kegley and Eugene 
Wittkopf.  American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process. 
Basingstoke: St Martin’s Press, 1996, 546.  
 
As shown in figure eight US involvement in the international arena has always been 
(and remains) robust and the fact that a defeat had been encountered in Southeast Asia, 
it had not (and did not) lose its penchant for international participation through high-
profile military actions.  This state-of-affairs would not alter in the general post-Cold 
War era nor with the loss of the Vietnam War, and moreover, is consistent with the 
US’ historical norm.  The use of military preponderance and warfare in this way it is 
safe to argue, is premised on a straightforward reasoning: military intervention had 
come to serve US geo-strategic purposes more efficaciously than straightforward 
diplomacy.  Observing pre- and post-Vietnam historical agendas whilst revealing an 
explicit timeline of force that the US exercises via a military presence within this 
came a definitive realization and change in geo-strategic thinking: in order for the US 
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to exercise maximum influence it had to incrementally move from a ‘multilateral’299
approach to a more ‘unilateral’
  
300 use of force.  If this was not possible it should, at 
the very least, take a leadership role in preponderance.  The change after Vietnam 
whilst still remaining steadfast to, and on the back of the WWII and Korean War 
doctrines and successes the US military definitively understood that examining the 
ways in which the defeat occurred could provide evidence that would essentially 
disallow for a repeat of what was in every sense, a debacle.  In the post-Vietnam era 
lesser campaigns—such as Lebanon, Grenada, the Gulf of Sidra, the Persian Gulf, and 
Panama—for the US had allowed for a honing of its military skills and therefore it 
had become a more precise contrivance of unilateral geo-strategic persuasion and 
although this is a banal observation, there are deeper issues that these interventions 
demarcate.  The straightforwardness of the graph showing incidents of direct 
American ‘interventionism’301
                                                 
299 The term multilateral/multilateralism is complex although a succinct explanation is the ‘term is 
generally used to describe relationships among several entities in the international relations literature, 
the term ‘multilateral’ is linked to the preference for, and institutionalization of, collective action in 
resolving problems that arise among several actors through a process of meetings, negotiation, treaty-
making and then non-violent forms of action.’  See: W. Andy Knight and Jim Whitman.  A Changing 
United Nations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, 38. 
 and the subsequent power projections they represent 
add significant merit to the argument of force, when used opportunistically and 
deliberately, satisfies the expansionist tendencies of a powerful nation-state.  
Furthermore they underpin a rationale of the US having long been a major geo-
strategic player has used limited warfare—as a tool of geo-strategic positioning—and 
the outcomes were in general, propitious to their policy direction and agendas.  The 
upshot of this is the Vietnam War for the US military was an aberration, a disastrous 
one, but an aberration nonetheless.  An heuristic historical analysis and observation 
that can be made based on this evidence, is that the US views military force, 
intervention, and limited warfare as an intrinsic and successful part of their geo-
strategic operational platforms.   The key issue for the US after the limited war of 
300 According to Haas, ‘Unilateralism is an approach to U.S. involvement in the world that minimizes 
and wherever possible excludes the participation of other governments and organizations.  
Unilateralists are uncomfortable with the compromises necessary for the smooth functioning of 
alliances, and they oppose the transfer of substantial authority to international organizations.’ See: 
Richard Haas.  The Reluctant Sheriff.  The United States After The Cold War. New York: Brookings 
Institute Press, 1997, 85.  
301 Kegley and Wittkopf indicate the graph, ‘summarizes the number of times presidents saw fit to 
establish American troops abroad.  The provocations were widely dissimilar and thus required vastly 
different levels of American commitment.  Still, the figure conveys some sense of how deeply 
interventionism is entrenched in the American experience.’  See: American Foreign Policy: Pattern 
and Process, 546. 
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Vietnam was to exercise a greater control over any limited war that needed to be used 
to gain greater geo-strategic platforms as the Vietnam War had exposed deep-set 
flaws in the practice of the use of limited war.  What eventuated was the US needed to 
examine the macrocosm of the Vietnam War in order to gain a greater understanding 
of future intervention which would serve the purpose of US geo-strategic positioning.  
This chapter will draw together the perils of geo-strategic positioning and 
preponderance and what the US would gain from these perils and influences. 
 
The perils of preponderance 
 
After the success of the Korean War however, a critical juncture was encountered in 
US geo-strategic thinking and that is, it was beginning to falter in what had been a 
successful ‘model’ of preponderance.  This chapter asserts the notion that in the 
decades after the Korean War the US’ highly successful model of preponderance was 
beginning to falter and there were decisive reasons that the US needed to address.  In 
other words, it had been flushed with the success of the Korean War and this had 
produced a lackadaisical approach to the way in which warfare was ‘evolving.’  The 
US had continued to intervene in countries although it had ignored the way in which 
warfare had evolved from highly-conventional and symmetrical force-on-force 
encounters, to more unconventional, asymmetrical skirmish-driven encounters.  
Asymmetrical exchanges generally comprise minor battles and low-intensity 
skirmishes—which in military parlance had come to be known as ‘firefights’—which 
insurgent movements and guerrillas deliberately exploit because they are not designed 
to develop into full-scale confrontations.  These exchanges broadly speaking, 
generally comprise de-centralised forces, often involving contingents of exogenous 
militia and/or disparate militia forces that came together in a more ‘organized’ way, in 
the military sense of the term, for the duration of a either a single firefight or a 
campaign.  After the encounter the forces would disband.  Due to the nature of the 
changes—or the ‘evolvement’—over time problems exponentially developed for 
forces accustomed to fighting symmetrically, and the US was no exception.  Because 
the US continued to intervene in many countries, the way in which warfare was 
developing had begun to impact on their geo-strategic objectives.   
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Although post-Korean War interventions remained high in relative terms the pre-
eminent challenge for US strategists became how to deal with any given conflict and 
whether it could be ‘contained’ within a country or region which effectively meant, a 
crisis not expanding and impacting on US interests.  Strategists began to understand 
this in a much broader sense and due to the limited war being the mainstay of 
intervention.  What needed attending to was, to arrest the ‘direction’ of limited 
warfare.  As a matter of course arresting the skewing of a limited war would allow for 
favourable outcomes for the US, as it would regain control of the more positive 
foreign policy outcomes and moreover, the sophisticated application of selective 
limited warfare could be used to strengthen (or re-strengthen) their Middle East geo-
strategic ventures.  Limited warfare had changed across many fronts and in varying 
degrees and this had brought about new challenges for the US, and the Korean War 
for all of its positive offshoots, had been the last symmetrical limited war and the US 
had to face this reality.  
 
In keeping with the theme of preponderance via limited warfare a primary challenge 
in the evolution of warfare—and one that directly impacted on US planning—was that 
although the kinetic phases of warfare had changed the ‘cost’ of warfare had not.   To 
explain this notion, minor battles and low-intensity conflicts draw enormously on 
conventional military resources in a similar way to force-on-force collisions.  The 
grouping and use of force is required as part of normal operations to initiate, respond 
to, and/or quell conflict.  The considerable military input required in interventions—as 
per the instances mentioned in the beginning of this chapter—I argue no longer 
offered comparable military ‘benefits.’  Therefore, very little positive political 
mileage and/or advantage could be gained via a low-intensity or mid-intensity conflict 
because of the military cost involved.  Repeated confrontations of this type had 
proved to be incrementally more and more onerous.  The evidence of changes in 
tactics by militia forces over time is substantial and is eminently traceable, however 
what is also evident is whilst this was happening, the US remained resolute and 
steadfast in its adherence to traditional warfare.  Within this paradigm the Vietnam 
War provides the strongest evidence of the way in which warfare had changed after 
the Korean War—as alluded to in the last chapter—and moreover, how the US had 
resisted the change.  This factor in and of itself, demonstrates how persistent and 
entrenched US commitment to conventional warfare was at the time, and how far it 
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had permeated into the services.  Strategists needed to tackle this problem if the US 
was to maintain its geo-strategic profile and fight new styles of war in the process.  
How the US accomplished this is now able to be analysed.  
 
Re-examining some factors of the Vietnam War that were not dealt with in the last 
chapter need to be investigated with regard to what the US had overlooked in the war; 
and how the corresponding lessons learned would be (eventually) applied to future 
‘hotspots.’  The Middle East was recognized by the US as a future zone of conflict in 
which it would probably be involved.  As the Middle East region continued to develop 
fiscally, militarily and politically, by the late twentieth century it had become one of 
significant geo-strategic worth.  This change forced the US to reassess its military 
practices and deployments.  The premise underpinning this was a solid understanding 
the Middle East region would possibly demand a decisive intervention at some point 
in either, the late twentieth or early twenty-first, centuries.  Other factors which would 
also have an impact on decision-making policy with regard to interventionism would 
have as a backdrop the horrendous loss of Vietnam to contend with, and other military 
faltering since the end of the Korean War—as alluded to in the opening paragraphs of 
this chapter.  It was nevertheless understood that intervention remained high on 
theUS’ geo-strategic agenda.  Other issues which would have some influence on 
foreign policy objectives were from a domestic perspective, the incurring of US 
military casualties and forthright political comment by other nations which the US 
would have to at the very least acknowledge, in any preponderance.   An example of 
such political comment and one which represents nation-states exercising their 
regional voice is the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States accusing the US of 
using ‘gunboat policy’302 under the pretext of ‘restoring law and order’303
                                                 
302 Yuri Gvozdev and Yuri Alexandrov.  Grenada: US Terrorism in Action. Moscow: Novosti Press 
Agency Publishing House, 1983, 91. 
 in their 
Grenada mission.  Importantly, and an adjunct alluded to earlier the signal being sent 
to the US by comments of this nature were that of a ‘lesser-developed’ nations 
evolving and changing.  Whilst these instances may have constituted only part of 
overall dialogue and interactions, they are relevant to the US needing to achieve a 
greater control over more forthright politico-machinations. This was particularly 
important if limited war or intervention was to be part of their agenda if it was to 
303 Grenada: US Terrorism in Action, 89. 
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produce greater positive outcomes. 
 
As the US was winding down its involvement in the Vietnam War, strategists 
remained active in their planning with regard to protecting its interests via expansion.  
In 1973, the US State Department identified actions which may be needed in the 
Middle East as it had progressively been moved to the forefront of geo-strategic 
positioning.  The reason this had occurred was based on a premise of largely 
identifying pivotal issues that had the potential to ‘threaten’ US interests.304
planning with regard to the Middle East was already afoot in the early 1970s and for 
many reasons—such as the 1973 Yom Kippur War
  Strategic  
305—there was an understanding, if 
not an expectation, in the echelons of government that it would invariably become 
involved in collisions and mid-intensity conflicts within the Middle East region.  
Mitigating factors that contributed to tensions, with respect to the US are too 
numerous to mention and it is enough to state regional powers had become more and 
more politically astute, and began to exert influence in pursuit of their own regional 
hegemonic ambitions.306
                                                 
304 The Gulf War Reader, 466. 
   This broad-brush statement also reflects regional powers 
began to become more pro-active in the pursuit of an independent political identity 
and voice.  An excellent example of the ‘voice’ is the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) were developing largesse and influences regionally, as 
well as locally, which were largely independent of US (and Western) interests and this 
exhibits political sophistication, maturity, and power projection.  The US although 
somewhat troubled by these developments generally accepted the status quo although 
it remained critically aware this state-of-affairs may impact on their ‘interests’ and 
thus, may require decisive interventions in the future.  An acknowledgement of this 
state-of-affairs is evident in the document, Middle East: Possible Use of Force by the 
United States in which circumventing a domestic catastrophe via decisive intervention 
is considered.  The document reads in part, ‘the United States seriously considered 
sending airborne troops to seize the oilfields of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi 
305 According to the New York Times, in citing the Federal Reserve Energy Information Administration, 
the price of oil immediately after the Yom Kippur War rose to approximately US$43.00 per barrel from 
a pre-war level of US$18.00 per barrel.  See: Jad Mouawad. ‘Oil Tops Inflation-Adjusted Record Set in 
1980.’ New York Times. World Business. InsideNYTimes.com. 4, March 2008.  Accessed 1 May, 2009.  
<http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/03/03/business/20080304_OIL600x275_GRAPHIC.gif> 
306 According to Klare the Middle East region would inevitably involve force-on-force confrontations 
as nations become more powerful, though they would not be beyond US military capabilities.  See: The 
Gulf War Reader, 466.  
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during the 1973 oil embargo.’307  The intent behind such an incursion was to assert 
greater control over oil and within the region in general, whilst assuring an ongoing 
oil supply; and to send a message that the US would act decisively when situations 
arose that affected its requisite needs.  The incursion did not eventuate, although the 
document was part of a greater foreign policy agenda cum vision which as its nexus, a 
security dividend’308
 
 which exhibits the US was capable of carrying out decisive 
intervention via sea- and airpower if the it was needed and the issue deemed ‘vital.’ 
Therefore, it can be safely argued as early as 1973 the stage had been set, in terms of 
military responses being part of their agenda of protecting their national interests—
even after the perils of Vietnam—and military strategists maintained a conviction to 
interventionist practices.  These convictions would exponentially develop with a 
strategic focus on the Persian Gulf region, and offer additional credible evidence that, 
the US had changed its strategic focus from Southeast Asia to the Middle East.    
At this point there is a requirement to link the US Vietnam ‘experience’ to an 
intervention into the Persian Gulf.  Although this seems an unlikely combination to 
bring together at this stage, when applied it will be shown to have a valuable 
juxtaposition of shedding light on the interventionist strategies of the US as it would 
move to gain (greater) control of the Gulf region.  A Vietnam-Persian Gulf connection 
is made in order to link an overview of what future interventionist strategies would 
entail.  What the US knew and understood in the immediate post-Vietnam era was the 
balance had to swing back to favouring their use of decisive intervention moving 
toward limited warfare, if it was to be vigorously pursued as a contrivance of 
persuasion. There was a new challenge-at-hand and the tangible spin-offs of any act 
                                                 
307 Glenn Frankel. ‘U.S. Mulled Seizing Oil Fields In '73. British Memo Cites Notion of Sending 
Airborne [Troops] to Mideast.’  WashingtonPost.com 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=A46321-2003Dec31> Accessed 10 
November, 2008.  The plan is also referred to as Dhahran Option Four and is articulated in by 
Shenkman in Saudi Arabia’s Doomsday Plan as, ‘In 1973 the British were told by American Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger that the United States might use force to maintain open access to the key 
oil fields of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. Two years later, in 1975, the Sunday Times of 
London published an account of a classified American plan, "Dhahran Option Four," which provided 
for an American invasion to seize the oil wells of Saudi Arabia. In an interview with the media in 1975, 
Henry Kissinger publicly acknowledged that the United States might use force to free up oil supplies in 
the Middle East to save the West from strangulation.’ See: Rick Shenkman. ‘Saudi Arabia’s Doomsday 
Plan.’ HistoryNewsNetwork.  
<http://hnn.us/articles/11802.html>  Accessed 10 November, 2008.  
308 Dennis Merrill.  ‘The United States and the Third World.’  American Foreign Relations 
Reconsidered, 1890-1993, 169. 
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of interventionism in the Middle East had to generate greater positive/beneficial 
offshoots than what had gone before.  Therefore, strategies needed to ‘tighten up’ and 
control any limited war, and in the process they had to reassess Vietnam; and use the 
application of new strategies and tactics.    
 
 
The macrocosm of Vietnam: influences on United States military 
supremacy 
 
A contextualization of the challenge is required here for a closer comprehension of 
how limited warfare needed to become a more ‘controllable’ contrivance of  
persuasion.  By articulating the Vietnam War in (or as) a macrocosm, enables a 
template to be produced, one which exposes the practices that had proved to be 
unworkable during the war and in doing so, further announces practices that would 
need to be modified if and when applied to limited war in the post-Vietnam era.  More 
importantly, by observing the Vietnam War in a macrocosm allows for a succinct 
overarching analysis to be undertaken, one that does not get bogged down in the 
incident-specific (tactical) dispositions of the war, which were dealt with in the last 
chapter.  In simpler terms, in dealing with ‘macro aspects’ of the Vietnam War 
strategists allowed for the identification of key elements that in effect, demonstrate 
how the war was lost and paradoxically, how it could have been won.  Teasing these 
out will crystallize how the influences of the Vietnam War played out and how they 
affected future grand strategy.  The exposure of these factors will allow a concise 
Vietnam War-Persian Gulf strategy to be interlinked and interpreted and in this 
process, will reveal how the Persian Gulf would be ‘approached,’ in terms of strategy.  
Thus, the Vietnam years remain pertinent because they offer a forecast for future US 
geo-strategic motives, whilst conveying a predilection for military confrontation in the 
achieving of goals.  The interlinking will offer an insight into how strategists define 
crucial components that would ensure limited wars of the future would be successful.  
And dealing with how the Vietnam War affected the population of the US is a 
pertinent starting point. 
 
The massive impact the loss had and the way in which it percolated through the  
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populace in general is expressed in the enormity of military and foreign policy failures 
of the war, and is shown in a stark and straightforward observance: the populace took 
at least a decade to come to terms with the pain and sufferings of this conflict.  The 
war Hallion avers had ‘profoundly wounded the US’309
 
 and the anguish Hallion refers 
to is succinctly summed up, and reinforced by LaFeber, as 
The ghost of Vietnam continued to haunt Americans, but at least the 
specter was more clearly defined: it was caused not by some 
imagined media conspiracy or the anti-war movement but by top 
officials who did not understand either the revolutionary situation 
they were entering or the very limited patience of the American 
people to support a long-term costly, distant war.  The new definition 
arising out of the historical debate after the war, directly shaped US 
foreign policies after 1974, especially the realization of officials, 
notably the American military, that if they again used force abroad, it 
had to be short, decisive, and with clear-cut and definable 
boundaries.310
   
 
 
Inherent within the above is an admission of the pain, humiliation, and military toll of 
a regional cum mid-intensity conflict and limited war had, in general terms, 
culminated in relatively few positive offshoots.  What it had also done was exacerbate 
a need that the next limited war had to be decisively won.  Using LaFeber’s comment 
as a guide enables a post-Vietnam pathway to be gleaned.  One in which the US 
intended to proceed down should it enter another mid-intensity conflict, and it further 
signals there had to be significant change.  A simple triad can be gleaned from direct 
influences (if not diktats) of future policy on limited warfare.  Post-Vietnam 
deployments should not comprise the same ambiguities of the Vietnam War, and if 
force was needed in the future to make ‘rogue states’311
                                                 
309 Richard Hallion.  Storm Over Iraq. Airpower and the Gulf War. Washington: Smithsonian Institute 
Press, 1992, 17. 
 conform to US foreign policy 
objectives then so be it; and crucially, when force was needed it must be applied  
310 Walter LaFeber. ‘From détente to the Gulf.’  American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993.  
Edited by Gordon Martel.  London: Routledge, 1994, 152.  Emphasis added. 
311 Although the term ‘rogue states’ was not coined until the Clinton administration the term is relevant 
when explaining US pretexts in general, and this term can be applied to (post-Cold War) Iraq.  
According to Lake ‘rogue states’ are ‘ruled by coercion,’ and ‘exhibit a chronic inability to engage 
constructively with the outside world.’  See: Anthony Lake. ‘Confronting Backlash States,’ Foreign 
Affairs. Washington: United States Information Service, March-April 1994, 10, 2. The issue is not as 
clear for Young and Kent however, as they observe the concept is filled with contradictions and 
difficult to execute in real terms, as the term was clouded by whether the state in question was friendly 
towards the US or not, and this factor influenced whether it was branded a ‘rogue state.’  See: 
International Relations Since 1945, 676.  
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differently than what had gone before.  The cause-and-effect factors which began to 
filter into future warfare outcomes are numerous and all need not be mentioned here, 
as only several substantial failures of the Vietnam War need to be highlighted from 
this point.  The relevance of highlighting the failures is because they address and 
indicate why US limited warfare strategies needed to be reformed  
 
Observing and recognizing the Vietnam War in a chronological macrocosm is to 
acknowledge it as being a long and drawn out slogging-match of attrition.  What 
helped create such destructiveness were the limitations that were initiated by the US 
government and ‘imposed’ on their military during the 1960s and early 1970s.   The 
‘imposing’ I refer to, comprised fundamental and associated foreign policy issues that 
constrained, contributed to, and exacerbated situations in the war which culminated in 
an inability to control and then contain, enemy forces.  The problems that were 
allowed to fester require identification when pinpointing these issues and 
problematics—the perceived and real reasons for the loss—underscore the flawed 
strategies of prosecuting the war.  The mismanagement of the war, paradoxically, 
offers a précis of how future wars would need to be managed.  
 
Central to the understanding that limited warfare needed a new approach is implicit in 
the stark recognition of a consistent problematic of Vietnam: that subsequent US 
administrations remained embroiled in a continuous ‘loop’ of reductive factors during 
the war, all of which soaked up valuable time, resources, tactical, and 
control/decision-making strategies.  For instance, the stagnation that was inherent 
compounded the problem of winning was the Johnson administrations’ prescribed 
‘limitations’312
                                                 
312 The way in which different types of tactics were addressed and used is a prevalent part of the 
literature on the Vietnam War—and opinions are vast and varied.  A pivotal and issue within the debate 
about what constituted ‘limitation’ resides in the use of airpower (the use of strike aircraft and air-
delivered munitions which will be dealt with in more detail later in the chapter).  The example of 
airpower is used here only to highlight what and how a problematic remained consistent, and was not 
addressed.  With regard to airpower there were significant successes, regardless of the destruction of 
airpower assets referred to in the previous chapter.  Tactical misuse of airpower however, stemmed 
from the White House essentially directing operations rather than the military, and the end disastrous 
result stemmed ‘not from the limits of airpower…[but] the limits on airpower,’ as construed and 
applied by the upper echelon of the White House.  See: Storm Over Iraq, I9.  Emphasis in original.   
 on the war.  The limits and restrictions were generated by both internal 
(domestic) obligations and external (foreign) policy considerations.  These limitations 
were generated by a mix of internal-external factors and continually encouraged 
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flawed strategies and the approach of how to effectively marry the two concepts to the 
actual and potentially successful ‘participation’313 in the war had expanded into and 
became a nexus of the war.  As enormous a problem this became, and the domestic 
discontent it created in relative terms, the limitations also contributed to an 
undermining of the war’s worth in the eyes of the populace.  Although it is impossible 
to identify a single all-encompassing reason for the loss of the war, the domestic 
discontent created an inability on the part of the government to make strong-minded 
foreign policy.  This is ensconced at the international level by the White House being 
concerned about the reactions of other nations if decisive actions were taken against 
North Vietnam.  An example of this being the war was deliberately ‘down-scaled’ by 
the US to decrease the risk of greater involvement by the USSR, or the People’s 
Republic of China.  Hence, a decisive invasion of North Vietnam by the US, in which 
victory would surely have been attained, was not carried out.314
 
   The upshot of these 
factors and influences was, strategists observed in post-war assessments that worrying 
about possible actions of foreign powers inevitably compounded, eventually leading 
to a generic undermining and inertia of the US military and a lack of political control 
over the war.  From this understanding came a determinant that in future, similar 
elements that presented military quandaries would need to be reacted to as early as 
possible, thereby disallowing minor problems escalating into major ones. It was 
recognized that allowing quandaries to fester effectively works against the purpose of 
a war and inevitably, impacts heavily on grand strategy.  Expanding on this point 
requires a retrospective analysis of elements to show how easy grand strategy is able 
to be eroded.  
The inertia and compounding of problems are able to be observed in a straightforward 
summation of events.  Mitigating factors of US indecision and the persistence of 
northern forces, is able to be seen in their strategy throughout the war.  Exacerbating 
the military issue-at-hand for the US, was the fact that northern forces put into place 
the asymmetrical tactics of warfare as stipulated, they had learned in 1954 whilst 
fighting the French military.  Enemy forces converted their tactics from symmetrical 
to asymmetrical after suffering heavy losses in the nascent phases of the Battle of 
                                                 
313 According to Frizzell by ‘the winter of 1972 the American people were thoroughly disillusioned 
with the war in Southeast Asia.  Critics sharply questioned the legality of U.S. interventionism there 
and the rationality of continued U.S. involvement.’ See: The Lessons of Vietnam, 151 
314 A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, 189.   
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Dien Bien Phu315
 
 against dug-in French forces which were able to call-in air strikes 
and deploy artillery.  As has been mentioned in the last chapter Northern forces 
exploited the tactics learned fighting the French and used them against US and (US-
trained) ARVN forces.  The adjunct that was to further undermine the US, and proved 
to be most effective was the North Vietnamese government, also employed core and 
systemic political actions in the process, and these political actions, once conjoined to 
a successful military strategy, further weakened US capabilities.  The ongoing 
problems can be observed in that the US began to lose the war militarily, as well as 
politically, because problems were inadequately addressed overall, which in turn 
produced an inability to effectively respond to situations.  Throughout the conflict 
systemic failure on the part of the US, and successes on the part of the Northern 
insurgency are able to be accurately graphed (see Figure 9).    
 
 
Figure 9.  Benchmarks of Insurgent Success: Vietnam [War] II. 
Reprinted from: Timothy Lomperis. From People’s War to People’s 
Rule. Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, 268. 
 
Figure nine offers an outline of the vital components which governed the war.  
Although the components are positivistic and heuristic, core elements are able to be 
teased out and interpreted accurately.  Figure nine offers a map and clarity to what 
became a multifaceted and disjointed war on the part of the US and asserts, Vietnam 
was lost because the downward trends (troughs) and endeavours of Northern forces 
were unable to be capitalised on.  Any inroads that were able to be made were simply 
                                                 
315 The Ten Thousand Day War: Search and Destroy, [Videorecording 1]. 
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dulled by persistent low-intensity counter-actions on the part of the North.  Some 
further interpretation is required here to offer the graph an additional credibility.  The 
graph whilst illustrating the Vietnam War as a macrocosm, highlights how the war 
incrementally shifted in favour of the North.  The graph illustrates the intrusive and 
persistent power of the NV insurgency (bottom line chronology) and  
the focussed momentum that was created by this action, allowed a politico  
‘critical mass’316 to be reached and then sustained.  The upward curve of the graph 
emanates from the ‘critical mass’ (bottom broken line) and climbs, thus emphasizing 
vantage/disadvantage points on the trajectory.  The trajectory of the mass is shown to 
gain exponential momentum for change—as per the military decisiveness exhibited 
by the upward trending unbroken line.  This, coupled with the political ramification 
on the far left of the graph, increase the momentum as the insurgency developed its 
asymmetrical tactical measures exhibited by the ‘crossover points,’ which further 
contributed to ongoing successes.  An upward momentum of successes essentially 
continues and although some tactical retardations (troughs) were encountered at times 
by the Northern forces, in real terms the successes continued relatively unabated, as 
emphasised by the upward-trending peaks.  The end point for the US was when a final 
‘strategic breakout’ point as shown by the middle ‘broken line’ was reached 
signifying the NV insurgents had attracted enough support to pose a genuine crisis in 
southern (US sponsored) rule.  At this point NV insurgents had jockeyed into a 
strategic position from which a tactical, and more importantly, a frontal and overt bid 
for power could be launched.317  In order for such a bid for power to take place, a 
potential governing and/or ruling force must have approximately ten to twenty percent 
of the adult population actively joining the insurgent cause—provided this number is 
widely distributed and includes key political groups—and support for the incumbent 
government has dipped below fifty percent.318
                                                 
316 The typology of a ‘critical mass’ is complex though centres on a premise of ‘in countries of ten to 
twenty million, a critical mass exists when an insurgent groups commands a hard core of five to ten 
thousand fighters and a network of sympathizers ten times as large.’  See: From People’s War to 
People’s Rule, 266. 
   What figure nine also represents is 
how the US ignored the ongoing political crusade of the Northern forces and the 
capabilities of their military forces and this would prove an enormous failure of grand 
strategy.  Identifying and assessing the milieu of events and their outcomes, reveals a 
317 From People’s War to People’s Rule, 266-267. 
318 From People’s War to People’s Rule, 267. 
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progressive impact on the ability of the US ability to prosecute a successful limited 
war; and generate victory.   
 
After Vietnam: new plans for limited warfare 
 
The trend reflected in figure nine although heuristic, represents an accurate  
(positivistic) representation of the war and paradoxically, the way in which the graph  
pans out is able to be further interpreted as a signal of the way in which the US would 
develop its military into tip of its ‘foreign-policy-spear.’  After the loss of Vietnam the 
US determined that its military planning with regard to any future sizable campaign 
and/or mid-intensity conflict would not be distracted from its primary objectives and 
hence, peripheral issues would not play a dominant role in the determinants of 
military capabilities.  Domestic political machinations would not be allowed to impact 
on the day-to-day tactics of a war; especially if they had the potential to curtail the 
‘decisiveness and effectiveness’319
                                                 
319 According to McMaster, Johnson took actions without a full appreciation of the military 
consequences, and made decisions which would benefit his short term political aims, which invariably 
retarded military decisiveness and effectiveness.  See:  H. McMaster.  Dereliction of Duty. Lyndon 
Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.  New York: 
HarperCollins, 1997, 108. 
 of a campaign.  In the future, all would be closely 
monitored because strategists saw what had gone wrong; and they had learned from 
the lessons of Vietnam.  Mid-intensity clashes of the future would see a symmetrical 
battleground legerdemain being moved to the fore as quickly as possible, in order to 
circumvent any asymmetrical tendencies.   The grand strategy rationale underpinning 
such reasoning is the need to generate a ‘type’ of warfare that would retard and/or 
disallow exogenous militia from gaining greater control than their prescribed capacity 
and/or mandate.  Military, as well as political components would also be absorbed 
into the milieu, and reacted to, in a more effectual manner on the part of the US, and 
crucially, driving conventional set-piece tactics to the fore at the earliest opportunity 
would be of utmost importance.  After Vietnam traditional and symmetrical warfare it 
was reasoned, would arrest any drift to a ‘people’s war,’ or a war of the ‘third kind’ 
and thus, a ‘low-tier’ state-of-affairs would be curtailed.  A core component at this 
point is recognizing the strategic projections that have been revealed through the 
prism of the Vietnam War were impacted on by multiple failings, including the 
constraints of actions during the war.  This allows the questions to be raised of how it 
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would approach limited war in the future; and how would control be ‘taken back’ in 
military confrontations?  The sufferings of Vietnam would continue to influence the 
regional pax-Americana that the US was pursuing and it would remain to be heavily 
influenced by what had evolved during the Vietnam years.  
 
Conclusion to ‘The United States and Intervention After Vietnam’ 
 
Prosecuting a successful limited war in post-WWII times has increasingly developed 
for Western societies and become more and more dependent on technology and for 
the US, this is particularly prescient.  The meeting of technology and modernity has 
required an incremental refinement of both aspects and along the pathway of progress 
during the Vietnam War, there was a distinct enmeshing of these two components.  To 
make the case of technology however, a precise delineation of how the technology 
and the force projection it offers although it has been shown to have not succeeded in 
gaining victory—that it was so assured of (in theory) reaching—was instead, an abject 
failure.  The US however, and as has been observed was able to learn from its 
mistakes and even whilst extracting its military from one conflict that was out of 
control was able to plan other strategic ventures.  This, in and of itself, shows the US’ 
faith in its military strength remained undeterred along with a considerable faith in the 
refined modernity that this expressed.  This chapter has shown the processes the US 
went through in coming to terms with the loss of a limited war and how it had learned 
from Vietnam.  The next chapter will be testament to the power of a country that had 
learned from its military venture in Southeast Asia and how from this, it had refined 
and honed its technological and strategic approach to limited war.  The next limited 
war would be executed on a vastly different military agenda.  
 
To wit, a successful campaign in the Persian Gulf—which will be elaborated on in the 
following chapter—would have many (potential) positive offshoots for the US, if 
handled well.  The prosecution of a successful limited war would 
 
• act as a definitive geo-strategic springboard for the US into the Middle East; 
• allow for a  regional pax-Americana to have a renewed authoritative post-Cold 
War beginning; 
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• enable a high-profile demonstration of military force;  
• revive a decisive conventional battle legerdemain; 
• comprise an overall reversal of any post-Korean War military failures; and 
• emphasize there would be no ambiguities about the outcome in a post-Cold 
War world when the US military played a part.  
 
The template, outlined in the above points, was firmly ensconced in the mind of 
American geo-strategic planners and are signposts for US ambition that would be 
acted out in the Middle East.   The US saw its role as a continuous and formidable 
geo-strategic player in the Middle East.  There are however, other underlying 
historical issues at play.  In observing the multifarious components of involvement in 
the region, the emergence of how the US was able to embark upon a limited war in a 
faraway land so decisively and with such conviction becomes clear.     
 
The US remains as committed to technology in the post-Cold War era as it was during 
the Vietnam War, and the Cold War era.  Future wars would not change as they would 
also require a substantial high-tech input and enormous organization.  As part of the 
grand strategy of limited warfare in the Middle East lethal force would (and could) be 
delivered in the relatively sympathetic desert terrain by the usual array of mobile 
armour (tanks, mobile-artillery, and to a lesser extent armoured personnel carriers) 
along with static long-range ground- and sea-borne artillery.  Crucially however, there 
would be an independent overwhelming force, which would accompany ground and 
naval assets: airpower.  Airpower, if used to its maximum potential and if applied at 
precise points in a campaign would increase the advantage of its user.  The US was 
keen, after the perils of Vietnam and stumbling in other military ventures, to exploit 
airpower to its maximum potential, in order to (re)gain lost ground that had been 
caused; to reinvigorate a pax-Americana; and to establish the US as a force to be 
reckoned with in the post-Cold War international arena.   To understand how the US 
would accomplish this requires an investigation of critical elements that would need 
to be conjoined if exploiting such a vast amount of power was to be successful.   
 
In the following chapter these issues will be articulated and more fully addressed as 
they form part of an overall schema of military progression/s and politico geo-
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strategies that were immediately put into place in the response to the Iraqi military 
invasion of Kuwait. The first post-Cold War, war of rivalry, would see the lessons 
learned in, and about Vietnam put firmly into action.  A crystallization of tactics and 
strategies would operate in a synchronistic way, and in doing so firmly establish 
American hegemony in the region; exhibit that airpower was the force to be reckoned 
with; and exemplify if it had been effectively used in Vietnam the outcome would 
have been different. 
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United States Supremacy in Modern 
Limited Warfare: The Persian Gulf War 
 
Preamble 
 
This chapter will address the airpower and ground invasion strategies that were able to 
be called upon in the Gulf region which encompassed and reflected a more 
sophisticated version of Cold War policies-of-containment grand strategies and also 
incorporated strategies learned from the Vietnam War.  A plethora of components 
were in place because of the Cold War for the US and paradoxically, due to the loss of 
Vietnam War could be actioned.  The fundamentals of an effective and decisive pre-
ground invasion air campaign would be followed up by a ground armour spearhead 
and an infantry push.  The purpose of the ground campaign comprised firmly 
establishing a US ground presence which would be reinforced with a continual 
airpower presence.  The secondary armour push would be accompanied by airpower 
covering the ground invasion, as well as it being used in sustained follow-up targeting 
campaigns.  The opportunity for an invasion would have the overall effect of the US 
having the opportunity to showpiece  the ambits of what it had achieved in WWII, the 
skills it had honed in the Korean War and reverse the crises the Vietnam War had 
presented—which will be expanded upon throughout this chapter—in a tactical and 
strategic way.  These tactics would be a major mainstay of power and control at the 
beginning and for the duration of any conflict in the Gulf region Gulf conflict and this 
chapter will adhere to these notions of how airpower finally became the decisive 
tactical and strategic weapon the US needed in keeping a region under control; and of 
it delivering results over and above the defeat it had encountered during the Vietnam 
War.  In simpler terms this chapter will examine how the US had not lost faith in its 
belief in airpower as that it should remain the mainstay of operational platforms of 
intervention and power projection.  As in the previous chapter’s reasons and 
influences with regard to the region and the way in which the US was drawn into the 
conflict will be examined so as to gain a deeper understanding of the role of the US 
and other players in the region.  This can now be done by dealing briefly with the 
history of the Gulf region. 
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Background and influences 
 
Whilst the US continually monitored developments in the Middle East that would 
possibly necessitate their involvement in a limited war, an overall aim remained: of 
incrementally establishing a stronger presence in the region which was commensurate 
with the status quo of maintaining an ongoing involvement.  In 1943 President 
Roosevelt declared ‘Saudi Arabia—because of its oil resources and the interests of US 
companies in exploiting those resources—to be of vital strategic interest to the United 
States,’320 and “The defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United 
States.”321  With these acknowledgements, the stage for ongoing involvement had 
been set.  The Middle East has a long history of Western involvement, particularly 
from Britain and America and whilst it is not necessary to delve deeper into the 
circumstances and nature of how this came about it does announce that the US viewed 
the region since the end of WWII as a ‘contested space’322 is enough at this point.   
Interconnecting the various regional machinations and US involvement is one of 
mixed signals being communicated to the region which have within them inherent 
tensions.  The US, is an upholder of sovereign rights on the one hand whilst Anderson 
suggests promoting self-determination for regions and states it follows a contradictory 
policy of espousing the ‘benefits of colonialism’323
                                                 
320 Daryl Champion.  The Paradoxical Kingdom.  Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform.  London: 
Hurst and Company, 2003, 233. 
 with regard to its presence; and 
the promotion of regional stability.  The roots of the interventionism and neo-
colonialism milieu need not be pursued further, other than to state the combination of 
the two have, and continue to be in various degrees, an important part of US policy in 
this region of the world.  Moreover, this modus operandi has served their geo-strategic 
321 Joe Stork and Martha Wenger.  ‘From Rapid Deployment to Massive Deployment.’ The Gulf War 
Reader, History, Documents, Opinions, 34.  
322 Views about the Middle East are enormous and varied and I do not intend to enter into them in 
greater detail than to state that the intrusion into the region has a long and fractious history in the first 
instance and in pre-WWII times by the British and after WWII by the Americans.  A sense of how 
contested it became and how flawed the processes of intervention were, is able to be gleaned in Davis’ 
account of British-American relations circa-1947 in which ‘American ideas primarily encountered 
British neo-imperialism as their dialectical ‘other’, in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf emirates as 
well as at [the] trans-regional level.  In Britain’s place, ‘nation-building’ under UN [United Nations] 
principles, realized through American technical know-how, was intended to frame a new international 
order…[and in the process] private interests were allowed by the state to define and lead American 
development activities, practicing corporate quasi-colonialism beyond the remit of official risk and 
expense, until their pandering to local elite rather than popular interests created volatile situations 
needing emergency official US intervention.’  See: Simon Davis.  Contested Space.  Anglo-American 
Relations in the Persian Gulf, 1939-1947. Leiden:  Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, 318-319. 
323 Carol Anderson.  ‘The Cold War in the Atlantic World.’ The Atlantic World, 295. 
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policy well.  As described in the last chapter, the US over several decades had been 
war-gaming possible military responses and overall, it had well-formulated plans to 
deal with any crises in the Middle East that might impact on its interests.  The loss of 
Vietnam did nothing to dislodge this inculcated thinking and moreover, the US 
remained undeterred as previous victories were enough to sustain a belief in their geo-
strategic abilities; and their history of colonialism and neo-colonialism helped 
underpin the virtues of intervention324
 
 accorded to by Johnson.   Broadly speaking, 
there had been a general understanding that due to the nature of the force-on-force 
exchanges of the Vietnam War, there would have to be significant changes if the US 
were to be successful in the region.  The following paragraphs will encompass the 
theory behind how this would take place; and how it would be applied in a tangible 
and effective way to the upcoming war. 
There had been, in the mindset of US political and military circles that any one of 
several long-term regional tensions could inevitably involve their country.  There 
would come a time when the US would need to venture ever-deeper into regional 
ruptures, and any one may require a boots-on-the-ground presence.   President 
Kennedy was instrumental in attempting to shift the ‘focus’ of the military, although it 
was President Carter who continued on this endeavour, although only achieving 
success in varying degrees.  Carter changed the focus by instituting a ‘revolution in 
military affairs,’325
                                                 
324 United States involvement in Okinawa and the Philippines are relevant examples of colonialism—
and are veiled in what the US deems a ‘status of forces agreement’—and the positive geo-strategic 
offshoots they offer.  Okinawa for example, ‘was justified by the need to mount an invasion of the main 
Japanese islands...then as a secure enclave for fighting the war in Korea, then as a B-52 forward base 
for deploying force against China, then as a B-52 bomber base and staging area for Vietnam, a training 
area for jungle warfare, and most recently a home base for troops and aircraft that might be used in 
Asia or the Middle East.’  See: Chalmers Johnson.  The Sorrows of Empire.  Militarism, Secrecy, and 
the End of the Republic.  New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004, 35.  And a further example of post-
WWII neo-colonialism exercised by the US can be seen in the Philippines government having their 
independence rendered virtually meaningless by three American initiatives: the Bell Act of 1946; the 
Military Bases Agreement of 1947; and the Military Assistance Pact of 1947.  See: The Sorrows of 
Empire, 207.    
 in which the alacrity of the mission became part of an overall 
325 The ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) it can be argued started with the Kennedy administration 
and was continued with a more precise focus during the Carter administration.  The RMA which is of 
most relevance to this thesis is the further development of the RMA after the PGW. The ‘revolution in 
military affairs’ (RMA) it can be argued started with the Kennedy administration and was continued 
with a more precise focus during the Carter administration.  The RMA which is of most relevance to 
this thesis is the further development of the RMA after the PGW. Each revolves around the concept of 
a ‘‘win-hold-win’ [strategy], in which U.S. airpower would hold one adversary at bay while the ground 
forces finished another, and then the ground forces would shift to mop-up whatever the Air Force and 
Navy had been unable to destroy in the second theater.’   See: Finding the Target, 149-150.  Boot 
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strategy, and rapid-response, became part of tactical operations.  The outcome of the 
change of focus would be known as the ‘Carter Doctrine.’  The doctrine would be 
premised on a rapid-deployment-force and its implementation was specifically aimed 
with the Middle East region in mind.  The principle underlying the use-of-force 
criterion on the part of Carter, is succinctly summed up in his statement, “Any 
attempts by any outside force to gain control of the Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will 
be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”326
 
   
Airpower as an advanced theory  
 
Should a conflict develop the US saw it as increasingly vital that the upper hand be 
gained as quickly as possible, and this it was believed, could be attained through the 
prism of airpower.  A decisive and rapid-response force largely depends on the astute 
employment and deployment of air assets.  Furthermore, what could be built upon in 
this schema was the USAF honing the role of airpower and extracting the maximum 
potential from its tactical placement in any contemporary war from the beginning.  
This was premised on, in the first instance of utilizing and expanding on what assets it 
had at hand, and in the second instance, what it would have available for follow up 
operations.  After years of research—and by studying what went wrong in the air war 
over Vietnam—on the role of airpower, and how it could be better utilized was 
paramount.  A breakthrough came in 1989 when Colonel John Warden III (USAF) 
developed a theoretical strategy in which air superiority would not only be at the core 
of future warfare but showed how it should be utilized in a highly specific and 
focussed way.  The strategy known as Warden’s Five Strategic Rings327
                                                                                                                                            
however, argues although the Carter administration sought to make changes, the army ‘adamantly 
resisted moving its focus from conventional conflict.’  See: Max Boot. The Savage Wars of Peace.  
Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.  New York: Basic Books, 2002, 293. 
 (see Figure 
10), is an illustration of the new decisiveness of airpower and reflects how it came to 
326 In October 1979 the Carter administration ordered the military to set up a ‘Rapid Deployment 
Force.’  The Force is now called Central Command (CENTCOM).  See: The Sorrows of Empire, 223. 
327 Colonel John Warden’s Five Strategic Rings is not the result of a single document.  It is the outcome 
of several of Warden’s studies entitled The Air Campaign: Planning For Combat. National Defense 
University Press, 1988, <http://www.au.af.mil/awc/awcgate/warden-allhtm> ‘Air Theory for the 
Twenty-first Century,’ Challenge and Response , (edited by Karl P. Magyar), Alabama: Air University 
Press, 1994, and John Warden’s, ‘The Enemy as a System,’ Airpower Journal 9, vol 2, Spring 1995. 
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be positioned in the overall schemata of warfare, and in doing so indicates how it 
developed its premier status.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  The Five Strategic Rings.  Reprinted from: Storm Over 
Iraq, 152. 
 
 
To be precise, with this illustration airpower can be connected to more contemporary  
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times in a more precise way when linking the obvious developments, modifications, 
and associated technical advances.  This confirms airpower’s ascendancy and 
importance as a major part of any contrivance of persuasion scenario and also 
highlights the place airpower continued to retain in the application of limited warfare.  
Ultimately however, the development process which produced such assets and the 
learning-curve associated with the efficacious performance of them, including the 
munitions delivery methods involved, up to and incorporating, modern airborne 
guided munitions such as cruise missiles, drones, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs),328
 
 
only requires the acknowledgment that airborne munitions also became a significant 
part of airpowers ascendancy.  As relevant as each component is, there is a 
requirement to only mention they exist in the overall scheme of warfare as this stuffy 
concentrates on piloted aircraft and the application of this particular airpower asset.   
What figure ten reveals is an eminently traceable linearity of airpower’s advances 
beyond other forms of immediate application of devastating lethal force.  In doing so, 
I argue, it also bluntly announces a high-profile adjunct which has already been 
alluded to and it is airpower and it is at the forefront of US power projection.  
Airpower, as defined in figure ten, sums up what lethal force actually consists ‘of,’ 
and showcases the execution and potential it poses as a force to be reckoned with.  
Furthermore, it displays the focussed trajectory of mass-firepower in conflict-driven 
environments, in either a limited war or an all-out war.  A further delineation of what 
figure ten actually represents, in terms of the application of force and ultimately what 
it replaced in warfare, is now able to be undertaken.  
Effective airpower penetration, as shown in the ‘Pre-Air Power Era’ and ‘Air-Power 
Era’ comparisons within figure ten have been a progressive and gradual process and 
have gone through numerous development phases since WWII, and particularly in the 
latter phases of WWII.  This is due to, I would suggest aircraft that the Allies 
produced during the latter part of WWII, such as the North American P-51D Mustang, 
P-47 Republic Thunderbolt, DeHavilland Mosquito VI, Hawker Typhoon Mk1B and 
                                                 
328 An insight into the development of LGBs and why the technology is so tactically valuable can be 
gleaned by the case of the Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam.  From ‘1965 to 1968, in Operation 
Rolling Thunder, American fighter bombers had flown hundreds of missions to destroy the great 
railroad bridge at Thanh Hoa, all without success and with considerable losses to the crews flying the 
mission…On May 13, 1972, a strike package of fourteen F-4 Phantom fighter bombers, armed with 
2,000 and 3,000 pound LGBs, dropped the bridge on the second try.’  See: Williamson Murray and 
Robert Scales.   The Iraq War.  A Military History.  Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2003, 49. 
 177 
the Gloster Meteor F8, readily convincing the Allies that the destruction that ground 
attack and low-platform strike aircraft could wreak was enormous; and in tandem with 
this the support they could offer ground assets in the gaining of territory.   Taking 
Warden’s Five Strategic Rings and using WWII as a backdrop to the ‘Pre-Airpower 
Era’—whilst acknowledging airpower had managed (minimal) inroads toward the 
bulls-eye during WWII—some fundamental issues remained after this time.   An 
immediately identifiable difference between the two eras is that in the pre-airpower 
era, as shown on the right hand side of the diagram, the gaining of territory for ground 
forces, regardless of effective airpower support, remained an arduous slog of attrition.  
The penetration of enemy forces for all intent and purposes remained a laborious task.  
To be explicit, the ‘progress’ toward victory needs to be given a perspective and this 
is due to the ambiguous nature of what ‘success’ comprises.  A fundamental 
component underpinning military success is to achieve goals with as few casualties as 
possible, and in the process, not have assets enervated to such an extent that it slows 
further progress.  In the pre-airpower era there was, in general terms, no effective way 
of undermining enemy potential and/or retaliation, as each stage toward victory was 
moved through and is represented by the ‘lightning bolt’ impacting but not 
penetrating the outer ring.   Furthermore, if the farthest outer ring is penetrated the 
following inner-ring remains strong and has to be moved through under much the 
same circumstances as the outer ring, with arduous slogs of strike and counter-strike.   
As progress towards the bulls-eye is continued it remains in the realm of a gruelling 
and punishing sequence of events.  Overall, each penetration of degrading, and/or 
destroying the enemy, involves a massive attrition of troops and equipment as each 
stage is progressed through which is largely due to each stage of degradation of the 
enemy being beset with force-on-force encounters.  To be clear about the outcome of 
what the history of attrition-driven warfare has taught strategists is to announce that 
the entire process has always been an ongoing and imprecise way of achieving 
goals.329
                                                 
329 Storm Over Iraq, 152. 
  The necessity of force-on-force confrontations during suppression 
processes—as signified by the lower right-side decal of the diagram—requires major 
resource input, and the process of application consisted in the ‘Pre-Airpower Era’ of a 
dyad: of it being costly in terms of the expenditure of troops during the initial invasion 
and/or penetration actions; and of further significant losses of equipment assets and  
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troops during follow-up responses, advances and/or suppressions.   
 
To strike a balance to the argument is to acknowledge the advance towards the ‘bulls-
eye’ is, and always will be, an inexact science.  This dilemma acknowledged, what 
Warden’s ‘Air Power Era’ offers, is a greater surety in reaching the desired goals with 
less resource expenditure and/or destruction.  The reason airpower was pursued so 
vigorously is it had as its proviso, an understanding that it could significantly 
eradicate the pre-airpower era problematics and drive through the outer-rings, whilst 
maintaining a greater strike capacity and capability; and in the tactical sense of the 
term this could be maintained with focussed airpower applications.  Figure ten 
specifically points to airpower’s advances and moreover, a capacity for it to be used 
as a core component of tactical and strategic operations, which encompasses how it 
developed into a pivotal component of prosecuting successful campaigns in limited 
warfare.  The ‘Airpower Era’ is specifically designed to strike through the outer rings 
without the pre-airpower’s accompanying attrition rate and of the actual strike rate 
being more devastating to the enemy.  The direct decal-illustrated comparisons—at 
the bottom right and left of the diagram—of both eras is accurately reflected when 
viewing airpower as a force.  Furthermore, as the progress toward the bulls-eye is 
engaged and comprehended, it further denotes post-Vietnam aspirations and 
objectives of the US with regard to force projection in general; and airpower as a 
decisive force in particular. 
 
The ascendancy of airpower 
 
Airpower’s progress as a contrivance of force is in need of elaboration to observe the 
way in which its uses are linked to tactical opportunism.  The efficacious use of 
sortie-organized and target-prescribed airpower, as we have seen was used by the US 
throughout WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War is during these wars it 
continued to be developed to a point where reaching the ‘bullseye,’ could be achieved 
(at least in theory) within a prescribed and focussed timeframe.  World War II 
constituted a progression toward the bulls-eye, although only far-outer ring 
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penetration was achieved as what the ‘bulls-eye’ constitutes is the ‘decapitation’330
 
 
phase of kinetic operations.  During WWII there were penetrations into the two outer-
most rings during the Vietnam War the outer rings were penetrated, although with 
inconsistent degrees of success and although the Vietnam War constituted an 
incremental progression closer toward the bulls-eye, it did ultimately (regardless of 
any failings), constitute a reaching of the outer-circle closest to the bulls-eye.  
Airpower was nonetheless, pursued and used by the USAF on a mass scale during the 
Vietnam War and from this point onwards the US military continued to develop 
airpower as a tactical and strategic weapon.  The US would continue to keep it at the 
forefront of its limited warfare geo-strategic operations and ambition, as losses did not 
retard their enthusiasm for airpower.  There were also offshoots into other areas of 
operations which airpower played a part, and although mentioning this is a slight 
digression from the fixed wing tactical components, non-fixed wing aircraft deserve 
mentioning to round off the argument of what airpower actually comprises, as 
concentrating on fixed wing aircraft explains only part of the lethality of airpower.  
The role of non-fixed wing aircraft will now be briefly revealed. 
The evolvement of non-fixed wing aircraft was much in line with the development of 
jet aircraft, and their inclusion in ground-borne operations, air-transport, air-mobility, 
support and attack,331
                                                 
330 Pape avers, the ‘use of airpower for decapitation [is]—a strategy spawned by precision-guided 
munitions and [was] used against Iraq [in the PGW and]—strikes against key leadership and 
telecommunications facilities.  The main assumption is that these targets are these targets are the 
modern state’s Achilles’ heel.  Regardless of the strength of the state’s fielded forces or military 
industrial capacity, if the leadership is knocked out, the whole house of cards comes down.’  See: 
Bombing to Win, 79. Emphasis in original. 
 and particularly air-firepower has also been pursued by 
strategists.  Helicopters, from the time of the Korean War, continually developed into 
a pivotal and high-profile component of intent-specific operations when requiring a 
massing, incursion and penetration, or delivery/extraction of Special Forces troops, 
and/or intent-specific platoons within a relatively central location.  Helicopters are 
also particularly worthwhile in providing operations with support mechanisms 
enabling operatives to be continually supplied and protected.  From an historical post-
WWII perspective this has come at the expense of previous rapid mass force 
331 To give an example of how airpower figured in the Army’s realm of operations in the Vietnam War 
is to observe the sheer number of non-fixed wing aircraft in the US Army’s 1st Aviation Brigade had as 
part of their arsenal consisted of  ‘441 Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, 311 Chinook cargo 
helicopters, 635 observation helicopters and…2,202 Bell UH-1 utility helicopters.’  See:  Storm Over 
Iraq,  23. 
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‘interdiction’332
flanking, harassment, sabotage, short-term securing, and/or cut-off manoeuvres.   
 processes such as fixed wing glider and paratrooper configurations.  
Gliders are too weather dependent and dangerous to operate for many reasons, and 
have been largely superseded by other technologies and tactics.  Paratrooper 
components however, are deployed in contemporary operations although the inclusion 
of helicopters in interdictory and/or support roles has relegated paratrooper 
configurations to Special Forces operations rather the mass deployments of WWII.  
The role of the paratrooper is somewhat limited and restricted in contemporary 
operations, usually consisting of deep-penetration observation and identification,  
 
The historical and various specific operational aspects of airpower having been dealt  
with, there is a requirement to focus on how the technology became such a pivotal 
part of warfare’s operational platform.  Following this particular pathway of 
developments opens up a clearer understanding of the technology itself, whilst also 
giving critical insights into the military and strategic adjuncts which, for the US, 
would assist in changing the face of warfare; and of crucial importance here is to 
acknowledge the ‘face’ of warfare would be reversed from the Vietnam War days by 
the US, and this came on the back of symmetrical warfare being reintroduced.  The 
technology aspect is relatively straightforward and with all of the progressive 
elements in mind, is able to be summarized concisely with a brief explanation of 
airpower—as a technology.  The actions the technology ‘presents’ has definitive roots 
which can be contextualized by simply stating the technology of airpower (and the 
constituent force it offers), are evident and easily traceable in the various mechanisms 
of its industrial application.  Continual experimentation—and the sciences associated 
with mechanical production and engineering—results in the completion and/or 
perfection of a given product/instrument, which in this case largely consists of jet 
propulsion and airframe design.  Aircraft design has continually improved and hence, 
airpower is a straightforward and refined outcome of the relevant designs.  Aircraft 
and its constituent of power have continually evolved, to a point in contemporary 
times of the technology being seen as a vital tactical and strategic instrument in 
contemporary warfare.  In rounding out this line of reasoning, its impact, and its place 
                                                 
332 ‘Interdiction’ as an action, ‘involves the discrete and direct use of force to prevent specified 
equipment, resources, goods, or persons from reaching a battlefield, port, or terminal.’  Richard Haas.  
Intervention.  The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World.  Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1994, 61. 
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in the milieu of the warfare, is able to be expanded on by briefly reintroducing 
‘Artillery and its ramifications.’   
 
The nascent technology of the implementation of the cannon had at its core what the 
technology of airpower in contemporary warfare also encompasses.  In broad terms, 
the science behind the cannon and aircraft technology effectively shares aspects of 
similar sciences: metallurgy and aerodynamics.  Airpower, in a relatively short time 
became a decisive instrument in the application of force, including defending, clearing 
a path for, and the transportation of an invading force.  As much as this can be seen of 
as a ‘revisiting’ of the past, in terms of effectiveness in an offensive campaign, is to 
bear in mind some towns surrendered to an invader because the invader possessed 
cannons, which inevitably means that the cannon must be treated as a decisive 
component within a campaign.  The development of airpower, whilst it may not have 
been as iconic a component as artillery was at its zenith, it does carry with it a 
significant tactical and strategic advantage.  The mechanisms of airpower linked to 
technology in contemporary times, are evident and can be seen in the application of 
targeting and the operational dynamics of the limited wars of Korea and Vietnam.   
 
Having identified and articulated the strategic and tactical macrocosms with regard to 
Vietnam, and using the Five Strategic Rings as a basis, now allows for the pending 
intervention into the Middle East to be addressed in a more focussed way.  In keeping 
with the lessons learned, the end result, from a US military perspective was any 
conflict to be waged against an opposing force within this region would have to be 
decisive; be of a steel-to-target nature; be overwhelming and have decisive airpower 
application as the mainstay of operations.  Applying these principles falls under the 
umbrella of the US quickly crushing the offensive (and defensive) capabilities of 
enemy forces.  From the outset, this would comprise the foundation of operations 
because after Vietnam it was realized that time is the ‘single greatest weapon a nation 
or any entity can use against the United States or any high-tier nation at the grand 
strategy level.’333
 
    
                                                 
333 Armed Conflict, 57. 
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Frictions in the Middle East and impending war 
 
In the late 1980s the understanding that war may take place in the region had moved 
on and this was due to continuous frictions in the region to ‘when’ a war would 
happen rather than ‘if’ it would happen.  An exploration of regional antagonisms 
offers a more balanced geo-strategic perspective, especially with respect to Iraq and 
its military and politico-military place in the region.  The pending war that had been 
festering according to Moore, was based on the premise that since the 1970s Iraq, had 
incrementally developed into a ‘hostile Middle East superpower,’334 and it was being 
viewed with increasing concern by the US and its allies.  The Iran-Iraq War during the 
1980s did nothing reduce its belligerence or stymie its regional attitude or ambitions  
of Iraq and its recalcitrance was an ongoing and worrying development for the US. 
This was in no small part due to its own geo-strategic ambitions and because of more 
general fears for the political stability of the region. The persistent belligerence of 
Saddam Hussein merely promoted the idea of a large-scale intervention being 
required by the US from a possibility, to a probability.  An exemplar of how 
troublesome Iraq had become is given a broader perspective by acknowledging the 
(somewhat rare) regional agreement and concession by the Saudis, Egyptians, Syrians 
and the Israelis who ‘all recognized the danger and joined with the United States to 
oppose any further Iraqi aggrandizement that might jeopardise [an already fragile] 
Middle East equilibrium.’335
                                                 
334 Raymond Moore. ‘The case FOR War.’  The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War. Edited By 
Macia Whicker, James Pfiffner, and Raymond Moore.  Westport: Praeger, 1993, 93. 
  In striking a balance to this agreement between 
neighbours, the rise of Iraq and its fractious place in the milieu of Middle Eastern 
politics, was not the only reason for regional tempest.   There were other ongoing 
frictions, which were not of the region’s own ‘making’ and they too, dictated the 
region would remain fragile.  Nevertheless, many of these reasons were deemed by 
intraregional actors to be caused by disproportionate US influence and many of the 
impositions had been in place due to UN agreements in the immediate post-WWII 
environment. The policies of establishing a presence by the US had over time, been 
ones associated with supporting friendly Gulf Arab dictatorships and/or monarchies 
and many regional actors saw this as an ongoing and contentious issue, which also 
contributed to regional tensions. A précis of how this influence had progressed—and  
335 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 95. 
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its high-profile military offshoots—are succinctly summed up by Champion as  
 
[T]he military alliance that exists between the United States and the 
Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia means that the US is able 
to exercise regional power almost at will…Kuwait and Bahrain in 
particular are notable for their hosting of US air and naval forces; 
Bahrain is home to the US Navy’s 5th Fleet.336
 
 
  
Once again, in order to give a clarity and balance to regional power dynamics and 
therefore, highlight any associated problematics a brief investigation into regional 
machinations is required.  The region, as well as having to deal with selective 
American polity and military presence has, due to stark differences of political and 
religious opinions, progressively become a political tinderbox.  Issues which 
announce this state-of-affairs and which the US has at times had considerable input 
include  
 
• the decades old Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 
•  the continual and unbroken support of Israel by the US;  
• protection of the Saudi monarchy from Arab nationalist movements;337
• continuing post-war frictions between Iran and Iraq; 
  
•  non-acknowledgement of the state of Israel by Iran;  
• the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; 
• the regional political and geographical sensitivities of the Occupied 
Territories; 
•  Iran’s ongoing and bitter hatred of Israel; and  
                                                 
336 The Paradoxical Kingdom, 233. 
337 Saudi Arabia, its role in the Middle East and its connection to the US are vast and complex although 
it can be summed up when linked to the superpower competition in the region during the Cold War.  
Defending the Saudi monarchy was necessary in order to stop the march of communism and of dulling 
pan-Arab intent and this is given a perspective by Citino as ‘Arab nationalism intensified as the Cold 
War came to the Middle East, Washington militarized the postwar [post-WWII]…order by arming 
Riyadh.  The Saudi government in turn, exploited American fears of communism to bargain for the 
military aid necessary to defend itself from Arab nationalists at home and abroad.’  See: Nathan Citino.  
From Arab Nationalism to OPEC. Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002, 163. Furthermore, and in conjunction with the 
aforementioned components with regard to Arab nationalism and why it was so important to mount a 
campaign against it was, as early as 1967 the US State Department had warned that Arab nationalism 
was a greater threat to US interests in the region than the USSR.  See: Gabriel Kolko.  Another Century 
of War? New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002, 29.   
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• a rising tide of fundamentalist and active pan-Islamic unity.   
 
All have in some ways played a part and due to this, the region has regularly 
threatened to spill over into larger-scale intraregional violence.  Additional specific 
incidents which have not resulted in kinetic conflict need not be listed as the 
mentioning of the most serious, the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War 
are two limited wars, which adequately highlight the point.   
 
There is a need to contextualize how US involvement in the region has panned out, 
how historical precedents have influenced it, and the offshoots that have been 
generated by their systemic input.  The presence of the US—as a superpower—I 
would argue has entailed somewhat quasi-Machiavellian tenets of positioning itself as 
an interloper, and then as moderator.  A revisiting of history is required here, if only 
to underscore the pathway of suzerainty that has been applied to the Middle East in 
the latter part of the twentieth century by the US.  One of the positive tenets of its 
deployments the US argues, is its continued presence in the region (which in part was 
originally premised on stopping the march of communism), has a positive residual 
outcome: ‘stability.’   The term ‘stability’ however, is subjective and is fraught with 
interpretation.  From an historical perspective, this line-of-reasoning, the ‘model’ if 
you will, and its associated criterion, is in keeping with and harks back to pre- and 
immediate post-Treaty of Westphalia  times.  At this time in history, ‘stability’ was 
produced by compliance to the exigencies of ruling powers and any outbreak of 
violence demanded intervention, either by direct force or the threat-of-force and thus, 
through the most powerful actor ‘stability’ was gained.  A problem with contrived 
stability is agreements are struck under the pain of repercussions of the powerful actor 
(or actors), which I argue negatively impacts on fruitful long-lasting and genuine 
negotiations.   
 
Times have changed in terms of autonomy and sovereignty since the Treaty however, 
and the US as a powerful regional player saw the continued belligerence of Iraq 
incrementally move it to a higher priority with regard to US geo-strategic 
assessments.  Iraq became a growing threat and a significant destabilising influence in 
the region and thus, the structural imperatives on what the US relies on to maintain its 
presence in the region and keep it ‘stable’ America believed, demanded greater input 
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into the Gulf.  As in days gone by the presence of a superpower tends to moderate the 
extramural excesses a powerful regional belligerent  and is based on this presumption, 
a strong military presence is enough to avert a spill over of tensions.  I argue this from 
the standpoint of notions of stability are premised on and have as an historical legacy 
ingrained and systemic beliefs which were generated by the Treaty of Westphalia; and 
the presumptions of European doctrines being supreme and able to be utilized in the 
seeking of peace.  The complexities this situation produces however, need further 
explication as highlighting the presence via subjective historical antecedents is not 
sufficient. 
 
The geo-politics and geo-strategy of the United States in the 
Middle East 
 
Influenced by pax-Britannica and emboldened by its WWII successes I argue there is, 
and has been, over many years a judgment on the part of the US that the Middle East 
region is incapable of managing its own geo-political, geographic and geo-strategic 
affairs.  I would argue this is an enhanced form of what in times previous was deemed 
‘orientalism’338
 
 and in more contemporary times, it is what Little considers to be an 
‘American orientalism’ which is 
Influenced by potent racial and cultural stereotypes, some imported 
and some homegrown, that [have] depicted the Muslim world as 
decadent and inferior, U.S. policymaker’s from Harry Truman 
through to George Bush tended to dismiss Arab aspirations for self-
determination as politically primitive, economically suspect, and 
ideologically absurd.339
 
  
The mindset to which Little refers is multifaceted, although it can be grasped by 
refining and conjoining imperialism to militarism and accepting these are, by 
definition, tied to hegemonic ambition.  The narrative underpinning the ‘orientalism’ 
consists of any Western presence being worthwhile, as this in and of itself, imbues 
                                                 
338 ‘Orientalism’ or the ‘Orientalist attitude’ according to Said consists of Arabs being thought of by 
Westerners as ‘camel-riding, hook-nosed venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real 
civilization.  Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a 
numerical minority he (sic) is entitled to own or expend (or both) the majority of the Worlds resources.’  
Edward Said.  Orientalism.  Western Conceptions of the Orient. England: Penguin Books, 1995, 108. 
339Douglas Little.  American Orientalism.  The United States and the Middle East since 1945.  Chapell 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008, 11. 
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self-aggrandizing and self-fulfilling prejudiced norms allowing for the most powerful 
actor to concoct cultural foundations for conflict that give a legitimacy to war.340
 
  The 
upshot of Iraq being persistently recalcitrant is that it fulfilled the ascribed norms of 
American orientalism (read: imperialism) and therefore offered itself up for military 
interdiction.  This would have the outcome for the US of being finally, able exert 
authority on the region with a military footprint, once and for all. 
To be sure there were other factors at play besides the more ingrained and tangible 
ones and they would also play a part.  A strong presence does not always have a 
boots-on-the-ground contingent and they need a brief acknowledgement.  The 
regional power-broking in the post-WWII world was one of the US persistently 
gaining influence in which there was a changing of the guard ‘from British hegemony 
to an American capitalist order,’341 and this was accomplished through imperialism 
and militarism.  Other facets that played a part and set up the American ‘order’ were 
those of indirect support, either through private consortiums condoned by the US 
government, or through indirect support in order to uphold a premise and/or the status 
quo.  Indirect support the US offers is evident in regional rulers/monarchies being 
able to exercise control over their populaces with US non-government help,342
                                                 
340 Philip Smith.  Why War?  The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez.  Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2005, 10-11. 
 such as 
the suppression of Arab nationalism, which is conjoined to the upkeep of stability 
through the Saud monarchy.  However, the task-at-hand has not always been so 
straightforward and has often required an inordinate amount of political manoeuvring 
above and beyond the relatively simple support of a monarchy, and this has often 
happened long after a particular event.  An example of a long-term and sustained 
campaign is the US government non-support of Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
in which the Shah of Iran was deposed and US Embassy employees were incarcerated 
by the respective revolutionaries.  Although the eventual outcome was the hostages 
being freed, the US used both events to shunt Iran into the role of ‘regional 
341 From Arab Nationalism to OPEC, 161. 
342 To highlight the ability of the Saud monarchy and the control it has over their kingdom, the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard is ‘a praetorian guard of sorts whose primary mission is to defend the [Saudi] 
royal family and was put into action to suppress a militant organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, in a 
major campaign against the Saud family in 1979.’  The guard is trained by a US company, the Vinnell 
Corporation, and remains a potent force in Saudi Arabia.  See: Craig Unger.  House of Bush, House of 
Saud. The Secret Relationship between the Two Most Powerful Dynasties. New York: Scribner, 2004, 
94. 
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agitator’343  which resulted in an astute political strategy of retarding Iran’s regional 
ambitions; circumventing any chance of a lasting pan-Arab alliance; and discouraging 
regional neighbours from allying with a perceived recalcitrant nation-state.  United 
States strategists had known for several decades the destruction of pan-Arab alliances 
were crucial to their power base in the region, and deliberately used regional frictions 
to deliver an enhanced presence of US forces to be viewed under the guise of 
protection.  The strategy of continually and systemically weakening any chance of a 
pan-Arab alliances was evident in the re-flagging of shipping in the Persian Gulf in 
1987344
 
 as this act would strengthen their geo-strategic presence via a flotilla being 
needed to protect the re-flagged ships which would advance their military might in the 
region.   It has been known ipso facto and from a military and therefore, strategic 
perspective a lack of regional alliances create power vacuums, which in turn, are 
harbingers for powerful external actors to intercede and gain influence.  The US 
realised early that any agreement among regional neighbours beyond OPEC 
threatened its role as a major external powerbroker and whilst OPEC’s presence was 
acceptable the US always sought to position itself militarily though the prism of 
regional alliances.  The problem has been that the issues in the Middle East have often 
been difficult for the US to forecast and therefore, it has a chequered history in the 
region.      
Just as frictions during the Cold War set the stage for many alliances, so too were they 
altered as the Soviet Union declined in power.  During the 1980s, with the Soviet 
Union mired in the Afghanistan conflict, the US sought to re-examine its role in a 
newly-charged political landscape.  In assessing this environment, the US had to 
reverse persistent failures if it was to adroitly thrust itself into a position of direct 
power.  The crucial issue became one of a need to get its military and politico-military 
influences synchronized.  Handling crises had not always gone to plan for the US as 
the Iranian Revolution and the Six Day War were not anticipated, and what is more 
Quandt argues, ‘with alarming regularity over the past thirty years, American 
                                                 
343 Arthur Goldschmidt.  ‘The Historical Context.’  Understanding the Contemporary Middle East.  
Edited by Deborah Gerener and Jillian Schwedler.  Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2004, 70. 
344 An example of the weakening of pan-Arabism and the need for a stronger power to enter the fray is 
the 22 July 1987 re-flagging of Kuwaiti ships in reaction to increased Iranian attacks.  The re-flagging 
worsened relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and signalled a shift in US policy to an overt 
support of Gulf states including Iraq, against Iran.  See: Charles Marschall.  Iran’s Foreign Policy. 
From Khomeni to Khatami.  London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 165. 
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presidents have found themselves dealing with Middle East crises for which they were 
poorly prepared…[and] each [crisis] to some extent caught Washington by 
surprise.’345
 
  The sagacity of Quandt’s estimations can be seen in the reactive way the 
Middle East had been dealt with in the lead up to the PGW.   The chequered history to 
which I refer, needs addressing here to gain an insight into events, responses and 
ideals that constituted a veritable cocktail of mismatched and convoluted agendas on 
the part of the US.    
The depth of involvement and reactions is evident as Rubin asserts that during the 
1970s the US ‘supported Iran against Iraq and, in the 1980s, it backed Iraq against 
Iran’346
 
 and the relevance of this, is reflected in the US being both a direct and an 
indirect actor.  The disjointed approach (and inherent fears) these roles have brought 
about, is clear in the following précis of  
[T]he United States gave Iraq satellite photographs of Iran’s military 
positions [after the fall of the Shah of Iran].  While initiating 
Operation Staunch to block arms sales to Iran in 1983, the United 
States encouraged allies to sell weapons to Iraq.  In many respects 
Iraq was treated as an ally.  There was never any criticism for its 
being the aggressor or starting the tanker war.  And in 1984 full 
diplomatic relations were restored…[B]y tilting toward Iraq, 
Washington also helped block an Iranian victory [one] that might 
turn the whole Gulf into an anti-American inferno of 
fundamentalism.347
 
 
The inconsistent approach to the region would continue after the Iran-Iraq War and is 
highlighted by President Bush’s approach to Iraq in 1989.  After Saddam Hussein had 
demonstrated his non-compliance to internationally accepted norms by launching 
poison-gas attacks on his own people in Iraqi-Kurdistan, Bush increased aid to Iraq.  
This was done in the (futile) hope of bringing Iraq into the ‘family of nations,’348
                                                 
345 William Quandt.  Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993, 415. 
 and 
of gaining some compliance to international norms from the Iraqi president.  
Underpinning the hopes and aspirations in any dealings with Iraq, as well as the 
greater Middle East on the part of the Bush administration, was a single-minded 
346 Barry Rubin. ‘The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement to War.’  Iraq’s Road to War.  Edited 
by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin.  Houndmills: MacMillann, 1993, 256. 
347 Iraq’s Road to War, 257-258. 
348 House of Bush, House of Saud, 80. 
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vision of how the world—especially developing nations—should progress and was 
also applied to the Middle East region.  Whilst this, in itself, does not signal that direct 
intervention would be part of any politico-military policy, it offers an insight into 
what was heavily influencing the Bush administration.  Puchala avers President 
Bush’s vision of foreign policy was one of connecting ideological principles, 
regardless of the cultural and historical practices the respective nation-states had, and 
the impetus for change was to reinvoke American leadership in the most sweeping 
manner possible. This was underscored by 
 
[A] foreign policy that assumes one world of compatible social, 
political, and economic values; that promotes democracy, open-
market economics, international law, and international organization; 
and that insists upon U.S. leadership because [according to Secretary 
Baker] “our moral principles and our material interests make us a 
leader”…The United Nations plays a central role in the Bush 
administration’s pursuit of a New World Order[349]…It is also to be 
understood that the United Nations is deemed useful to the United 
States only if the United States can again lead the organization and 
thus effectively recapture it as in the immediate post World War II 
era.350
 
     
 
The upcoming war 
 
 
It was military might that would soon be able to enforce the new world order as  
ascribed to by Bush and moreover, the upcoming war would also offer a chance for  
decisive reform which would offer an ongoing platform of security for the US.  
Besides the personal intent of Bush and the influences of his administration, post-Cold 
War advances into the region would also allow the US to right previous geo-strategic 
and geo-political blunders.  This would be undertaken on the broader Carter mantle of 
‘vital’ interests being threatened, and under the auspices of the more contemporary 
                                                 
349 On September 11, 1990 Bush, in the UNGA, declared (in part) ‘Out of these troubled times a New 
World Order can emerge, under the United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders,  We 
stand at a unique and extraordinary moment.  This crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also 
offers us a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation.  Today that New World 
Order is struggling to be born.  A world quite different from the one we’ve known.’  See:  A Century of 
War, 217. 
350 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 224. 
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and wide-ranging term of ‘enduring broad national interests.’351
 
  A direct move into 
the region would be further assisted by the decline of the only other major 
powerbroker in the region—the Soviet Union.  Whilst the decline of the Soviet Union 
is critically important to the geo-strategic opportunity it would offer, another 
significant factor which cannot be ignored, because it motivates both intraregional and 
international interactions is, oil.  A brief synopsis of oil is required, in order to give a 
balance to all the geo-strategic and geo-political argument; and simply because it is 
such an enormous focal point of the region.   
Broadly speaking nations seek to guarantee their access to oil reserves and supplies 
therefore the frictions and tensions this quest produces makes the Middle East a hub 
for geo-strategic oil supply; and oil reserve power dynamics.  The US is no different 
in terms of interest and Moore stipulates oil, is a significant factor in determining their 
policies.  To bring a deeper perspective to the issue, only five percent of US oil 
consumption comes from the Persian Gulf however, over 37 percent of Japan’s and 33 
percent of the world’s supply originates in the Gulf.352   This state-of-affairs produces 
a dyad for the US: oil is a fuel required to sustain the US domestic industrial and/or 
manufacturing complex, and it is also provides a means for international geo-political 
advantage.  Oil has always played a role in any regional frictions and this is 
heightened by ‘Iraq has perhaps the largest unexplored oil region in the world with the 
exception of the Soviet Union.’353   Oil and its associated political machinations often 
trigger regional disagreements and they are somewhat commonplace however, with 
respect to Iraq, the ongoing and fractious relationship between Iraq and Kuwait—
which would ultimately lead to the beginning of the PGW—major tensions centre on 
numerous demarcated ‘ownership disputes.’354  The tensions consist of what Little 
deems to be  ‘simmering territorial disputes’355
                                                 
351 ‘Broad national interest’ is multifaceted but can be loosely defined as a ‘healthy and growing US 
domestic economy and the opportunity for Americans’ to prosper.’  See: The White House.  National 
Security Strategy of the United States.  Washington DC: The White House, March 1990, 13. 
 and in the latter part of the twentieth 
century they were centred on ownership and/or control of the Rumaila oil field and 
352 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 95.   
353 William Engdahl.   A Century of War.  Anglo-American Oil, Politics, and the New World Order. 
London: Pluto Press, 1992, 213. 
354 King Ghazi a pre-WWII ruler of Iraq, as early as 1937, had publicly expressed a ‘claim to 
sovereignty over Kuwait’ and was critical of both US and British influence in the region.  See:  Charles 
Tripp.  A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 98.  
355 American Orientalism, 254. 
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Failakka Island.  Along with the ownership tensions there remained an omnipresent 
and decades-old suspicion by Iraq that Kuwaiti engineers were ‘slant-drilling’356 oil 
from under Iraq’s sovereign territory.  What is more, Iraq was seen to be secular and 
progressive in the region and to reward this state-of-affairs it had been given one 
billion in credits by the Reagan administration357 during the 1980s.  According to 
Smith, the containment of an evil Iran was vital to the regions stability as according to 
the US  ‘Saddam Hussein’s nation spent a fair portion of the 1980s in military conflict 
with its fundamentalist Islamic neighbour…For 1980s America it was Iran and not 
Iraq that was the monster that had to be caged.’358
 
   
The persistence of the tensions within the region and to a significant extent, the 
support the US had shown Iraq over the preceding decades, had emboldened Iraq.  
Previous decades had seen Iraq being presented in a positive way and had been 
generally well-received by the US.  This treatment throughout the Iran-Iraq War of 
the 1980s I argue, had inadvertently set the stage for an invasion of Kuwait, as in real 
terms, Iraq had no solid reasons to believe that an invasion would elicit anything more 
than a political response.  Underpinning this is the US State Department in the late 
1980s believed Iraq’s war with Iran had ‘changed Iraq from a radical state challenging 
the system to a more responsible state…working within the system and promoting 
stability in the region.’359
 
  This however, was not to be the case. 
The Invasion of Kuwait 
 
Notwithstanding the issues associated with regional preponderances, oil and 
ideologies on August 2, 1991, the Iraqi military struck a decisive blow in their 
regional ambitions by invading Kuwait.  This single act triggered the PGW.  In more 
general terms, and placing the invasion into perspective, the speed of the Iraqi military 
push into Kuwait disturbed the US—and Western governments in general—and thus, 
invoked considerable protest in the United Nations General Assembly and the United 
                                                 
356 ‘Slant-drilling’ is a method by which drilling is angled to access pockets of oil, in this case located 
under the sovereign state of Iraq.  See: Ivan Eland and Bernard Gourley. ‘Why the United States 
Should Not Attack Iraq.’ Policy Analysis. Washington: Cato Institute, December 2002, 464, 5. 
357 Philip Smith.  Why War? , 101. 
358 Why War?, 101. 
359 American Orientalism, 253. 
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Nations security Council (UNSC).   The sheer size of the Iraqi military invasion (see 
Figure 11), overtly displayed an intention to occupy Kuwait for a long time, and 
moreover, in soundly defeating Kuwaiti forces exhibited a zealous and cohesive 
regional force projection. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Invasion Route of Iraqi Forces on August 2 and 3, 1991.  
Reprinted from: Triumph Without Victory. The Unreported History of 
the Persian Gulf War.  The Editors, U.S. News & World Report.  
New York: Times Books, 1992, 11. 
 
The Iraqi military success was due to the sheer size and makeup of their forces which 
 
[E]xceeded 100,000 men.[360
                                                 
360 There is some contention about the exact number and makeup of Iraqi forces that penetrated into 
Kuwait.  All sources generally agree however, the number of troops was about 100,000 and the intent 
]  Most were from his [Saddam  
 193 
Hussein’s] eight divisions of the Republican Guard, the elite force 
created by the Iraqi leader toward the end of the [1980-1988] war 
against Iran…Despite the resistance thrown up by Kuwaiti soldiers 
and a gaggle of palace guards, the emirate never stood a chance 
against Saddam’s elite forces.361
 
 
The deftness and geographic breadth of the invasion was what caught observers by 
surprise.  In broad terms, and why it constituted such a surprise, is because in the post-
Iran-Iraq War era it was generally accepted that if the Iraqi military mounted a 
campaign against Kuwait it would be confined to annexing the disputed Rumaila oil 
field, or perhaps the capture of Failakka Island; and one or two other strategic 
locations.  Any show of force it was thought by the international community, would 
be designed to elicit favourable regional political and oil remunerations and/or 
concessions, rather than to exercise supreme regional control.  For the US however, 
the critical point quickly became if the invasion was allowed to succeed Saddam 
Hussein would control ‘20 percent[362] of the world oil reserves; if he conquered 
Saudi Arabia, he would control 40 percent…[and] it would have given Saddam the 
power to dramatically raise [oil] prices and inflict substantial damage on both the 
United States and the world economy.’363
 
   The US without a doubt saw the invasion 
as a threat to its ‘enduring broad national interests’ as defined in the National Security 
Strategy of the United States. 
The immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
 
Once the magnitude of the invasion had been absorbed, the US, as part of UNSC364
                                                                                                                                            
was to annex Kuwait.  Various reports of troop numbers go as high as 140,000 troops organized into 8 
divisions, with as many as 1,500 tanks and 350 armoured personnel carriers.  See: Alberto Bin, Richard 
Hill and Archer Jones.  Desert Storm. A Forgotten War.  Westport: Prager, 1998, 23. 
  
361 Triumph Without Victory, 13.   
362 There is considerable debate in the oil and military communities about exactly how much oil 
Saddam Hussein would actually control.  There is the issue of direct, as well as indirect control factors 
at play.  Rubin suggests it would be as much as ‘55% of the world’s proven reserves,’ and a further 
important point needs mentioning, that regardless of actual control a major issue is the one of Hussein 
being able to menace other nearby Arab states.  See: Iraq’s Road to War, 89.    
363 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 95. 
364 The UNSC consists of 15 nations which share voting influences and are selected on a revolving 
basis.  The strength of the UNSC resides in the Permanent Five (P5) members who hold ultimate 
power—via the unconditional right of veto—in the council.  The P5 members are Britain, China, the 
Russian Federation, France, and the United States, and at the time of the invasion of Kuwait the 10 
non-permanent members comprised: Austria, Belgium, Cote d’lvoire, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Romania, 
 194 
Permanent Five (P5) mounted a brief diplomatic campaign encouraging Iraqi forces  
to exit Kuwait.  The extent of the action, and the unwillingness of Saddam Hussein to 
order his forces to leave, resulted in military action being expeditiously called for by 
the US.  A broader perspective from the standpoint of the US, and in the international 
arena of the UN is needed here to give a perspective to the political machinations.  
Firstly, the actual invasion itself, although beyond the realm of US government 
expectations, was not considered an event that it was incapable of countering in the 
military sense of the term.  According to Klare, any activity in the Middle East which 
required a military response from the US would be viewed as a relatively 
straightforward ‘regional clash,’365
 
 and as such, would be well within the military 
ambit and capabilities that it had in place.    
Immediately after the invasion of Kuwait there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in 
the UNSC.  All the various interactions and machinations are not necessary to engage 
here, as it is only the most important resolutions and accompanying issues that require 
a mention, in order to show that diplomatic measures had been in place.  Twelve 
resolutions were produced between 2 August and 29 November 1990366 as a 
consequence of Iraqi actions: the most important of these consisted of Resolution 
660,367 Resolution 678,368 and Resolution 686.369   The significance of the three are in 
the first instance, the resolution explicitly condemned the invasion of Kuwait and was 
unanimously carried; in the second instance, there was substantial agreement amongst 
the parties that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, and authorized 
the use of force if Iraq failed to comply;370
                                                                                                                                            
Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. See: UN.org.   <
 and in the third instance, the resolution 
enabled UNSC sponsored forces to ‘bring the military presence in Iraq to an end as 
http://www.un.org/sc/searchresyear=1991>  Accessed 6 
August 2008.   
365 The Gulf War Reader, 466. 
366 War as an Instrument of Policy, 106. 
367 ‘UNSC Resolution 660,’ August 2, 1990.  Vote: 14 for, 1 abstention (Yemen).  See: United Nations 
Security Council.  <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/resolutions/s-res-1441.pdf>  
Accessed 18 September, 2008. 
368 ‘UNSC Resolution 678,’ November 29, 1990.  Vote: 12 for, 2 against (Cuba and Yemen), 1 
Abstention (China).  See: United Nations Security Council.   <http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/iraq-
blue-e-110702-1198.pdf>  Accessed 21 September, 2008.  The importance of Resolution 678 is that 
Congress employed it as a springboard for the authorization of US armed force.  
369 ‘UNSC Resolution 686,’ March 1991.  Vote: 11 for, 1 against (Cuba), 3 abstentions (Yemen, China, 
and India).  See: United Nations Security Council.   
<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/resolutions/s-res-1284.pdf>  Accessed 20 
September, 2008. 
370 A History of Iraq, 253-254. 
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soon as possible consistent with achieving the objective of the [previous] [R]esolution 
[678].’   In other words, and consistent with the wording of Resolution 660 and 
Resolution 678, Iraq would be forcibly expelled from Kuwait. The last resolution 
would be accompanied by Article 42 of the UN Charter, which allowed for the 
legitimate use of force.  Article 42 (in part) states 
 
Should the Security Council consider the measures provided for in 
Article 41[371] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, 
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace or security.  
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations.372
 
 
To be specific, the UNSC was justified in its actions of condemnation and of 
employing a ‘use of force’ criteria, as this aspect had been ‘forced’ due to an invasion; 
the history of Iraq’s persistent post-Iran-Iraq War recalcitrance; and the ignoring of 
international norms and standards set by the UN. 
 
With in-principle agreement of many other Arab nations and the legal means of the 
UN in place, the impending engagement, as well as the US exercising politico-
military might in the UNSC was timely.  With respect to regional ambitions there was 
a critical factor that prompted the expeditious call-to-arms.  According to 
Roxborough, it was generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union which saw the US 
military as having been cast adrift, was suffering extreme goal deprivation, and 
needed a new definition of principal threat.373
                                                 
371 Article 41 stipulates, ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations.’  See: <
  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would offer 
the US an opportunity to engage in a high-profile regional action, establish their 
military preparedness and responsiveness in the region, and allow the use of the 
military to be a pivotal instrument in that persuasion.  Finally, the chance to act 
expeditiously and with force had eventuated.  The action in the Middle East was not 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>  
Accessed 9 November, 2008.  
372 Donald Puchala, Katie Laatikainen, and Roger Coate.  United Nations Politics. International 
Organization in a Divided World. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007, 214. 
373 Nicholas Roxborough ‘Globalization and American Military Strategy.’ International Sociology. 
Edited by Said Arjomand.  London: Sage, 2002, 3, 17, 434. 
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only motivated by regional problematics as it had a domestic codicil that was 
according to commentators, centred on domestic issues motivating and fuelling a 
predilection for going to war.  Whilst this fits well with the model of rulers and states 
wishing to extend power extramural to their own borders—as expressed in chapter 
one—observing the political machinations underpinning Bush’s actions does demand 
brief attention.  Domestic factors that played a part in going to war in the ‘defence’ of 
Kuwait were underpinned by ineptness on the part of Bush and as perceived by the 
US populace.  The ‘economic plight’374 of early 1990 had generated an unease about 
his ability to manage situations and as Bush was keen to jettison this image going to 
war would give him an opportunity to show his skills.  Repelling the invasion of 
Kuwait would, at the very least, deliver the opportunity for Bush to regain his 
domestic management and leadership credibility and offer as its addendum, a more 
proactive stance and/or approach.  Any misgivings about the worth of launching a 
war, according to Puchala could and would be addressed on a template of future 
domestic imperatives, and be hinged on American interests rather than Kuwaiti or 
Saudi, national interests.375
 
  Bush would push this agenda.  The domestic and 
international game plan demanded decisive action and on this front, Bush would 
deliver. 
With the UN on side and a coalition to finance the war, as well as other Arab and 
Western military forces engaged in varying degrees, the decision to go to war was 
made.  In the international arena Iraq’s resistance gained condemnation as  
 
Saddam Hussein failed to heed repeated warnings that force would 
be used unless he withdrew from Kuwait.  Further, it was not until 
the Joint Congressional Resolution authorizing the use of force had 
passed on 12 January 1991 and the UN’s January 15 deadline 
concerning the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait had arrived 
and the president signed the National Security Directive authorizing 
the execution of the [Operation] Desert Storm attack plan.376
   
 
 
Congress enabled President Bush to go to war by enacting the necessary domestic  
                                                 
374 In 1990 President Bush faced, ‘an out-of-control federal budget deficit, collapsing banks, soaring 
unemployment and an overall depression, privately likened to some inside the White House to the 
1930s Great Depression.’ See: A Century of War, 213. 
375 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 238. 
376 Bob Woodward.  The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, 366. 
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legal frameworks, and although they are too numerous to mention, are summed up in 
the following précis of legal requirement of1990-91, which states in part 
Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the 
President "to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 
665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677";  Whereas in December 1991, 
Congress expressed its sense that it "supports the use of all necessary 
means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of 
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution Public Law 102-1"…377
 
  
President Bush, feeling emboldened and regarding the use of force was keen to 
confront Iraqi belligerence.  During August 1990 the stage had effectively been set 
and there was no turning back, all that was needed was for the military forces to be 
strategically placed.  The statement by Bush in early August of “This will not stand. 
This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait,”378
 
 placed Iraq on notice and on 
13 August 1990, he further stated 
 
Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border, 
capable of initiating hostilities with little or no preparation.  Given 
Iraq’s history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its 
neighbors, to assume that Iraq will not attack again would be unwise 
and unrealistic.   And therefore after consulting with King Faud [of 
Saudia Arabia]…I have responded to that request [for help] by 
ordering U.S. ground and air forces to deploy in the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia…The mission of our troops is wholly 
defensive…America has never wavered when her purpose is driven 
by principle…First, we seek the immediate, unconditional and 
complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait…Second, 
Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored to replace the 
puppet [Iraqi] regime…And third, my administration…is committed 
to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf…Fourth, I am 
                                                 
377 ‘Public Law 102-1: Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against 
Iraq.’ Office of the Press Secretary. The White House.  October 2, 1990.   
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/1990/10/20021002-2.html> Accessed 28 September, 2008. 
378 The Bush Library.  Remarks and an exchange with reporters on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait August 
5, 1990. See: <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90080502.html>  Accessed 14 August 
2008. 
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determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad…My 
military objective is to see Saudi Arabia defended.379
 
 
The momentum for a military intervention which had been progressively building  
resulted in what Birch calculates to be a military action of an ‘Allied coalition[380
fronted by the United States, launched [on January 16, 1991] the air war (Operation 
Desert Thunder) was a prelude to the eventual employment of ground forces’
],  
381
 
 
(Operation Desert Storm).  The US, in using the military as the tip of its foreign 
policy spear—and with the UNSC as the legitimate sponsor—signalled the critical 
military juncture in Middle East preponderance had been reached.  United States 
regional geo-strategic objectives in the Middle East could now be met openly; and 
with overwhelming force.   Regional military preponderance was able to be exercised 
under the auspices of the UNSC, and crucially, the US could engage its precision-
military hand immediately the diplomacy (and vision), that was envisaged by the 
Treaty of Westphalia was disengaged.  Moreover, the US would, after the perils of 
Vietnam, have the chance to redefine warfare by sheer confrontational force and 
hence, by not let it stray into asymmetrical exchanges by forcing a symmetrical 
legerdemain.  
The Strategy 
 
The crucial principal parameters to be met in the kinetic phase of operations in 
exercising this proven type of warfare would incorporate decisiveness and reflect 
tactics which would comprise (and be maintained), at a relatively high-tier and high-
tech level.  Operations, and the campaign in general would be ‘guided’ toward a 
traditional European way of war ‘legerdemain,’ as quickly as possible.  The war 
would not be allowed to drag on, nor would it be allowed to drift into an asymmetrical 
exchange; it would have celerity of action; be focussed in intent; and be of an 
overwhelming nature.  As detailed earlier, for the US any post-Cold War regional 
                                                 
379 ‘Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, George Bush, 1990.’ The American Presidency 
Project.  Washington: Washington GPO, 1990, 33, 1216-1223.  < http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/> 
Accessed 12 August, 2009. 
380 The Allied coalition ground forces which would be made available and play a literal military role in 
the ousting of Iraqi forces were the US, the United Kingdom, and 12 member nations of the Arab 
League.  
381 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 138. 
 199 
clash and impending war in the Middle East would be a relatively straightforward 
affair in terms of application, as the US retained the military capabilities to execute 
(and survive) a massive war.  The technology and systems that were in place at the 
trigger-point of the PGW were heavily focussed on a ‘war-winning rather than a war-
fighting plan.’382
 
  
Reflecting on Vietnam is once again pertinent because it readily conjoins strategies 
that enable a greater understanding of imperatives to be employed, if a new ‘type’ of 
war and warfare comprising traditional strategies with refined outcomes, was to 
succeed.  With the debacle of the Vietnam War a decade and a half behind them, the 
doctrine the US would follow would have its roots firmly planted Clausewitzian 
notion of ‘decisiveness.’  Being ‘decisive’ from a military perspective is to adopt a 
‘strategic defensive’ approach to the conflict at hand.  A core component of this 
consists of and resides in, what a commander must take into account from the initial 
stages of the conflict.  A commander must be given advice which takes into account 
the enemy’s capabilities and responses, and having studied the plan the commander 
has a duty to insist on tactical changes that ensure maximum success, or tend their 
resignation rather than prosecute a flawed plan.383  This throws up the issue of why 
the Vietnam War evolved the way it did and what is more, draws out the incessant 
‘moral cowardice at the top’384
 
 issues that plagued the war; and the dire repercussions 
in its aftermath.  Record avers 
 
It was clear during the Vietnam War and even more so in its 
conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior military 
leaders disagreed with their civilian superiors on fundamental issues.  
The major sources of contention were the Johnson administration’s 
refusal to mobilize the reserves, imposition of the highly restrictive 
targeting denials and rules of engagement on the air war against 
North Vietnam, and denial of permission for U.S. troops to invade 
southern Laos.  Most of the military leadership believed that these 
policies, individually or together, cost the United States victory in 
the Vietnam War.385
 
 
                                                 
382 John Olsen.  Strategic Airpower in Desert Storm. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, 94.  
Emphasis in original. 
383 On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War, 121. 
384 Why The North Won The Vietnam War, 132. 
385 Why The North Won The Vietnam War, 132. 
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The relevance of the strategic defensive approach ascribed to by Clausewitz is that a  
‘major victory can only be obtained by positive measures aimed at a decision, never 
by simply waiting on events.’386  Abutting and underpinning this precept further, also 
reflects the need for decisions which are posited in the tactics of Jomini387 who states 
the ‘annihilation of an opponent’s force is the best route to victory…and mass your 
own armies to threaten a decisive point; then defeat a fraction of the enemy army with 
all of your own.’388  In more contemporary military assessments, and with air-
mobility as a more paramount, superior and reflexive force requires a synchronized 
formulaic, in order for it to achieve decisive results.389  Post-Vietnam strategy 
explicitly fused the Clauswitzian and Jominian doctrines together, of decisiveness and 
overwhelming force, which were seen to be the key components of a winning modus 
operandi.  Furthermore, it would bolster geo-strategic policy for the US in the post-
Vietnam War era, would influence and reflect the tactics that the US had trained for in 
the Cold War era, and be the pivotal doctrine that the US, as a high-tier nation, could 
easily exploit with regard to military intervention.  The premise upon which this type 
of limited warfare was hinged was one of ‘military campaigns will not be undertaken 
unless the result can be quick and decisive.  To wit, only short and decisive campaigns 
will be considered ‘winning ones’390
 
 and from an historical perspective the corner had 
been turned.  High-tier nations with the US at the forefront I argue recognized that the 
previous wars of long and arduous force-on-force slog-of-attrition encounters were 
now—before the first shot in the PGW had been fired by the US or its Western 
allies—superfluous to modern warfare. 
A ‘winning war’: Operation Desert Shield, Desert Thunder, and 
Desert Storm 
 
As stipulated the ability to execute a successful limited war primarily rests on 
deploying the technology available, in this case airpower, along with the specifics of 
organization that are in this instance, the strict modernity of the military.  These 
                                                 
386 On Strategy:  A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War, 121.  Emphasis in original. 
387 Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was a soldier in Napoleon’s army and served in many campaigns 
before he became a military historian and theorist.  His most famous book was published in 1837 
entitled, A Summary of the Art of War.  
388 Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya And Vietnam, 18. 
389 On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, 200. 
390 Armed Conflict, 56. 
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factors have as auxiliaries, a type of assurance that when a war is embarked upon it 
will be won and for the war to be short and a ‘winning’ war it is fundamentally 
dependent upon the synchronicity of the components.  The assurance is implicit when 
conjoining these two essential components at critical points in the waging of 
campaigns.  Military strategists understand the absolute necessity and meticulousness 
required in carrying out tasks, and to exploit them to a maximum extent as the 
window of opportunity they provide is limited.  The PGW, as a limited war, would in 
the late twentieth century, be fought by the only remaining superpower which had 
technological and organizational aspects solidly in place which would enable it to 
win; and of equal importance, to win within the framework it had dictated.  The 
limited war to be fought would, due to the considerable time and effort that had gone 
into honing airpower and the strict modernity that it required, also have another 
driving force to make airpower even more efficient and deadly.  A sweeping and 
powerful new tactic that had been developed with the specific aim of exploiting 
airpower as the mainstay and backbone of kinetic operations: ‘parallel warfare.’  This 
in turn would contribute to the bulls-eye of the air-power era being reached and had 
been developed because it offered the best possible exponential results as the 
technology and modernity were tightly ‘fused’ together.   The conjoining alluded to, 
requires a brief explanation to properly understand what is different about this 
particular progression of technology, the strategy that allowed it to be effectively 
employed as a part of the tactics of a campaign, as the future way of warfare, and as a 
key component of grand strategy.   
 
Parallel warfare has at its nucleus, a significant change from previous campaigns and 
whilst it remains true to the doctrine of penetration shown in Warden’s Five Strategic 
Rings theory, there are some differences which highlight the advanced nature of the 
technology-modernity fusion.  Describing the tactics associated with waging a 
successful campaign and the various difficulties encountered, Deptula articulates, that 
in ‘air campaigns before the [Persian] Gulf War, force was primarily applied in a 
sequential fashion to ‘roll back’ enemy defences before attacking targets of the 
highest value.  Area and point defences had to be eliminated before planners could get 
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to what they really wanted to attack.’391
 
  This type of attention to planning amounts to 
strategic bombing circumventing and/or destroying future effective actions by an 
enemy, although without the collateral damage and of it being considerably more 
focussed.  After this progression airpower can be employed in tactical bombing as 
friendly forces advance.  Previous to the notion of parallel warfare gaining impetus 
and acceptance, operations such as tactical bombing (and to some degree strategic 
bombing), were largely designed to clear a path for ground forces which then 
employed airpower to act in a support role, of either call-in firepower or free-fire 
strikes in front of friendly forces.  The end result however, would invariably be a 
slogging match if pockets of resistance were unable to be dealt with effectively.  
Warden’s theory, although it was a vast improvement over what had gone before, 
remained dependent on the success of airpower penetrations and if the success rate 
was low, back-up ground forces faced being involved in costly attrition-driven 
warfare. 
Parallel warfare, whilst it is still dependent on strike capability, the success of 
individual action relies on a different combination of the attack phases of operations.  
To be specific, it does not rely on the ‘rolling back’ approach to targeting and due to 
this comprises a much more efficient usage of combinations of technology and assets.  
Deptula succinctly places this in perspective in the description that  
 
First the early warning sites are put out of action to mask ingress of 
friendly strike packages.  Next operation centers controlling enemy 
defensive fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missile 
systems are targeted to force defensive systems into autonomous 
operations, which destroys the integrated enemy defense systems.  
Enemy defensive force elements are targeted, and finally the target 
of [highest] value, in this case enemy leadership, can be hit.392
 
 
As in any tactical operation of suppression, parallel warfare for all of its advances on 
the Five Strategic Rings, the possibility of the strategy encountering problems during 
its application does exist.  In order to counter this possibility airpower assets have to 
be scrupulously managed and  placed into ‘packages,’ which offer the best parallel 
                                                 
391 David Deptula.  ‘Parallel Warfare: What is it? Where did it come from? Why is it important?’  
Eagle In The Desert.  Looking Back on U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War.  Edited by William 
Head and Earl Tilford.  Westport: Praeger, 1996, 130.  Emphasis in original. 
392 Eagle In The Desert,130.  Emphasis in original. 
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(simultaneous) results in any given strike scenario.  Essentially, the aim of parallel 
strikes is to target enemy assets in a way that provides the greatest success which, in 
simpler terms, comprises the targeted strikes generating a continuous loop of 
destabilization, or a ‘house of cards’ effect.   The success of the targeting constitutes 
two positive outcomes for the initiator, the first being less sequential (follow-up) 
targeting is required in the suppression process, and this has the codicil of fewer 
missions and therefore, less danger to airpower assets.  The overall strategy consists 
of all vital targets being attacked simultaneously, or within a heavily restricted 
timeframe to reduce specified targets generating ad-hoc elements of strikes in the 
future.  To place this into a strategic framework, the more ad-hoc and sequential (or 
follow-up) air strikes that are engaged the less successful the result according to the 
requirements parallel warfare.  The aim is, in terms of expediency and efficiency, the 
fusing of ordnance technology to compatible air assets, control and command the 
assets via critical organization that establish supremacy and the destruction and then 
suppression, of enemy forces.  This is achieved with the intent and purpose to 
 
[H]it all the elements of an air defense system simultaneously….but 
this situation still leads to a somewhat sequential application of 
force…This kind of simultaneous attack can be accomplished with 
large force packages on non-stealthy [sic] aircraft in discrete areas of 
theater or on a one-time raid against a limited target set.393
 
   
The typical air asset packages and configurations to be deployed both tactically and 
strategically in the PGW were designed to destroy air defence systems in the first 
instance, and then further retard and destroy Iraqi forces with a massive airborne 
deliverance of munitions (see Figure 12).   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
393 Eagle In The Desert, 133. 
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Figure 12.  Beginning January 19, 1991, Iraq’s “Back Door” was 
Opened with Air Raids from Turkey. Reprinted from:  Triumph 
Without Victory, 241. 
 
Follow up missions would retard any ability on the part of the Iraqi forces to respond 
immediately and would result, in an overall degradation of their fighting ability.  For 
parallel warfare to work at its maximum potential, an initial massive attack must 
comprise simultaneous nature, or be closely followed by a decapitation attack on the 
military upper echelon.  The succession of attacks then enable an auxiliary 
punishment phase of bombing operations to be mounted in order to, in this instance, 
instil fear and lower the overall morale in the Iraqi military.    
 
The main trajectory of the PGW became, after the offensive start-point of 17 January, 
1991 to degrade and preferably crush Iraqi forces within the ‘Kuwaiti Theater of 
Operations’ (KTO), rather than to place a defensive perimeter around Kuwait and 
other friendly Gulf states.  Airpower would exercise maximum punishment over a 
limited timeframe and exploit its penetration abilities.  To be precise, the application 
and efficacy of airpower is what would be of most benefit in making the limited war 
‘limited,’ and victory was being achieved.  Hence, the path of events remained 
centred on airpower achieving extraordinary results through the avenue of what had 
been identified by strategists as ‘centres of gravity,’ and the placement of assets to 
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bring them to the fore in the destruction process.  Initial offensive strikes in the KTO 
would consist of 150 attack aircraft whose objectives were 
  
• Attack Iraqi political/military leadership and command control; 
• Gain and maintain air superiority; 
• Sever Iraqi supply lines; 
• Destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; 
• Destroy Republican Guard forces and liberate Kuwait City. 
 
Centers of Gravity. 
 
• Iraqi National Command Authority; 
• Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; and the Republican 
Guard Forces Command.394
 
 
 
The military strategy having largely been readied and in place the necessity to initiate 
a campaign was of the essence.  The US was primed to go to war and as a result, the 
political pressure for a war with Iraq was maintained.   
 
As with all conflicts there remained a subset of problematics that needed to be 
confronted and the US needed to take these problems into account because they 
spurred on the underlying need for a quick and winning war.  The Bush administration 
understood that should Iraq withdraw of its own accord, the chance for the US to 
execute repercussions for the invasion would pass; and the opportunity to expel Iraq 
by force would diminish rapidly.  There was also a greater danger for the US than the 
actual going to war.  According to Rubin, if the Saudi Arabian monarchy ‘decided the 
United States was bluffing [about using military force] it would make its own peace 
with Baghdad and ask the expeditionary force to leave.’395   Timing therefore, became 
a critical component in the milieu of debate and the moment the deadline passed, ‘the 
United States and the coalition implemented the UN ultimatum and attacked at dawn 
on January 17, 1991.’396
                                                 
394 Revolution in Warfare?, 32-33. 
   United States and Coalition forces had access to flyover 
corridors from Turkey and also had access to modern airbases and infrastructure in 
Saudi Arabia, which made penetration into Iraq a relatively easy operational 
component.  Furthermore, additional air assets were available from a fleet-air-arm 
395 Iraq’s Road to War, 264.   
396 Iraq’s Road to War, 270.   
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flotilla in the Persian Gulf and thus, the commencement of operations was largely 
only dependent on the speed, availability and the deployment of the assets.  The 
applications of assets in the initial targeting sorties that were flown by Coalition 
elements—although in the main, consisting of US operational components—is 
emphasized in the sheer size and breadth of the air operations, and this in turn offers 
an insight into the way in which the war would be conducted.  The initial operations 
are summed up  
 
At approximately 0100 on 17 January, eight American Apache 
helicopters…escorted by four Air Force MH-35 PaveLow special 
operations helicopters crossed the Iraqi border flying 
low…[whereupon] they destroyed two early-warning radar 
installations.  This assault created a ‘radar black’ corridor in the Iraqi 
defense network, and eight F-15 fighter bombers immediately 
crossed into Iraq.  They were the leasing (sic) element of 700 allied 
aircraft that had assembled beyond Iraqi radar detection.  An hour 
later 30 F-117A Stealth aircraft began bombing government 
installations in Baghdad and southern Iraq.  Once their attack was 
finished, the Iraqi capital was struck by cruise missiles launched 
from US Navy ships and B-52 bombers…allied air forces flew more 
than 1000 combat sorties, and the U.S. fired 151 cruise missiles.397
 
  
 
Once the airborne attacks initiated they remained constant throughout the first twenty-
four hours and by the end of this time, thirteen hundred combat missions had been 
flown by US and Coalition forces.  The following twenty-three days of the war would 
involve over ‘54,000 sorties’398 of devastating and continuous air strikes comprising 
2,870 aircraft—seventy five percent of which came from US assets.399  Most of the 
objectives and targets of the raids had been met and out of sixty-five airfields in Iraq 
only five were operational and ninety-five percent of the Iraqi defence radar systems 
had been destroyed.400
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The air campaign in the KTO had unveiled the new era of warfare that for a decade 
American military-planners had been forming.  The combination approach that 
strategists had planned consisted of integrating air, land, and sea campaigns into a 
synergistic whole, one that was designed to allow US forces that were outnumbered to 
fight and to win.401
  
  The capacity for the US to marry resources, regardless of any 
assistance from their allies, is evident in the following diagrams (see Figure 13 and 
Figure14) which highlight the intersecting of attack forces that were under the control 
of the US.  At the outbreak of hostilities on 17 January, 1991 otherwise known as D-
Day, the US had a massive amount of interdictory force at their disposal as is able to 
be observed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. D-Day Air Campaign. Reprinted From: Thunder in the 
Desert, 128. 
 
                                                 
401 James Blackwell.  Thunder in the Desert. The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War. New 
York: Bantam Publishers, 1991, 112. 
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Figure 14.  [US] Carriers Deployed on D-Day.  Reprinted from:  
Thunder in the Desert, 131. 
 
 
The relentless assault the air campaign produced from both land- and sea-borne  
aircraft and the concomitant use of ‘unmanned munitions’402
in what it was designed to accomplish.  From both a tactical and strategic point of 
view and the aims of the campaign were to 
 proved to be successful   
 
• target the Hussein regime, not the Iraqi people; 
• minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage; 
• minimise US and allied losses; 
• pit US strengths, against Iraqi weaknesses.403
 
 
Throughout the war it is a banal observation to state that the results of combat varied 
to some degree and that individual attacks by air and ground assets delivered different 
results.  What is of relevance in assessing the tactics are, the new integrated approach 
to warfare exponentially increased the effectiveness of airpower and this can be 
gleaned in a simple observation.   
 
Prior to the PGW the nascent phases of warfare demanded a movement of ground  
                                                 
402 ‘Unmanned munitions’ are in the main an air- or sea-launched cruise missile (the ‘Tomahawk’) and 
a television-guided bomb (the ‘Maverick’), and the tempo of the war is reflected in Tomahawk usage 
which consisted of  more than 100 cruise missiles being fired from nine US Navy ships during the first 
night of the PGW.  See: Thunder in the Desert, 127.  
403 Strategic Airpower in Desert Storm, 98. 
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troops to the fore as a fortification measure at the first opportunity, and this often 
resulted in a costly and attrition-driven initial battle.  The change of pace to what had 
gone before was, the relentlessness of the air attacks necessitated US and Coalition 
ground forces remain stationary until February 24, 1991, and this exhibits the ferocity, 
effectiveness, and strength of the low-platform airpower applied in the KTO.  Ground 
forces were kept at a point of invasion readiness, until the air campaign was able to 
achieve as much advantage as possible over the static Iraqi forces; had inflicted as 
much damage as was necessary to degrade the projection (and re-supply) of Iraqi 
military assets; and ensured US and Coalition forces had maximum control of the 
KTO and Iraqi airspace.  Airpower and technology, having delivered the requisite 
elements of strategic advantage fulfilled, their strike roles and thus, had delivered a 
high level of success in accordance with the Five Strategic Rings and within the 
parameters of ‘Parallel Warfare.’ This is best articulated in the Precision Strikes 
against Leadership and Telecommunications/Command, Control, and 
Communications chart (see Figure 15), which exemplify what airpower and its 
accompanying organization and synchronicity are designed to achieve.   
 
    
 
 
Figure 15.  Precision Strikes against Leadership and 
Telecommunications/Command, Control, and Communications. 
Reprinted from:  Revolution in Warfare?, 59.  
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The air campaign and what it carried out from a tactical planner’s perspective and 
from and historical point of view, was envisioned as early as 1945 by General Arnold 
of the United States Army Air Force.  Arnold foresaw and dictated airpower should be 
developed in order to ‘pass over all former visualized barriers or lines of 
defense…deliver devastating blows…before surface forces can be deployed.’404
key nodes in war-making potential.’
  The 
air campaign was so successful in the KTO that it essentially, encompassed all of the 
requirements set out in the (1990) US Department of Defense white paper Global 
Reach-Global Power: Reshaping for the Future.  Deptula, a principle author advanced 
on Arnold’s iterations and stated ‘that one [USAF and strategic planner’s] should 
focus on airpower’s inherent strengths - speed, range, flexibility, precision and 
lethality…[and] inflict strategic and operational paralysis on any adversary by striking  
405
so successful it brought about the next stage of the offensive earlier than expected.   
  The airpower component of the campaign was  
On 24 February 1991, fifteen hours earlier than expected General Norman  
Schwarzkopf, the Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command  
(CINC), gave the order for a ground attack to begin.406
spearhead—the Ground Offensive Campaign, or Phase IV of operations (see Figure 
16)—saw other components of  US military power go into action.  Airpower’s role 
from this point on would digress slightly from sortie-driven targeting to that of a 
support role for the ground forces.  This was due to the outcome of the initial targeting 
being successful and because there were numerically less targets in the KTO over this 
time.  As a result, less aircraft needed to be dedicated to asset destruction; and strike 
role-flexibility could be introduced.     
   An armoured  
 
  
                                                 
404 Barbara Faulkenberry.  Global Reach-Global Power.  Air Force Strategic Vision, Past and Future. 
Alabama: Air University Press, 1996, 14. 
405 Donald Rice, Global Reach—Global Power: The Air Force and U.S. National Security, Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June 1990, 4, 13. 
406 Rick Atkinson.  Crusade. The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1993, 511. 
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Figure 16.  Phases of Desert Storm Campaign Plan. Reprinted from: 
Revolution in Warfare?, 42. 
 
With the US modus operandi and the role of airpower in the KTO established, a brief  
analysis of what the Iraqi military had in place is needed at this point to gain a greater  
wholistic comprehension of the impending ground clash.  Iraqi commanders had from 
the start assumed there would be a marine landing emanating from the Kuwait 
coastline.  The airport was also heavily defended by an armoured division, and in total 
four heavy (armoured) divisions and seven infantry divisions had been strategically 
placed to meet the threat from the sea.  There had also been considerable anti-tank and 
anti-personnel minefields put in place along with ditches, berms, trenches and 
fortified dug-in placements.  The Iraqi command knew that it was going to have to 
defend against an enemy that was geared to fast-moving warfare and would attack 
with air supremacy intact.  The Iraqi military also understood that it was going to be 
hard-pressed to control the tempo and direction of the battle.  What is more, forward 
elements of the Iraqi Army knew initial contacts were designed to absorb the brunt of 
US armour and air power and in the process of countering this initial advance, Iraqi 
commanders could then plan a counter-attack.407
                                                 
407 Lawrence Freedman and Efrain Karsh.  The Gulf Conflict 1990-199. Diplomacy and War in the New 
World Order. London: Faber and Faber, 1993, 362-363.  
   Due to the advantages of the Five 
Rings strategy and the accompanying parallel warfare components this would prove to 
be a hopelessly decrepit strategy. 
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The ground war was codenamed ‘G-Day’ and on February 24, 1991 the US and 
Coalition forces finally crossed into Kuwait.  The US armoured spearhead breached 
the first lines of defence the Iraqi military had in place at multiple locations with an 
array of armoured combat vehicles, and decimated the defending forces in the 
process.  A step-by-step analysis of the attack by US and Coalition forces is not 
necessary at this point, suffice to state the blocking manoeuvres outside of Kuwait 
city, and the penetration into Kuwait proper, in and of itself, was a supreme logistical 
and military assault.  The assault can be summed up 
 
In four days the [US] VII [Army] Corps advanced more than 150 
miles, and destroyed an estimated 4,985 Iraqi vehicles, including 
1,300 tanks, 1,200 infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel 
carriers (APC), 265 artillery pieces and 100 air defense systems.  It 
captured 21,463 Iraqi soldiers, 600 tanks, 575 infantry fighting 
vehicles and APCs, 370 artillery pieces, 450 air defense systems and 
1,300 wheeled vehicles.408
 
 
In real terms there were very few casualties for the US and the Coalition forces, and 
losses of equipment were also minor overall.  The reality of the situation rapidly 
changed ‘from what had been a movement to contact and deliberate attack to a pursuit 
and exploitation’409 role for Coalition forces and in particular, for US armour and air 
assets.  The Iraqi military began to retreat in earnest and the liberation of Kuwait was 
completed in what was to become known as the ‘100 Hours War.’410
 
  As a result, and 
from a military perspective 
The [Persian] Gulf War showed the effectiveness of stealth and 
precision technologies, and showed that the Army, which had 
suffered few casualties in the ground war, could have destroyed the 
fourth-largest army on Earth with half the forces deployed.  What 
this told [US] Administrations and Americans was that the all-
volunteer force was working and effective, and that its ground forces 
were too large…The United States could also increase its 
effectiveness by investing in airpower technologies.  No matter what 
the outcome of a war, America always learned the same lessons 
through the prisms of American culture, which produced a strong 
                                                 
408 The American Culture of War, 363. 
409 The ‘exploitation phase’ of military operations is one in which an army, ‘pursues a faltering enemy, 
forcing it to fight in the hope of precipitating a total collapse.’ See: The American Culture of War, 356. 
Emphasis in original. 
410 “Iraq War Will Be Short.’ BBC News. World Edition. 15 November, 2002. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2479807.stm>  Accessed 21 August, 2007.   
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preference for technological solutions and a strong disinclination to 
employ American manpower in limited wars.411
 
 
On March 2, 1991 a final chapter in the campaign to route the Iraqi military was 
waged in the ground war.  The Hammurabi Division of the Iraqi Army was destroyed 
by the US 24th Infantry Division and the outcome of this action resulted in the 
unconditional surrender of the Iraqi military—now trapped in the KTO—to CINC 
Schwarzkopf on March 3, 1991.    
 
The Persian Gulf War and what it ‘represented’ 
 
On 6 March, 1991 President Bush made a speech with regard to the termination of the 
PGW, in which he referred to a ‘new world order’ in which the US would become 
more acutely involved in the reigning in of terror.  Bush stated in part  
I thank the Members of this Congress—support here for our troops 
in battle was overwhelming. And above all, I thank those whose 
unfailing love and support sustained our courageous men and women: 
I thank the American people…Tonight, I come to this House to 
speak about the world—the world after war. The recent challenge 
could not have been clearer. Saddam Hussein was the villain; Kuwait, 
the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North 
America and Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and 
the Arab world, all united against aggression. Our uncommon 
coalition must now work in common purpose: to forge a future that 
should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human 
nature…Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in 
which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the 
words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which “the principles 
of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong. . .”  A 
world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is 
poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which 
freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. 
The Gulf war [sic] put this new world to its first test. And my fellow 
Americans, we passed that test.412
The pathway and grand strategy which underpinned President Bush’s actions, that are  
 
                                                 
411 The American Culture of War, 378. 
412 ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict 1991-
03-06.’  Public Papers-1991-March. 
<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2767&year=1991&month=3>  Accessed 
19 Dec, 2007. 
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present within the context of the speech, effectively placed America in the post-Cold 
War world as a ‘benevolent hegemon.’413  America was a country willing to protect 
its interests, and come to the aid of less-powerful allies, and in keeping within this 
notion, Birch avers that fighting and decisively winning the PGW the stage was set for 
an evolving grand strategy which superseded the Cold War containment approach to 
more decisive foreign policy objectives.414   This new approach is expressed in 
quoting (retired) Army Chief of Staff Vuono in which an overall ‘strategy of power 
projection…to a broader more active engagement that protects and advances U.S. 
interests…’415
The upshot of a significant (regional) victory in such a chronologically short 
engagement was it placed the US in a unique position, one which was compounded 
and yet strengthened by, the collapse of the Soviet Union.  To be sure, foreign policy 
relationships which at times had been fractious with allies were now reaffirmed on 
the back of this decisive win.  To be specific and within the context of this thesis, the 
influence the US expressed by the win can be drawn together with several succinct 
observations.  From a global perspective, it   
 could, on the back of this new type of warfare—and with airpower at 
its zenith—now be engaged with a newfound vigor.   
[R]established German and Japanese dependence on U.S. protection 
[of] their key raw materials and resources…[P]ut Third World 
countries on notice that the end of the [C]old War did not give them 
license to play by their own rules of the game…[R]ecreated the 
circumstances for renewed public support at home for American 
hegemony abroad.  Its high-tech massacre of a retreating Iraqi army 
accomplished with light U.S. casualties, suggested that America 
could go back to the pre-Vietnam War days of hegemony-on-the-
cheap, that the [Persian] Gulf War was prototype of “mid-intensity” 
wars of the future, in which American technology and fire-power 
would provide quick, decisive victories at small public sacrifice.416
 
 
With the PGW at an end saw Bush’s popularity rating as high as eighty- 
                                                 
413 Richard Melanson.  American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. The Search for Consensus 
From Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, 339. 
414 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 147. 
415 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 147. 
416 America’s Half-Century, 250  
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eight percent417 the critical notion that was understood was that America had come to 
the fore in the power-stakes of the international arena.  Pfiffner emphasises the 
favourable combination of factors, ‘did much to reassert U.S. superpower status in the 
world.’418  Within this was, the winning of the PGW allowed Bush to reverse one of 
the worst legacies in all of American history: the Vietnam War.419  The US was 
unable to pursue the ‘exploitation phase’ of tactical operations to its fullest extent due 
to Bush calling an end (cease-fire) to operations at 8:00am on February 28, 1991.420  
The Iraqi forces were nevertheless, soundly routed and although the US Army’s 24th 
Infantry did continue fighting until the 2nd March,421
 
 due to the Iraqi Hammurabi 
Division not laying down their arms during their retreat—the reasoning for the pursuit 
was a belief the division may be repositioning for a counter-attack—and as a result 
the Hammurabi Division was pulverised by a combination of coordinated artillery and 
air strikes.  This was the last kinetic campaign action of the PGW.  The Coalition and 
US forces were victorious and in doing so the US had made peace with a component 
of its past. 
The late twentieth century military zenith of the United States 
 
Engaging in war had been part of America’s geo-strategic focus since the end of 
WWII, as has been ascribed to in the earlier chapters of this thesis.   The intervention 
which resulted in the PGW is offered and given a different perspective by Hadar in 
the proclamation that the Persian Gulf intervention was ‘basically a unilateral 
American action under the façade of a collective security action.’422
                                                 
417 Robin Toner.  ‘Critical Moments; How Bush Lost Five Moments To Seize The Day.’ New York 
Times, October 11, 1992.  
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE0DF103EF932A25753C1A964958260> 
Accessed 23 March 2008. 
   The 
intervention, as a high-profile and powerful exercise of US military preponderance 
purposely and directly, shifted the military to the fore, and extended an overt 
expression of how Middle East geo-strategic policy would be approached from 1990 
onwards on the part of the US.  A comprehension of exactly how this would now be 
418 The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, 105. 
419 Steve Yetiv.  US Decision-Making and the Persian Gulf War. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2004, 
80. 
420 Crusade, 511. 
421 Crusade, 511. 
422 Leon Hadar.  Quagmire: America in the Middle East.  Washington: Cato Institute, 1992, 23.  
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approached the RMA the US had been developing, in terms of quick and efficient 
responses represented it as having reached its zenith. The ability and capacity to 
mobilize at such a rapid pace—in moving military force to the fore, and of actually 
deploying it to the Gulf—is a considerable achievement in the history of a deployment 
leading to direct conflict; and the devastating success achieved.  The overwhelming 
successes the PGW had, reveals an underlying agenda of a military option being 
thrust to the fore as Hadar succinctly states 
 
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Washington could have 
attempted to strengthen the position of Saudi Arabia and the other 
Arab oil states by assertively calling for Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait, by passing resolutions in the UN Security Council and 
highlighting the presence of American naval forces in the 
area…Pressure from the Arab oil and Israel lobbies, which were 
concerned about continued American backing for their regional 
clients, enhanced support from the neoconservatives and the 
Rockefeller Republicans, helped to activate the Cold War’s Middle 
Eastern paradigm and energized Washington to launch its first 
campaign of post-Cold War interventionism.  An American effort to 
maintain the power of the Arab gulf monarchies and Israel’s regional 
nuclear monopoly was now framed as a crusade to establish a new 
world order.  That ploy was not new.  America’s entry into World 
War I…was described as part of a crusade to “make the world safe 
for democracy”… the Middle East had become the last refuge of the 
foreign policy activist.423
 
 
 
The claim of Hadar is one of a decisive campaign being launched to re-establish US 
military might which had faltered from the position that it had gained in WWII and 
the Korean War as a pre-meditated forceful and functional component in the principle 
of persuasion.  Moreover, the need to exercise military might on the back of the defeat 
of Vietnam was desperately needed to re-establish American predominance in the use 
of warfare; and to stamp its authority on the region.  For the first time in the post-
WWII and UN dominated political arena which had, up until the time of the PGW, 
had continued to elevated and sustained sophisticated political discourse and 
mediation in the international arena faltered and then collapsed under the weight of 
one nation-state’s preponderance and its ability to exercise extreme military power.   
The UNSC P5, discarded the option of intense meaningful dialogue with the Iraq 
                                                 
423 Quagmire, 27.   
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leadership and when faced with the US’ ability to execute a decisive military 
campaign according to Hadar, the UNSC, essentially submitted to US will.  The 
effective geo-strategic gains of limited warfare brought the technological aspects of 
warfare (airpower) to the forefront of persuasion and this was the new tool of 
supremacy, as was artillery (the cannon) in times gone by.   New campaigns, with the 
use of airpower would and could be weighed heavily in favour of the US.  All that 
was needed was a greater focus on the ‘type’ of limited warfare to be engaged in and 
it being conjoined to what technology and its accompanying synchronicity could 
offer.  Warfare had reached a zenith: a limited war could now meet all the US 
requirements of being a ‘winning’ war, and this now came with a considerable 
amount of surety.  The PGW had proven, a war could be ‘short and decisive.’ 
 
Conclusion to ‘United States Supremacy in Modern Limited Warfare: The 
Persian Gulf War’  
 
The US returning to military supremacy has been throughout this chapter, dealt with  
under the auspice of using overwhelming airpower to gain geo-strategic advantage.  
What has also been extrapolated in the content of the chapter is losing the Vietnam 
War proved to be beneficial—in the strict military sense of the term—as it had helped 
hone skills that would win a future war; and thrust the US to new geo-strategic 
heights. Whether the evidence that Hadar presents is relevant in arguing the adjunct of 
whether using such and obdurate course of action which essentially reversed the 
stance adopted by liberal-democracies—as ascribed by the Treaty of Westphalia and 
its corresponding tenets of solving issues in an ‘amicable’424
                                                 
424 The Treaty of Westphalia’s purpose in the context of this thesis, has been to use it as a crux for the 
active utilization of diplomacy over warfare, and in doing so maintains that for all of the Treaty’s 
shortcomings (and there were many) it encouraged and ascribed to tolerance and dialogue.  Whilst 
recognising much of the dialogue was centred on religious aspects of the time, the  reference to the 
word ‘amicable’ in the above text is able to be observed in ‘the mere existence of the legal option of 
proceeding in such a way obliged Catholics and Protestants to seek compromise solutions acceptable to 
both sides.’  See: The Thirty Years War.  The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618-1648. 145.  
 way—and that the 
fundamental belief, confidence and reliance on political deliberations taking 
precedence over military actions, remains a moot point.   What is of interest here 
however, is the ability to revert to a military option, and enabling it to be taken to its 
full potential and advanced to a maximum advantage during and after, a war.  The 
theme that has underpinned this is, that the US saw its opportunity, was emboldened 
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by the history of airpower and the (post-Vietnam) newfound strategies were able to be 
brought to the fore; and it acted on these potentials at the first opportunity.   
 
Expanding on Hadar’s analysis as the military option was moved to the forefront of 
persuasion it is fair to argue the US, in putting Operation Desert Shield425
 
 into place 
remained within the integrity, intent and purpose of the respects the sovereignty of the 
nation-state of Saudi Arabia; and in doing so remained within the numerous 
parameters set by the UN.  The sovereignty of Iraq at this point was respected, 
inasmuch as a direct intervention into the affairs of a sovereign actor did not take 
place.  Furthermore, the non-intervention into Kuwait and the protectorate cum 
interventionist measures associated with Saudi Arabia were engaged in with the 
consent of the Saudi monarchy which once again, respected sovereignty and 
sovereign rule.  The respective placement of military resources it can be argued, was 
also appropriate if only due to Saudi Arabia facing a genuine threat of being invaded 
if the push into Kuwait by Iraqi military forces, continued in the direction strategists 
thought may develop (see Figure 17).   
Operation Desert Thunder426
                                                 
425 Operations Desert Shield consisted of ‘the deployment of U.S. military forces to protect the Gulf 
region from further Iraqi encroachment’ rather than a direct campaign against Iraqi military forces.  See: 
‘Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.’ Air Force Historical Studies Office, 
<http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/desert.htm> Accessed 7 July, 2008.  There is an 
argument that the deployment of an armed flotilla in the Persian Gulf constitutes and/or is a regional 
incursion which develops further frictions.  Although this may be the case, from a legal perspective 
there is no tangible impact on the various legal understandings and rationales, as the deployment was at 
the request of the Saudi monarchy.   
 and Operation Desert Storm however, were what the US 
was most keen to execute, as they would either prove or disprove the post-Vietnam 
theories of airpower’s abilities and re-establish the US as a regional power broker.  
Moreover, the strategies associated with airpower and a follow-up armoured thrust 
could be tested on a relatively wide front and be assessed in decisive and focussed 
426 To be specific Operation Desert Thunder did not become operational until Operation Instant 
Thunder had taken place.  Operation Instant Thunder for ease of reference is included in the references 
to Operation Desert Thunder, as it comprises pertinent issues regarding the technology and organized 
modernity aspects of airpower and its uses.  This is summed up, the ‘original Instant Thunder plan had 
begun in August 1990 with a total of eighty-four targets to be struck over a six-day period 
[immediately presidential authority was given]…the first priority was to gain command of the air.’ See: 
Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen.  Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf.  Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1995, 34.   There were sometimes several operations being undertaken within the 
three main operations cited, such as Operation Desert Saber as part of Desert Storm. For ease of 
reference they will be usurped by the main operations mentioned, as they constitute the main thrust of 
analysis.   
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campaigns.  To be sure, US and Coalition forces in the process of carrying out the 
campaigns claim they were strategic measures aimed at reducing the chances of Iraq 
mounting a counter-strike, and from a military strategic perspective, this is a fair 
argument.  However, what remained at the forefront of tactics for the US I argue, was 
the opportunity to exercise airpower; and for the opportunity not to be lost.  Victory in 
no uncertain terms was what the US was primarily focussed on.   
 
 
 
Figure 17. Expected Avenues of Iraqi Approach. Reprinted from: 
Peter Huchthausen. America’s Splendid Little Wars. A Short History 
of U.S. Military Engagements 1975-2000.  New York: Penguin 
Group, 2003, 138. 
 
This chapter has, not only been about the Middle East and frictions therein, it has also 
dealt with the trajectory of how the US has approached issues after WWII, during the 
Cold War and in particular, after the decline of the Soviet Union.  The issues have 
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been underpinned by the geo-strategic intent of the US with regard to the region and 
have been teased out against these backdrops.  With regard to the invasion of Kuwait 
however and the US garnering a coalition of forces follows the basic trend of, 
‘military coalitions have been a central feature of US security policy in the post-
World War II era.’427   The PGW has been further underpinned by a greater factor and 
that is the US, as a superpower, presumes that if it fails to take responsibility for 
controlling dangerous volatile forces in the Middle East region—that was in part, 
caused by the disintegration of the USSR—no one else would.  With this, came an 
addendum: the taking of control will often require the use of military power.428  The 
first mid-intensity engagement in the post-Cold War world without a doubt, expressed 
America as a decisive military force in the Middle East region and in the international 
arena.  On the surface, all had worked out well for the US and the ‘Gulf War [PGW] 
is generally and duly considered a military success.  It is the best example available of 
the impact of new technologies, of air power, of striking heavily and early with 
decisive impact.’429
 
  This is what the US expected through their post-Vietnam decades 
of research and it fitted their understanding of how war would pan out in the latter 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
The Vietnam issue of when and how much force to apply has been addressed through 
earlier chapters and I have further developed the tangent that war is never a 
straightforward business and the speed and tenacity displayed in the PGW produced 
for the US, its own problematics. The war was embraced thoroughly for what it could 
offer in terms of testing the military however, it eventually faltered on the back of the 
Bush administration having no lucid political strategy, which in turn brought the war 
to a premature end.430
                                                 
427 Robert Pauly.  US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf.  Safeguarding American Interest through 
Selective Multilateralism.  Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, 2. 
   Whether the PGW had adequately sated the US population 
and political quest for the ‘reversal of history’ as espoused by Bush is a moot point 
and need not be debated further here.  The fact remains, that at the end of the war 
regime change in Iraq, a major reason for the action in the KTO, simply did not take 
428 Seyom Brown.  The Illusion of Control.  Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2003, 25-26. 
429 Intervention. The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, 109. 
430 Robert Callum.  ‘War as a Continuation of Policy by Other Means: Clausewitzian Policy and the 
Persian Gulf War.’ Defense Analysis. Alexandria: Center for Naval Studies, 17, 1, 63. 
<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=105>  Accessed  23 May, 2007. 
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place and whilst it brings to light that airpower is the decisive force it was designed to 
be, and is able to achieve exceptional tactical and strategic results, however in doing 
so, it affirms the perception of Clausewitz, that war obeys no laws but its own.   
 
Regardless of the failings of the Bush administration, what had been clearly delivered 
to president-elect Clinton was a clear mandate, that America should pursue a geo-
strategic policy through the prism of  
 
• decisive force as achieved in the PGW; 
• exploit the new advantages of being the world’s sole-superpower;  
• deliver clear-cut outcomes if force is applied that are favourable to America 
and the American people;  
• if military might is needed then it should be executed with due speed and 
diligence; and  
• it should be decisive and overwhelming.   
 
America however, it will be shown, was about to enter a new era with regard to the 
application of force, and the astute use of airpower in its newly enhanced role would 
be an indentured part of American preponderance long after the PGW ended.  
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The Clinton Years and the ‘Inertia’ of the 
American Military  
 
Preamble 
 
In order to understand the Clinton presidency and its ‘hesitancy’ in military matters, a 
reflection on the presidency of his predecessor—George H. W. Bush—and the lasting 
pressures his administration left behind is required.  Moreover there are several other 
factors which are in need of scrutiny as they involve issues of friction within the 
domestic and international spheres of America and of equal importance, are the 
dangers of engagement that arose during Clinton’s presidency as well as the military 
sophistication and political awareness that began to grow in the region—all would 
influence actions and outcomes.   A succinct place to begin with regard to American 
actions is President Bush was widely criticised after the ending of the PGW.  The 
criticisms centred on not toppling Saddam Hussein, for not pursuing the war to a more 
decisive end and ‘not moving beyond the limited purposes of the Gulf 
intervention.’431  During the course of the PGW the Bush administration according to 
Mahnken, failed to understand Iraq’s true centre of gravity, and in turn, hoped that the 
Iraqi leader would not be able to survive such a dramatic defeat.  In other words, the 
main thrust of the war—to completely defeat Saddam Hussein—was left to chance.432  
To wit, the American military was seen of as a force that had been ‘unwilling, despite 
their technological superiority, to close with the Iraqi army on its home territory and 
finish off the job…The [Iraqi] nation’s leadership had stood up to the military might 
of the United States and survived.’ 433
 
   The arguments that followed the PGW are 
immense and comprise a plethora of opinions.  The legacy of the war however, 
haunted Bush in the domestic public arena, and to a large extent his lack of leadership 
skills in the eyes of the American public, can be summed up as  
Why the Bush administration did not disarm Saddam Hussein is  
                                                 
431 Intervention, 109. 
432 The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered.  Edited by Andrew Bacevic and Efraim Inbar. London: Frank 
Cass, 2003, 132-133. 
433 The Iraq War, 32. 
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incomprehensible [to the American people].  While the Bush 
administration proved adroit at gaining support for, planning and 
fighting the war, it proved inept in planning the peace…[and] 
Saddam Hussein was still a dictator in Iraq, and Bush had reinstalled 
a monarchy, not a democracy, in Kuwait.434
 
 
The incompleteness of the PGW and the issue that Bush maintained ‘the prediction 
that Saddam would be internally ousted following an intifadah in 1991,’435
 
 which 
eventually did not take place, and this became a factor in the presidential election of 
1992.  The end result was Bush lost the election to William (Bill) Clinton who was 
then elected to the office of President of the United States.  On 20 January, 1993 
Clinton took office with the state-of-affairs being 
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War American power, prestige, 
and influence were the highest they had been since World War Two.  
The Berlin Wall had fallen, the [C]old [W]ar was over, the Soviet 
Union was collapsing, and the United States stood alone, as the 
world’s only superpower, the most powerful nation on Earth, and it 
had demonstrated that power to the world with considerable awe.  
Economically and technologically the United States had no 
equals.436
 
 
From a military perspective the paradox for President Clinton was one of having to 
manage the situation that Bush had left behind, which was essentially, that the US was 
unable to capitalize on Iraq’s weaknesses; and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
Americans to about re-entering the war.  Hence, this chapter will present a 
perspective: the perceived inertia of the Clinton years; the dithering of his 
administration and the way in which military intervention was called upon and carried 
out; and the way in which the far-right exploited these (apparent) weaknesses and 
pushed for greater geo-strategic preponderance.  The intention of Clinton, despite all 
of the post-PGW pressures was to continue to advance a strong US presence in global 
affairs; and relegate the unfinished business of the PGW to a peripheral issue, by still 
presenting a strong America.  With this in mind, and of Clinton being keenly aware of 
the criticisms that the Bush administration had endured and along with the ‘especially 
                                                 
434 The American Culture of War, 369. 
435 Steven Wright.  The United States and Persian Gulf Security.  The Foundations of the War on 
Terror. Berkshire: Ithaca, 2007,126.  Emphasis in original. 
436 The American Culture of War, 375. 
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messy [international] agenda of unfinished items’437
 
 the Republicans had left behind, 
the new administration set about putting into place agendas which would overcome 
the foreign policy failures of the PGW.   
A major and immediate task for Clinton was to arrest any ‘drift’ in a perceived 
weaknesses of the US as a global force.  The way in which Clinton sought to manage 
the situation and retain a key involvement in world affairs, was through the prism of 
engagement incorporating the containment and/or isolation of ‘rogue states,’ and 
portray his foreign policy critics as isolationists and protectionists.438
 
   The Gulf 
region continued to demand attention and Clinton engaged with Iraq almost 
immediately.  Conscious of the criticisms of the PGW in general, and of it being 
considered by many in the international diplomatic community as a unilateral action 
on the part of the US, a new approach was needed.  Clinton was aware that the 
unilateralist intent within the Bush administration were governed by a ‘set’ of 
convictions which, although complex, can be summed up as 
American global hegemony enables the United States to transform 
the world; other countries will join the United States (bandwagon), 
not oppose it.  Deterrence has been weakened and must be restored.  
The international status quo damages the United States and the cause 
of human freedom.  Democracy is possible for all peoples.  The 
moral dimension must be restored to American diplomacy and 
military strategy.  Time is not on our side; the cost of inaction is 
greater than the costs of action.439
 
 
   
Within the context of engaging with, controlling and containing Iraq the overarching 
mechanism was one of shifting from the unilateral stance shown to the American 
people by Bush to a position of having an ‘assertive multilateral’440
                                                 
437 Linda Miller.  ‘The Clinton Years: reinventing US foreign policy.’ International Affairs.  London: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1994, Vol. 70, 4, 625. 
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438 American Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War, 339-343. 
439 P. Edward Haley.  Strategies of Dominance.  The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006, 139. 
440 ‘Assertive multilateralism’ is a theory that was coined by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and 
is part of US grand strategy which incorporates the involvement of other friendly Western powerful 
nations sharing balance-of-power and security issues.  The outcome is in general terms one of 
according to Schweller (in quoting Ikenberry), ‘promoting greater international order and security.’  
See: Randall Schweller.  ‘The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay.’  
International Security.  Massachusetts: The MIT Press, Summer 2001, 26, 1, 164.   
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Incorporated in this state-of-affairs was that whilst US grand strategy remained 
focussed on preponderance, it incorporated an awareness of other powerful Western 
nations and the direct input they could provide in keeping the world safe from rogue 
states.  Engaging with Iraq could still be done in a pro-active and forceful manner, 
although it would form part of a greater ‘dual containment’ policy toward both Iraq 
and Iran.  The policy as prescribed by Art ‘aims to hold the line against a specific 
aggressor that threatens American interests in a given region or that strives for world 
hegemony’ 441 and the Clinton administration remained in line with Bush’s 
administration in its steadfastness and ultimate aim: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein 
and regime change.  The critical difference for the Clinton administration was that the 
change was not pursued with the same ‘hawkish’442
 
 policies and practice that Bush 
had instigated.   
Global engagement and pressure on Iraq 
 
The stance taken toward Iraq requires only specific areas be taken into account and 
only those which continued to relate to US military preponderance and UN influences.  
The US acknowledged Iraq was weakened by Desert Storm Saddam Hussein 
remained in power and there appeared to be no imminent threat to his control of Iraq.  
Sanctions were in place and had been since the end of the PGW, in order to curtail 
Hussein’s belligerence.  Included in this, were mechanisms designed to impede his 
ability to reconfigure and rebuild a military presence extramural to his own borders 
and to reconstruct Iraq’s military forces.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 
687 had been passed on April 3, 1991 to apply extra pressure on Iraq, and the 
resolution reads in part 
 
[D]ecides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept, under international 
supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its 
weapons of mass destruction [WMD], ballistic missiles with a range 
over 150 kilometres, and related production facilities and equipment. 
It also provides for establishment of a system of ongoing monitoring 
                                                 
441 Robert Art.  A Grand Strategy for America. New York: Cornell University Press, 2003, 83. 
442 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, defines ‘hawkish’ as, ‘A person who 
favors military force or action in order to carry out foreign policy,’ and ‘disposed to warfare or hard-
line policies.’ See: Dictionary.com. New York: Random House, 2006. 
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and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these weapons 
and missiles. Requires Iraq to make a declaration, within 15 days, of  
the location, amounts and types of all such items.443
 
 
 
The Clinton administration was keen to keep in place sanctions and exploit the 
resolutions which had already been passed during Bush’s term of office.  Any 
components of them that could still be used as pressure points were pursued in order 
to contain Iraq.  The resolutions enacting the PGW were, at the time of the new 
presidency non-operational, however there were other resolutions which could still be 
acted upon in the application of continual pressure.  For instance, Resolution 688444 
which nominated a no-fly zone over southern Iraq by fixed wing and non-fixed with 
aircraft was still able to be actioned.  Additionally, Operation Northern Watch—
which encompassed the northern ten percent of Iraq and was put into action to protect 
the Kurdish population—could still be used as a mechanism of control and had as an 
additional dividend, the US being seen to have a strong stance against the dictator.  By 
the end of August 1992 approximately 60 percent of Iraq was deemed a no-fly 
zone.445  The balance that Clinton needed to strike was to show his presidency was 
inclusive of other actors’ opinions, whilst moving away from the perceived aggressive 
unilateral stance of the Bush administration and yet be strong and decisive when 
action needed to be taken with regard to protecting America’s interests and/or 
reputation.  Clinton used Resolution 707446
 
 which in part, ‘demands that Iraq provide 
without further delay full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed weapons 
and [scientific] programmes, as required by [R]esolution 687 (1991)’ to keep the 
pressure on Iraq, and he used it repeatedly to exercise authority over Iraq.  
The Clinton administration with all of its intent of engagement was faced with the 
dilemma of what avenue to take in order to fulfil its programme of containment 
                                                 
443 United Nations Security Council.  UNSCOM [United Nations Special Commission] Chronology of 
Main Events. <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/resolution687.htm> Accessed 5 January, 
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444 UNSC Resolution 688 was passed April 6, 1991.  See:  
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf> Accessed 29 
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445 Steve Yetiv. The Absence of Grand Strategy.  The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005.  
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008, 92-93.  
446 UNSC Resolution 707 was passed on August 15, 1991. See: UNSCOM Main Chronology of Events. 
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toward Iraq.  Due to, and because of the political residue of the Bush administration, 
and the sense of failure in defeating Iraq, Clinton was always faced with the problem 
of what was the best avenue to take in order to be seen as a decisive president.  Posen 
and Ross suggest the arguments that entered the discourse of foreign policy and the 
public arena for Clinton’s administration consisted of an, ‘uneasy amalgam of neo-
isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.’447  As each 
foreign policy ‘direction’ is immense in its application only a brief synopsis is 
required here, in order to highlight what core aspects of any given direction a policy 
may take, and what Clinton was compelled to acknowledge in its employment.  In 
summary, neo-isolationism has as its nexus the idealism of American troops 
protecting the homeland with the security, liberty and property of the American 
people as the only vital interest, whilst simultaneously disengaging from the vast 
majority of external threats such as civil wars.448   Selective engagement Posen and 
Ross aver ‘endeavours to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial 
and military potential—the great powers’449  Therefore, power-sharing and security-
sharing is required if a conflict and/or intervention is entered into.  Art further 
stipulates ‘selective engagement holds that military power remains a useful and 
fungible instrument of statecraft…[and] is a forward-defense strategy.’450
 
  What is 
meant by this and why Clinton essentially favoured it, is the contention that  
America’s core alliances and forward-deployed troops serve several 
useful functions.  First, they help keep the peace and dampen 
security competitions among the great powers in the western and 
eastern Eurasia and to a lesser degree among the states in the Persian 
Gulf by providing both military deterrence and political reassurance.  
Second, to the extent that they help maintain peace and dampen 
security competitions, these alliances and troops help retard NBC 
[nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons] spread, preserve 
openness, and foster the spread of democracy.  Third, these alliances 
facilitate war waging, peacekeeping, and peacemaking when the 
United States decides to undertake any of those tasks, because 
standing alliances permit more rapid and more effective actions that 
assembling ad hoc coalitions.  Fourth, America’s alliances serve as 
institutional forums where important political-military issues can be 
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managed by maintaining close political-military links with four of 
the world’s six other great powers—Britain, France, Germany and 
Japan.451
 
 
Cooperative security is a policy that entails a kind of  “world peace” centred on US-
driven liberalism (and not realism), which does not rely on spontaneous power 
balancing and instead, encourages engagement with international institutions—such 
as the UN and NATO.452  Primacy requires hegemonic stability, which the US is 
capable of exhibiting due to its military power.  Whilst power is to be displayed 
overtly via military presence, it is only US preponderance of power that ensures 
peace—Gilpin’s ‘hegemonic governance’453
 
 model.  Regardless of the balances or 
imbalances of each, and at what points Clinton allowed selective engagement to turn 
into direct action, multilateral underpinnings still have aspects of primacy within 
them.  The conjoining of this is explained thus,  
American primacy justifies confidence about the future.  Global 
trends favor the United States more than any other country. 
Multilateralism is better than unilateralism.  Democracy has only 
limited relevance to other countries.  Introducing morality into 
public diplomacy can hurt as much as help.454
 
 
 
With regard to US primacy, after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union the way in 
which America sought to navigate its way around international issues and conflict 
with Clinton at the helm, was to combine as many aspects as possible that would be 
advantageous to the US.  According to Clinton, dual-containment, selective 
engagement and assertive multilateralism were the combinations that would best serve 
the US.  Incorporated in this combination was a core understanding and one that has 
been alluded to earlier.  Interventions as direct action and interventionism as policy 
meant the US would inevitably be involved in ‘second tier’ (or regional) conflicts and 
from this and mid-intensity conflicts had a strong chance of developing.  With this in 
mind how Clinton pursued military avenues can be more fully addressed. 
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United States military force in the Clinton era 
 
At this point, it is not relevant to delve into the specifics of the handling of potential 
second tier conflicts that the US became embroiled in during Clinton’s presidency, but 
to address the somewhat convoluted approach to assertive multilateralism.  Within 
this and what remains pertinent is that Clinton had called for the creation of a 
permanent rapid-deployment-force during his presidential campaign in 1992.  The 
New York Times, reported Clinton called for a US rapid-deployment force which 
would be, “standing at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing 
mass violence against civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and 
combating terrorism,”455
 
 and for it to be formed under the auspices of the UN.  This 
would be done in order to gain and infuse a greater involvement of others and he 
further called for UN and/or NATO forces to be involved in resolving the Balkans 
crisis.  Clinton also called upon UN forces to be involved if US forces were deployed 
into Somalia, and that the containment of Iraq via the air exclusion zones have the 
input of other powerful actors.  All were part of his multilateral stance on foreign 
policy and there were some relative successes in the stance Clinton had taken 
however, although the actual implementation, as well as the ideology of assertive 
multilateralism failed.  The failure stems from the inherent weaknesses, limitations, 
and contradictions within the strategy.  The necessity of mentioning these (albeit 
briefly), is pertinent to reinforce the level of failure and the problems that were 
created.  Sterling-Folker stipulates assertive multilateralism as a strategy 
[F]ailed to account for the weaknesses in U.N. organization and 
command structures…U.N. field command structures are unwieldy, 
inefficient, and poorly equipped to manage complex military combat 
operations involving volunteer troops with incompatible equipment, 
training, operational guidelines, intelligence, and languages… 
[A]ssertive multilateralism was predicated on the highly 
questionable assumption that the Security Council had reached a 
consensus on the need for and parameters of second-tier intervention 
in general…[A]ssertive multilateralism also foundered on the 
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potential disparity between the costs of resolving second-tier  
fragmentation and the “national interest” in doing so…[and] as a 
way for the United States to remain engaged and share the costs of 
engagement at a time in which pressures towards neoisolationism 
were growing, assertive multilateralism failed to account for the loss 
of control and the apparent encroachment of U.S. sovereignty 
implicit in the notion that such U.N.-led peacemaking would 
entail.456
 
   
The involvement of the Clinton administration and the placement of US forces in the 
Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda, regardless of any successes were widely deemed 
failures—especially ‘on October 3, 1993, when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in a 
single engagement [in Mogadishu, Somalia].  Poor coordination between U.S. and 
U.N. authorities exacerbated the situation in which the U.S. troops found themselves 
outnumbered by local forces…A major public outcry and congressional debate 
ensued.’457  Ultimately, the failure was also of grand strategy and this forced the 
Clinton administration to develop a more focussed policy on global US military 
participation.  In February 1995 the administration provided its policy for future US 
involvement: A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.458
 
    
The strategy within the document has as its core messages signalling the strategic 
intent of the US and refers to a generic multilateral intent with a greater role for the 
UN and NATO in meeting security challenges forcefully—along with US 
involvement.  Throughout the document there is overt praise for US forces and the 
need for military might and is consistent with the US being ‘unparalleled’ due to  
‘military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals and above all, our 
people.’459
 
  What is more, the opening pages of the document emphasize  
[M]ilitary force remains an indispensable element of our nation’s 
power…Today our military is the best-equipped, best-trained and 
best-prepared fighting force in the world…and I [President Clinton] 
am committed to ensuring this military capability is not 
compromised…When our national security interests are threatened, 
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we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can, but 
force when we must.460
   
 
Other core pretexts of the strategy centre on  
 
• enhancing US security; 
• promoting prosperity at home; and 
• promoting democracy. 
 
The post-Cold War era is acknowledged as presenting a different set of threats and to 
handle these requires  
 
[F]irst and foremost, developing and maintaining a strong defense 
capability of forces ready to fight…[and] U.S. military capabilities 
are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has 
unparalleled military capabilities: the United States is the only nation 
capable of conducting large-scale effective military operations far 
beyond its borders.461
  
  
For all of its foreign policy intentions and interventions however, the Clinton 
administration was widely viewed as being inept.  Examples of the ineptness range 
from  
 
• the lack of will for encouraging and demanding UN and NATO involvement 
in multilateral operations; 
• of being lax about terrorism and counterterrorism, especially with regard to the 
World Trade Center bombing, the bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and 
Nairobi; 
• of being soft on Iran and its sponsorship of terrorism; 
• of taking a soft line on state-sponsored terrorism when Iraq launched a failed 
bid to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in April 1993; and  
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• of being fixated and having a pre-occupation with gaining agreement to a 
flawed Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the last months of his 
presidency.462
 
    
Regardless of any failings, an important aspect to note is that Strategic Assessment 
1997463 is littered with US response initiatives,464 and what is more it forecasts an oil 
war in the Persian Gulf as being a serious issue which US military force may be 
required in order to guarantee supplies.465
 
   
The production of two strategies shows Clinton was aware of the imperatives of geo-
strategic problematics in the Middle East region although the failures produced and 
generated a new breed of political movement that came to the fore in the US domestic 
arena: the neo-conservatives.466  Neo-conservatives had begun to deliberately 
construct policy and push for change on the back of the faltering of the Clinton 
administration—which in the eyes of neoconservatives consisted of military 
spinelessness and moral wretchedness467
 
—and they wished to position American 
military preponderance in a more focussed way.  Paradoxically, for Clinton part of the 
reason the Persian Gulf had remained such a vexed issue was because Bush had not 
achieved decisive outcomes during the PGW. 
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Dealing with the ‘neo-conservative’ agenda reveals a pathway that would lead to  
Gulf War II; and an eventual occupation of Iraq.  The nascent aspects of 
interventionism within the context of more precise foreign policy objectives were 
written and distributed by the most ardent of the neo-conservatives and their policy 
for preponderance is revealed in the Project for the New American Century468
American foreign and defense policy is adrift.  Conservatives have 
criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton administration…[but] 
have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America’s role in 
the world.  They have not set forth guiding principles for American 
foreign policy…We aim to change this. We aim to make the case 
and rally support for American global leadership…As the 20th 
century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's 
preeminent power...We are in danger of squandering the opportunity 
and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital—both the 
military investments and the foreign policy achievements—built up 
by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, 
inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconsistant leadership are 
making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around 
the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits 
threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we 
are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to 
deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead…Our aim is to 
remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences 
for today. Here are four consequences: 
 
(PNAC).   The authors of the PNAC were scathing in their assessment of what was 
happening to America under the Clinton administration, and as a result, they sought to 
reconfigure preponderance in a more focussed way and articulated 
• we need to increase defense spending significantly if 
we are to carry out our global today and modernize 
our armed forces for the future; 
• we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and 
to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and 
values; 
• we need to promote the cause of political and 
economic freedoms abroad; 
• we need to accept responsibility for America's unique 
role in preserving and extending an international 
security friendly to our to our security, our prosperity, 
and our principles. 
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As the neo-conservatives announced their position on the Persian Gulf and of 
America being more interventionist, the Clinton administration, with regard to Iraq 
remained focussed on containment.  Broadly speaking, the administration ‘was left 
with little choice but to adopt a containment policy through supporting UN resolutions 
until this had been achieved.’469  During the Clinton administrations time in office 
Saddam Hussein was troublesome to his Gulf neighbours and continued to brutalize 
some of his own populace, refused to comply with many UN sanctions unless 
continually monitored, maintained a ballistic weapons programme and most 
importantly, remained defiant toward the US and the West in general.  
Notwithstanding, all elements contributed to a public perception of Clinton’s foreign 
policy agenda as being flawed and therefore, his ideals associated with multilateralism 
remained ‘too grand.’470
At the end of his time in office and due to a perceived (and actual) lack of successes—
including his hesitations associated with Rwanda,
   
471 which had been suggested in the 
mainstream news press as a factor that contributed to the mass murder of the Tutsi 
population—Clinton was seen of as being generally incompetent in foreign affairs.   
This has been attributed to in part, what Stephanopoulos called Clinton’s ‘chronic 
bouts of indecision’472
Republicans [neo-conservatives] claimed that the Clinton 
administration had abandoned geopolitical policy in favour of 
  and from this stemmed a lack of timely and articulate actions.  
The end result being the various deployments that were needed to circumvent a 
situation becoming a crisis were not carried out.  The issue-at-hand remains, 
regardless of the directionless aspects of the Clinton administration and his personal 
ineptness, throughout his time in office the neoconservatives began making inroads 
into the political psyche of the American populace; and build a voter base.  The 
inroads were based on a premise of ridiculing the involvement of the US under the 
tutelage of Clinton and this mood is summed up as    
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“social work.”  According to this critique the administration 
overstretched underfunded U.S. forces in a series of humanitarian 
missions in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans.  Theses ill-conceived 
exercises in “nation-building,” it was argued, misused the military 
and squandered limited resources in areas of little material interest to 
the United States.473
The movement against Clinton remained deeply critical of the misdirected strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement and this was against the backdrop of the 
neoconservatives being ‘already at war’
 
474
 
 with Saddam Hussein and reflects their 
intent as they continued to pressure Clinton.   The ascendancy of the neoconservatives 
continued throughout the 1990s, until on January 20, 2001 George W. Bush—a 
stalwart neoconservative—won office and was sworn in as the forty-third president of 
the US. 
Conclusion to ‘The Clinton Years and the ‘inertia’ of the American 
Military’ 
 
 
There were no decisive limited wars that the US was involved in during the Clinton 
administration.  Crucially however, that is not to assume that the administration did 
not make its own contributions to interventionism, as strategies for warfare and the 
accompanying diplomacy were developed along with assessments of what the US 
might face in a conflict.  The problem for Clinton throughout his presidency was 
involvement in the international arena, with regard to military input, was often 
haphazard and in general poorly executed.  To be sure, this was to be the case in the 
1992-1995 Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, which was the first post-PGW large-
scale well-publicised peace operation.  The operation was originally initiated by Bush 
before his departure from the Whitehouse and was deemed a worthwhile project. 
However, under Clinton’s direction the US changed its objectives without an adequate 
risk assessment of the situation in Somalia and it migrated from ‘assisting in the 
delivery and protection of famine relief supplies to pursuing a peace-enforcement goal 
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474 Patrick Buchanan.  ‘Have the Neocons Thought This Through?’ The Gulf War Reader, 213. 
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and of targeting the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed’475 and his forces.  The 
end result of this change in direction was a debacle in which18 Marines were killed in 
contacts with Aideed’s irregular forces,476 and the skirmishes resulted in two US 
Blackhawk helicopters being shot down.  The relevance of this is Clinton, like many 
of his predecessor’s, had failed to understand the rapidity of asymmetrical warfare in 
a high-density cityscape and had planned Aideed’s capture on the tactical advantage 
of a high-tier interdictory and extraction process.  The problem that had not been 
taken into account was US interdiction forces would be vulnerable to the low-tier 
decentralised forces and the disastrous outcome reflected it had been handled badly by 
Clinton and subsequently, his popularity ratings dropped.  In a poll taken in the 
aftermath of the incursion ‘anywhere between one half and two thirds of interviewees 
expressed their disapproval when asked the question, “Do you approve or disapprove 
of the way (President Bill) Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?”477
 
   Another 
relevant point in this example is that in contemporary conflicts for the US—whether it 
consists of a minor skirmish or a mid-intensity conflict—is outcomes are closely 
monitored by the media of the US, which is hyper-sensitive to exchanges that result in 
the death of US military personnel. 
After the Somalia debacle Clinton became ‘risk averse,’ especially when it involved 
sending American soldiers into combat478 and this placed Clinton in a quandary.  The 
dilemma became one of how to project US power in the world without using military 
action, and if military force was used, how to handle the challenge of asymmetrical 
warfare in a hostile environment.  An additional and enormous problem for Clinton 
was the simmering discontent of the neo-conservatives in Congress who ‘believed that 
terrorists and rogue leaders found encouragement in Clinton’s unwillingness to 
destroy those who attacked Americans’479
                                                 
475 Louis Klarevas.  ‘The Poll-Trends. The United States Peace Operation in Somalia.’ 
  and with this came a further issue: the 
American people were growing weary of helping their allies.  An example of the 
averseness Clinton had developed was during the Balkans crisis of the mid-1990s 
although he committed American forces to peace-keeping in the process he retarded 
Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 2000, 64, 4, 526-527. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=102&sid>  
Accessed 23 February, 2006. 
476 Public Opinion Quarterly, 527. 
477 Public Opinion Quarterly, 525. 
478 Strategies of Dominance, 141. 
479 Strategies of Dominance, 141. 
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the effectiveness of the mission by demanding that aircraft be ‘restricted to a floor of 
15000 feet so that minimum casualties [read: US aircraft losses] would result.’480  As 
well as the neo-conservatives being unhappy with the Balkans conflict outcome allies 
of the US soundly criticised this move. This further contributed to Clinton being seen 
of as inept when articulating military deployments which involved a nuanced 
understanding of engagement and by scrupulously avoiding labeling the Rwanda 
crisis a ‘genocide’ because he was ‘fearful that it would spark cries to intervene’481 
further announced him to be an ineffective promoter of American strengths.  
Furthermore, Clinton’s limited and ineffective use of force against al-Qaeda and Iraq 
from 1993-2001 confirmed in the eyes of the neo-conservatives that his presidency 
was decrepit, as he did not reduce appreciably, the threats posed to US interests either 
at home or abroad,482 and his announcements that the US military must be prepared to 
respond to a full range of threats to US interests abroad483
 
 did not stem the tide of 
criticism.  
In summary, at the end of his presidency it was strongly perceived that America had 
lost its way in the area of straightforward decisive foreign policy objectives and 
actions, and that rogue states had been allowed to prosper due to inaction on the part 
of America.  To what extent this is the case remains a moot point and need not be 
discussed further as what is of most relevance is at the time of Clinton’s departure the 
issues and scandals that had haunted his presidency had generated a desire in the 
American people that for decisive change, one which would re-position and re-
establish America’s place of power in the international arena.   
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The United States and Gulf War II: Setting 
the Stage for Modern Warfare in the 
Twenty-first Century 
 
Preamble  
After Clinton intervention and any accompanying war it might bring would be 
assessed by the newly-elected neo-conservative regime in a different light than the 
‘assertive multilateralism’ that had formed the praxis of Clinton’s policies.  Proactive 
interventionism and unilateral geo-strategic policies would be the new order of the 
day, in other words what had formed the very nucleus of the PNAC would be put into 
action.  The election of George W. Bush would supply the impetus for this to happen 
and this in and of itself, would demand a new set of criteria be employed with regard 
to the military intervention.  This chapter will briefly address the urgency of this 
mindset; the reactions that directly reflected the PNAC’s neo-conservative policies; 
and the tactical and strategic ambits which would be brought to fruition.   
The issue at hand for the US at the time of a newly-elected administration and as has 
been alluded to in the previous chapter, was to set about reclaiming the ‘direction’ 
and/or ‘control’ of limited war.  The problem that had been encountered was that 
regardless of the improved strategies and tactics in the successful limited war of the 
Persian Gulf—although they had shattered the mantle of Vietnam—they were not 
‘expressed’ precisely enough in the PGW.  The inherent process of reclamation will 
be addressed in this chapter from geo-strategic, strategic and in particular, the tactical 
perspectives with regard to Iraq.  Furthermore it will address and encompass other 
influences that would help mould the geo-strategic ambits of the reinvigorated neo-
conservatives.  This chapter will focus on the strategy and tactics of GWII as the 
mainstay of, not only a reinvigoration of the US as direct intervener and its 
commitment to airpower, but it will also address the calculated, continuing and 
necessary ‘shift’ of warfare from asymmetrical to a symmetrical set-piece 
legerdemain.  Furthermore, this analysis will draw heavily on the previously 
mentioned actual and perceived losses of the disaster of Vietnam and the early 
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withdrawal of forces in the PGW, as well as address pivotal regional influences that 
helped promote a security dilemma in US strategic thinking that lead to the war.  
Finally, this chapter will investigate the strategy that produced a win and observe this 
through the prism of the US tactical strategic and geo-strategic realms as well as, how 
the war was conducted in order to reconcile past frictions.  
 
Background 
At the time of Bush’s inauguration the pertinent assessment that can be made is, there 
were no substantial risks to America in terms of a conventional threat that could not 
be managed.  The instances, to which I refer, include the bombing of the USS Cole in 
Yemen, the bombing of two American embassies in Africa, and the (basement) 
bombing of the World Trade Center.  Whilst these informed the US that it still had 
enemies which were prepared to act—and that they would be an ongoing problem— it 
nevertheless, did not alter US geo-strategies overall.  There were however, various 
incidences that had impacted on US assets during the 1990s and although they could 
be deemed significant infiltrations they did not have greater ramifications, nor did 
they constitute a clear and present (overwhelming) danger.   
As with the oil debate, no contemporary thorough examination of the Middle East is 
able to take place during this time without a reference to terrorism and its adjuncts. 
Therefore, I will digress to a small extent here to other influences that would come to 
inform US strategy.  The only significant and consistent threat that had remained and 
was capability of carrying out attacks on the American homeland and American assets 
abroad, was a ‘terrorist’484 organization known as al-Qaeda.485
                                                 
484 There is considerable relevance here in distinguishing ‘terrorism’ from guerrilla warfare. 
Enunciating it further requires an acknowledgment of it having asymmetrical components of warfare—
and as alluded to earlier—and the impacts/influences ‘terrorism’ had on the Clinton and then the Bush 
presidencies culminating in a ‘war on terror.’  There is a vast plethora of ‘types’ of terrorism: state 
terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, freedom fighters, resistance fighters, jihadists (common English 
translation: ‘Holy warriors’), sole-operators, single-issue terrorism, to name only some examples.  The 
type of terror which was so troublesome to the Clinton administration and then prompted the 
declaration of a ‘war on terror’ contain the three ‘hinges’ of terrorism: ‘the method (violence), the 
target (civilian or government), and the purposes (to instill fear and force political or social change).’  
Moreover, the attributes which prompted the declaration are those of ‘new terrorism,’ which 
incorporate ‘militant fundamentalism…reinforced by trainers who focus on the verses in the Koran and 
hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet Muhummad) that form the basis of Islamic law and idealize the 
glory of dying for Allah…The new terrorists are less hierarchically organized that their secular 
predecessors and, consequently, more difficult to spot, track, and intercept.  In the past terrorist groups 
  Al-Qaeda, as an 
 240 
organization is multifaceted and its history is complex.  What can be said for certain is 
it ostensibly came to power and had its formative years in the early- through mid-
1980s and this was due to the organization fighting the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan.  Al-Qaeda’s rise was due to the strength of its partisan and/or insurgency 
actions during this time and a brief exploration of the Afghanistan conflict is needed 
at this point.  The scrutiny will shed light on aspects of limited warfare whilst 
emphasizing America’s focus on and commitment to the Middle East as a geo-
strategic locale and power base.   
Infusing al-Qaeda into the milieu of the Middle East and the geo-strategic emphasis 
that is assigned to it, is able to be easily traced.  Entering into the debate however, 
requires a balance be brought to the debate surrounding terrorism.  There is a need 
here to evaluate what ‘constitutes’ terrorism, and what terrorists ‘are,’ to gain a 
greater balance and understanding of the debate.  Gearty contextualizes this within a 
précis of  
Governments, by definition the upholders of the existing order, will 
naturally seek to condemn their opponents as terrorists. Since the 
public relations victory achieved by this linguistic sleight of hand 
can be crucial in the ensuing struggle for popular support.  The 
pressure for loose definition will always be strongest from those who 
have most to lose from any change. Thus, in 1982 the CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency] included for the first time threats and hoaxes in 
its statistics on international terrorism…Unsurprisingly in such a 
context, official definitions of terrorism have occasionally jettisoned 
the key element in the whole equation, terror, in favour of all-
embracing formulas which have come close to designating all 
insurgency as terrorist subversion.486
Exploring al-Qaeda therefore, requires a brief exploration of the turmoil in 
Afghanistan and how it came to influence US strategists.  The rise to power of the  
  
                                                                                                                                            
organized themselves very much like a large corporation, that is pyramidally and linearly, with a 
discernible descending or ascending power structure…Islamic groups, such as bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, 
are fluid and not structured the same way as secular groups of earlier groups.’  See: Harvey Kushner.  
Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003, 361-363. Emphasis in original. 
485 The common English translation for al-Qaeda/Al-Qaeda is ‘literally “the Base.”’   See: Montasser 
Al-Zayyat.  The Road to Al-Qaeda.  The Story of Bin Lāden’s Right-Hand Man.  Translated by Ahmed 
Fekry.  London: Pluto Press, 2004, xx.  Furthermore, Al-Qaeda is also often spelt slightly differently 
depending on commentators. Examples of this are al-Qeida, al-Qa’ida and al-Qaida.  For ease of 
understanding the spelling throughout this thesis will remain with the most commonly accepted 
spelling: al-Qaeda. 
486 Conor Gearty.  Terror. London: Faber and Faber, 1991, 15. 
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People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Party during 1978 produced an 
immediate and ongoing Afghani Muslim discontent.  The issues associated with this 
ranged from the secularisation of their society, education of females and Marxist land 
reform.  Violence eventually broke out and then spilled over into a quasi-civil war 
which caught the attention of the Soviet Union.  In order to bring some stability to the 
region, assert greater control over Pakistan’s geo-political influences and oust forces 
which may overthrow the pro-Soviet government the Soviet Union invaded in 
December 24, 1979.  The invasion resulted in the death of (self-declared) President 
Hafizullah Amin and the installing of a pro-Soviet secularist government headed by 
President Babrak Karmal.  A civil war ensued from the pain of this transition to power 
and it was from this point an anti-Soviet insurgency maintained a steady resistance 
and the country descended further into full-blown civil war and general chaos.  The 
chaos that ensued in turn produced an American involvement in the conflict and saw 
the CIA, in collaboration with Pakistani intelligence services, funnel millions of 
dollars and weapons through Waziristan Province in Afghanistan.487  This 
collaboration supplied feudal warlords, tribal chiefs and their fighters, who considered 
themselves ‘mujahideen’488 with assistance and some of these tribal fighters would go 
on to form close alliances with al-Qaeda.  During the time a jihadist named bin Laden 
fought in the conflict and gained prominence as a fearless fighter amongst his tribal 
jihad489
In keeping with two themes of technology and airpower of this thesis there requires a 
mention here that although the mujahideen were proficient fighters, they remained at 
the mercy of Soviet airpower; and were unable to make significant inroads into their 
campaigns due to this threat.  The mujahideen were particularly vulnerable to Soviet 
Hind attack helicopters and understanding the tactical advantage this type of asset 
offers—and in keeping with airpower as an overwhelming force—a vivid description 
posits the Hind’s as essentially 
 fraternity.   
                                                 
487 Zahid Hussain.  Frontline Pakistan.  The Struggle with Militant Islam.  London: I.B. Taurus, 147. 
2007. 
488 The common English translation for mujahid is ‘holy warrior’ and 
mujahideen/mujahadeen/mujahadin/mujahedin  is ‘holy warriors.’  For ease of understanding the most 
common spelling mujahideen will be used. 
489 ‘Jihad’ as referred to in an earlier footnote is the term used for ‘holy war.’   There is further 
clarification needed here as the term is somewhat misused.  According to Johnson, the ‘real juuhad is 
the struggle to live out one’s faith in an imperfect world, jihad a’nafs,  but historically the concept had 
been corrupted to mean a holy war against the unbelievers, jihad bi al saif.’  See: Rob Johnson,  Oil, 
Islam and Conflict.  Central Asia since 1945.  London: Reaktion Books, 2007, 29. 
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[F]lying tanks: even the big 12.7mm AA [anti-aircraft] guns supplied 
by China couldn’t penetrate the Hind’s thick armor plate.  The 
gunships could deliver devastating fire on fixed or moving targets, 
using advanced optical sighting systems to target their 23mm Gatling 
guns, and pods of antipersonnel rockets, packed with thousands of 
needle-sharp flechettes, slung beneath their stubby wings.490
A broad-brush understanding of the unfolding civil war saw in addition to the Hind 
being deployed the Soviets also operated their SU-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, 
Mig-21, and Sukhoi jet fighters.  The stranglehold airpower had on the conflict 
needed to be broken and what changed the tactical advantage of the war in favour of 
the mujahideen were US-made, CIA-supplied, FIM-92 Stinger shoulder-launched 
missiles, which ensured the ‘Soviet aerial dominance’
  
491
Throughout the 1980s bin Laden became ever-more dedicated to the jihad of 
removing occupying powers from Afghanistan.  During the push to remove the 
Soviets bin Laden had used some of his own fiscal and industrial resources—being 
the son of a wealthy construction industrialist—to build a network of caves, redoubts 
and tunnels in various parts of Afghanistan to offer shelter and protect to his fellow 
fighters.  During this time, and with his status on the ascent, bin Laden immersed 
‘himself in Islamic studies and came to be profoundly influenced emotionally, 
intellectually, and politically by two important Islamic thinkers: Mohammed Quttub 
and Abdullah Azzam.’
 would be broken.  Consistent 
with the piecemeal success of destroying aircraft it would simultaneously neutralise 
their effectiveness by elevating the ‘floor altitude’ from which they could operate 
against the mujahideen and thereby reduce the tactical value of the aircraft.  As the 
lack of air cover during tactical operations took hold it diminished the overall 
effectiveness of other military assets and the end result, was a slow downgrading of 
the fighting ability of the Afghani and Soviet forces.   
492
                                                 
490 Eric Margolis.  War at the Top of the World. The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet.  
New York: Routledge, 2002, 31. 
   Quttub and Azzam were both prominent and outspoken 
Islamic leaders, who in various absolutist ways, and by a range of means called on 
fellow Muslims to rid the Muslim lands of infidels: Russians, Jews, and Christians, 
ostensibly, ‘the West.’  What is more, the two proselytized the oil beneath Saudi 
Arabia was a gift given to the Muslim world from Allah, which in turn belonged to all 
491 Martin Walker.  The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World.  London: Fourth Estate, 1993, 
287. 
492 War at the Top of the World, 79. 
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Muslims; especially the needy and the poor and did not belong to the Saudi monarchy.  
Bin Laden believed in the ideology of Quttub and Azzam and proselytized their fire-
brand ethos both directly and indirectly to his Arab and Muslim volunteers that were 
present—which is reported to number as many as 100,000 mujahideen between 1979 
and 1989.493   A major offshoot for bin Laden due to the combination of events, was it 
allowed him to consolidate his ‘control over an army of jihad fighters bent on the 
destruction of the United States.’494
A withdrawal by the Soviets in 1989, followed by a retreat to the city of Kabul by 
surviving Afghani government military forces then took place and there remained no 
improvement in the situation of Afghanistan.  With the withdrawal of the Soviets and 
with the Afghani government forces bunkered-down in Kabul and the loose-knit 
mujahideen warlords, having had the main source of tolerance toward each other exit 
their country, immediately ‘lost the peace.  Jealousy, tribalism, and the lust for power, 
replaced the holy war, and Afghanistan descended further into chaos.’
  The turmoil in Afghanistan as well as bin 
Laden’s subsequent ‘control’ over the Taliban is relevant before addressing GWII. 
495
[A] Pathan mullah [Mullah Omar]…assembled a handful of 
talibs[
  As tribal 
warlords fought amongst themselves Afghanistan became crippled by a combination 
of banditry, rape, a vibrant drug trade and vicious inter-tribal rivalries.  Attempting to 
arrest the descent into further chaos in 1993, a single event happened that was to 
reverberate throughout the southern regions of Afghanistan.  Margolis gives the 
account of  
496]…sought out a group of bandits who had raped 
girls and women from a neighboring village…and executed 
them on the spot…Omar was already a renowned 
mujahid...[and] was an Islamic and Pathan 
traditionalist…who believed in an ultra-strict interpretation 
of the Holy Koran and the wisdom and immutability of tribal 
customs.497
 
  
The assemblage of talibs progressively and incrementally began to exercise  
                                                 
493 War at the Top of the World, 81. 
494 Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 363. 
495 War at the Top of  the World, 51. 
496 The word ‘Taliban’ is a derivation of the Arabic ‘talib.’ The English translation for talib is, 
‘religious student.’  See: War at the Top of the World, 57. 
497 War at the Top of the World, 57. 
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ever-greater control over southern Afghanistan and they soon developed into 
a fighting force which gained ever-greater momentum.  After sweeping all 
opposition before them in late-1996 the Taliban finally took Kabul498  and 
from this came a transitional process: al-Qaeda developed from being an 
arm of the Taliban to a more deep-rooted organization; and at its helm is 
Osama bin Laden.499
Al-Qaeda was created during the operation backed by the 
Americans, Saudis, and Pakistanis to finance and organize the 
Mujahedin’s resistance to communism in Afghanistan and to recruit 
(mainly Arab) Muslims from abroad to fight in that cause.  Once the 
Taliban came to power in Kabul (1996), they formed a close alliance 
to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization and indeed in some 
respects al-Qaeda became the military arm of the Taliban…And so, 
after helping to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda turned 
its attention to its erstwhile Western backers who were also engaged 
in the military support of the monarchical regime in Saudi Arabia.
  Bromley emphasizes this transition, asserting that 
500
 
  
The offshoot of this was, for the West and the US in particular, was an explosive mix 
of (unforseen) anti-US forces, and anti-Western forces that bonded.  Halliday sums up 
the nexus as comprising 
[A] reassertion of the most traditional strands of Islamic thinking, a 
brutalization and militarization of the Islamic groups themselves, and 
a free-floating transnational army of fighters drawing support from 
Pakistan, the Arab world, Southeast Asia, and Chechnya with its 
base in Afghanistan…there now emerged an organized militant 
challenge.501
What al-Qaeda offered for the US was an opportunity to become more forcefully and  
 
                                                 
498 War at the Top of the World, 90. 
499 Osama bin Laden/Usama bin Laden is deemed to be ‘the leader, spokesman and figurehead of the 
loose and devolved Islamist network know as al-Qaeda.  Bin Laden made his name as military leader, 
trainer, engineer and fighter in the anti-Soviet jihad (Holy War) waged by the Afghan Muslims during 
the 1980s.’  See: David Holloway.  9/11 and the War on Terror.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2008, 167. 
500 Simon Bromley. ‘Connecting Central Eurasia to the Middle East in American Foreign Policy 
towards Afghanistan and Pakistan: 1979-Present.’  The Greater Middle East in Global Politics.  Social 
Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of World Politics.   Edited by M. Parvizi Amineh.  
Leiden: Brill, 2007, 88. 
501 Fred Halliday.  The Two Hours That Shook The World: September 11, Causes and Consequences. 
London: Saqi Books, 2002, 45. 
 245 
directly involved in Central Asia, and the Middle East.  By the mid-1990s al-Qaeda 
was relatively well-established both ideologically and militarily, although at this stage 
it remained concentrated in Afghanistan.  Finally, to what degree it represented, and at 
what point in time it presented as an imminent danger to the US are moot points, and 
there is disagreement amongst commentators about the makeup and precise threat al-
Qaeda represents.  Addressing this, albeit briefly, is required to gain a deeper insight 
underlying factors would generate US involvement in Iraq.  Al-Qaeda is described by 
Kolko as a desperate and random force without a focussed geo-strategic purpose and 
therefore, regardless of its successes does not pose a significant danger to the US.502  
This is supported somewhat by al-Qaeda being described by Laanigii as “a fluid and 
nebulous movement”503 and not the tight-knit organization which is presented in the 
popular media and Taylor asserts the organization is largely ideological and ‘driven 
by the power of the World Wide Web’504 rather than actual fighting members.  The 
somewhat decentralised existence that it portrays, as this existence was forced upon it 
as Al-Qaeda was driven to exit its Afghani training camps and disperse more widely 
when they were destroyed in November 2001 by US cruise missile strikes.,505  
Nevertheless, al-Qaeda remained a threat-of-sorts to the US and whatever the level of 
its strike capabilities throughout the 1990s and into the early twenty-first century, 
however, it was not powerful enough to distract the US from its dual-containment 
policies associated with Iran and Iraq.  What it did present, was a threat to the US in 
terms of it being a large group of decentralised fighters that would need to be 
countered at some point in the future as it had developed into a key fundamentalist 
terror organization willing to strike Americans ‘anytime and anywhere.’506
                                                 
502 Another Century of War?, 9. 
  An 
immediate placatory response to the situation at hand by the Bush administration was 
relatively minor, consisting of helping to arm and improve the cohesiveness of   
Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan, which comprised a somewhat loose-knit 
503 General Hamidou Laanigii is the Chief of Internal Security, Ministry of Internal Security, Morocco. 
See: Peter Taylor.  ‘The drug dealer, the estate agent and the telephone man.’  The Cutting Edge.  
Terrorism Special. Part II. The New AL-Qaeda. London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005, 
[Videodisc II]. 
504 Peter Taylor.  ‘Jihad.com’  The Cutting Edge.  Terrorism Special. Part I. The New AL-Qaeda. 
London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005, [Videodisc I]. 
505 The Cutting Edge, [Videodisc II].   
506 Although al-Qaeda existed as a loose-knit organization throughout the 1980s it is widely 
acknowledged that it became an organization in the more formal sense of the term (with its leader, 
Osama bin Laden) in 1989.  See:  Mark Juergensmeyeyer.  Global Rebellion.  Religious Challenges to 
the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al-Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, 
199. 
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confederation of warlords and tribes that opposed the Taliban.507
The presidencies of both Bush and Clinton, although they were concerned about 
attacks on the US homeland did not cause a straying from the weapons-of-mass-
destruction debate that was raging about Iraq.  This was only one international issue 
and although it focussed on Iraq, there were in concert with this were a plethora of 
other issues centred on recalcitrant and/or rogue states and al-Qaeda remained only 
one of many strategic issues that needed to be addressed.  To be sure, in 2001 the CIA 
did inform president-elect Bush that al-Qaeda was a ‘tremendous threat’ a danger that 
was ‘immediate’ and that bin Laden was ‘‘coming after the US again,’ although it was 
not clear when or how.’
  This strategy was 
commenced on the precursor that it would degrade the Taliban’s fighting and/or 
planning capabilities and contain the spread of it to within the southern regions of 
Afghanistan.   
508  Clarke’s account that al-Qaeda planned attacks years in 
advance, inserted sleeper cells into the US, used reconnaissance and took a long-term 
view of their struggle, one they believed would take decades perhaps generations to 
achieve.509
What was known for certain by the Bush administration was that al-Qaeda was 
planning an attack and that it may be a devastating one.  Al-Qaeda struck on 11 
September, 2001 and an assessment of the event and its aftermath as stated by Saikal 
is    
   This information was circulated throughout the White House and the 
Pentagon.  The evidence about the perseverance of al-Qaeda at this stage was well-
known and that the US would need to counter it was, in 2001, was a foregone 
conclusion.  
The attacks were hugely destructive of lives, property, and economic 
opportunities, profoundly symbolic in targeting the heart of the 
USA’s global economic and political-military power, and potent in 
shattering the psyche of invulnerability of the USA and many of its 
allies around the world.  They exposed the USA’s perceptions both 
of itself as the world’s only secure superpower, and of the 
international order it had cherished since the end of the Cold War 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In the past the USA focussed 
                                                 
507 Bush At War, 34. 
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much of its intellectual and physical energy on a capacity to defend 
and assert itself against the aggression of another state actor.  The 
attacks struck at this paradigm of security.  The enemy was no longer 
a state, but a sub-national actor, with an extensive shadowy 
international network, committed to what has been dubbed 
“Armageddon type” missions…The September 11 attacks 
challenged the USA and changed terms of reference for it on many 
issues in numerous ways...They highlighted the weaknesses in the 
US military preparedness in dealing with non-state actors…By June 
2002, the Bush administration expediently embraced a new strategic 
doctrine to enable the US to bomb first and explain later.  The 
doctrine exalted the primacy of preemptive strikes against terrorists 
and hostile countries possessing chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons, and essentially sidelined containment and deterrence, the 
two key pillars of US behaviour during the Cold War.510
 
  
The specific occurrence of the attack need not be further analysed, as what is of 
interest here is the ongoing strategy, and therefore, geo-strategy that it triggered.  The 
total destruction of the World Trade Center and localised damage to a wing of the 
Pentagon would become known as ‘9/11.’  The events created a vast plethora of 
opinions and debate and the one that best describes the event, and gives credence to 
and the pre-emptive strategies that ensued, is it being ‘a moment of historical rupture, 
an epochal event that drew a clear line through world history, dividing what came 
after 9/11 to what went before.’511   The strategic shift that came out of the events of 
9/11 was what had been set up by the Clinton administration, as the US being a 
‘benevolent global hegemony,’512 was in need of a radical departure.  As has been 
stipulated this was further intensified by the non-completion of the crushing of Iraq in 
the PGW, and for the neo-conservatives this level of geo-strategic bungling would 
now cease.  Recalcitrant groups and rogue states would now be dealt with more 
severely, and were summarily put ‘on notice.’  Thus, the Bush administration 
‘intended to abandon containment and had no interest in appeasement’513
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 as the depth 
and schism 9/11 created in the American psyche was profound, and it would be used 
as the trigger to launch an invasion on Iraq.   
511 9/11 and the War on Terror, 1. 
512 The term benevolent global hegemony was first coined by Kristol and Kagan in the Reagan years, 
and centres on US ‘preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain.’ See: William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan.  ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.’  Foreign Affairs. July/August 
1976, 75, 20.  
513 US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf, 69. 
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What now needs to be focussed on is how the invasion of Iraq enabled a rebirth of the 
traditional notions of warfare and invasion that were exhibited, though not fully 
carried to completion in the 1991 PGW.  The challenges of this pending limited war, 
which was part of an overall war on terror, presented a unique opportunity for the US 
to exercise traditional symmetrical tactics in a limited war.  To be specific, the 
centralised nature of Iraqi assets presented an opportunity for the US to better ‘shape,’ 
and direct the war and this would mean reverting to traditional, well-formulated 
modes of warfare comprising airpower, steel-to-target and armour-driven assaults.  A 
modern day version of frontlines would be used to assert and then establish 
supremacy, and it would also assist in sending signals to other rogue states that 
realism would now be a mainstay of US geo-strategic policy; and that force would 
now be used in a much more pro-active way.  The direction of warfare would be 
reclaimed on the back of overwhelming force.  The re-establishing of a European 
style of warfare would arrest the perceived inabilities of the US military, and utilize 
the pending conflict as the new prism through which limited war would be viewed. 
 
The United States and pre-emptive attack 
In the post-9/11 environment and in accordance with the neo-conservative resolve of 
the PNAC, Bush sought immediate retribution on those who had attacked US citizens 
on home soil and ‘nine days after terrorists attacked the World Trade 
Center…President George W. Bush…declared a war on terrorism.’514  The focus 
quickly became Iraq.  Regime change in Iraq had, since the PGW, long been a neo-
conservative goal and the evidence suggests the war was declared and driven by the 
immense geo-strategic possibilities that this single event presented.  An approach was 
formulated and put into action with the full knowledge that the attacks had been 
carried out by disaffected Arabs from one of the US’ key Arab (Islamic) allies,515
                                                 
514 James Outman and Elizabeth Outman.  Terrorism. Primary Sources.  Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2003, 
121. 
 
Saudi Arabia.  The Bush administration remained focussed on Iraq regardless of 9/11 
and this I argue, also resides in deeper social and political underpinnings.  A brief 
exploration of these tenets will offer an insight into the administrations quest to  
515 Islam and the West, 9.    
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conquer Iraq.    
The announcement of Iraq being a target points to much more than the overt notions 
expressed by the Bush administration of ‘saving’ democratic polity and they are 
underscored by a nucleus of prejudice that smacks of the ‘civilizational identity’516 
concept, ascribed to by Huntington which the neo-conservatives had succeeded in 
bringing to the fore.  The identity concept in question is formed by an overall 
conceptual understanding that Muslims have the propensity, because of their religious 
intolerance of the West to act irrationally.  This relatively crude understanding, one 
which resides in broad-spectrum misconceptions and pre-conceived ill-informed 
notions according to Saikal, had gained an increasing degree of legitimacy in 
Washington’s corridors-of-power.517  Nine-eleven was further interpreted as an 
‘assault against [western] modernity, based on Islamic fundamentalist hatred of all 
Western values,’518
So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains 
the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between 
the two great civilizations and the ways of life will continue to 
define their relations in the future even as it has defined them in the 
last fourteen hundred years…Nineteen of twenty-eight fault line 
conflicts in the mid-1990s between Muslims and non-Muslims were 
between Muslims and Christians…In the 1980s and the 1990s the 
overall trend of Islam has been in an anti-Western direction…against 
the perceived “gharbzadegi” or Westoxification of Muslim 
societies.
 by those selfsame powerbrokers and the ingrained prejudice 
driving these notions is able to be summed up in Huntington’s political overview of 
519
 
 
                                                 
516 The central core of Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations, ‘is that culture and cultural 
identities, which are at the broadest level civilizational identities, are shaping the pattern of cohesion, 
disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold War world.  The five parts…corollaries to this main 
proposition [are].  Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and 
multicivilizational…Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting, the West is declining 
in relative influence…non-Western countries are generally reaffirming the value of their own 
cultures…Part III: A civilizational-based world order is emerging…and countries group themselves 
around the lead or core states of their civilization…Part IV: The West’s universalist pretensions 
increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China…Part V: 
The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners 
accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against 
challenges form non-Western societies.’  See:  Samuel Huntington.  The Clash of Civilizations. 
Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone Books, 1996, 20-21. 
517 Islam and the West, 9.    
518 Tariq Ali.  The Clash of Fundamentalisms.  Crusades, Jihads and Modernity. London: Verso, 2002, 
309. 
519 The Clash of Civilizations, 212-213.  Emphasis in original. 
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In keeping with the requirement for action against Iraq the ‘first to put Iraq right at the 
top of the American [post-9/11] policy agenda was Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul 
Wolfowitz in the days immediately following 9/11,’520 and Wolfowitz encouraged the 
new president to look beyond homeland security issues.  Due, in part to this ‘Bush 
grew into this strategic vision [of acting against Iraq] little by little mostly as a result 
of his own thoughts, sharpened or rounded by multiple sources of advice.  He was the 
one who laid the foundation…by calling it [9/11] a ‘war’ not a crime.’521  Drawing 
further ire from the US the Iraq government was, the ‘only government in the world to 
openly celebrate the September 11 event.’522  The geo-strategic decisions that were in 
the process of being made by the neoconservatives and driving the Bush 
administration however, needed to be put into a strategic plan.  In September 2002 a 
plan entitled, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)523
The strategic undertones which now need to be brought forth to balance the argument, 
and which underpinned the rationale for a strike however, run much deeper than the 
straightforward tactical measure of a surprise attack. Chomsky avers  
 
was released. 
[T]hat there is no possible way the United States and Britain would 
permit a sovereign, domestic Iraq.  Just think the policies a 
democratic Iraq would follow.  First, the state would have a Shiite 
majority, so it would probably shore up relations with Iran, which 
also has a Shiite majority.  There is also a very substantial Shiite 
population in Saudi Arabia in the regions where the oil fields are 
located.  A Shiite-dominated independence in Iraq, right next door, is 
very likely to elicit reactions in the Shiite regions of Saudi Arabia, 
which could well mean that the core of the world’s energy resources 
will be under the control or influence of an independent Shiite 
government.  Is the United States going to allow that? It’s 
unimaginable.  Second, an independent Iraq would try to recover its 
historic place as a leading force, maybe the leading force, in the 
Arab world…Iraq will rearm and will probably develop weapons of 
mass destruction, first as a deterrent and, second to counter the main  
                                                 
520 The Clash of Fundamentalisms, 309.   
521 Alexander Moens.  The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush. Values, Strategy, and Loyalty. Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004, 164.  
522 The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush, 166. 
523 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  The White House. Washington, 
2002. 
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regional enemy, Israel.524
 
 
The strategy in the NSS constituted a way forward, with regard to the challenges of 
going after terrorists and state actors that supported them, and with this document the 
‘war on terror’ began in earnest.  According to Ricks this was ‘the birth of pre-
emption’525 and comprised ‘an astonishing departure from decades of practice and 
two centuries of tradition.’526
We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of 
our actions.  To support preemptive options we will: 
  The overall stratagem laid out in the document is far 
too vast to list here and mentioning its mainstays of being centred on determination, 
strength and freedom is enough.  The core change, and therefore political departure 
from what had gone before centred on a shift from the multilateral ‘engagement and 
enlargement’ approach stressed by Clinton, to a more focussed approach on pre-
emption and unilateralism.  The document reads in part 
• build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide 
timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may 
emerge; 
• coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of 
the most dangerous threats; and 
• continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to 
conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results. 
The purpose of out actions will always be to eliminate a specific 
threat to the United States or our allies and friends.  The reasons for 
our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.527
 
 
As has been stipulated since establishing his administration Iraq had increasingly 
become the epicentre of the Bush administration’s attention and although bin-Laden 
remained a target, the continuous recalcitrance of Saddam Hussein and his snubbing 
                                                 
524 Noam Chomsky.   Imperial Ambitions.  Conversations on the Post-9/11 World.  New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2005, 148. 
525 Thomas Ricks. Fiasco.  The American Military Adventure in Iraq.  London: Penguin Books, 2006, 
38. 
526 Fiasco, 38.   
527 ‘Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.’ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,16. 
 252 
of the UN528
For the Bush administration, Iraq was an inviting target for pre-
emption not because it was an immediate threat but because it was 
thought to be a prospective menace that was incapable of 
successfully defending itself against a U.S. invasion.  For an 
administration that was determined to change the strategic equation 
of the Middle East and make Saddam an object lesson to [WMD] 
proliferators, Iraq was not a danger to avoid but a strategic 
opportunity.
 offered additional impetus for the US to act.  Accepting that 9/11 was the 
trigger for a serious attempt at regime change in Iraq, the post-9/11 situation 
developed into one of  
529
 
 
Bin Laden was part of strategy but not part of a general or overall geo-strategy and in 
the early days of the war on terror the politico-strategic issue that had occupied much 
of the presidency had been the capturing and/or killing of the terrorist leader Osama 
bin Laden.530
With this new strategy in place all that was needed was a reason to launch a pre-
emptive attack on Iraq.  The view by Washington was to simultaneously consort with 
as many other willing nations as possible in the build up to any pre-emptive strike, in 
order to present it as a multilateral effort.  The single reason which offered the best 
motive for an attack was Saddam Hussein’s (supposed) amassing of WMD.  The 
WMD issue offered merit and a pre-emptive strike legitimacy in the eyes of the Bush 
administration, and ‘the American leaderships resolve to invade Iraq was hardened by 
9/11 and it took advantage of the American public’s thirst for vengeance to impose its 
   The targeting of bin Laden had largely been left in place because of the 
criticisms the Clinton administration had received in the popular press for being 
unable to accomplish the task, whilst (theoretically) being presented with the 
opportunity.   
                                                 
528 Saddam Hussein had refused to comply with UN Resolution 1441 or the previous seventeen 
resolutions associated with WMD according to the US and Britain.  The violations of the resolutions 
therefore, justified the use of force against Hussein.  See: The Absence of Grand Strategy, 118-119. 
529 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor.  Cobra II.. The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation 
of Iraq.  New York: Patheon Books, 2006, 64.  
530 ‘Following several assassination attempts by Saudi agents in the Sudan [in 1992 through 1996], bin 
Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996, where he remained on 9/11 prompting the US war in 
Afghanistan which began on 7 October 2001’ and Bin Laden is widely believed by US intelligence 
sources to be a ‘key architect of the 9/11 attacks.’ See: 9/11 and the War on Terror, 167.  
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original objective: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.’531
 
   In an historical context 
underpinning a desire to go to war in part rests on whether a government has 
confidence in their chances of success—as stressed and in relation to rulers as per 
chapter one in this thesis.  After 9/11 Bush’s administration believed that a war would 
be successful as the American people’s ‘confidence in their military’ was high, 
standing at approximately seventy-nine percent (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18.  Confidence in the Military percentage saying “great deal” 
or “quite a lot.” Source: ‘Military Still Americans’ Top-Rated 
Institution.’ Source: Gallup. <http://gallup.com./poll/11869/Military-
Still-Americans-Top-Rated-Institution.aspx >  Accessed 22 February 
2009.   
 
Whilst the relevance of figure eighteen does not directly translate into whether a 
president is more able to deploy forces for a war, it does offer an heuristic insight into 
how a pre-emptive strike would be interpreted in the domestic political landscape.  
The high rating of how the US perceived their military was further bolstered by 
‘[r]oughly two thirds of the American people thought Bush was a strong leader.’532
                                                 
531 Oliver Roy.  The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East.  Translated by Ros Schwartz.  London: Hurst 
and Company, 2007, 13-14. 
  
The combination of these factors, as has been alluded to in earlier chapters of this 
thesis, fit the notion of leaders feeling more emboldened and being more willing to 
utilize force as an option when their populace is supportive.  The faith and confidence 
532 Bob Woodward.  Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, 91. 
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the populace attributed to its military I argue, does indicate a propensity to revert to 
military force and moreover, a poll taken in the summer of 2002 revealed that 53 
percent of Americans ranked the Bush administrations overt enmity toward Iraq as 
‘excellent or good.’533
The Bush administration cultivated and generated a groundswell of support for action 
against Iraq throughout 2002, as the administration consistently made reference to an 
Iraq- and al-Qaeda link.   During October-November of that year Bush personally 
made ‘over twenty speeches throughout the US setting out the case that Iraq had 
WMD and a relationship with al-Qaeda and that it could and probably would, provide 
WMD to terrorists to use against the United States.’
   
534  The obsession with the 
connection between WMD and terrorist organizations was also buoyed by the fact that 
53 to 64 percent in an August 2002, (mistakenly) believed that Saddam Hussein was 
involved in the 9/11 attacks.535
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. 
They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means 
to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to 
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic.
  Fermenting public approval further, was in early 2002 
Bush had linked Iraq to an ‘axis-of-evil,’ along with Iran and North Korea.  In his 
State of the Union Address, Bush publicly stated 
536
 
 
The statement reflected the mood of the American people and the issue became one of 
an attack on Iraq would proceed through to the completion point—the removal 
Saddam Hussein.  This would be borne on the back of what should have happened 12 
years before. 
                                                 
533 US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf, 45. 
534 Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers.   The Political Road to War with Iraq. Bush, 9/11 and the Drive  to 
Overthrow Saddam.  New York: Routledge, 2007, 141. 
<http://reader.eblib.com.au.ezproxy.ballarat.edu.au/Reader.aspx?p=321529> 
535 The Absence of Grand Strategy, 121. 
536 The address was made on January 29, 2002. See: ‘Speeches by US presidents, 2002, George W. 
Bush.’ State of the Union Address Library. < http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/2002-george-w-bush> 
Accessed January 12, 2009.   
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The war plan and modern limited war  
As an overall view of the war plan began to take shape, US strategists and war 
planners knew the key to a successful invasion was speed and surprise—as per the 
PGW—and three core operations would need to be achieved for success to take place.  
Airpower would be the focus point and the speed and surprise aspect would emanate 
initially from an air campaign comprising sixteen days of continuous air strikes 
against Iraq: codenamed ‘A-Day.’  Throughout the initial air campaign another plan 
would be put into action: the Hybrid Plan.   United States Military Command Center 
(CENTCOM) would mobilize 20,000 army and marine personnel into Kuwait, and 
have support mechanisms in place.  Immediately after the air offensive, a ground 
campaign would take place and this was given the codename ‘G-Day.’  After the 
immediate launching of the ground campaign the entire ground offensive would be 
designated Cobra II.537
On 19 March, 2003 Bush committed the US to a second war in Iraq.
   This limited war was launched upon the premise of removing 
Saddam Hussein from power as quickly as possible and would have the official title 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), although it would quickly gain the colloquial title, 
‘War on Terror.’ 
538  Although this 
was without explicit UNSC approval539  Bush began the limited war with a brief 
statement: “For the peace of the world and the benefit and freedom of the Iraqi 
people, I hereby give the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom.  May God bless 
the troops.”540  The limited war that would be fought immediately after the command 
was given comprised the traditional European approach to warfare, that of using as 
much overwhelming force as possible, although to be specific, it would be modified 
after the initial stages to what had gone before.  The war would be geared toward a 
strategy ‘which relied heavily on Special Forces—airpower, surrogate forces; small 
flexible ground forces; and the new concept, Shock and Awe.’541  Whilst this strategy 
has elements of both the Five Strategic Rings and ‘Parallel Warfare,’ it had developed 
further and become known as ‘Rapid Dominance.’542
                                                 
537 Cobra II, 68-82.   
  The major component of shock 
538 The American Culture of War, 412. 
539 Strategies of Dominance, 151. 
540 Plan of Attack, 379. 
541 The American Culture of War, 413.  Emphasis in original. 
542 ‘Rapid Dominance’ is an approach to warfare that seeks to ‘destroy or so confound the will to resist 
that an adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military 
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and awe comprised overwhelming the opposing force in the initial phases of attack in 
several key ways and is able to be summed up as being   
 
[B]ased on speed, manoeuvre, shock effect, extensive covert 
preparation of the battlefield, precision strikes at strategically 
significant targets, and information dominance.  This doctrine was 
based on the premise the United States was fighting a state, not a 
nation, and that it was possible to maintain the separation between 
the people and the government…Many…believed that the awesome, 
overwhelming demonstration of U.S. airpower attacking multiple 
targets simultaneously would strike such fear that the enemy would, 
to some degree, be paralysed; that intelligence sources would locate 
key leaders, including Saddam Hussein, who could then be targeted 
and killed with precision weapons (i.e. “decapitation strikes”); that 
the destruction of the enemy’s communication systems would 
deprive him of the information required to fight effectively;  and that 
the multiple intelligence sources  and digital communication systems 
would allow U.S. forces to act and react faster than the enemy, and 
respond with greater agility and flexibility.543
 
 
 
 
The shock and awe campaign in the lead-up (and during) the war would also be 
known as the ‘Rumsfeld Doctrine’—so named due to the changes carried out by 
Bush’s  Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld.   
 
The symmetrical and traditional war begins 
 
The war started in earnest in what Ricks describes as ‘a volley of cruise missiles and 
bunker-penetrating bombs against Doura Farms, a group of houses sometimes used by 
Saddam Hussein located in a palm grove in the western bank of the Tigris in the 
southern outskirts of Baghdad,’544 and were to comprise other cruise missile 
‘decapitation strikes’ on the presumed locations of Saddam Hussein.545
                                                                                                                                            
objectives...To affect the will of the adversary Rapid Dominance will apply a variety of approaches and 
techniques to achieve the necessary level of Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military 
leverage points.  This means that psychological and intangible, as well as physical and concrete effects 
beyond the destruction of enemy forces and the supporting military structure will have to be achieved.’  
See: The American Culture of War, 414. 
  As massive as 
the strikes were in the initial phases, the first night of the war disallowed for an 
543 The American Culture of War, 414. 
544 Fiasco, 116. 
545 The American Culture of War, 422. 
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expansive attack on Baghdad as air strike targeting consisted of destroying command, 
control and leadership assets.546   This was because over ‘500 high-value targets 
within the confines of Baghdad were off limits to air strike’547 and because many 
assets had already been destroyed during the previous months under the cover of the 
no-fly-zone campaign.548
This is consistent in the evidence of   
  Nevertheless, the enormity of the air campaign which in, 
and of itself, intimates the importance of airpower, its application and the value 
allocated to air superiority, consisted of approximately 15,000 sorties being flown.   
 
The [US] Air Force and Navy deployed their full array of airpower, 
flying 15,000 sorties against enemy targets. B-52s flying out of 
Britain launched cruise missiles. Submarines and surface ships 
launched more than eight hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles, F-
117s flying out of al-Udeid  Air Base, Qatar dropped precision-
guided bombs. F/A-18 [sic] flying from carriers in the Persian Gulf 
and the Mediteranean, and Air Force f-15Cs and F-16s flying out of 
Kuwait dropped and launched precision munitions. B-2s flying out 
of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean dropped JDAMs (Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions) and other ordnance. B-1Bs attacked targets with 
precision munitions.549
 
  
 
From this point onward there was a departure from traditional campaigns on the part  
of the US and Coalition forces, and it is crucial to understand that US forces put into 
place mechanism that would disallow for the mainstay of operations to drift from a 
European way of war.  The trajectory of a traditional campaign is to use airpower to 
soften up resistance over a longer period of time than the GWII had allowed, and only 
prior to ground forces going into action.  As has been stipulated airpower is then used 
in the role of air cover and/or call-in firepower, and general harassment targeting in 
‘free-fire’ zones ahead of the advancing forces.  Due to the previous targeting exploits 
and the near-zero responses of the Iraq military, in terms of a coordinated anti-aircraft 
defence, the opportunity to launch a land campaign presented almost immediately.  
The ground attack plan was brought forward to meet these conditions and on March 
21, an armoured thrust from Kuwait into Iraq began. British forces pushed northward 
toward the port town of Umm Qasr, and Basra, and the other primarily American 
                                                 
546 The Iraq War, 166. 
547 The Iraq War, 167. 
548 America’s Secret War, 293. 
549 The American Culture of War, 422. 
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advance, was two main thrusts designed to link up on the outskirts of Baghdad550
 
 (see 
Figure 19). 
 
  
Figure 19.  [The Attack out of Kuwait by Coalition Forces].  
Reprinted from America’s Secret War, 297. 
 
 
Classic blitzkrieg thrusts of armour into the weak points of Iraqi defensive positions 
were mounted in the ground attack and they were designed to route the defending 
forces via pivotal thrusts, rather than a wide-front confrontation.  The tactical 
approach was not to confront dug-in Iraqi positions but to manoeuvre around them, 
identify where any resistance was emanating from and deploy tactical air strikes 
against the positions.  This would allow follow-up armour and infantry to destroy the 
localised opposition, as for the main thrust, ‘the objective was Baghdad.’551
 
  Only a 
brief description of the charge along Route 8—the major artery road into Baghdad—is 
needed here to give an overarching perspective of the offensive, and highlighting its 
traditional basis.  The charge consisted of the US Army’s V Corps advancing from 
Kuwait up the Euphrates River valley, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 
(1stMEF) advanced from Kuwait up Route 1: the key was for the Army and the 
Marines to enter the city from different directions.   
Furthermore, the aim was to quickly secure and establish logistical pathways along  
                                                 
550 The Iraq War, 294. 
551 The American Culture of War, 424. 
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the way, position forces at road junctions and establishing minor air bases.  By the 
beginning of April the American forces were closing in on Baghdad and the Army 
and the Marine Corps attributed the success of the advance to ‘bold, rapid maneuver 
[sic] warfare.’552
 
   There was another issue, that had panned out in favour of the US 
spearhead and rapid advance and it was that the Iraqi Army had essentially 
‘evaporated.’  According to Keegan there were  
[N]o columns of surrendering prisoners, no senior officers offering 
their capitulation.  The war was over but where was the defeated 
army?  For all of the millions of rounds of ammunition expended, for 
all the thousands of tons of high-explosive delivered to targets, it 
was as if the Iraqi army had not existed in the first place.  American 
and British soldiers could testify to the undoubted experience of 
combat, often at high intensity; but when the shooting stopped, their 
enemies had vanished.553
 
 
 
The Army and Marines pushed on toward Baghdad, and although they encountered 
some resistance they progressed relatively unopposed.  A brief example of the 
resistance encountered is required here, to emphasize that when localised resistance 
did exist it was not sustainable on the part of Iraqi and/or decentralised forces, once it 
was met with coordinated firepower, and thrusts into its core.  What is more the 
resistance that was met proved to be of an ad-hoc nature, and only briefly cohesive at 
best.  The type of semi-coordinated defence that was thrown up on 23-24 March at An 
Nasiriyah junction southwest of Baghdad and will be briefly explained.  The attack on 
American forces, although a tactical push-of-sorts and with a somewhat coordinated 
thrust, was more opportunistic rather than a planned assault.  In part it was triggered 
by the opportunities a sand storm (shamal) had provided for the Iraqi forces as the 
Americans approached and therefore, was not part of an Iraqi Army initiative per se.  
There were some Iraqi regulars involved however, it was more of a (mixed) fedayeen 
effort, of ‘poorly trained [militia] fighters...anxious to die in a war against the 
West.’554
                                                 
552 The American Culture of War, 424. 
  This would be an ominous sign of future skirmishes, however at this time 
the Americans were successful in their assault against the fighters and after several 
553 John Keegan.  The Iraq War. The 21-Day Conflict and its Aftermath.  London: Pimilco, 2005, 127-
128. 
554 The Iraq War. The 21-Day Conflict and its Aftermath, 149. 
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hours continued their push toward Baghdad.  Further semi-organized resistance was 
encountered in two towns closer to Baghdad—Najaf and Hillah—and more concerted 
military efforts were required at these two locations.  The reason for this is that the 
towns contained elements of the Iraqi Army Hammurabi Republican Guard Division 
which had been sent south to engage the Americans in a more deliberate way.  An 
offensive needed to eliminate both the fedayeen militia forces and Iraqi regulars 
which would  take approximately eight days and involve pivotal assaults, counter-
attacks and call-in firepower support on the part of US forces.  By April 10 resistance 
had been cleared and for the Marines, the road to Baghdad was open.  The US Army 
had made better progress than the MEF and on April 3, after the taking of the airport 
on the outskirts of the capital another plan of attack, in order to gain the prize 
objective was put into action.  On the outskirts of Baghdad on April 5, US 
commanders—Major-General David Petraeus (US Army) and Major-General James 
Mattis (US Marines) respectively employed the first of two ‘‘thunder runs,’ which 
were a ‘monstrous charge of tanks and other armored vehicles’555
 
 into the capital.  
The initial thrust, and the following-up lunge into enemy territory, represents a 
reliance on technology that has grown through embracing the European way of war; 
exhibits using the platform of technology to establish reinforced perimeters; relies on 
the establishment of the perimeters to maintain a tactical platform from which further 
pushes can be attempted; and the platform is able to be used to draw the enemy to it 
and can be destroyed by call-in airpower and artillery.  The tactical thrusts are 
summed up as   
The first attack consisted of an armoured column built around 
twenty-nine tanks that swung up a major highway, Route 8, that cut 
into the southwestern part of Baghdad…The tanks and Bradley 
fighting vehicles arriving at the airport at the end of the first run 
appeared to be in flames because the intense shooting [by Iraqi 
militia forces] had set fire to the backpacks and other gear that U.S. 
armoured soldiers carry on the outside of their vehicles…On April 7, 
the second foray cut through to Saddam’s palace complex in the 
center of Baghdad, on the left flank of the Tigris, and decided to 
stay.  The American military believed it had taken Baghdad. 556
 
   
 
The tactical manoeuvre of ‘thunder runs’ constitutes a change within the concept of  
                                                 
555 Fiasco, 125. 
556 Fiasco, 127. 
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victory which this thesis has premised the argument that the notions have changed.  
Thunder runs supported by airpower, in this instance, offer the stark reality that 
victory consists of the projection of force in order to establish platforms that offer 
tactical advantage that can be then utilized at will.  The concept of victory—as 
stipulated in chapter one—was once measured only through the prism of a through 
eradication of the enemy from which the enemy could not recover and mount a 
counter-offensive.  This is no longer the case as ‘victory’ exists in the sense that the 
US military understood that the force projection would present its own problems 
however, the success of the runs would allow for a continuing set of successes which 
would stabilize their foothold; and allow for the force projection to offer mechanisms 
of control that would enable force to be applied when the need arose.   
 
The blitzkrieg approach is a successful tactic in order to reach an objective however, 
the speed and tactical advantage of a highly-mechanized thrust does create problems 
and they immediately presented.  The level of opposition the advance faced shows 
that a well-armed populace albeit with small-arms only, was able to engage the 
American thrust.  Moreover, what this highlights from a tactical perspective is the 
speed of the advance did not completely suppress the resistance; it merely altered the 
timeframe in which the Americans would be engaged by any opposition.  The 
momentum of the thrust entailed bypassing resistance in order to get to the objective 
and using this tactical approach by its very nature, develops future hazards.  Needless 
to say, those that have been bypassed have not been disarmed, nor rendered 
inoperative and retain the ability to fight an insurgency campaign.   For the US, in its 
military campaign the goal was to get to the centre of Baghdad as quickly as possible, 
in order to deliver a competent and forceful projection of power—and in this, they 
succeeded.   The remnants of the Iraqi Army did not mount a campaign against the 
invading American and Coalition forces and whether this was due to the previous 
PGW enervation of Iraqi forces in general, desertions and/or a general unwillingness 
to fight is a banal observation only and need not be debated here.  From the capturing 
of Baghdad onwards US forces (and Coalition forces in the south) were, for all intent 
and purposes, in control and command of Iraq.   
 
It is not needed to delve deeper into the actual positioning of US assets at this time 
because of the laborious amount of tactical decisions that would require analysis, 
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suffice to say there was little resistance overall, and the first target of the airport being 
taken was successful.  However what is of importance, is the traditional components 
and the European roots of their military intervention and occupation resurfaced and 
became apparent.  The American forces in the Eurocentric and traditional way 
bunkered down and remained in their compounds and formed a defensive perimeter 
around their assets and used airpower to form a protective tactical and strategic 
umbrella.  For all of the decisiveness of actions the ultimate outcome, was to 
withdraw into fortified positions with protection from air power, static, and mobile 
artillery assets: the Green Zone557
 
 is a prominent exemplar of these traditional aspects. 
After the invasion  
 
In keeping with a successful war and it generating positive outcomes for an 
occupation, the incumbent US president, under the auspices of a ‘war on terror’ saw 
his approval rating soar to approximately seventy-two percent (72%).558
 
   The US had 
achieved their aim of overthrowing a troublesome and belligerent international and 
regional regime.  At this point the trajectory of winning the war shifted to a post-
conflict strategy of US forces repositioning to maintain peace, disallow an 
asymmetrical conflict to develop and crush any insurgency activities as per the 
lessons of Vietnam having been learned. 
Not long after the overthrow of the Hussein regime, Iraq in general descended into  
Chaos, and the issue that was presented by this activity was how to control the  
populace?  From a US tactical perspective it was to ensure the widespread looting and 
lawlessness did not result in American forces being turned on in the midst of the 
                                                 
557  The ‘Green Zone’ is the administrative centre of Baghdad and the official title is the ‘International 
Zone.’  The zone is ‘the centre of power has remained as in Saddam's day, the Republican Palace, a 
grandiose behemoth of a building set back from the riverbank on a wide bend on the Tigris…and is a 
backdrop to the comings and goings of the US and other staff charged with rebuilding and reforming 
Iraq…Iraq's American rulers - in the guise first of Jay Garner's ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance], then Paul Bremer's CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] and now the US 
Embassy have operated behind tanks and barbed wire and, since the UN bombing last year [2003], 
massive concrete blast walls. See: Martin Asser. ‘Profile: Baghdad’s Green Zone.’ BBC NewsOnline. 
14 October, 2004. 
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3744468.stm >  Accessed 23 March, 2010. 
558 Jeffrey Jones.  ‘Bush’s Approval Rating Drops to New Low of 27%.’ Gallup. 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/110806/bushs-approval-rating-drops-new-low-27>aspx> Accessed  30 
October, 2008. 
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mayhem by insurgent forces using the situation to their advantage.  There was 
acknowledgement in military circles that resistance to US forces comprised an 
‘intelligent and adaptive enemy’559 and from a tactical perspective, the problem 
became one of ensuring any insurgent force did not isolate and then attack US 
personnel and assets.  The other problem was US forces were already overextended 
and thus, would be unable to respond to assaults with the rapidity and focus required.  
Hence, a key for US forces was to establish networks of control and occupation 
cohesion via check points and the control of road junctions as early as possible, and in 
the process to assess the situation overall and arrange for other strategic sites to be 
occupied.  The situation which faced the invasion force, once it had established an 
‘occupation’560
 
 essentially remained in the historically, well-trodden path, of adopting 
one or a blend of the following strategies    
Accommodation 
A strategy of accommodation attempts to satisfy the nationalist 
demands of the population by incorporating elements of that 
population in the governance of the occupied territory.  Successful 
strategies of accommodation co-opt local elites into the occupation 
project.  Those elites come to see the occupation as a means for 
ensuring their position of power within the occupied territory, both 
during and after the occupation…When successfully implemented, a 
policy of accommodation minimizes the resistance to occupation, 
which lowers the cost of the occupation to the occupying power. 
  
Inducement 
A strategy of inducement provides resources to the occupied 
population in an effort to by acquiescence.  The logic behind the 
strategy holds that if an occupied population sees its welfare 
improving under occupation, then it will tolerate the occupation.  
Nationalist demands for self-determination are, according to the 
logic of this argument, a lower priority than economic well-being. 
 
Coercion 
Coercion is the use or threatened use of military force to defeat any 
elements of the population that resist or threaten to resist an 
occupation…Coercion in occupations can take the form of either 
explicit actual violence, or latent violence that deters violent 
opposition to occupation.  Military occupiers may employ violence 
in order to destroy any opposition.  Occupiers may also use the threat 
                                                 
559 Fiasco, 137. 
560 ‘Occupation’ according to Benvenisti is ‘the effective control of a power (be it one or more states…) 
over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that 
territory.’  See: Eyal Benvenisti.  The International Law of Occupation. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1993, 4. 
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of violence to quell any resistance before it erupts…Violent 
opposition to occupation can inhibit successful accommodation and 
inducement strategies, so coercion becomes a  necessary prerequisite 
to these more cooperative strategies when significant opposition is 
present.561
 
  
 
 Asymmetrical warfare and other challenges of occupation 
 
From the time of occupation US military forces began to experience violent 
insurgency-related incidents along with demonstrations by the local populaces in 
many of the cities.  Whether the demonstrations and attacks were organized by 
displaced Ba’ath Party members, ex-Iraqi military members or ad-hoc militia forces 
exploiting the general post-invasion chaos to their advantage needs only to be 
mentioned.  Further discussion is not needed here beyond emphasizing that 
‘insurgencies and ambushes were killing American troops every day…By November 
[2003] more had died after the end of major hostilities than in the war proper.’562
 
  The 
main issue for the US was the insurgency was rapidly developing and had all of the 
hallmarks of becoming a protracted conflict.   
It was decided by the US military command the main focus for the problems the US  
forces were encountering centred on the cities of Fallujah and Najaf, and it was in 
these two locations that the US chose to express the full range of power within the 
prescribed ‘limits’ of urban warfare.  These two cities I suggest, presented a chance to 
overtly express the lessons learned in the failures of Vietnam and therefore, a chance 
to reclaim control over warfare; and to reverse the impact of asymmetrical warfare on 
the overall occupation plan.  This would be accomplished by forcing a symmetrical 
legerdemain.  Najaf, in and of itself, was a considerable strategic problem, however 
Fallujah is the city that will focus on here as it presented the longest battle; remained 
persistently recalcitrant; and required two dedicated campaigns to oust the insurgent 
forces.   
The first campaign Operation Vigilant Resolve563
                                                 
561 David Edelstein.  Occupational Hazards.  Success and Failure in Military Occupations.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008, 49-53. 
 in April of 2004, was designed to  
562 Why War?  The Cultural Logic of Iraq, The Gulf War, and Suez, 175. 
563 Operation Vigilant Resolve was a major operation launched ‘by US Marines to kill or capture those 
responsible for the murder of four American security contractors last week is continuing in the town of 
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remove the insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his dedicated followers and  
was built on the premise that a full-scale attack on Fallujah would dislodge the 
hardcore opposition.  An actual military attack would be needed because it was 
recognized al-Zarqawi did not have the cross-religious bonding, which was a part of 
the revolt in Najaf564
 
 and therefore, it could be confronted head-on by US forces 
without stirring up additional opposition along religious and/or ethnic lines.  The 
problem was becoming one of as the insurgency gained political momentum, it 
became more and more coordinated and quickly developed into a zone-of-defiance.  
Discussing both operations would be a redundant exercise, as what is relevant here, is 
to observe the tactics of the US forces in the kinetic phase of the last operation against 
Fallujah in November 2004, Operation Phantom Fury/Operation Al Fajr (New 
Dawn), in which US forces reverted to a traditional European modus operandi.     
The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was responsible for the security of the 
city, set about exercising control over the city as per its military agenda as 
asymmetrical, low-intensity warfare was beginning to take hold and therefore, it 
needed to be moderated, and then eliminated.  Traditional warfare was needed to 
displace it as quickly as possible, as it was recognized this would turn the tide in 
                                                                                                                                            
Fallujah, west of Baghdad.’  See: Peter Cave.  ‘Marines continue clampdown in Fallujah.’  ABC News. 
7 April, 2004.  < http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/04/07/1082669.htm>  Accessed 23, 
November 2009.  The operation was ultimately a failure due to the handing over of control of the city 
to the Iraqi Defense Force newly formed Fallujah Brigade which was incapable of curtailing systemic 
resistance from the insurgents.  See: ‘OIF-II Feb 2004-Today.’  United States Marine Corps.  Marine 
Corps Base: Camp Pendleton <http://www.cpp.usmc.mil/press/kit/OIFII.asp>  Accessed 23 October, 
2009. 
564 The insurgency in Fallujah required much more direction than that of Najaf as it required two 
campaigns to oust the leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  Nevertheless, fighting the cleric Muqutada al-
Sadr in Najaf did present specific problems though they were eventually able to be handled through 
negotiation rather than persistent violence.  Al-Sadr chose to fight the US forces in Najaf for a myriad 
of reasons but centred much of it on religious sentiment and formed a Mahdi Militia (sometimes 
referred to as the Mahdi Army), to counter US and Coalition forces although he had openly called for a 
‘revolution’ against US forces in Sadr City, Najaf.  See: Peter Cave.  ‘Cleric tells Bush: get out or face 
Iraqi revolution.’ Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ABCNewsOnline, 10 April, 2004. 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200404/s1084811.htm>  Accessed 23 July, 2008.   Al-Sadr’s 
firebrand politics was seen to comprise a unification-of-sorts amongst the religious elements of the Shia 
and Sunni religious groups which had always been tense.  The important point is that US commanders 
and politicians were keen to negotiate with al-Sadr because of the inroads he was making in the 
population in general and his political pontificating was having an effect overall of weakening 
American political resolve.  After several months of fighting the US arranged for a meeting, and after 
negotiations the Mahdi Army agreed to a ceasefire.  As a result it was widely acclaimed al-Sadr had 
‘emerged the winner because he had challenged the US-led occupation, held off their greatly superior 
army for weeks, and survived without making concessions that would weaken him permanently.’  See: 
Patrick Cockburn.  Muqtada al-Sadr and the Fall of Iraq.  London: Faber and Faber, 2008, 186. 
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favour of US forces.  A traditional assault on the city by the MEF565 (and the 
Coalition Provisional Authority or Iraqi security forces that were employed by the 
US) was planned, as the MEF had taken over tactical control from the 82nd Airborne 
Division.  The plan called for combat teams ‘to surround the city and then penetrate it 
from two angles…immediately before launching a series of raids to capture key 
individuals linked to the most extreme violence in the city...employing a focussed 
effort to isolate the insurgents,’566 and to take the city from a ‘visible and defiant’567
 
 
insurgency (see Figure 20).   
 
 
 
Figure 20. Initial Assault Operations into Fallujah, November 2004.  
Reprinted from: Fighting for Fallujah, 56. 
 
 
The commencement of the assault was reported by Penhaul as, “The sky over Falluja 
seems to explode as U.S. Marines launch their much-trumpeted ground assault. War 
planes drop cluster bombs on insurgent positions and artillery batteries fire smoke 
rounds to conceal a Marine advance.  Tracer fire and the rattle of machine guns 
crisscrosses the cityscape as insurgents fight back.”568
                                                 
565 Although the attack comprised components of the US Army such as the Blackjack Brigade and the 
101st Airborne, Cavalry, and Special Forces, Engineer groups and Navy commandos and various aerial 
assets, for ease of understanding they will all be grouped under the banner of the MEF.   
  The ensuing firefights lasted 
566 John Ballard. Fighting for Fallujah.  A New Dawn for Iraq. Westport: Praeger Security International, 
2006, 13. 
567 Fighting for Fallujah, 40. 
568 Karl Penhaul. ‘Six Americans killed in Falluja push.’ CNN.com.’ 9 November, 2004. 
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0411/09/lt.01.html>  Accessed 12, August 2009.  
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for days and often resulted in block-by-block and house-by-house running exchanges, 
in which responses to situations escalated and de-escalated, according to who had the 
upper hand during engagements.  However, as the fighting continued, and the MEF 
penetrated deeper into the city where they were supported by call-in firepower from 
air assets.  During daylight hours this consisted of F-15 Eagle and F/A-18 Hornet 
fighters and AH-1 Cobra helicopters; and at night by AC-130 Specter gunships.569  
Other aerial assets from various land- and sea-borne locations were also used to 
support the MEF and as the fighting continued and the insurgency maintained its 
momentum the MEF were ‘forced to use more weapons against a broader range of 
targets.’570  To wit, ‘when insurgent forces proved too difficult to dislodge US forces 
called upon air, tank and artillery assets to facilitate the process.’571
 
  
Fallujah is where the steel-to-target paradigm with airpower, as the pivotal component 
of assault operations, once again came to the fore.  As can be seen, it represented an 
updated version of the traditional mechanised deftness that had remained with the 
West.  The penetrations into Fallujah, although more fluid than wide-confrontational 
assaults were designed with the same recourse in mind, not unlike the static ‘fire-
bases’ of the Vietnam War, as assaults was designed to draw the insurgents to them—
where they could be summarily pulverised.  The MEF used the tactic of driving into 
the city as a moving target which would encourage consistent insurgent attacks 
against them, and as insurgents prepared for an attack or during an attack, air assets 
could be called in to (theoretically) precision-strike their positions, and armour could 
also target them.  To be precise, a static frontline was not able to be constructed—
although it would have been preferred—ultimately it was not needed as targeting was 
accomplished by the positioning of the US assets into a frontline-of-sorts which 
further encouraged pitched set-piece battles.    
 
What Fallujah came to represent is needed in order for symmetrical and/or traditional 
warfare to be teased out and to show it allowed the steel-to-target paradigm to be 
exercised in an otherwise chaotic situation and it was vital for US forces to construct a 
stand-and-fight situation.  Call-in firepower could then be utilized within the sphere-
                                                 
569 Fighting for Fallujah, 13. 
570 Fighting for Fallujah, 17. 
571 Ahmed Hashim.  Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq.  London: Hurst and Company, 2006, 
45. 
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of-influence and the tactic that would enable this—which essentially lay at the heart 
of operations—was to ‘corral’ the insurgents into a pre-defined locale; suppress their 
capabilities; limit their avenues of escape; and make escape avenues too dangerous to 
access.  The positioning of snipers and the use of call-in firepower via airpower within 
a restricted area is the new frontline as modern warfare and symmetrical limited 
warfare demand this facilitation.  The upshot of this from a tactical perspective is, it 
forces the insurgents to stay and fight a pitched battle, and although the way in which 
the battle is fought has been modified from bygone days, it mimics the European way 
of war.  After an initial range of air strikes from both fixed wing and non-fixed wing 
aircraft insurgent positions can then be attacked by armour in the first instance, and in 
the second infantry is then able to follow-up and capitalize on the confusion armour 
penetration causes.  The end result is a complete immobilizing and destruction of 
insurgent forces and then surviving dislocated insurgent forces are able to be 
destroyed, with additional call-in air strikes.  
 
After the battles of Najaf and Fallujah the insurgency continued to plague US forces 
in the occupation of Iraq.  A significant part of the problem was the consistency of the 
violence and the recognition that ongoing hostilities toward them were not ‘merely 
mopping-up operations and that U.S. military forces were likely to be in Iraq for a 
long time.’572
 
  The intensity of the insurgency and its direction against US and 
Coalition forces, had progressively increased and although these confrontational 
components of the war—as per Fallujah and Najaf—were meant to stem the tide of 
hostilities, the insurgency persisted.  The number of attacks throughout Iraq steadily 
increased over 2006 (see Figure 21).  The attacks were not restricted to occupying 
forces as the general population was also targeted, in order to promote a civil war and 
encourage popular dissent although the US did receive the brunt of skirmish-driven 
exchanges.  A residual affect for the insurgent forces is it would show that the 
occupying forces were incapable of instilling security and/or peace; and of 
maintaining stability (see Figure 22).   
                                                 
572 David Elliot. ‘Parallel Wars?’  Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam.  Or, how Not to Learn from the 
Past.  Edited by Lloyd Gardner and Marilyn Young.  New York: The New Press, 2007, 21. 
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Figure 21. Jan 2006-May 2006 Average attacks [on US forces] Per 
Day.  Reprinted from: Bob Woodward.  State of Denial.  New York: 
Simon & Shuster, 2006, 472. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 22.  Enemy Initiated Attacks Against Coalition and Iraqis 
Each Month from May 2003 to May 2006.  Reprinted from:  State of 
Denial, 473. 
 
 
The specific attacks on US and Coalition forces, although they reflect a continuation 
of violence, are not critical to further analysis in terms of tactics, other than to 
acknowledge they represented an ongoing and ever-increasing sophisticated response 
to the occupying forces.  What the ongoing insurgency represents is evidence that 
coercion became a dominant part of the occupation strategy.  The issue that the 
insurgency has persisted, according to Krepinevich, has three sources (which were 
identified as early as 2005), and they include  
 
The security vacuum that followed the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime gave hostile elements the opportunity to organize and, the 
poorly designed and slowly implemented reconstruction plan 
provided the insurgents with a large pool of unemployed Iraqis from 
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which to recruit.  As the insurgency dragged on and tied up US and 
Coalition resources.  The second source is Iraq’s tradition of rule by 
those best able to seize power through violent struggles...The third 
source of the insurgency is the fact that jihadists have made Iraq a 
major theater in their war against the United States, abetted by the 
absence of security in Iraq by the presence of 140,000 “targets.”573
 
 
 
With ample force available to them the US remained unable to significantly wrest 
effective control of Iraq from insurgent forces.  At the time of writing the conflict 
remains vibrant and burdensome in relatively equal order.  The main issue of 
dissolving all of the Iraqi military components—the elite Republican Guard, the 
regular Republican Guard and the paramilitary Fedayeen—by the leader of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority L. Paul Bremer, was described by a congressional 
Democrat in Congress as an ‘invitation to disaster’574 is a moot point and is not in 
need of debate here.  The issue became one of when the Iraqi security forces, which 
had been hastily drawn together after the summary dismissal of the Iraqi regular 
military, would be able to take effective control of the cities, and how long that would 
take.  The insurgency that had plagued US forces began to swell from the ranks of 
disaffected Iraqi military personnel and thus, became one of the ‘greatest errors in the 
history of U.S…warfare...[which] unnecessarily increased the ranks of its [the US’] 
enemies.’575   The stage had been set and an ongoing insurgency for the occupying 
forces, particularly the US, had to build a security network in an increasingly hostile 
environment.  The invasion and taking of Iraq and associated actions of suppressing 
revolt allowed for the Council of Foreign Relations—at the behest of the US 
government—to produce a document entitled Guiding Principles For U.S. Post-
Conflict Policy In Iraq.576
                                                 
573 Andrew Krepinevich. ‘How to Win in Iraq.  A Faltering Effort.’  Foreign Affairs.  
September/October 2005, 84, 5, 2. 
  This document was drawn up as a standard-bearer of a 
cohesive post-hostilities strategy; and as a propaganda tool to assuage the adverse 
opinions the occupation of Iraq had generated, in particular from Germany and 
France.  The document, whilst being too vast to analyse critically here, elicits a vision 
574 The Democrat was Congressman Walter B. Slocombe who was also a recognized expert on military 
issues.  See: Dale Herspring.  Rumsfield’s Wars. The Arrogance of Power.  Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2008, 147. 
575 David Phillips.  Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco.   New York: Westview, 
2005, 38. 
576 Edward Djerejian, Frank Weisner, Rachel Bronson, Andrew Weiss.  Guiding Principles For U.S. 
Post-Conflict Policy In Iraq.  United States: Council of Foreign relations, 2003. 
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for Iraq and posits America as being ‘ready to assist in the transition’577
 
 to a post-
Hussein Iraq.  This I argue denotes that the limited war was successful to the point 
that the goals of intervention had been achieved.  In order to assert power in such an 
overt way after the invasion the US had to win the war decisively and convincingly 
and it did so, via airpower in the first instance and an air-supported blitzkrieg thrust 
into Baghdad in the second.   The success of limited warfare had been reclaimed via 
GWII and in no uncertain terms it being the new way modern limited war would be 
pursued, and along with this traditional warfare had reclaimed its place as an excellent 
underpinning mechanism for occupation and power.   
With regard to US intervention in Iraq the premise of Operation Iraqi Freedom was 
always hinged on the formal understanding of ‘promoting democracy’578 hence, the 
invasion reflected the ideological nature of the Bush administration and its neo-
conservative power-brokers and its subsequent need to ‘confront evil’579 (read: rogue 
states).  This had been a persistent theme in the PNAC document and the trigger that 
provided the launch was the WMD issue.  Underpinning the geo-strategy of a strong 
US military foothold in the Middle East is Bush’s desire to use ‘American purpose 
and power to make people free inside strong but accountable states’580 and an 
American presence is designed to be self-buttressing; and for the benefit of all.   
Broader reasons which assuage and reinforce these principles for establishing a 
presence as Yaphe states, is ‘US policy has always been about having access to an 
unlimited supply of cheap oil, open seas and free trade, and doing no harm to 
Israel.’581
 
   A central tenet of this situation, and with regard to the Middle East and the 
post-Vietnam state-of-affairs is the US has sought an active and overt boots-on-the-
ground military presence since the PGW—or at the very least employs the threat of a 
rapid-deployment-force incursion—which is supported by a fleet-air-arm and carrier 
support groups, and a general flotilla presence in the Persian Gulf.    
                                                 
577 Guiding Principles For U.S. Post-Conflict Policy In Iraq, 3. 
578 Yukab Halibi.  US Foreign Policy in the Middle East.  From Crisis to Change. Surrey: Ashgate 
Pubklishing, 2009, 119. 
579 Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzedah.  US Foreign Policy in the Middle East.  The roots of anti-
Americanism.  London: Routledge, 2008, 168. 
580 The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush, 210. 
581 Judith Yaphe.  ‘Bush policy and the (de)stabilisation of the Persian Gulf.’  Middle East Policy. 
Edited by Louis Cantori and Augustus Norton.  Washington: Blackwell Publishing, Spring 2005, 12. 
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Due to the geo-strategic intent of the US over time, Iraq had been placed squarely in 
its sights, and what line-of-reasoning that prevailed and whether Bush was too heavily 
influenced by neo-conservative agenda not of his own making are banal observations 
and moot points only.  The overriding issue remains that Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was launched on the back of assumptions that  
 
American policymakers apparently thought that once if Saddam 
were overthrown, progressive liberal movements would flourish in 
Iraq, ushering it towards a vivid democracy. These hopes have 
gradually evaporated.  In its rush to stabilize the Middle East through 
democratic processes the Bush administration miscalculated when it 
assume [sic] that the transition to democracy in Iraq would be quick 
and smooth…According to Bush’s vision, Iraq would constitute a 
democratic prototype that could be emulated by other Muslim 
nations in the region.582
 
 
This was not to be the case, as represented by the strikes on US military personnel 
continued throughout the Bush administration and has continued throughout the 
Obama administration.  The US government however, believes the government of 
Iraq will be able to take control of Iraq with its own security forces, and that US 
troops will be able to ‘draw down’ further from the initial pullout of US troops from 
major cities in June 2009, and promises to hand greater control over to Iraqi forces.  
Nevertheless, insurgents persist in killing US personnel with an array of small-arms 
and the ever-present improvised-explosive-device (roadside bomb), and explosive-
intrusion-device which is used against hard-armour vehicles.  The effectiveness of this 
partisan warfare is represented in the deaths of US personnel over time (see Figure 
23), and the total to late-2009 (see Figure 24).  
 
                                                 
582 US Foreign Policy in the Middle East.  From Crisis to Change, 120. 
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Figure 23.  US Deaths by Month.  Reprinted from: ‘Iraq Coalition 
Casualty Count.’US Department of Defense, iCasualties.org  
<http://icasualties.org/oif/US_chart.aspx.>  Accessed 16 April 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status 
Fatalities as of: October 26, 2009, 10.a.m. EDT [Eastern Daylight 
Time] Reprinted From: U.S. Department of Defense, Defenselink, 
Casualty Report 2009, 22, 09 (02). 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdfDefenselink>  
Accessed 25 October, 2009. 
 
From a strategic perspective, Record averred as early as the (US) Winter of 2005, 
the ‘continuing insurgency in Iraq underscores the capacity of the weak to impose  
considerable military and political pain on the strong.’583
deaths of US personnel, is the fighting modes that originated in the European tradition 
is reflected in the US military remaining ‘wedded to the premise that success in war is 
  Further underpinning the  
                                                 
583 Jeffrey Record.  ‘Why the Strong Lose.’  Parameters.  Carlisle: US Army War College, Winter, 
2005-06, 16. 
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best achieved by overwhelming technological advantage’584 and have remained 
steadfast to this principle.  The premise has been built upon consecutive engagements 
which have presented a quandary of not ‘‘how can we solve it?’, but rather ‘what 
piece of technology’ is best to deal with it?’’585   The continuing deaths of US 
personnel remain and as the boots-on-the-ground occupation of Iraq begins to weary 
the American public, the words of General MacArthur (Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers) in the post-WWII occupation of Japan, are a vivid reminder of the 
costs and perils of occupation.  In 1945 Macarthur stated, “History points out the 
unmistakable lesson that military occupation serve their purpose at best for a limited 
time, after which deterioration rapidly sets in,”586 and the vibrancy of the ongoing 
insurgency in Iraq reflect the truth of this statement.  However, and with all of its 
perils, the US has decided to remain in Iraq for the long term,587
 
 even though attacks 
on US military personnel continue and posits the truth of the matter being only the 
kinetic opening phases of the GWII have been won decisively.  The rationale of this 
decision and its factors of influence will be addressed in the following conclusion.  
Conclusion to ‘The United States and Gulf War II: Setting the Stage for 
Modern Warfare in the Twenty-first century’     
 
Nonetheless, for the US, the invasion of Iraq was a geo-strategic exercise consisting 
of establishing a greater and more definitive strategic footprint in the Middle East, 
which in turn would then enable it to exercise regional authority—beyond the setting 
of Iraq.  The cessation of major hostilities as ascribed by the force-on-force European-
symmetrical model of warfare in its kinetic phase, achieved the forecast results of the 
Iraqi military crumbling before the onslaught of American airpower, armour and 
infantry penetrations.  The kinetic phase of operations effectively, ground to a halt 
when Bush announced his ‘mission accomplished’588
                                                 
584 Rod Thornton.  Asymmetric Warfare, Threat and Response in the Twenty-First Century.  Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007, 157. 
 declaration.  To what degree the 
585 Asymmetric Warfare, 157. 
586 Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945-September 1948.  Washington D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1949, 2:764.  
587 As recently as June, 2008 reports in the media suggest the US is seeking the approval from the Iraqi 
government to allow the US to have 50 permanent bases in Iraq.  See:  ‘US blamed for Iraq woes.’  
BBCNews, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7444525.stm>  Accessed 10 July, 2008. 
588 ‘Commander in Chief lands on USS Lincoln.’  CNN.com Inside Politics. 2 May, 2003.  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/01/bush.carrier.landing> Accessed 25 October, 2008.   
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mission, in terms of establishing victory remains a moot point, although from the 
perspective of victory being seen of as an invading force crushing their opposition and 
achieving operational successes throughout the campaign constitutes a victory-of-
sorts.  Furthermore, it does show that the US did use GWII to ‘reclaim’ limited 
warfare and form it as a part of decisive foreign policy.  In the period from the initial 
shock and awe campaign, through to the taking of Baghdad and the following 
relatively minor force-on-force encounters I argue, airpower remained the mainstay of 
tactical operations; along with the astute use of technology and organization.  The 
forthright taking of Baghdad as a geographic locale, and as a definitive point in the 
tactical and strategic ambits, also succeeded in reversing the self-imposed limits of the 
PGW; the supposed dithering of Clinton; and announces a successful limited war is 
one that enforces a symmetrical legerdemain as well as retains overwhelming force as 
a priority.  In doing so, it did not suffer from the perils of ‘graduation.’   Moreover 
GWII, in terms of reclaiming a control over limited warfare and establishing a new 
paradigm was a success as the corralling of militia’s into pockets, which is essentially 
I argue the ‘new frontline,’ because it allows for a steel-to-target regimen via 
airpower, armour and static- and mobile-artillery penetrations, leading to occupation 
and systemic control on the terms of the invading force.  Furthermore the 
‘evaporation’ of the Iraqi military in the face of overwhelming US firepower and 
momentum was a sign that the assets put into place by the US reflected the clout 
available to them, which were then continually positioned to ensure favourable 
results.  Airpower’s availability to US strategists reflects a high-profile component of 
the way in which limited war is conducted and the steel-to-target framework of 
engagement remains a standard call-in component of operations: this is modern 
warfare in the twenty-first century.  It further signifies that if control of a situation is 
lost, it will only be short-term, and call-in firepower will restore the balance in favour 
of US personnel in any operations.    
 
Nevertheless, upon winning the war and after the cessation of major hostilities, an 
insurgency erupted, as has been described in the latter part of this chapter.  The 
insurgency, whilst being part of power struggle between militia groups ‘turf wars’ 
vying for domestic control, it has also been consistently directed at US and US-
sponsored forces.  The insurgency has maintained an ongoing wilfulness which has 
developed into a dedicated campaign against the US (and its allies), and has come 
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according to Friedman to form a U.S.-jihadist war, causing a once (relatively) 
predictable stable situation to then ‘hang in the balance.’589  The numerous setbacks 
which have been caused by hostilities due to the influence of al-Qaeda, by Sunni-
Shiite tensions, and by the general fury of the Iraqi population who view the US as 
occupiers and not as saviours, has shown the insurgents remain committed to 
removing infidels from Muslim lands.  United States forces having consistently had 
hostilities directed against them the strategic and organizational bias, which prioritises 
fighting conventional wars against conventional opponents,590
                                                 
589 America’s Secret War, 339.   
 has shown to be 
unsuited to an ongoing, committed, and relatively well-organized insurgency,  thus 
European style warfare does not guarantee victory in the European and/or Western 
sense of the term.  Gulf War II was supposed to be a limited war in which intervention 
via invasion was to significantly shift the parameters of overwhelming force and of it 
being an overt and thorough force that it was to undermine any chance of a low-
intensity insurgency developing and continuing.  As reflected, if only in the deaths of 
US personnel, this has not been the case and the low-intensity campaign by the 
insurgents in Iraq reflect that it will not stop and has strong possibility of becoming, in 
the eyes of the insurgents, a third tier nation, versus a first tier nation war; and a 
people’s war.   This new approach and what its formulaic comprises will be 
deliberated in the following closing chapters.  
590 Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala.   Iraq in Fragments.  The Occupation and Its Legacy.  New york: 
Cornell University Press, 2006, 162. 
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 Discussion 
 
 
The sequence of historical events this thesis has covered has shown that warfare has 
been on the agenda as a policy of gain and advantage for centuries and remains true to 
the Clauswitzian ethos, that war is ‘and act of violence intended to compel our 
opposition to fulfil our will.’591
 
  The capacity to indulge in warfare for Europeans 
and/or Eurocentric societies has had, as its codicil, organization and technology which 
has been driven by hierarchical structures and institutions.  The astute deployment of 
both, as mutually supporting mechanisms of each other has developed into a 
‘European way’ of warfare.  This has generated over time, a belief on the part of 
Western powers, that when implementing these beliefs to a maximum potential a war 
has a greater likelihood of being won.  For instance, the technology that assisted the 
D-Day invasion and the following boots-on-the-ground presence of US and Allied 
troops was largely enabled by the use of airpower and sea-borne artillery as decisive 
interdictory forces, followed up by armoured penetrations.  The requirements of the 
massive force-on-force engagements of WWII proved that these two mechanisms 
could deliver excellent and therefore, winning results.   
The sea-borne interdictions of artillery at this time in history which supported the 
advancing ground forces once a perimeter had been set up and a foothold gained, was 
then additionally supported by consistent thrusts of low-platform and high-platform 
airpower as an overwhelming force.  During WWII, this allowed the push into 
mainland Western Europe to be incredibly successful, as was the push north from the 
southern most tip of Italy using similar tactics with the merging of airpower to mobile 
armour proved to be the winning solution.  During this time I have argued, the astute 
use of airpower and artillery has underpinned a significant conviction to the acumen 
of how to execute initial and then ongoing boots-on-the-ground presence in a 
strategically focussed way and crucially, of enabling that presence to remain.  
Airpower is the pivot of, and for this level of success.  
 
Underpinning the successes of WWII and examining the US as a geo-strategic force  
                                                 
591 On War, 101. 
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that indulges in “imperialist activity”592
 
 as defined by Go, further demonstrates that 
the US has successfully implemented, utilized and exploited much of the aspects of 
modernity that are required to operate a cohesive force, whilst utilizing the industrial 
components of modern times.  These aspects I further suggest, has allowed for 
military intrusions to be placed and remain, at the forefront, of the US geo-strategic 
intent, (see Figure 25). 
  
 
Figure 25.  Twentieth-century U.S. military interventions. Reprinted 
from: Mark Peceney.Democracy at the Point of Bayonets. 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1999, 16. 
 
                                                 
592 Go defines “imperialist activity” as ‘the exertion of influence by one state over other states or 
territories through formal political control or overt uses of force…(such as Iraq beginning in 2003).’  
See: Julian Go.  Hegemony and America’s Imperial Career.  Paper presented at the 37th World            
Congress of the International Institute of Sociology.  Stockholm, 5-9 July 2005, 6.  Emphasis in 
original. 
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The sheer scale of interventions represent a vibrant representation of the military 
option of naval power and airpower in the first instance, armour and infantry in the 
second delivering, in the majority of cases, a capitulation by others when confronted 
with the combined presence of these assets.  Moreover, it is the ability to elevate a 
conflict to the European way of war, and of airpower being a mainstay of force that is 
the true measure of the success of intervention.  In tandem with this I have also argued 
any force actually applied has, as its concomitant, a decisive ability to exponentially 
apply greater force or threat-of-force, than the initial application.  Notwithstanding 
this has been underpinned by the ability to institute ‘mass industrialized violence and 
highly mechanized mobility’593 on a greater scale after the initial use of force.  Thus, 
the well-disciplined and far-reaching military that the US possesses, in conjunction 
with a massive fleet-air-arm and the strict Weberian modernity that supports it, has in 
terms of geo-strategic intent, been successful.  This has allowed the concept to 
develop into an ongoing mechanism of force which has yielded significant geo-
strategic returns.  What is more, the number of interventions gives credence to the 
argument that military might (or the expected use of it) dominates negotiations, and 
often exerts ‘a dominant solo rôle’594
Parts of this thesis have been concerned with focussing on geo-politics and influence 
on rulers and governments, the number of interventions listed in figure twenty-five are 
evidence that mounting military campaigns, have developed into a normal component 
of American geo-strategic policy.  Military intervention for a liberal-democracy can 
be deemed to represent the views and interests of its citizens
 in geo-strategic manoeuvrings.  Admittedly, 
whilst the military components of imperialism may not always succeed in accordance 
with the exact parameters of what it sets out to achieve, the evidence suggests it 
nevertheless, remains a steadfast and dedicated pathway of influence for the US. 
595
                                                 
593 America’s Splendid Little Wars, 22.  
  which, in simpler 
terms, constitutes forceful encroachment and/or occupation have become acceptable 
parameters in preponderance according to US citizens.  The US, from a nation-state 
driven perspective, and as this thesis has shown, has been able to maximize on the 
organizational and technological components of warfare that are required before the 
start of kinetic operations, and whilst operations are taking place.  Bonaparte has also 
been shown to be an exemplar of this strategy, and it is safe to argue America has 
594 Michael Howard.  Studies in War and Peace.  London: Temple Smith, 1959, 186. 
595 Democracy and the Global Order, 49. 
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advanced upon it, regardless of the political persuasions of the incumbent 
government.  Incorporated within this, and from a military perspective is, it is evident 
that the US has also been particularly astute at using and/or manipulating pre- nation-
state building blocks to an exceptional degree (see Figure 26), and beyond the time of 
the ‘modern state’ as ascribed to by Held.  This has been in the first instance, to gain 
geo-strategic pre-eminence; and then develop into a superpower in the second 
instance.   
 
 
 
Figure 26.  War and the modern state.  Reprinted from:  
Democracy and the Global Order, 55. 
 
The US has manifestly and astutely drawn on the following pre- ‘modern state’ ambits 
(or part thereof) as posed in figure twenty-six, to gain its geo-strategic present day 
dominance.  The ones in particular—and which I will modify and advance upon, in 
order to give more scope and clarity to the role of the US, as an intervening force in 
contemporary times—in descending order are   
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• perceived threats from rivals developed into actual threats from rivals 
• strictly organize and centralize the means of war; 
• extraction of resources from their society to support the use of force; 
• most powerful subjects/classes mobilize effectively first; 
• growth of institutions; 
• exploit the components of  ‘organization,’ ‘protection’ and ‘war-making’ to 
encourage intervention at the earliest opportunity; and   
• ability to enhance mutual insecurity by the competition of other sovereign 
nation-states being seen of as a direct threat.  
 
Held’s model entitled War and the modern state, embraces the organizational 
components and harnesses them to technological capabilities that have, over time, 
been able to be applied as a successful method-of-persuasion; with the adjunct of a 
deadly capability by the US.  As this has evolved, so too has the technology, in which 
there have been rapid advances, and this is particularly pertinent to the latter phases of 
WWII and beyond.  As I have previously stated, it reflects what the US has learned 
from its involvement in the total war of WWII in the first instance, and Korea and 
Vietnam in later times.  The premise upon which these inferences have been made is, 
the loss of the Vietnam War was not able to dislodge the domestic strength and 
cohesion of the US population, and although it lost the war Americans, still had 
retained faith in their geo-strategic ability.  Therefore, the population still retained the 
ability to strictly organize and centralize the means for war.  Moreover, and regardless 
of the pain of losing the war, the US had displayed the institutional ability, in the 
military spheres to put the lessons learned from this disastrous entanglement to good 
use in future campaigns.  I have addressed the US along the line-of-reasoning that 
even with the high rate of aircraft losses, it steadfastly remained with what it had 
learned and moreover, it would not be deviated from the main foci: airpower would 
remain the mainstay of geo-strategic operations.    
 
The elements which I have extended upon and refined emphasize the US and its role 
in building up its geo-strategic supremacy throughout the majority of the thesis and 
these constituent components have been interlinked to show how the US has honed its 
abilities with regard to military interventions.  In accomplishing this, the US has also 
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been able to keep vibrant other aspects—such as nationalism—which have allowed it 
to remain a powerful nation-state, and indulge in military interventions sometimes far 
from their homeland.  I have focussed on throughout is the successes of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Furthermore, I have drawn into the milieu 
numerous issues that have allowed it to remain powerful, such as a massive fleet-air-
arm that continually enhances global power; and along with this airpower that has 
become the vital part of its constant overall power.  The purpose of this has been in 
the first instance, to chart the rise of the modern military, link ground and maritime 
power as forces with various mixes of capabilities, technologies, loyalty and specific 
delivery of force in the remainder of the thesis, and in particular to airpower in the 
later chapters. 
 
I have shown technology and its uses have been a constant companion of, and an 
intersecting part of the progress and expansion of this powerful Western nation-state.  
The US has embraced technology as a persistent part of their contrivance-of-
persuasion paradigm and has applied it thoroughly, and as an active component of its 
geo-strategic preponderances, particularly in the post-1989 fall of the USSR era. With 
regard to warfare, however the speed of the PGW campaigns, the supremacy of 
US/Coalition airpower, and the pace of the Iraqi military withdrawal contributed to 
the overall success for the US.  I have further shown how the speed effectively 
disallowed for an insurgency to develop through the demarcation and close 
monitoring and the development of battle frontlines.  The Iraqi Republican Guard, 
with its ‘stand and fight’ mindset, allowed for it to be decimated by US steel-to-target 
operations along with airpower’s focussed use allowed the US to shatter Iraqi forces 
and extend its geo-strategic presence and remain within the region.   
 
Gulf War II, as I have shown however, produced a different set of outcomes and it is 
these differences that have been explored in light of the war panning out vastly 
differently than was expected.  This reinforces the notion and mirrors what Clausewitz 
stressed about war obeying no laws but its own and in this instance, an element of war 
arose that was unexpected.  President Bush summed it up as, the ‘catastrophic success 
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principle,596’ in which the enemy dispersed into the local populace. Within this is also 
the refusal to fight in the European mode of warfare in which they would have 
‘surrendered or been done in.’597  By dispersing, they simply lived to fight another 
day and this had not been encountered on such a large scale by the US, as an 
occupying force, for decades.   The tenacity with which President Bush entered into a 
limited war with Iraq was shaped before September 11, 2001 which was the launch 
point for a prescriptive invasion into Iraq.  Long before 9/11 according to Jervis ‘Bush 
displayed little willingness to cater to world opinion…as the United States interpreted 
its interests and the interests of the world, in its own way,’598 and these interests drew 
on the deep rooted unilateralist-orientated segments of the Republican Party.599  As 
has been shown, Bush firmly ascribed to the hegemonic-stability-theory,600 in which 
only one nation-state dominates and exercises control overall and through the refusal 
to allow a multi-polar balance-of-power scenario to be generated.601
 
  The trigger for 
an invasion of Iraq was the destruction of the World Trade Center, however, all of the 
required polities were in place which would generate the required sentiment.  The US 
military was eminently capable of fighting a war which would theoretically, bring 
peace to the region, oust a dictator benefit the Iraqi people and crucially, the 
American people in general supported their military and its endeavours.   
In the case of GWII in the first instance, was the WMD threat and in the second 
instance, when no WMD to be found, the invasion was deflected from this issue to 
one of ‘regime change.’  Although these are relevant though banal points they merely 
reflect that powerful nation-states are prone to generating alternative reasons for 
intervention and the US is no different.  The issue for US strategists throughout has 
become one of US geo-strategic ambition, which have since the PGW, relied on 
reversing the strategic and tactical events of the limited asymmetrical war of Vietnam 
                                                 
596 Michael Gordon. ‘The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War.’  New York Times. 19 
October, 2004.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/international/19war.html>  Accessed 23 December, 2009. 
597 Benjamin Buley.  The New American Way of War.  Military culture and the political utility of force. 
London: Routledge, 2008, 123.  
598 Robert Jarvis.  American Foreign Policy in a New Era. New York: Routledge, 2005, 87. 
599 American Foreign Policy in a New Era,  87. 
600 The ‘hegemonic-stability-theory’ need only be mentioned and briefly described in the main text here, 
as any further analysis would be an arid exercise because it contains the same requisites as the 
‘hegemonic governance’ model, as described by Gilpin.  See: War and Change in World Politics, 144.  
601 American Foreign Policy in a New Era, 90. 
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in the first instance, and of instituting traditional tactics based on symmetrical warfare 
in a new environment in the second.  This has been a successful exercise.     
 
To be sure, an acceptance of the standing army in its most enhanced form has been 
cultivated by presidential administration after administration within the US, as it has 
been with powerful rulers in the pre- nation-state and of European governments in the 
sovereign nation-state.   The outbreak of a long-term insurgency or an asymmetrical 
conflict was not a state-of-affairs which was seriously considered by the Bush 
administration and the belief existed that American soldiers would be greeted as 
liberators.  The key to a successful post-invasion plan when the insurgency would not 
cease was to give notice that the US was withdrawing from a military offensive and 
reducing troop numbers at the earliest opportunity.   
 
As pertinent as this is the US has the ability to impose its will on Iraq via its 
occupation and this is borne of having strategic freedoms which have come from 
codicil of their post-WWII inculcations.  The specific one that has been the major 
inhibitor of the ‘belief’ I have given the banner heading of ‘asymmetrical warfare,’ 
which is usually seen of as a low-intensity conflict, and one that comprises an 
‘ongoing’ nature.  Although the advantages and merits of this type of warfare came to 
fruition in the south of the Vietnam, its true worth is that it shattered the (perceived) 
‘mantle of guarantee’ that I have alluded to throughout, and that a powerful nation-
state would always defeat its ‘lesser’ adversary.  As asymmetrical warfare has refused 
to completely stop (see Figure 27), the US has had to change its pattern and strategy 
of approach to this war if it wishes to access the fruits of its labour as a powerful 
nation-state interventionist; and superpower.   
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Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
2003 0 0 92 80 42 36 49 43 33 47 110 48 580 
2004 52 23 52 140 84 50 58 75 87 68 141 76 906 
2005 127 60 39 52 88 83 58 85 52 99 86 68 897 
2006 64 58 34 82 79 63 46 66 77 110 78 115 872 
2007 86 85 82 117 131 108 89 88 70 40 40 25 961 
2008 40 30 40 52 21 31 13 23 25 14 17 16 322 
2009 16 18 9 19 25 15 8 7 10 9 11 3 150 
2010 5 5 7 8 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
 
 
Figure 27.  Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq Coalition Casualties: 
Fatalities by Year and Month.  Reprinted from: 
<http://www.icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx > Accessed 25 June, 
2010. 
 
 
The way in which the US has changed its approach to limited war, in order benefit to 
the maximum amount possible from being involved in GWII, will be addressed in the 
following chapter. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the quest for power the unambiguousness that winning a war once heralded is, in 
the twenty-first century, no longer be measured with the preciseness of times past.  
This is partially due to the nature of modern war and of the battleground not offering 
the ‘decisive blow’ to the enemy from which clearer lines of demarcation—and 
therefore winning—can be drawn.  In simpler terms, broad-scale confrontations are no 
longer the way in which limited wars are fought and if broad-front battles do take 
place—such as Inchon in the Korean War, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the French 
Indo-Chine War, or the Battle of Cedar Falls in the Vietnam War—they are, in 
contemporary times, aberrations of warfare rather than the norm.  However, there is 
no question that the abilities of the American military are vast and the level of 
interdiction that is able to be exercised through a boots-on-the-ground presence, 
combined with the numerous assets at their disposal, remains considerable.    
 
Gulf War II however, is a limited war, which in pure military terms, began as a mid-
intensity conflict and entailed some relatively broad-front interactions—though not on 
the scale of previous wars—and after the end of kinetic operations in October 2003, 
has reduced in stages to a low-intensity, asymmetrical regional conflict.  This is 
because the Iraqi military encountered a full-scale defeat which opened the way for an 
insurgency to develop, and has since this time there has been an ongoing insurgency 
fighting the US occupation.  The insurgency essentially believes it represents the Iraqi 
people and the war represents in many ways, a low-tier nation versus high-tier nation 
encounter.  Combat has taken place in several cities and this has within it, traits of a 
people’s war and has had religion, nationalism and ethnicity as bonding elements in 
the matrix of fighting on the part of the insurgents.  The problem for the US has been, 
that though their forces have at times inflicted heavy losses on insurgents, and 
although this has occurred with only moderate losses to their own forces by 
comparison.  However, the battles that have raged have not been able to eradicate 
attacks on either US forces, or city dwelling populations after the event.  Hence, the 
ability to create and build upon an unambiguous power base has been compromised 
and continues to be combated by insurgents.   The problems that have arisen and 
which afflicts the US in its pursuit of greater power I argue, are due to such issues as  
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• numerous frictions in regional constellations of power and the irredentism of 
actors therein;  
• the desire of the American people for their military not to be immersed in a 
‘quagmire’ that is difficult to retreat from; 
•  the moral constraints which limit the extension of the punishment phase of 
bombing operations and the ability to utilize airpower to its maximum 
potential;  
• decisive victory in the kinetic phase of operations ceasing to provide 
unmistakeable  subjugation and lines-of-control; and  
• the ongoing skirmishes driven by the insurgent presence.   
 
The features of the conflict in the Persian Gulf are not necessarily restricted to GWII 
and presented in varying forms also existed during other minor conflicts such as the 
Balkans and Somalia in the mid-1990s in which the US was involved.  These have 
been outlined in this thesis to emphasize elements of limited war and what is 
‘modern’ about modern warfare and whilst these conflicts rest on the same premise of 
intervention—regardless of whether the conflicts have been of a low- or mid-intensity 
nature—they have also reflected the US’ geo-strategic intent.  As has been outlined in 
this thesis, in the latter part of the twentieth century this happened in conjunction with 
the PNAC actively heightening the military with regard to the geo-strategic 
considerations in US foreign policy.  This thesis however, has rested on the astute use 
of airpower which has been pursued with vigour by the US, and its capabilities have 
constantly been utilized and refined within the various parameters of their geo-
strategic ambitions.  The case which defines this process—and that this thesis has 
ultimately rested upon—is the post-Vietnam analysis and then conceptual theory of 
Warden’s Five Strategic Rings which arose out of the ashes of Vietnam.  This thesis 
has put forward the argument the status airpower has attained has profoundly altered 
the way in which warfare has been encountered on the part of the US.  And this has 
been put to use in order to ‘realign’ symmetrical warfare with the decisive use of 
airpower, which has comprehensively increased the ability of the US to execute its 
geo-strategic capabilities.  Whilst this does include traditional elements within it such 
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as Clauswitzian and Jominian602
 
 approaches the thesis has also reflected the fluidity 
of exogenous and decentralised militia’s and the problems they have posed and in 
particular, with regard to ‘drifting’ a conflict toward a more symmetrical style of 
warfare.  This style of warfare is the most productive for the US in the pursuit of 
control.  The issue has been that after the decisive win of the PGW, that ultimately 
proved airpower’s worth, US military power has continued to confront a highly 
complex situation around GWII.  What this demonstrates in the first instance there is 
no ‘end of history’ in evolution of the elements of warfare; and in the second that the 
rise of the modern military has reached the point that powerful modern military’s—
this thesis has centred on the US and its significant study of military tactics and of 
refining the use of airpower—has remained engrossed with the traditional notions of 
‘winning’ and true ‘victory’ which are outmoded and out of date.  Whether, powerful 
Western nation-state military’s  are unable or incapable of accepting that winning 
outright—in this case by attempting to totally destroy insurgencies, militias or other 
exogenous forces—it remains unnecessary, as tactical and strategic supremacy and 
control over a country is able to be attained by an airpower supported or threat-of-
support presence.  What is important to recognize here is for a modern day military—
the US as the prime example—is that considerable mechanisms of control exist, aside 
from winning in the traditional sense of the term, and therefore, prove that it is no 
longer necessary.      
Military strategists, because of the nature of their business are blinded by the belief 
that winning wars forms a grip on power that is unassailable.  From a military 
standpoint this is borne out in the wars that have gone before GWII.  The problem is 
US strategists have come to believe the winning of the post-kinetic phases of GWII 
will, in some way, offer a greater grip on power.  Whilst it may remain preferable and 
desirable to win a war upon the premise of the past, and whilst, it no doubt remains in 
the interests of America not to get immersed in another quagmire what powerful 
Western European nation-states set up long before the Allied victory of WWII, and 
moreover this thesis has presented evidence as far back as the outright victory of the 
Battle of Lützen by King Aolphus and one also based upon Lidell-Hart’s definition of 
                                                 
602 Jomini suggested all battles could be won ‘rationally’ and by applying decisive force to critical 
points in the enemy’s defence, and I have used the example of the US corralling insurgents in the cities 
of Najaf and Fallujah as having (traditional) Jominian  components, though on a somewhat reduced 
scale to that of the Vietnam War. 
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victory603
 
  the US has redefined winning a limited war.  This now comprises one of it 
being ‘short and decisive,’ representing ‘victory’ and in doing so the notion of losing 
has also been redefined.  Any festering discontent that may arise in the aftermath of 
the winning timeframe denotes effectively ‘losing,’ rather than being consigned to an 
ongoing part of regional discontent; or of reactions against occupation.  The 
tactician’s perspective demands, as a matter of course, that reactions against opposing 
forces be mounted and that they be crushed.  This is undertaken on the premise to 
restore safety and orderliness lest the military personnel who are constantly being 
targeted express a notion of ‘losing,’ which can develop its own momentum and 
reality.  
The ongoing presence of the US in Gulf War II, although it has not panned out the 
way in which the US would have preferred, reflects that their military show no signs 
of exiting the country due to the constancy of engagements in which the US loses 
personnel.  In simpler terms leaving Iraq will be a political decision and not a military 
one.  The relatively steady paced withdrawal of troops, including the embedding of 
them with Iraqi forces604
 
 is unlike the panicked withdrawal from Vietnam and further 
signifies winning the war was not necessary in order to maintain and employ future 
control.  Furthermore the evidence suggests, the way in which the withdrawal is being 
conducted and the subsequent lack of panic denotes the reserve of power is in the 
availability of airpower, and this further proves it is airpower that provides for this 
strategy to exist; and if control needs to be arrested back.  In conjunction with this, the 
US government stresses it has no desire to remain, nor does it have any long-term 
aspirations for influence on the Iraqi people, as espoused in the Guiding Principles for 
U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq.  Although the US may be incapable of accepting 
that winning a war is no longer necessary in order to have a grip on power, the subtler 
aspects of why it remains involved in the war are eminently observable.  The use of 
airpower—as the decisive force—and its deployment either from carrier-fleet or land-
borne assets, is the way of future and the US understands this, in no uncertain terms.  
This is borne out in the following features of airpower 
                                                 
603 See: Lidell-Hart, On Strategy, Footnote 17. 
604 ‘US Soldiers leave Iraq’s Cities.  < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8125547.stm>  BBC 
News.   Accessed 10 February 2011. 
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• as a decisive form of force;  
• airpower is used as the backbone of armour-supported boots-on-the-ground 
interventions;  
•  it is a power that can immediately introduced into centralised insurgency 
confrontations as a call-in force and can deployed in the pursuit of de-
centralised forces;  
• it is able to be configured by intensifying, reducing or augmenting any battle 
situation; and 
• is able to be utilized over long-term or short-term confrontations.    
 
I argue that the conflict shows no signs of abating to a complete cessation and through 
this analysis I have shown that it is no longer necessary to win a war in order to retain 
a substantial grip on power because for the US, it offers lessons for future 
interdictions and interventions.  The US for instance, remains in the country as an 
occupying force and in the process is able to hone military skills, utilize and refine 
airpower as an ongoing and deadly force, and is able to exercise immediate tactical 
control and reactive stratagems.  All of these factors contribute to an overall and 
vibrant geo-strategic presence which would not have been possible in years gone by 
because only winning outright offered these rewards.   
 
The evolution of these parameters I argue, constitutes two lessons that were learned in 
previous times, and once again, it requires a chronological cross-referencing.  The 
first one is with regard to the US’ involvement in Vietnam, what I  
refer to is succinctly summed up thus  
 
The North Vietnamese managed to maintain enough pressure on the 
US military to keep the Americans’ focus off the battle for the hearts 
and minds of the Vietnamese population.  In the hills and jungle, 
North Vietnamese regulars proved enormously effective in nullifying 
the advantages that the Americans enjoyed in technology and 
firepower.605
 
 
This has not happened in GWII, and although it is with varying degrees of failure and  
                                                 
605 Williamson  Murray and Geoffrey Parker. ‘The Post-War World 1945-2007.’  The Cambridge 
Illustrated History of Warfare. The Triumph of the West.  Edited by Geoffrey Parker.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 351. 
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success that the US has operated its platform of ‘hearts and minds’ after the initial 
phases of GWII, at no point have US taken their focus off an overt and strong military 
presence.  Whilst it is true to say that the US has had a programme of attempting to 
win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, it has notwithstanding remained 
consistent in its approach to the insurgency and in doing so has not been diverted from 
taking war to the insurgents at all times.  This factor, I argue, has made the pain and 
suffering associated with the Vietnam War, in the clinical military strategic sense of 
the term, worth the loss.  The US military has effectively engaged with the ongoing 
insurgency and as I have suggested, when the opportunity has presented itself has 
corralled the insurgents and used airpower as a circuit-breaker in their favour.  In the 
process of any engagements the US has attempted to force an ongoing and debilitating 
outcome on the insurgents, by instituting and/or manoeuvring traditional and 
symmetrical encounters to the fore, wherever and whenever possible.  As has been 
observed in the statistics presented, this has effectively retarded the insurgents’ 
capabilities, as the amount of US deaths has significantly reduced over time and in 
doing so, proves the insurgents momentum has been interrupted.  The modus operandi 
of the US ground troops has been successful overall and their use of airpower as an 
overwhelming and direct force, in the suppression of insurgents has produced an Iraq 
that is ‘now a weak state in which armed factions based on ethnic, religious and tribal 
identities compete for the control of territory and resources.’606
 
   
Although winning the war in the more traditional sense of the term has not slipped 
from the forefront of involvement in Iraq, the broad-scale geo-military strategy of 
retaining as much power as possible within the domestic sphere of Iraq whilst 
influencing the broader region, remains vibrant.  Although a shift by military 
strategists has not taken place, what GWII signifies and represents, is that whilst US 
military strategists remain focussed on the ‘winning’ of war and of outright ‘victory,’ 
for powerful Western nation-states, maintaining and continually accessing a 
maximum power base does not mean actually needing to win a war outright.  
Although Western Europe set up this doctrine and it was reinforced by the complete 
victories of WWI, WWII and the Korean War, it is now a decrepit strategy.   
                                                 
606 Penny Green and Tony Ward.  ‘The Transformation of Violence in Iraq.’  British Journal of 
Criminology.’ Oxford: Oxford University Press. September 2009, 619. 
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From a broader perspective, America as an occupying force in Iraq uses the pretext of 
eventually ‘winning’ the war in order to maintain its grip on power in Iraq; and in the 
region in general.  This constitutes a paradox which the US is able to exploit: 
eventually winning the war requires an ongoing presence which effectively make 
winning GWII no longer necessary, because to win the aftermath of the kinetic phases 
of operations would (theoretically) mean having to exit Iraq.  What it relies on, in this 
process, is an astute mix of strict modernity, its rise to the zenith of what the nation-
state aspired to become for its military, learning from previous losses through 
institutional mechanisms, a strong maritime presence and crucially, I argue the 
comprehensive and flexible use of airpower.  The obvious outcome of this is the 
constant possibility of airpower being used as an overwhelming force, which has 
made it no longer necessary for the US to win a war in order for substantial benefits to 
their geo-strategic power to take place.  I contend therefore, that winning a war is no 
longer necessary in order to hold on to power and of holding on to regional power 
stakes in general.  The powers that are available through these mechanisms were, in 
times gone by, only associated with outright victory however, in the twenty-first 
century this pretext has been altered substantially.  
 
Finally, the evidence in this thesis suggests, if it was necessary to win a war in toto in 
order to retain power then the US would have exited Iraq upon the destruction of the 
Iraqi military.  Yet the US remains in Iraq.  Therefore, the fact that it remains in Iraq 
without having won the war testifies to the proposition that it is now no longer 
necessary to win a war in order to remain faithful to the tenets of what Western 
Europe set up centuries ago.  Airpower I contend is the defining weapon making the 
US’ presence as a powerful nation-state overtly recognized, and I have illustrated that 
airpower is the leveller in any challenges that asymmetrical warfare throws up to 
symmetrical warfare, and that powerful Western nation-states—in this case the US—
have learned this lesson, and exploit this to its maximum potential.  
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